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A. Scope of the investigation 
The aim of this dissertation is to present, as far as possible, a general description 
of the theory of the sign and signification in Augustine of Hippo (354–430 AD), 
with a view to its evaluation and implications for the study of semiotics. The 
underlying aspiration is that such an endeavour will prove to be beneficial to the 
scholars of Augustine’s thought as well as to those with a keen interest in the 
history of semiotics. 
The concern towards the study of the concept of the sign cuts across the en-
tire history of humanity, drawing criticisms and appraisals in a debate that is as 
fascinating as it is complex. However, it is possible to trace time periods in the 
history of Western thought in which the subject has been addressed organically 
and in greater depth. The study of the notion of the sign has deep and ancient 
philosophical roots, to the extent that it is addressed in many branches of human 
knowledge – from Hippocratic medicine to classical rhetoric – yielding results 
often intertwined in a concordant or discordant way. Fundamentals of semiotics 
are found, genuinely, already in Hellenism (particularly in Stoicism, where can 
be found a highly sophisticated theory of the sign) and the Middle Ages – espe-
cially in relation to the interpretation of the Scriptures. The history of the 
concept of the sign and the history of semiotics do not always overlap. While 
the historical overviews of semiotics often begin with John Locke, Charles 
Sanders Peirce, and Ferdinand de Saussure, some interpreters believe that this 
history is still incomplete, as Charles William Morris states in his work Signs, 
Language and Behaviour (1946). Yet the fundamental innovations of the 
subject matter are already in the works of Augustine of Hippo, inheritor of the 
studies undertaken in the previous centuries. As the historian Robert A. Markus 
has noted (1996: 1), “some of the Christian fathers devoted explicit and sophis-
ticated discussion to signs and the way in which they signify. Of these the most 
notable is Augustine of Hippo [...] who has even been seen by some modern 
writers as a father of semiology”. 
Indisputably, Augustine’s sign theory was highly influential in medieval se-
miotics and became a point of reference for the theories of signification in the 
succeeding centuries. Augustine explicitly formulated a definition of signum –  
“A sign is a thing which causes us to think of something beyond the impression 
the thing itself makes upon the senses” (Signum est enim res praeter speciem, 
quam ingerit sensibus, aliud aliquid ex se faciens in cogitationem venire)1 –  
that became canonical. The echo of Augustine’s scholarship was felt for many 
centuries.2 The numerous references to Augustine’s theory of signs made in 
                                                                          
1  Doctr. chr. 2,1 (trans. Robertson, On Christian Doctrine, 34). 
2  On Augustine’s influence on medieval theories of signification, see Irène Rosier-Catach, 
«Signification et efficacité: sur les prolongements médiévaux de la théorie augustinienne du 
signe», Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques 91 (2007), 51–74. For an 
appraisal of Augustine’s theory within medieval semiotics, see Meier-Oeser, Stephan, 
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Anselm’s Dialogues Concerning Truth, in Peter Abelard (1079–1142), in John 
of Salisbury (c. 1115–1180), in William of Sherwood (c. 1205–1267) and in 
Peter of Spain (1215–1217) evidence Augustine’s influence in the eleventh, 
twelfth and thirteen centuries (Scott 1972: 29–31). 
The particular significance that signum (“sign”) has for Augustine is beyond 
doubt. For Augustine, signum is a term that is as general as to encompass a vast 
array of phenomena: miracles and wonders (Markus 1957), sacraments (sacra-
mentum as signum), traces (vestigia), gestures, images, signal signs (as, for in-
stance, military signs), and spoken and written words are all grouped under one 
single head, namely, signa (“signs”). 
Before we begin, it behoves us to make a terminological clarification. In 
many of his works, Augustine used extensively the Latin term signum. How-
ever, there is no English word which adequately represents the nuance of this 
term. In fact, the semantic field covered by the Latin signum does not map 
neatly onto that of the English “sign” or “symbol”, despite some commentators 
maintaining the contrary (Markus 1957; Chydenius 1960). Although there have 
been attempts to make Augustine’s vocabulary overlap with a more contem-
porary terminology, such a juxtaposition that equates signum to “sign” or “sym-
bol” ultimately conceals and dilutes Augustine’s genuine terminology. Thus, the 
title selected for the present study – Augustine and the Study of Signs and Signi-
fication – should not mislead the reader. The writer is fully cognizant that there 
is a semantic gulf between the Latin signum and the English “sign” that cannot 
be bridged so easily and must be always kept in mind while discussing Augus-
tine’s approach to the topic of signs.  
As Barbara Cassin and colleagues aptly pointed out  
 
Although it is frequently said that Augustine’s signum absorbed the values of the 
symbol [...], there has never been an inquiry into the philosophical or theological 
consequences of the fact that in Augustine’s text, we are dealing at this juncture 
with only one term, namely, signum. (Cassin et al. 2014: 983) 
 
However, because the present study has been written in English, it seemed ap-
propriate to keep the main title in English, too. Moreover, considering the aca-
demic context in which the research has been conducted – semiotics as a disci-
plinary field – it is a custom to employ the English term “sign” as an umbrella 
term. 
The Latin term signum ties in with a manifold of meanings and the study of 
its etymology has generally been a very hard nut to crack.3 Emanuele Dettori 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
«Medieval Semiotics», in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2011 Edition), 
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/ 
semiotics-medieval/>.  Date of access: 09/09/2017. 
3  For a comprehensive view on this issue, see Barbara Cassin et al., «Sign, Symbol», in: 
Cassin, Barbara (ed.), Dictionary of Untranslatables. A Philosophical Lexicon (2014), 974–
987; Umberto Eco «Segno» and «Simbolo», in: Enciclopedia Einaudi XII, Torino: Einaudi 
(1981), 628–627; 877–914; Louis Kelly «Language study and theology in the Late Middle 
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(1999 1997: 216–220) outlined five main meanings of signum on the basis of 
the analysis of the most ancient Latin texts: 1) “image” (cut, curved, or painted); 
2) “insignia”; 3) “stars or heavenly body”; 4) “trace”; 5) “signal, password”. In 
Augustine, too, signum is a term that reaches a very high degree of generality so 
much so as to embrace under the same genus classes of signs that were pre-
viously considered as independent phenomena. In fact, it has been often argued 
that the significance of Augustine’s theory of the sign lies in the coexistence of 
two matrices that are for the first time grafted one upon another. In other words, 
Augustine’s concept of signum encapsulates both an “inferential” model of the 
sign – based on the Stoic tradition of the sign as inference – and an “equational” 
model shaped on a linguistic conception of the sign as equivalence (Manetti 
2010; 2013). 
The bibliography on Augustine is vast and the works are legion. Augustine’s 
theory of the sign has been the subject of an increasing number of studies that 
have addressed this issue from different disciplinary standpoints. To mention 
just a few, theology (Duchrow 1965; Johnson 1972a; Johnson 1972b; Morgan 
2010), sacramental theology (Martinez 1976), contemporary linguistics and 
semantics (Baratin, Desbordes 1982; Simone 1969; Kelly 1975; Piacenza 1992; 
Vecchio 1994), philosophy (Bettetini 1996; Colish 1983b 1968; Jackson 1967; 
1969; O’Daly 1987; Ripanti 1980; Todisco 1993) and semiotics (Deely 2009; 
Manetti 1987; Todorov 1977). However, accurate studies for subject, discipline, 
and significance have not yet given an organic and systematic vision of Augus-
tine’s theory of the sign.4  
The first study conducted on the subject is, to our knowledge, Karel Kuy-
pers’s Der Zeichen-und Wortbegriff im Denken Augustins (1934), who already 
underscored the significance of Augustine in regard to his theory of signs. His 
work, however, focused prominently on Augustine’s De magistro. There are 
numerous studies that have focused on individual works of Augustine touching 
upon his sign theory (Connaghan 2004; Daniels 1977; Drucker 1998; Engels 
1962; Pépin 1976; Ruef 1981; Toom 2002) or on the influence that the Stoic 
theory of meaning exerted on Augustine’s understanding of words and signs 
(Barwik 1957; Pinborg 1962; Baratin 1981; Colish 1985). Cornelius Petrus 
Mayer has provided an outstanding study of the Augustinian corpus through a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Ages», in: Sylvain Auroux; E. F. K. Koerner Hans-Josef Niederehe; Kees Versteegh (eds.), 
History of the Language Sciences/ Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaften/ Histoire des 
sciences du langage. An International Handbook on the Evolution of the Study of Language 
from the Beginnings to the Present/ Ein internationales Handbuch zur Entwicklung der 
Sprachforschung von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart/Manuel international sur l’évolution 
de l’étude du langage des originses à nos jours, 572–583; Bianchi, Massimo Luigi (ed.) 
1999. Signum. IX Colloquio Internazionale del Lessico Intellettuale Europeo. Roma, 8–10 
Gennaio 1998.  
4  The literature on the concept of the sign in Augustine is quite extensive, and in the 
course of this dissertation, we provide information on the studies that have addressed this 
issue. For an initial framework, see the select bibliography compiled by R. A. Markus, Signs 
and Meanings: World and Text in Ancient Christianity (Liverpool: Liverpool University 
Press, 1996) 120–124. 
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statistical methodology which includes the analysis of the occurrence of signum 
throughout the corpus (Mayer 1969; 1974). We will provide a detailed overview 
of the relevant literature in each chapter of the present work because much of 
the secondary literature on the subject relates either to specific works of Augus-
tine or to specific corners in the study of his works.  
In regard to Augustine’s theory of the sign, the De doctrina christiana has 
especially proved to be fruitful. Indeed, this work has generated considerable 
recent research interest. The four books forming the treatise have been typically 
studied as independent subjects. Book IV has been generally regarded as “the 
first manual of Christian rhetoric” (Sullivan 1930: iii) and, in virtue of such a 
key feature, has been widely studied (Conroy 1933; Guenther 1945; Paternostro 
1950; Pizzolato 1995; Sullivan 1930). Book I, in contrast, has received relati-
vely little attention. Gérard Istace, who conducted a systematic study on the first 
book and considered it as “une unité littéraire bien définie” (Istace 1956: 290), 
is one of the rare scholars who ventured into such an enquiry. Books II and III, 
in turn, have been discussed in relation to the theory of signs and its antecedents 
(Grech 1995; Jackson 1969; Markus 1957; Pizzani 1995). Yet Eugene Kevane 
(1966: 122) remarks that the studies that focused on one single book of the 
treatise, considered as an independent research unit, “overlook the masterful and 
brilliantly unified plan of composition that Augustine had in mind for the work 
as a whole”. However, resorting to the words of Augustine himself proves that 
the treatise could also be read in parts: “This book has turned out longer than I 
wished, and longer that I had thought it would be. But to that reader or listener 
to whom it is pleasing it is not long. He who finds it long and wishes to know 
about it may read it in sections”.5 
In addition to theologians, historians, and philosophers, the De doctrina 
christiana has also held a special fascination for scholars of semiotics, so much 
so as to be regarded as Augustine’s “central treatise”, such that “the text that 
has a better claim than any other to be considered the first semiotic work” 
(Todorov 1982 1977: 40).  
 
 
B. A theory of semiotics ante litteram? 
The present work is concerned with the clarification, analysis and systemati-
zation of the theory of the sign and signification in the work of Augustine, not 
so much because he directly addressed the study of semiotics, but rather be-
cause certain fundamental concepts of the discipline – first and foremost the 
concept of signum – are explicitly treated in his works.  
Indeed, Augustine’s approach to signs is always dual and instrumental. Nu-
merous authors share such a thesis (Deely 2009: 9; Jackson 1967: 2; Ripanti 
1980: 29; Simone 1969: 89–90; Todorov 1982 [1977]: 46). The double valence 
of Augustine’s theory of the sign is also reflected in the secondary literature on 
                                                                          
5  Doctr. chr. 4,31 (trans. Robertson, On Christian Doctrine, 168). 
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the subject. It is probably possible to consider Augustine as a precursor of 
studies on the sign and therefore as a father of semiotics. Conversely, this aspect 
is downplayed for the purely theological and exegetical overlay of his works 
that do not fully allow, without going beyond what Augustine wrote, for a full-
fledged extrapolation of an organic and general theory of semiotics, especially if 
considered for its own sake.  
Among those who identified in Augustine a semiotics ante litteram (Deely 
2009; Manetti 1987; Simone 1969; Todorov 1977), we include Umberto Eco, 
who, in connection with the development of the field, referred to it as “the his-
tory of an ostracism” (Eco 1987: 109). He pointed out that despite its very an-
cient origins, semiotics has encountered a difficult process of institutionali-
zation that has hampered its development and diffusion. For Eco (1987: 109), 
semiotics, from its very inception, has been an ostracized disciplinary field, and 
as such, it has constantly been in search for its own reason d’être.6 This 
hindrance has led semiotics to struggle to identify a unified disciplinary object. 
From here stems the hypothesis glimpsed by Eco that “the entire history of 
philosophy could be re-read in a semiotic perspective” (Eco 1987: 109).  
According to Eco, semiotics turned out to be a discipline disguised in various 
“applied” studies, abandoning the particular purpose of a “general semiotics” – 
that is, the philosophical problem of the sign.7 Eco, in fact, presumed that the 
scope of semiotics is to find some general coordinates that would account for the 
variety of phenomena that constitute the object of study of semiotics as a 
disciplinary field. Considering the “theoretical and methodological possibility of a 
unified historical approach to a supposedly identifiable Semiotic Thought”, Eco 
(1979a: 75) suggested three plausible hypotheses that could be used as a roadmap 
to trace the history (or histories) of semiotics: a first, “restricted” hypothesis 
(which exclusively considers semiotic theories that were formulated explicitly), a 
second “moderate” hypothesis (which factors in implicit or “repressed” semiotic 
theories too), and a third “encyclopedical” hypothesis (according to which certain 
                                                                          
6  On this point, see Roman O. Jakobson Coup  d’oeil sur le développement de la 
sémiotique (Bloomington, 1975). 
7  Umberto Eco insisted on the difference between a «general semiotics» and the various 
«specific semiotics», the latter being the grammar of a particular sign system. The study of 
specific semiotics proves to be successful insofar as it describes a given field of 
communicative phenomena as ruled by a system of signification. The task and the nature of 
a general semiotics are different, because general semiotics is concerned with the concept of 
sign as a phenomenon of «referral» (renvoi) – after R. Jakobson’s felicitous expression. The 
demarcation between «general» and «specific» (or applied) semiotics is a recurrent 
distinction is Eco’s ouvre, and it finds its most mature formulation in Semiotica e Filosofia 
del Linguaggio (1984). Also in his latest lectures and interviews – especially when 
addressing the compelling question of the future of semiotics – Eco often reiterated the 
distinction outlined above. On this point, see also the unpublished interview of Eco with 
Kalevi Kull («Conversation with Umberto Eco», Milan, 15th January 2012) as well as Eco’s 
last public lecture delivered on the 24th of May 2015 at the University of Lodz. It is also 
worth reminding that, to our knowledge, the first scholar who drew such a distinction 
(«general» and «applied semiotic») was Charles Morris (1955 [1946]: 220). 
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practices are thought of as significant for a general theory of signs and, therefore, 
should be the subject of specialized studies).  
According to Eco’s threefold proposal for a history of semiotics, Augustine’s 
literary production would definitely fall into the first “restricted” hypothesis 
because Augustine employed and conceptualized notions such as signum in an 
explicit fashion, although he did not directly design a theory of semiotics per se: 
 
A history of semiotics is concerned with those who, having explicitly recognized 
the existence of a sign-relationship in language and/or in many non-verbal hu-
man activities, outlined a general theory of signs or even foresaw the develop-
ment of such a theory as a crucial node for human sciences. For instance, Plato’s 
Cratylus, Stoics, Augustine, Ockham, Poinsot, Locke, Vico, Lambert, Husserl, 
Peirce and so on. In this perspective only authors who have explicitly used a 
term like “semiotics” (or its congeners), sign, theory of sign etc., ought to be 
passed under review. (Eco 1979a: 79) 
 
Undoubtedly, Augustine treats the concept of signum as an explicit object of 
philosophical research, and this is a good reason to devote a study ex professo to 
his own approach. The present work, thus, endorses the trend traced by Eco in 
order to reconsider and explore, from a purely semiotic angle, the fundamental 
structure of the sign and signification in Augustine. 
For understanding the particular importance of Augustine’s theory of the 
sign within semiotics the works of Tzvetan Todorov (1977; 1978) and, more 
recently, of John Deely (2009) are two essential starting points. Both scholars 
acknowledged that Augustine himself did not seem to be fully cognizant of his 
interest in the business of semiotics. Undoubtedly, as already noted, the general 
character of Augustine’s works is essentially theological-religious. Yet, within 
the treatment of those issues, he nonetheless succeeded in articulating his own 
theory of the sign. There has been a lot of debate over whether Augustine’s 
theory was a novelty or whether he paid tribute to the preceding tradition and to 
what extent this intellectual trajectory is a rupture or a continuation in regard to 
the past traditions. Todorov, in his study Théories du symbole (1977), suggests 
two main features to be at the basis of the semiotics of Augustine: eclecticism 
and psychologism. For Todorov, the originality of Augustine’s thought lies in 
fact almost entirely in his synthetic ability. Probably this faculty leads him to 
the first formulation in the history of Western thought of what deserves the 
name of semiotics: he in fact appears to be the founder of a “unified” theory of 
the sign. In this regard, Todorov (1982 [1977]: 25) marked the “birth of occi-
dental semiotics” with Augustine.  
Along the same lines, John Deely went so far as to argue that Augustine 
marks the beginning of “semiotic consciousness” and the so-called “proto- 
semiotic” development (Deely 2009: 3–7). In doing so, Augustine seems to 
having limited himself to re-conceptualizing ideas and notions that were rooted 
in different theoretical horizons. Todorov has argued that the fundamental 
operation that Augustine performed was the grafting of two distinct traditions, 
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both concerning the sign, that became synthesized and united into one single 
theory. The development of a theory of the “word” in the rhetorical and seman-
tic domain was kept distinct from a parallel theory of the “sign” rooted in the 
realm of logic. Augustine seems to have adopted what was previously attributed 
to words and to have extended it onto the general level of signs. As will be seen 
in what follows, in his “doctrine of signs” (doctrina signorum), words will 
come to occupy only one place among other kinds of sign. The doctrine of the 
verbal sign (symbolon), which harkens back to Aristotle, is thus subjected to a 
theory of the logical sign (semeion) – a model, this second one, which Augus-
tine presumably derives from the logic of a propositional-implicative type of 
Stoic origin. The complete welding together of a theory of sign and a theory of 
language in Augustine is therefore based on the incorporation of the Stoic 
theory of meaning. Except that, for the Stoics, only non-verbal signs were con-
sidered as signs (semeia). Augustine will exceed this perspective with decisive-
ness: words are thought of as signs on the same terms as non-linguistic signs.  
Those studies on the subject conducted within semiotics, however very in-
fluential, have often been quite selective in focusing on individual works of 
Augustine. Deely’s Augustine and Poinsot. The Protosemiotic Development 
(2009) deals almost exclusively with the second book of Augustine’s De doc-
trina christiana, whereas in Todorov’s study (1977), certain relevant sources 
such as the De dialectica and the De magistro play only an ancillary role, if not 
at all dismissed. Hence, the need to fill in a gap in contemporary research on 
Augustinian semiotics. To this end, we have included in the selected corpus of 
sources both the De dialectica as well as the De magistro, to which we devote a 
close examination. Our contention is that both works show a profound semiotic 
awareness and provide outstanding clues for reflection. 
Moreover, studies on Augustine conducted within semiotics have generally 
focused on the Augustinian theory of signs severed from the context in which 
the theory initially originated. Arguably, this seems a rather artificial and ad hoc 
divorce, and whether it is intentional or not, it could substantially dilute or dis-
tort Augustine’s own thought. By contrast, the present study privileges the 
facets of the theory that were previously neglected within semiotic research by 
contextualizing Augustine’s theory of signs within the overall structure of the 
works under scrutiny.  
We shall support this contention by looking at numerous illustrations. The 
universe, for Augustine, is divided into “things” (res) and “signs” (signa). It 
will be seen that one reflection of the general tendency described above is dis-
cussing Augustine’s concept of signum in isolation, irrespectively of the rela-
tionship that this concept entails with the notion of “thing” (res). This order of 
approach must be reversed. At the cost of demythologizing the concept of the 
sign – undoubtedly, a pervasive notion in contemporary semiotics – we spell out 
the necessity of a discussion of the philosophical concept of res as a background 
for conceptualizing the definition of signum. At any rate, as will be shown in 
Chapter 3, the concept of res plays a crucial role in the overall structure of the 
De doctrina christiana, and it is essential for conceptualizing the notion of the 
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sign. Moreover, the doublet res/signum constitutes the backbone of Augustine’s 
theory and is persistent throughout his literary career.  
Another specimen of this naivety is the division between “natural signs” 
(signa naturalia) and “given signs” (signa data), which Augustine sets forth in 
Book II of the De doctrina christiana. This is an additional example of how 
Augustine’s notions took a life of their own. Unhappily, such a division has been 
the object of systematic distortion and was generally presented in ways that do not 
overlap with Augustine’s vision. We will discuss both issues in due course. 
 
 
C. Setting the significance of Augustine’s works  
for the present research 
Our first task is clearly a justification of the significance of the subject matter 
for the present research. Augustine’s semiotic thought has to be mined, as it 
were, from the abundant deposits, which we find in his many writings on lan-
guage and communication and in his philosophical works.8 The present study 
will be confined to the writings in which the theory of signs is treated ex 
professo – as for instance in Book II of the De doctrina christiana – and the 
works in which Augustine deals with the analysis of words as signs or treats the 
question of communication and acquisition of knowledge through signs. In-
teresting causes for reflection on the subject are found primarily in the De dia-
lectica (“On Dialectic”), De magistro (“The Teacher”), the De doctrina christiana 
(“On Christian Doctrine”), and in De trinitate (“The Trinity”), even though these 
works have other functions and purposes. Nonetheless, the corpus of the selected 
texts does not completely exhaust the thought of Augustine on the subject. Thus, 
for the interpretation of certain particular passages or concepts, we will resort to 
other additional sources within the Augustinian corpus that are tangentially 
concerned with the subject treated in the present dissertation.  
The present study focuses on the following works that, for the sake of clarity, 
are arranged in a chronological order:9 
 
De dialectica (387) 
De magistro (389) 
De mendacio (395) 
De doctrina christiana (Books I–III 25,36) (396) 
Contra mendacium (420) 
De doctrina christiana (Books III–IV) (426–427) 
                                                                          
8  Augustine’s philosophical works are: Contra Academicos (386), De Beata Vita (386), 
Soliloquia (386–7), De Dialectica (387), De Libero Arbitrio (388), De Musica (387–90), De 
Mendacio (396), De Magistro (389) and De Diversis Questionibus (388) (Kirwan 1989: 7). 
Although Kirwan takes 396 as the date for the De mendacio, it is generally assumed that the 
treatise was written in 395 (Bettetini 2001: 5; Muldowney 1952: 47). 
9  To this list we shall also include the Soliloquia and the De trinitate and a few ohter 
works, discussed in section 4.6 
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In order to circumscribe the limits of the present enquiry, the study focuses, for 
the most part, on the first decade of Augustine’s literary production. We have 
chosen his juvenile treatise, the De dialectica, written as early as 387, as the 
terminus ad quo and the De doctrina christiana, penned after 395, as terminus 
ad quem of the study. Within this span of time, it is our intention to focus this 
study even more by concentrating our analysis on the De dialectica, the De 
magistro, and the De doctrina christiana, each of which will be discussed in 
separate sections of the dissertation.  
In addition to the works just mentioned, we included a study on the subject of 
mala fide communication, unravelling Augustine’s doctrine of the lie (menda-
cium). It is our contention that a semiotics of lying is of pivotal importance. 
Augustine set forth the fundamentals of this issue primarily in two treatises: De 
mendacio (“On Lying”) and Contra mendacium (“Against Lying”), although 
the themes of mendacity and falsehoods run throughout numerous other works. 
We hold that the subject of lying is intimately interconnected with the subject of 
signs and how signs are used by interpreters for specific purposes. For this 
reason, it is our contention that the issue of lying should be treated in tandem 
with Augustine’s theory of signs. Thus, it enters in its own right as a sub-topic 
in the present research. This is a somewhat untraditional approach to the study 
of the lie in Augustine, which was often confined within the realm of ethics and 
moral theology. We shall see that Augustine in his analysis is very cognizant of 
the power of words and how false signs affect sign-receivers. 
Moreover, there is an obvious reference that bonds semiotics with the topic 
of lying, namely, U. Eco’s famous definition of semiotics as the study of any-
thing that can be used in order to lie (Eco 1975). This celebrated, yet paradoxi-
cal, formulation should be corrected because the definition of the sign as some-
thing that could be used in order to lie is too restrictive. Eco himself recanted 
his own stance (Eco 1997: 37). It would be more appropriate to say that se-
miotics is a theory of erroneous inference. This would allow us to extend the 
proprium of semiotics not only to sign situations where a lie may manifest, but 
also to include parallel phenomena of erroneous inference – for instance, a 
mistake – that may occur in a sign situation, and that, strictly speaking, cannot 
be regarded as lies. We will see that the difference between a lie and an erro-
neous inference was already stated with lucidity in Augustine’s De mendacio. 
There are numerous valid reasons supporting the choice of texts mentioned 
above. Undoubtedly, Augustine’s treatise De doctrina christiana is a central 
text in respect to the theory of signs. Thus, it is not surprising that, in contrast to 
other Augustinian sources, this treatise has probably received more attention 
than others, especially among the community of interpreters within semiotics. 
On the contrary, the De dialectica and the De magistro, not to mention the De 
mendacio and the Contra mendacium, have not had such a fortune. Thus, in 
comparison with previous studies on the subject conducted within semiotics, the 
present study attempts to expound Augustine’s theory of signs as presented not 
only in the second book of the De doctrina christina but also in other of his 
works. Because the De doctrina christiana has received more attention in regard 
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to the theory of signs than have other works, we will place emphasis also on the 
De dialectica and the De magistro, being somewhat less-travelled albeit funda-
mental cornerstones for the Augustinian theory of signs. Despite the fact that 
the De dialectica was for a long time considered as a spurious work, it is now 
acknowledged as a genuine text of Augustine. The De dialectica is particularly 
significant to the present study because it clearly shows a rich and sophisticated 
theory of signification, whose outlook echoes the ancient Stoic theory of 
meaning.  
Many of the themes already treated in the De dialectica are taken up and am-
plified in succeeding works, and yet this early treatise lays the foundation of 
Augustine’s approach to signs. Thus, not only the need for our enquiry to follow 
a chronological design – the De dialectica being the earliest text under scru-
tiny – but also the theoretical depth and clarity within this early work have led 
us to place it at the outset of our enquiry. Furthermore, the paucity of studies 
conducted within semiotics specifically devoted to Augustine’s De dialectica 
fully supports such a choice. There is also a very practical reason to delimit the 
object of study in a way that allows it to be dealt with within the time span of a 
doctoral dissertation.  
The De magistro is the lengthiest treatment of signs in antiquity after Plato’s 
Cratylus. However, despite the dialogue presenting, for the most part, a minute, 
thorough and illuminating disquisition of signs, the De magistro has been 
generally conceived as a theologically oriented work. The conclusion of the 
dialogue, where Augustine emphasized the role of divine illumination in human 
thought (only God can teach us), led the majority of commentators towards such 
an interpretation. However, after a detailed analysis of the form and content of 
the work, we contend that the dialogue is grafted upon a division based on signs 
which is the heart of the book.  
As we will see in detail, Augustine’s real concern in the De magistro was the 
problem of the conditions of the possibility and communicability of knowledge 
itself. As numerous studies have shown (Cloeren 1984; Madec 1975: 71; 
Manfredini 1960: 17–27; Parodi 1996: 9; Pépin 1950), the problem of the ac-
quisition of knowledge and the possibility to convey it by means of language or 
other sign systems, is key to the dialogue. Moreover, in order to discuss these 
problems, Augustine examined a series of issues that today are certainly cata-
logued under the rubric of semiotics. Indeed, Eugenio Coseriu (1969: 108), 
Robert Markus (1957: 65), and Umberto Eco (1984) all claim that the De 
magistro is among the greatest contributions to semiotics from antiquity. Com-
menting in a similar way, Guzzo (1927: 114) states that the treatise established 
the science of expression and general linguistics. Nevertheless, not all studies 
were able to grasp this aspect of the work. Even among scholars overtly en-
gaged with the “doctrine of signs”, such a profound study of signs and signifi-
cation as the De magistro does not find the place that one would expect it to 
have. Although John Deely refers to the dialogue in his seminal study Four 
Ages of Understanding (2001), his enquiry devoted ex professo to the semiotics 
of Augustine and Poinsot (2009) is focused mainly on Augustine’s De doctrina 
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christiana, referring to the De magistro only in passing. In the same vein, for 
Todorov (1977) and Ripanti (1980) the De magistro is of secondary importance. 
Like the other works that the present dissertation aims to discuss, the theory 
of signs set forth in the De doctrina christiana emerges, too, against the back-
ground of a broader thematic horizon. Indeed, the book’s main thrust is inter-
preting the Bible and communicating the truths identified in it. Thus, Augus-
tine’s discussion of the subject of signification is grafted within a theological-
hermeneutical context. Undoubtedly, the De doctrina christiana is a chief 
source of knowledge because it discusses organically and systematically the 
theory of signs – focusing especially on written words – and the interpretation 
of texts in the light of patristic exegesis.10 Yet Augustine’s enquiry is neither an 
abstract theory nor a semiotics per se. On the contrary, his undertaking shows a 
pragmatic and applied approach because he intends to formulate a method for 
studying the Sacred Scriptures and to pass it down to posterity. Thus, the sign 
theory of Augustine is always instrumental; it is the means to an end.  
This point is essential. There is a particular difficulty that because Augustine 
was one of the most influential fathers of the Church, he had a special inclina-
tion to the Christian religion, and for this reason, it is hardly feasible to isolate 
with precision and certitude his philosophical or, as it were, his “semiotic 
thought” from his theological commitment and from the context in which his 
doctrine was deeply rooted. Thus, any investigation on Augustine’s theory of 
signs must come to terms with the fundamentally exegetical nature of his en-
quiry. Disentangling such a theory is a real challenge because the subjects of 
signification, interpretation, and exegesis are in fact almost inseparably inter-
woven throughout the pages of the De doctrina christiana as well as in other 
works. Nonetheless, outstanding inquiries have quite successfully ventured into 
the study of the “doctrine of signs” formulated in this treatise and considered 
independently from the application of the theory to the interpretation of the 
Bible (Deely 2009; Jackson 1967; 1969; Markus 1957; Simone 1969; Todorov 
1977). However, it is all too easy to dismiss Augustine’s theory of signs for his 
theological overtones. His thought was profoundly philosophical as well as 
theological, and it is worthy of close scrutiny also prescinding from the theo-




                                                                          
10  For a comprehensive overview of the work, see Luigi Alici, «Segno e parola in 
Agostino: Attualità e prospettive», in Riccardo Ferri, Patrizia Mangarano (eds.), Gesto e 
Parola. Ricerche sulla Rivelazione (2005), Roma: Città Nuova, 211–230; see also Luigi 
Alici, «Introduzione», in Sant’Agostino d’Ippona. La dottrina cristiana (1989), Milano: 
Edizioni Paoline, 6–83, which includes a rich bibliography; Gerald Press, «The subject and 
structure of Augustine’s De doctrina christiana», Augustinian Studies 11 (1980), 99–124. 
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D. Methodology 
The present study is interpretative of Augustine’s works. The theory of the sign 
is expounded on the basis of the interpretation of Augustine’s texts. Thus, the 
methodology employed throughout the present dissertation is based on textual 
interpretation. Augustine’s works are interpreted through close scrutiny of the 
selected corpus of texts that form the primary sources for the enquiry.  
In this work, we have attempted to pursue two objectives: (1) to extract from 
Augustine’s writings a theory of signs and (2) to appraise the theory thus ob-
tained against the background of semiotics. On certain occasions, Augustine’s 
topics, concepts, and terminology are assessed against the background of the 
theories of other authors. The aim is to primarily clarify Augustine’s position 
and also to emphasize the legacy and implications that such concepts and ideas 
have had or might have for the general study of signs. Moreover, hindrances 
and shortcomings that some accounts on Augustine’s theory of signs and signi-
fication naturally may display are pointed out, and some solutions are offered. 
The reader will notice that, sometimes, we privileged Augustine’s own 
words over our own speculations on the subject treated. This is not accidental 
nor the result of a naivety, but a feature that results from a deliberate and well-
pondered choice. Many of the concepts, formulas and arguments that Augustine 
recurred to in his works are not as straightforward as one would have liked them 
to be. First, the most obscure or difficult notions are identified, analysed, and 
discussed. We have often taken into account numerous additional Augustinian 
sources that encourage the elucidation, interpretation, and expansion of the 
subject. In other cases, we have preferred to describe Augustine’s concepts and 
theories and compare them to certain modern semiotic theories, for the sole 
purpose of cultivating the comprehension of the concepts under scrutiny in a 
contemporary key. Because Augustine’s intention was not to outline a theory of 
signs for its own sake, our task is to connect the dots within his theories of the 
sign, and this is, inherently, a step forward in the interpretation of Augustine’s 
approach to the problem of meaning. Our selections are choices that involve an 
interpretation, and as such, this is already our own contribution and should be 
taken as such – not simply as Augustine’s own thought. 
However, one could too easily fall into the temptation of superimposing his 
or her own ideas in order to fit the disciplinary background one belongs to. The 
terminology Augustine employed is peculiar to his era, and thus, any bold ex-
trapolation or speculation should be treated with the due care. Our inclination is 
to give priority to the interpretation of the text in order to explicate and expound 
it as clearly as possible. Once this task is sufficiently carried out, there is an 
avenue to factor in and discuss the significance of Augustine’s disquisitions of 
signs for the contemporary semiotic reader. We truly hope that we have 
achieved a balanced stance in such an endeavour. 
Finally, a word of explanation is due to the reader for what concerns the 
practice and style of quotations. At the risk of rendering the corpus of the thesis 
somewhat heavy with citations, we have opted for including both the original 
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quotation in Latin, as well as an English translation. Although this is not the 
custom, we believe that this solution offers to the scholar of Latin the possibility 
to rely on the original source and it provides the chance to reveal its content also 
to those who are not well versed in Latin. We have also made use of several 
translations and commentaries that have helped with the interpretation (whose 
list is in section B of the bibliography). 
 
E. Outline of the dissertation 
The division of the dissertation is into four general chapters. In Chapter 1 it is 
argued that the first work where Augustine explicitly discusses at length the 
subject of words as signs and signification is the De dialectica. We begin by 
describing the structure of the treatise. We show that Augustine develops a vo-
cabulary to describe the process of signification with words. This model is 
tetradic and includes verba, dicibles, dictiones, and res. We argue that although 
the treatise was interrupted in the midst of an important discussion on the tech-
nical terms he employed, the tract is of pivotal importance. It is shown that 
Augustine used a rather sophisticated theory of signs that has evident Stoic 
roots. An additional characteristic feature of Augustinian semiotics is that it is 
chiefly geared towards the problem of communication. Next to such a semiotics 
of communication, it also presents a concern toward the issue of the designation 
of words thought of as signs. 
Chapter 2 examines the dialogue of the De magistro, whose main pro-
tagonists are Augustine and his son Adeodatus. We dwell at length on the gene-
sis of the dialogue as well as on the much-debated question of the form and 
structure of the De magistro. We examine the interpretations proposed in 
secondary literature and argue that the bifurcation Augustine makes on signs 
and things is key to the overall logic of the text. It is argued that despite the 
dialogue’s purpose being to assert that Christ is the only teacher for men, the 
great majority of the work deals with a theory of signs that is often neglected 
but is yet worthy of study. This account shows that Augustine used and en-
visaged not only a theory of signs but also a theory of showing (ostension), 
which provides unseen implications for semiotics. 
Chapter 3 pursues the enquiry into the De doctrina christiana. The treatise is 
explored in reference to the theory of signs and contemporary semiotics. Spe-
cific attention is given not only to the second Book of the tract, which is de-
voted to the doctrina signorum (“doctrine of signs”), but also to Book I where 
Augustine discusses the doctrina rerum (“doctrine of things”). We single out 
and discuss four key issues within this work: 1) the definition of signum against 
the background of the concept of res; 2) the division between signa naturalia 
and signa data; 3) the role of intentionality in the theory of signs; 4) the various 
divisions of signs. 
Chapter 4 delves into the subject of mendacity and deception by discussing 
two works of Augustine that are relatively less known: De mendacio and 
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Contra mendacium. Our analysis will show that a semiotics of lying is of 
pivotal importance. It also argues for the view that Augustine’s stance on the 
matter is more nuanced and subtle than is often portrayed. After a detailed 
analysis of Augustine description of the nature of the lie we challenge the tradi-
tional definition of the lie – Mendacium est quippe falsa significatio cum 
voluntate fallendi (“A lie is a false signification told with the desire to de-
ceive”)11 – an offer an alternative reading based on a contextual reading of the 
Augustinian doctrine of the lie. 
 
                                                                          
11  Mary Sarah Muldowney, S. S. J., trans., «Against Lying», in Saint Augustine. Treatises 
on Various Subjects (The Fathers of the Church. A new translation, Vol. 16) ed. Roy J. 
Deferrari (New York: Fathers of the Church, third reprint 1981, 106 vols.), C. mend. 12,26. 
28 
I. WORDS AS SIGNS IN THE DE DIALECTICA   
1.1. Genesis of the work 
The subject of this chapter is Augustine’s De dialectica  – penned in 387 in 
Milan – where one can glimpse the first definitions of signum (“sign”), verbum 
(“word”) and res (“thing”).1 Before becoming bishop of Hippo, Augustine was 
a master of rhetoric. His interest towards words and language in all its articula-
tions – already displayed from his first juvenile treatise, the De dialectica, in-
deed – is therefore not surprising. 
For years the work was considered of dubious paternity but was attributed to 
Augustine by Darrel Jackson and Jan Pinborg on the basis of lexicographical 
studies and quantitative textual analysis (Pinborg 1975).2 The De dialectica, 
coupled with the De musica and the De rhetorica, is part of the Augustinian 
design of a larger project on the liberal arts, as stated by the author in the Re-
tractationes – the book in which Augustine reviewed all his precedent works: 
 
At the very time that I was about to receive baptism in Milan, I also attempted to 
write books on the liberal arts, questioning those who were with me and who 
were not averse to studies of this nature, and desiring by definite steps, so to 
speak, to reach things incorporeal through things corporeal and to lead others to 
them. But I was able to complete only the book on grammar – which I lost later 
from our library – and six books, On Music, pertaining to that part which is 
called rhythm. I wrote these six books, however, only after I was baptized and 
had returned to Africa from Italy, for I had only begun this art at Milan. Off the 
other five arts likewise begun there – dialectic, rhetoric, geometry, arithmetic, 
and philosophy – the beginnings alone remained and I lost even these. However, 
I think that some people have them.3 
 
The authenticity of this treatise, however, is not above suspicion, especially if 
one considers that much of the terminology Augustine outlined in the De dia-
lectica does not occur elsewhere in his writings.4 
                                                                          
1  The book is sometimes titled Principia Dialecticae and was published by Migne (PL 
XXXII coll. 1409–1420) on the basis of the Maurine edition of the works of Augustine. The 
De dialectica has been presented in a critical edition by Crecelius (1857), Pinborg (1975), 
Baldassarri (1985) and by Bettetini (2004). Unless otherwise indicated, the quotations from 
Augustine’s De dialectica are given in the English translation of Belford Darrell Jackson and 
edited by J. Pinborg, Augustine. De Dialectica (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1975). 
2    On the debate on the authenticity and authorship of the work, see also Jean Pépin, Saint 
Augustin et la dialectique, Wetteren, Villanova University Press 1976, 21–60; Jan Pinborg, 
«Das Sprachdenken der Stoa und Augustins Dialektik», Classica et Mediaevalia XXIII 
(1962): 149–151; Henri-Irénée Marrou St. Augustin et la Fin de la Culture Antique, Paris 
1938, 576–578. 
3  Retr. 1,5 (trans. Sister M. Inez Bogan, The Retractations, 21–22). 
4  This is apparent if one compares Augustine’s terminology employed in the De dialectica 
and in De magistro. The term dicibile, which Augustine uses in the De dialectica and that is 
reminiscent of the Greek word λεκτόν, is rendered as pronuntiatum in De magistro 5,16 (ed. 
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The De dialectica poses serious difficulties of interpretation for its in-
completeness as well as for the lack of sources. In fact, in regards to the first 
point, the work cannot offer conclusive interpretations insofar as only an 
unfinished draft of it was found. In the work, however, the concepts of signum 
(“sign”) and verbum (“word”) are defined with clarity, as traceable in chapter V.  
In regards to the second point – the unreliability of sources – for some, the 
treatise does not offer significant originality on the theory of language,5 but it 
does present clear credibility about its Stoic origin.6 And yet inasmuch as the 
thought of the Stoics is not transmitted directly, but is derived from secondary 
sources, also on this ground there are margins of uncertainty. 
The aforementioned difficulties, however, did not prevent clear and precise 
studies of the sources within the De dialectica. They were formulated by 
Balduin Fisher in De Augustini Disciplinarum Libro Qui est De Dialectica 
(1912) and by Karl Barwick in Probleme der Stoischen Sprachlehre und 
Rhetorik (1957), which still remain two essential studies for the interpretation of 
the treatise. Leaving aside a detailed enquiry of the sources of the De dialectica, 
which would fall outside the primary scope of this study, it is worth referring to 
the philosophical context upon which the innovative capacity of Augustine’s 
theory of the sign is grafted. 
 
 
1.2. Definition of dialectic and the Stoic legacy 
The treatise presents ten chapters and revolves around five main themes: the 
concept and division of dialectics (ch. I–IV), the relationship sign-dicibile-thing 
(ch. V), the origin of the word, the power of the word (ch. VII), and the 
obscurity and ambiguity of the word (ch. VIII–X). 
Augustine begins with a definition of dialectic: 
Dialectica est bene disputandi scientia. Disputamus autem utique verbis.  
(Dialectic is the science of disputing well. We always dispute with words.)7 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Daur, 174). While the term dicibile is unique to the treatise De dialectica and does not 
reoccur in other Augustinian works, the term pronuntiatum is akin to Cicero’s rendering of 
ἀξίωμα, i.e. λεκτόν αὐτοτελές (cf. Aulus Gellius, Noct. Att., XVI.8). I owe this observation to 
Prof. Costantino Marmo (as reported in the preliminary review of the 9th March 2018). 
5  C. Kirwan (1989: 35), for instance, claims that the characterization of language which 
we find in the De dialectica is «neither original nor profound nor correct» and he defines the 
latter as a «fragmentary schoolbook containing prolegomena to logic». 
6  For an overview of this tendency, see Jan Pinborg, «Das Sprachdenken der Stoa und 
Augustins Dialektik», Classica et Medievalia XXIII (1962): 148–177; Baratin, Marc and 
Desbordes, Françoise, «Les origines stoïciennes de la théorie augustinienne du signe», Revue 
des Études Latines LIX (1981): 260–268; Marcia Colish, The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity 
to the Early Middle Ages. II Stoicism in Christian Latin Thought the Sixth Century, Leiden, 
E. G. Brill 1985. 




1.3. The structure of the De dialectica 
For Augustine “we always dispute with words”, which are divided into 
“simple” (simplicia) and “combined” (coniuncta): 
 
Simplicia sunt quae unum quiddam significant ut cum dicimus ‘homo, equus, 
disputat, currit’. 
 
(Words which signify some one thing are simple, as when we say ‘homo,’ 
‘equus,’ ‘disputat,’ ‘currit’ (man, horse, disputes, runs).13 
 
Coniuncta verba sunt quae sibi conexa res plures significant, ut cum dicimus 
‘homo ambulat’ aut ‘homo festinans in montem ambulat’ et siquid tale.  
 
(Combined words are those which, when connected to one another, signify many 
things, for example, when we say ‘the man is walking’ or ‘the man is walking 
quickly toward the mountain’).14 
 
                                                                          
8  De oratore II, xxxviii, 157. 
9   Institutiones oratoriae II, xv, 34. 
10  Diogenes Laertius VII, 42. 
11  «Logic in its general sense, is, as I have believed I have shown, only another name for 
semiotic, the quasi-necessary, or formal doctrine of signs» (CP II, 134). 
12  «I think science may be divided properly into these three sorts. First, physica, [...] or 
natural philosophy [...] Secondly, practica [...] The most considerable under this head is 
ethics. Thirdly, semeiotike – The third branch may be called Semeiotike, or the doctrine of 
signs, the most usual whereof being words, it is aptly enough termed also Logike, logic: the 
business whereof is to consider the nature of signs, the mind makes use of for the 
understanding of things, or conveying its knowledge to others» (Locke 1836: 549–550). 
13  Dial. 1,5 (trans. Jackson, De dialectica, 82). 
14  Dial. 2,6 (trans. Jackson, De dialectica, 82–85). 
Augustine’s definition of dialectic is, as regards to the first part of the citation, 
clearly derived from the Stoics. Barwik (1957: 8), to substantiate this hypo-
thesis, refers to volume III, fr. 267 of the Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta: 
διαλεκτικὴ ἐπιστήμη τοῦ εὖ διαλέγεσθαι. Darrel Jackson (1975: 121) underlines 
that the Augustinian definition of dialectic synthesizes the concepts of rhetoric 
and dialectic expressed by Dioegenes Laertius. Jackson, however, ascribes the 
most likely source of this definition to Cicero – dialectic is ars bene disse- 
rendi8  – and Quintilian – rhetoric is bene dicendi scientia.9 
For the Stoics, dialectic is “the science of correctly discussing subjects by 
questions and answer” or “the science of statements true, false, and neither true 
nor false”.10 Moreover, the Stoics identify logic with dialectic, and the latter is 
understood as a semiotics, which is the science of signs. These concepts were 
already spelled out by the Stoics well in advance of Charles S. Peirce11 and John 
Locke12 as noted by Estelle Merrill Allen (1935: 10). 
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Regarding verbs, all third persons are simple words15 as they have a single 
meaning, while the first and second persons of verbs are combined words since 
they show a double meaning. The distinguishing criterion underlying the diffe-
rence between simple and combined words does not lie in the structure of the 
word but in the way in which words signify. The meaning prevails rather than 
the structure. The only exception to this is the impersonal verbs – “it rains” or 
“it snows” – as they are all verbs in third person and, as such, do not require 
any determination of person. 
Augustine proceeds with his analysis of words providing some examples that 
clarify the above-mentioned distinction. A word like disputat (“disputes”) –  
formed by the prefix dis and the verb puto – may seem combined, but in reality 
is simple. In fact, it should be noted that in Latin, the first and the second person 
verbs signify the person who is speaking or the person spoken of – and 
therefore are combined words. Conversely, with the exception of impersonal 
verbs, third person verbs have an undetermined subject and thus are simple.     
Along with verbs, simple nouns are included among simple words, and pro-
positions among combined words. For Augustine, combined words include not 
only complete propositions – “the man is walking” – but also incomplete 
sentences – such as “the man quickly toward the mountain”. Combined words 
that express a proposition are in turn subdivided in two species: those that are 
subject to truth or falsity and those that are not. 
In short, the word can present itself in isolation – that is, provided with a 
single specific meaning – or can occur combined with other words. Combined 
words – namely, words that combined with each other signify more things – are 
divided into combined words where, despite the connection, the thought still 
remains suspended (for example, “the man quickly toward the mountain”) and 
combined words that present a complete thought (for instance, “the man is 
walking”). The latter are further distinguished as combined words that do not 
signify what is true or what is false and combined words that signify what is 
true or what is false (statements). 
Augustine proposed a further distinction that concerns statements. They are 
divided into “simple” (simplices) and “combined” (coniunctae). Complex pro-
positions not only combine propositions but also find judgment in respect to the 
connection (copulatio) of one with the other. The connection of propositions is 
developed through the premises (concessa) and the conclusion (summa), thus 
constituting the argument (“if he is walking, he is moving”; “that man is 
                                                                          
15  The same definition of simple words is found in the De dialectica of Martianus Capella; 
thus, it is safe to assume that both have been drawn from the same source, identified by 
Fisher (1912: 52) in Marcus Terentius Varro. Thus, the correlation between the two 
(Augustine and Capella) is explained by Fisher as having a common source (Varro’s 
Disciplinarum libri). However, it must be pointed out that this terminology is closer to 
Martianus Capella than to Augustine. I was not aware of this point had not C. Marmo 
pointed me in that direction. For a comparison between Augustine and Capella, see Jackson 
(1975: 124–125). 
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walking; therefore, that man is moving”) which is such that the premises are not 
compatible with the contradictory of the conclusion. 
Several authors pointed out that the Augustinian system of the word 
presented in the De dialectica traces the Stoic distinction between incomplete 
lekton, complete lekton and full logical proposition (Baldassarri 1985: 10). 
Although there is a clear correspondence between the two articulations, there 
are also substantial differences. While in the Stoic doctrine the distinction speci-
fically relates to the incorporeal (lekton), in Augustine it concerns words 
directly. 
On the basis of this distinction of words, Augustine established a fourfold 
division of the dialectic: 
 
1. Simple words (de loquendo) 
2. Combined words 
a. Do not make a statement 
b. Do make a statement 
i. Neither true nor false 
ii. True or false (de eloquendo) 
A. Simple (de proloquendo) 
B. Combined (de proloquiorum summa) 
 
The following chart summarizes the structure and classifications outlined in the 













     
 
Figure 1. The structure and classifications outlined in the first four chapters of the De 




Having outlined the divisions of the dialectic, Augustine dwells on the part 
relating to signification (de loquendo). Chapter V of the treatise is the essential 
knot for the interpretation of the work, it being there that the first definitions of 
verbum (“word”), res (“thing”) and signum (“sign”) are formulated: 
 
Verbum est uniuscuiusque rei signum, quod ab audiente possit intellegi, a 
loquente prolatum. Res est quidquid vel sentitur vel intelligitur vel latet. Signum 
est quod et se ipsum sensui et praeter se aliquid animo ostendit. Loqui est arti-
culata voce signum dare. Articulatam autem dico quae comprehendi litteris 
potest.  
 
(A word is a sign of any sort of thing. It is spoken by a speaker and can be 
understood by a hearer. A thing is whatever is sensed or is understood or hidden. 
A sign is something which is itself sensed and which indicates to the mind 
something beyond the sign itself. To speak is to give a sign by means of an 
articulate utterance.)16  
 
In this chapter, the whole discourse of Augustine revolves around the concept of 
signum. The definitions, each of them being concatenated, in fact, lead to the 
concept of word as a sign, that it is therefore the key notion. 
Verbum is a sign that, coming from the speaker and reaching the listener, 
directs the mind of the listener to the thing (res).  
Res is the external object. It is that which is perceived directly, insofar as 
corporeal, by the senses, or inasmuch as incorporeal, by the mind, or remaining 
hidden from the direct perception of the senses and of the mind, it is inferred 
starting from what is directly perceived.  
Signum is what – inasmuch as it is a sensible reality that incorporates in 
itself an intelligible content – coming into contact with a subject that perceives 
it, makes it possible to show (to the senses) the sign in itself and (to the mind) 
something other than the sensible, of which, the sign as sign, is constituted. 
On these premises, Augustine presents speaking (loqui) as the giving of a 
sign (signum dare) through an articulate utterance (vox articulata). The latter, in 
turn, is intended as the sound deployed by phonatory organs of man under the 
direction of reason (intentionality). In De dialectica, vox articulata means what 
can be transcribed in letters (litterata). The term vox articulata will reoccur in 
the De magistro, however, with a different meaning. As L. G. Kelly (2002: 15) 
pointed out: “In Augustine vox articulata means a ‘sound bearing a meaning’ 
and is synonymous with vox litterata, for what is clearly pronounced can also 
be written (De magistro x.34)”. In costrast to the De dialectica, in the De 
magistro the term vox articulata is generally coupled with the locution cum 
aliquo significato (with some significance). This suggests that the meaning 
                                                                          
16  Dial. 5 (trans. Jackson, De dialectica, 87). 
1.4. Definitions of verbum, res, signum, loqui and  
vox articulata 
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attached to the adjective articulata in the De magistro highlights the link 
between a phonic expression and its meaning (rather than its transcribability).17 
Giovanni Manetti (1993 [1987]: 158) reached the conclusion that the 
concept of sign in Augustine and the terminological distinctions outlined in the 
De dialectica can be compared with the modern concepts of signifier, signified 
and referent. The author proposes a semiotic triangle, which we quote in full 





Figure 2. The semiotic triangle (Manetti 1993 [1987]: 158) 
 
 
The terminological difference between vox articulata, sonus and dicibile is 
discussed in the following sections. It should be noted that, according to 
Todorov (1982 [1977]: 47), Augustine’s definition of verbum – “A word is a 
sign of any sort of thing. It is spoken by a speaker and can be understood by the 
hearer” – highlights the existence of a twofold relationship linked to one 
another in the same definition. On the one hand, it infers the relationship 
between the sign (signum) and the thing (res) that concerns the framework of 
designation and signification; on the other hand, it infers the relation between 
the speaker and the hearer that relates to the dimension of communication.  
 This twofold relationship can be traced as follows (see Fig. 3): 
 
   
 
Figure 3. The dimensions of signification and communication 
                                                                          
17  I owe this terminological clarification to Prof. Costantino Marmo (as reported in the 
preliminary review of the 9th March 2018). 
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As pointed out in the introduction, the sensibility towards the communicative 
dimension is one of the characteristic features of Augustinian semiotics and is 
also an innovative element as compared to the previous tradition. Ruef (1981: 
86) noted, in this regard: “Das Charakteristikum von Augustinus Zeichentheorie 
ist dies, dass sie auf kommunikationstheoretischen Grundlagen beruht”.18 Thus, 
to communicate means to activate in the mind of someone else something that is 
in our own mind and it implies the voluntary and intentional transfer of an idea 
from a sign-giver to one or more sign-receiver(s). 
One of the characteristic elements of Augustine’s definition of signum is its 
pragmatic collocation and the social significance that it implies. Simone (1969: 
106), who writes that “la presenza di una audiens e di un loquens è considerata 
elemento costitutivo della natura stessa del segno linguistico”,19 highlighted this 
point. 
 
1.4.1. Written words and spoken words 
Augustine suggests that every word is sound20 and distinguishes the spoken 
word from the written word. The spoken word is a sign of the thing, whereas the 
written word is a sign of the spoken word; that is, it is able to signifiy the sound 
to the mind. This means that the vision of written letters ensures that the 
recognition of the sound (of which the written letters are signs) takes place in 
the mind, as well as the necessary recognition of the signified present in the 
fonic sign and consequently in the graphic sign.  
Suggesting that every word is sound, Augustine uses the term sonus. As 
noted earlier, we have already encountered the use by Augustine of vox arti-
culata in order to refer to the phonic side of the verbal sign. We must at this 
point determine whether vox articulata and sonus are interchangeable terms or 
if these are concepts that, although partially overlapping, pertain to different 
meanings.   
Each word is, at one and the same time, both sonus and vox articulata. Yet 
sonus (the sound) is considered unrelated to the intelligible content, whereas the 
vox articulata (articulate voice) is in relation to the intelligible content signified 
by it. Therefore, the examination of sound is the task of rhetoric, while the study 
of the voice is the task of the preliminary part of the dialectic, which is the 
general doctrine of grammar. Dialectic proper is concerned with the study of 
meaning insofar as it is meaning (that is, thought insofar as it is thought). Thus, 
sonus is not subject to the doctrine of dialectic, yet the act of disputing about the 
sonus is subject to dialectic – insofar as it is dialectic that clarifies the laws and 
rules of disputing correctly. 
                                                                          
18  «The characteristic feature of Augustine’s sign theory is that it is based on principles of 
communication theory». My own translation from German. 
19  «The presence of an audiens and a loquens is considered a constitutive element of the 
nature of the linguistic sign». My translation from Italian. 
20  A word can be conceived as sound by placing emphasis on the sonic dimension of an 
uttered word. 
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1.4.2. Signs of things and signs of words:  
object language and metalanguage 
Augustine appears to have been “the first thinker who identified the distinction 
between object language and metalanguage” (Simone 1969: 106).21 Having out-
lined the fundamental concepts discussed above and having stated that the 
sound aspect per se is not part of dialectic, some observations of considerable 
importance follow: 
 
Sed cum verba sint signa rerum, quando de ipsis / obtinent, verborum autem illa, 
quibus de his disputatur – nam cum de uerbis loqui nisi verbis nequeamus et cum 
loquimur nonnisi de aliquibus rebus loquimur – occurrit animo ita esse verba 
signa rerum, ut res esse non desinant.  
 
(Words are signs of things whenever they refer to them, even though those 
[words] by which we dispute about [words] are [signs] of words. For since we 
are unable to speak of words except by words and since we do not speak unless 
we speak of some things, the mind recognizes that words are signs of things, 
without ceasing to be things).22  
 
In this passage, Augustine sharply distinguishes between signum rei (word as a 
sign of thing) and signum verbi (word as a sign of word): one can dispute 
through words not only about things but also about words (about the sound of 
words, the parts of speech as well as the meaning conveyed through words 
insofar as they are signified). In other words, a meta-language can be achieved 
that has language itself – in its various levels – as its own object, in a nutshell, a 
language about language.  
In the case of signum verbi, the word is, on one hand, what it is talked about 
(the object, res), and on the other hand, it is what we are talking with (what 
allows us to talk about something else): one word constitutes the object 
language, the other the metalanguage.   
The distinction between object language and metalanguage is possible only 
in virtue of the distinction between signum and res that Augustine outlined. The 
distinctive character of the sign is to have a special status which makes it 
capable of being, at one and the same time, sign and thing – the sign as sign, in 
fact, does not cease to be a thing. These two functions are not contradictory but 
complementary. As we will see in what follows, this is a recurrent theme in 
Augustine’s writings. 
As noted by Simone (1969: 107), Augustine conceived of the distinction 
between signum and res in terms of a relative, functional and mobile 
relationship, rather than as an absolute, static and definitive relationship.  
In conclusion, word qua sign is, from two different points of view, signum 
and res, sign and thing (see Fig. 4). 
                                                                          
21  My translation from Italian: «Agostino pare essere stato il primo pensatore che abbia 
individuato la distinzione tra lingua-oggetto e metalingua» (Simone 1969: 106). 
22  Dial. 5,8 (trans. Jackson, De dialectica, 89). 
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Figure 4. Signum rei and sigum verbi 
 
 
1.4.3. The twofold nature of the sign 
The sign is thus of a relational nature showing (ostendit) something other than 
itself. Therein lies the importance of the sign in semiotics: the reference of the 
sign to something else. In this respect, the reflection about the sign is of the 
utmost actuality, proven by its application in semiotic theories of this century. 
This vision of the sign is apparent in Roman O. Jakobson, who speaks of the 
sign as a renvoi, that is, the phenomenon of referral or standing-for, and 
resumes exactly the same principle of Augustine: 
Why is it necessary to make a special point of the fact that sign does not fall 
altogether with object? Because beside the direct awareness of the identity 
between sign and object (A is A1), there is a necessity for the direct awareness of 
the inadequacy of that identity (A is not A1). The reason this antinomy is 
essential is that without contradiction there is no mobility of concepts, no 
mobility of signs, and the relationship between concept and sign becomes auto-
matized. Activity comes to halt, and the awareness of reality dies out. (Jakobson 
1981 [1934]: 750) 
Moreover, the sign retains the character of duality – sensible and intelligible –  
insofar as on one hand it implies a relation between the sign (signum) and the 
senses (sensus) and, on the other, a relation between the sign and the mind 
(animus), which, through the sign, apprehends something that is not the sign in 
itself. This means that the sign presupposes, simultaneously, a twofold relation-





Figure 5. The twofold character of the sign 
 
Sensus refers to the perceptible character of the sign. A sign, insofar as it 
presents a sensible side, can be perceived in various ways depending on the 
human senses engaged in the process of sign perception. The modalities of sign 
perception vary according to the sense to which the sign refers. A sign, in fact, 
can be perceived through the sense of hearing, of sight or through the use of 
other senses.  
In the De dialetica, Augustine merely points out this aspect without going 
into the merits of the various kinds of sign that can be classified according to 
the sense perception or sense production. As we shall see in the course of our 
enquiry, Augustine discusses such matters elsewhere.  
Summarily, the elements that characterize Augustine’s definition of the sign 
as outlined in the De dialectica are: 
 
1.  The relational nature of the sign – namely, the reference of the sign to 
something other than the sign iyself; 
2.  The twofold nature of the sign: sensible and intelligible; 
3.  The social nature of the sign; 
4.  The intentional nature of the sign. 
5.  The intersubjective nature of the sign. 
 
1.4.4. Augustine’s tetradic semiotic theory:  
verbum, dicibile, dictio, and res 
Now we come to the crux of the matter as discussed by Augustine in the fifth 
chapter of the treatise. Like we said, this part has a special significance for the 
present study insofar as Augustine presents important conceptual distinctions 
that fall into a general theory of semantics. 
Here is the excerpt where Augustine distinguishes four conceptual corner-
stones of his semiotic theory.  Todorov (1982 [1977]: 21) considered this part of 
the chapter as “a particularly obscure page of the treatise”; therefore, we 
decided to report the text in extenso, not only for the richness of its content, but 
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also because it has given rise to a number of interpretations not always 
concordant: 
 
Cum ergo verbum ore procedit, si propter se procedit id est ut de ipso verbo 
aliquid quaeratur aut disputetur, res est utique disputationi quaestionique 
subiecta, sed ipsa res verbum vocatur. Quidquid autem / ex verbo non aures sed 
animus sentit et ipso animo tenetur inclusum, dicibile vocatur. Cum vero verbum 
procedit non propter se sed propter aliud aliquid significandum, dictio vocatur. 
Res autem ipsa, quae iam verbum non est neque verbi in mente conceptio, sive 
habeat verbum quo significari possit, sive non habeat, nihil aliud quam res 
vocatur proprio iam nomine. Haec ergo quattuor distincta teneantur; verbum, 
dicibile, dictio, res. 
 
(When, therefore, a word is uttered for its own sake, that is, so that something is 
being asked or argued about the word itself, clearly it is the thing which is the 
subject of disputation and inquiry; but the thing in this case is called a verbum. 
Now that which the mind not the ears perceives from the word and which is held 
within the mind itself is called a dicibile. When a word is spoken not for its own 
sake but for the sake of signifying something else, it is called a dictio. The thing 
itself which is neither a word nor the conception of a word in the mind, whether 
or not it has a word by which it can be signified, is called nothing but a res in the 
proper sense of the name. Therefore, these four are to be kept distinct: the 
verbum, the dicibile, the dictio, and the res.)23 
 
Augustine addresses the problem of the relationship between the sign and what the 
sign is a sign of, by distinguishing the concepts verbum, dicibile, dictio and res. 
Recalling the previously defined distinction between signum verbi (sign of 
words) and signum rei (sign of things), verbum performs both sign-functions: 
the word is a sign of words because we speak about words only through words; 
nevertheless, the word does not cease to be a sign of things (signum rei), 
inasmuch as the word, referring to itself (propter se) becomes the subject of 
discourse and the object of that metalinguistic function that language possesses. 
Verbum, then, in this passage refers to the word that refers to itself, becoming 
the object of question and discussion. 
The second distinction made by Augustine is the dicibile, and it is 
distinguished by the verbum, as the former is what is perceived by the mind and 
that in the mind itself is enclosed (sed quod in verbo intelligitur et in animo 
continentur). The dicibile is what is understood in the word, in the mind of the 
listener; it is what the mind conceives of the word uttered.  
The dictio, instead, is the enunciation: it includes both the verbum and the 
dicibile; it is thus the unity of the signifier and the signified. Unlike the verbum  –  
spoken to signify itself (propter se) – the dictio intends to signify something 
that is other than itself, and of which it is the sign. 
Res, finally, it is the external object: it is what is neither verbum nor the 
dicibile nor the dictio. 
                                                                          
23 Dial. 5,8 (trans. Jackson, De dialectica, 89). 
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1.5. The “force” of the words (vis verborum) 
In this brief but revealing section of the treatise (Ch. VII), Augustine takes up 
the subject of the force of words (vis verborum).24 Besides having a 
signification, words do have a “force” (vis), which is directly proportional to the 
ability to impact, affect, of move (movere) the listener. The force of words is, 
thus, an indicator of the effect of words upon the hearer. 
 Augustine explicates this concept as follows: 
 
Vis verbi est, qua cognoscitur quantum valeat. Valet autem tantum quantum 
movere audientem potest. 
 
(The force of a word is that whereby the extent of its efficacy is learned. It has 
efficacy to the extent to which it is able to affect the hearer.)25 
 
The force of a word is the measure of its value: the greater the force of a word, 
the greater the value. Thus, the vis verborum oscillates through a spectrum that 
goes from a high degree of efficacy to a lower one.  
 There are three ways in which a word affects the hearer: 
 
(1) On its own account (secundum se); 
a. In relation to the sense; 
i. By nature; 
ii. By custom; 
b. In relation to art; 
c. In relation to both sound and art. 
(2) On account of what the word signifies (secundum id quod significat); 
(3) On both its own account and what the word signifies. 
 
The first modality according to which a word exerts its force relates to the word 
considered in itself – the word taken as a word – prescinding from the 
signification of the word (what it signifies). Here the emphasis is on the phonic 
dimension of the verbal sign and how the perception of the sound impacts the 
hearer. This perspective, thus, focuses on the word as perceived sound by the 
listener.  
The sense of the listener is effected in two way: either by nature or by 
custom. Some words, Augustine maintains, have a rougher sound, whereas 
others are more soft and gentle. This is so by nature. An illustration of this is the 
name /King Artaxerxes/. Upon hearing it, the hearer is unpleasantly impressed 
because of the harshness this word expresses, whereas the name /Euryalus/ is 
smoother to the ear: “For, who, even though he has heard nothing about the men 
                                                                          
24 Norman Kretzmann (1972 1967: 366) refers to vis as “import” of words. 
25 Dial. 7,12 (trans. Jackson, De dialectica, 101). 
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who are named, will not suppose that there is great harshness in the former and 
mildness in the latter?”.26  
Besides the sound of a word, the sense is also affected by custom. This way 
of efficacy of the word has to do with the “degree of familiarity to the hearer” 
(Kretzmann 1972 1967: 366). An uttered word can either sound familiar or 
foreign to the hearer according to his/her linguistic competence: “This has 
nothing to do with the smoothness or roughness of sound, but rather with the 
extent to which the passing sounds themselves are received by the inner 
chambers of the ears as familiar guests or as strangers”.27 As Cassin and 
colleagues aptly noted:  
 
[…] the word is instituted as a function of a certain (immediate or mediate) 
relation to the thing; its pronunciation will thus provoke a sensory impression in 
the listener, which will induce an intellectual impression dependent either on the 
nature of the word (the “softness” or “harshness” of its sound, for instance), on 
the thing it signifies, or both. (Cassin et al. 2014b: 956)  
 
Words can also affect the hearer by art or by both sense and art. Here Augustine 
has in mind the context in which an uttered word is perceived and appraised 
with reference to a particular discipline whose purpose is to identify the word as 
a part of speech (grammar) or as a poetic meter (metrics). Augustine refers to 
the word /optimus/ whose two short syllables captured by the ear allow one to 
catalogue this word as a form of dactyl in metrics. 
A word can affect the hearer on account on what it signifies (prescinding 
from an analysis of the word taken per se):  
 
Iam vero non secundum se, sed secundum id quod significat verbum movet, 
quando per verbum accepto signo animus nihil aliud quam rem ipsam intuetur, 
cuius illud signum est quod accepit. 
 
(A word affects sense on account of what it signifies rather than on its own 
account when the mind receives a sign by a word and considers nothing other 
than the thing itself whose sign has been received.)28 
 
Tarmo Toom (2007: 411) maintains that “when Augustine mentions a word 
affecting on account of what it signifies …, he has a semiosis, the scientia 
signorum, in mind”. Here Augustine anticipates a principle that will be taken up 
and further developed in the De magistro and reiterated in the De trinitate. 
Lastly, a word affects the hearer “both on its own account and on account of 
what it signifies”, and in this case “both the statement itself and that which is 
stated by means of it are attended to together”.29 As an illustration of this, 
Augustine considers the sentence /He had squandered his patrimony by hand, 
                                                                          
26 Dial. 7,12 (trans. Jackson, De dialectica, 101). 
27 Dial. 7,12 (trans. Jackson, De dialectica, 101). 
28 Dial. 7,13 (trans. Jackson, De dialectica, 101). 
29 Dial. 7,13 (trans. Jackson, De dialectica, 101). 
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by belly, and by penis/. This sentence maintains a certain decorum in the 
expression because the same referent (the male genital organ) could have been 
also expressed using a much more sordid and vulgar word. In other words, the 
shamefulness of the thing signified is veiled by the dignity of the word used to 
signify it. Although both words signify the same thing there is a difference in 
their force. In the case in which a more inappropriate terminology is used, both 
the ugliness of the expression (the word in its own account) and the shame-
fulness of the thing signified (what it signifies) would affect in tandem the sense 
and the mind.    
Such an explication leads Augustine two distinguish a twofold perspective: 
the presentation of the truth, which is the concern of the dialectician, and the 
preservation of propriety of language, which is the concern of the rhetorician.   
The threefold classification of the modalities in which the force of words is 
manifested echoes the various perspectives in which words as signs can be 
conceived, namely, the word in relation to itself, the word in relation to the 
thing it signifies, or the word in relation to both. This minute dissection of the 
word in several facets seems novel and valuable because it allows him to focus 
on different aspects of the sign and how it affects the sign-receiver. We can 
notice that in this chapter of the De dialectica Augustine engages with a 
pragmatic dimension, which studies the relations between signs and interpreters 
(Morris 1938) or the relations between words and the listener.  
 
  
1.6. Pragmatics of disambiguation 
In the following chapter (Ch. 8), Augustine identifies two main hindrances that 
may hamper the force of words, namely, obscurity and ambiguity. The diffe-
rence between the two concepts is explained in these terms: 
 
[…] Quod in ambiguo plura se ostendunt, quorum quid potius accipiendum sit 
ignoratur, in obscuro autem nihil aut parum quod attendatur apparet.  
(In what is ambiguous more than one thing is presented, but one does not know 
which of them is to be understood; in what is obscure, on the other hand, nothing 
or very little appears to be considered.)30 
 
What is ambiguous refers to several things that are suggested simultaneously. 
Later, we will see that Augustine depicts these ideas as a crossroads with many 
paths, multiple forks in a road (multivium). However, in the case of obscurity, 
nothing or very little suggests its meaning. Ambiguity and obscurity, however, 
can easily overlap, especially when a word is conveyed but very little is 
manifested about its signification. To untie this knot, that is, the similarity 
between ambiguity and obscurity, Augustine gives a brilliant example: 
 
                                                                          
30 Dial. 8,7 (trans. Jackson, De dialectica, 103–104). 
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Sed ubi parum est quod apparet, obscurum est ambiguo simile: veluti si quis 
ingrediens iter excipiatur aliquo bivio vel trivio vel etiam ut ita dicam multivio 
loco, ibique densitate nebulae nihil viarum quod est eluceat. Ergo a pergendo 
prius obscuritate terretur; at ubi aliquantum rarescere nebulae coeperint, videtur 
aliquid, quod utrum via sit an terrae proprius et nitidior color incertum est. Hoc 
est obscurum ambiguo simile. Dilucescente autem caelo quantum oculis satis sit 
iam omnium viarum deductio clara est, sed qua sit pergendum non obscuritate 
sed ambiguitate dubitatur.  
 
(When a little appears, obscurity is similar to ambiguity, as when someone who 
is walking on a road comes upon a junction with two, three, or even more forks 
of the road, but can see none of them on account of the thickness of a fog. Thus, 
at first, he is kept from proceeding by obscurity. When the fog begins to lift a bit, 
something can be seen, but it is uncertain whether there is any road or any of the 
bright colors typical on the earth. This is obscurity similar to ambiguity. When 
the sky clears enough for good visibility, the direction of all the roads is 
apparent, but which is to be taken is still in doubt, not because of any obscurity 
but solely because of ambiguity.)31 
 
An object can be either manifest or obscure to the mind and/or to the senses. By 
combining the different logical alternatives of an object being either manifest or 
obscure to the mind and/or to the senses, Augustine singles out three kinds of 
obscurity: 
 
(i) Something is manifest to the senses but is obscure (or close) to the 
mind; 
(ii) Something would be manifest to the mind if it were not inaccessible to 
the senses; 
(iii)  Something is obscure both to the senses and to the mind. 
 
He provides illustrations for all the three kinds of obscurity. An example of the 
first kind is when someone, who has never seen a pomegranate nor has ever 
heard what sort of fruit this is, sees a picture of a pomegranate. He would not be 
able to recognize the object depicted because this object is unknown to his mind 
although it is manifests to his eyes. Conversely, the second kind of obscurity 
occurs when there is a picture of pomegranate in the darkness. As soon as the 
darkness disappears and the eyes can see the object, the mind will recognize 
what is depicted without hesitations. Augustine’s own example of the third kind 
of obscurity is a man who, without prior knowledge and experience of a 
pomegranate, seeks to recognize the picture of a pomegranate in the dark. Of 
the three kinds of obscurity, the third is the most obscure. Thus, obscurity 
reaches its zenith with the third kind. This is so because even if that thing which 
is hidden to the senses would be revealed, the mind would not be able to grasp 
it. Baldassari (1985: 22) pointed out that Augustine’s threefold distinction of 
                                                                          
31 Dial. 8,7 (trans. Jackson, De dialectica, 105). 
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obscurities echoes the Stoics’ theory of ambiguity and he applies it to the 
relation between signifier and signified. 
In order to show how his distinction applies to language, in the reminder of  
chapter 8, Augustine discusses two linguistic examples of obscurity, temetum 
(wine) and magnus (great). The three illustrations of kinds of obscurity 
discussed above are extended to the analysis of the word temetum. Suppose that 
students attending a class of grammar are arranged spatially at different 
distances from their teacher, so that they would form three different groups 
according to the distance that separates them from the teacher – (1) those seated 
nearby the teacher, (2) those that were at some distance from him, and (3) those 
who were farthest from him. Suppose also that, for some reason, only some of 
those who were seated farthest from him knew what temetum is, whereas of the 
others were not acquainted with the meaning of this word. It is apparent, then, 
that all three groups were, for different reasons, rambling in the dark. If the 
grammar teacher utters the word temetum in a very low voice, the pupils who 
sat nearby him heard it distinctly, those who sat at some distance heard it less 
clearly, and those who were the farthest away were unable to hear the sound of 
the word. These three groups of students illustrate the three kinds of obscurity: 
those who heard distinctly the sound of the word but did not know its meaning, 
represent the first kind. Those who knew the word temetum and yet could not 
hear its sound distinctly or not at all, represent the second kind. Those who 
neither were acquainted with the sound of the word spoken by the teacher nor 
with its significance, exemplify the third and most severe type of obscurity. 
Augustine concludes that “one who speaks in a loud enough voice, with good 
articulation, and using the best-known words, will avoid all the varieties of 
speaking obscurely”.32  
Augustine continues his analysis of the pragmatics of disambiguation by 
tackling the issue of ambiguity and its types. Augustine, as usual, provides 
insightful examples. The setting is, once again, a grammar teacher with his 
students as his audience. Suppose the teacher spells out just one word that 
everyone is acquainted with as, for instance, magnus (great), followed by 
silence. By simply uttering this word and then pausing, without providing the 
reference to any specific context, the grammar teacher would leave his students 
completely in the dark as to how to interpret this term. What could the grammar 
teacher mean with one single word? It is apparent that the word magnus has 
multifarious interpretations depending on the context in which the word occurs: 
grammar (“What part of speech is it?”), metrics, (“What sort of [metrical]foot is 
it”), history (Pompey the Great, how many wars did he wage?”, poetry (“Great 
and almost unique is the poet Virgil?”), or simply reproaching the students’ 
negligence (“Great laziness toward studies has come upon to you!”).33 It is 
                                                                          
32  Dial. 8,2 (trans. Jackson, De dialectica, 107): «Omnia igitur obscure loquendi genera 
vitabit, qui et lvoce quantum satis est clara nec ore impedita et verbis notissimis utetur». 
33  Dial. 8,2 (trans. Jackson, De dialectica, 107). 
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apparent that one single word, taken out of context, could give rise to numerous 
interpretations and bring out several referents.  
Augustine further spells out the concept of ambiguity. He does not subscribe 
to the view (held by the Stoics) that every word is ambiguous, or to the 
principle (held by Hortensius in Cicero), that because words are ambiguous it 
therefore is not feasible to explain ambiguous words by means of ambiguity. 
Augustine clarifies that when it is said that words are ambiguous this concerns 
only single words. Single words are disambiguated by conjoined words. In other 
words, a word is ambiguous when it is considered in isolation. However, when 
a word in included into a discourse it cannot be said that words are ambiguous.  
Like obscurity, also ambiguity is distinguished into various kinds. Augustine 
provides a very detailed set of distinctions that are embedded one into the other. 
The first two kinds of ambiguity are the following: 
 
(i) Ambiguity in what is said;34 
(ii) Ambiguity in what is written. 
 
An illustration of the first kind occurs if someone were to hear the word aciens 
(sharpness), without a clear reference to the discourse or statement in which it 
appears. He would be very uncertain as to whether this expression refers to (a) 
the point of a military formation, (b) the sharpness of a sword, or (c)  the 
acuteness of one’s vision.  
Likewise, an illustration of the second kind (ambiguity in what is written) 
occurs when someone reads the written expression leporem, with no reference 
to its context. There would be a degree of uncertainty in regard to the quantity 
of syllables – “whether the penultimate syllable of the word is to be drawn out 
as a form of ‘lepos’ (wit) or whether it is to be shortened as a form of ‘lepus’ 
(hare)”.35 
The first kind of ambiguity is, in turn, divided into two further kinds. When-
ever something is said, many things can be understood. This leads to the 
bifurcation into univocally named terms and equivocally named terms. 
The first head of this twofold division, univocal expressions, refers to many 
things that can be included under the same name and under the same definition. 
This idea is easier to be grasped by way of an example, as does Augustine. The 
example for a univocal term is the word homo (man), whose definition is “a 
rational, mortal animal”. It is apparent that this term is equally applicable to a 
                                                                          
34  Notice that Baldassarri (1985: 23) refers to this first kind of ambiguity as ambiguity in 
spoken and written expressions: «Vengono quindi distinte due specie di ambiguità: 
l’amniguità che si presenta e in ciò che è scritto e in ciò che è detto e l’ambiguità che si 
presenta solo in ciò che è scritto»). 
35  Dial. 9,13 (trans. Jackson, De dialectica, 109): «[…] utrum paenultima huius verbi 
syllaba producenda sit ab eo quod est ‘lepos’ an ab eo quod est ‘lepus’ corripienda - quam 
scilicet non pateretur ambagionem, si accusativum huius nominis casurn voce loquentis 
acciperet».  
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wide variety of tokens which can all be listed under the same rubric and that are 
all contained in the definition: 
 
Hominem cum dicimus, tam puerum dicimus quam iuvenem, quam senem, tam 
stultum quam sapientem, tam magnum quam parvum, tam civem quam 
peregrinum, tam urbanum quam agrestem, tam qui iam fuit quam qui nunc est, 
tam sedentem quam stantem, tam divitem quam pauperem, tam agentem aliquid 
quam cessantem, tam gaudentem quam maerentem vel neutrum. Sed in his 
omnibus dictionibus nihil est, quod non ut hominis nomen accepit ita etiam 
hominis definitione claudatur.  
 
(When we speak of a man we speak equally of a boy and of a young man and of 
an old man, equally of a fool and of a wise man, equally of someone large and of 
someone small, of a citizen and a foreigner, of a city-dweller and a country-
dweller, of one who was and of one who now is, of someone sitting and of 
someone standing, of a plutocrat and a pauper, of one doing something and of 
one doing nothing, of one who rejoices and of one who mourns and of one who 
does neither. Among all these eight expressions  there is not one which does not 
accept the name ‘man’ in such a way as to be included by the definition of 
man.)36 
 
Thus, univocally named things are those that are included in one term as well as 
in one definition of that term, although each of the things included have their 
own names and definition and, as such, are distinguished one from another. 
Equivocation, in turn, occurs when many things can have one name, thus 
leading to different interpretations. Equivocation is a very entangled issue and 
has many divisions and subdivisions within itself. Augustine first distinguished 
three kinds of ambiguity based on equivocation:  
 
(i) Equivocation deriving from the liberal arts (ab arte); 
(ii) Equivocation that stems from the use of words (ab usu); 
(iii) Equivocation that derives from both of these together. 
 
The first kind of ambiguity based on equivocals is due to the highly specialized 
metalanguage or vocabulary tailored and employed by the discipline that deals 
with words (such as grammar and dialectic). The same term (Tullius) may have 
different significations depending on whether a grammarian or a dialectician 
would be called to define the same word (because Tullius is at the same time a 
name and a dactylic foot, depending on the disciplinary viewpoint’s that 
variously define the same term). 
The second kind of equivocals derives from the use (ab usu) of words. Use is 
defined as “that for the sake of which we learn words”. Withdrawing attention 
from the disciplines that study words, also for the layman who hears the word 
Tullius this term would be quite ambiguous. Tullius is in fact an equivocal term 
because this term may signify various things: the famous and great orator, a 
                                                                          
36  Dial. 9,20 (trans. Jackson, De dialectica, 111). 
48 
picture or a statue of him, a book with his writings, and so forth. The first and 
second kind of equivocation can be combined and give rise to a third type which 
is derived by a mix of both, by equivocation from art and from use. 
Proceeding with the classification of equivocals, the first kind (ambiguity in 
the liberal arts) is in turn divided into. Words that cause ambiguity in the liberal 
arts can either be the examples of themselves or they cannot. If I were to define 
what “word” means I could use /word/ as an illustration of the definition. This is 
not always possible. If I were to define the meaning of “adverb” I could not be 
able to use /adverb/ as an example of itself. 
Like the first, also the second kind of ambiguity based on equivocation (the 
one that is derived from the use of words) is divided into two forms. The 
rationale grounding this division is that equivocal terms could stem from either 
the same origin or from a different one. Equivocals originating from the same 
source are those things that are comprised in the same term although they are 
not included under one and the same definition. In the example quoted above, 
Tullius can refer to many different things (the man, the statue the book, and the 
corpse). However, these four references cannot be included under one single 
definition, nonetheless, they have a common matrix, as it were, or source (the 
man Tullius). 
Equivocal expressions that have different origins are illustrated by the term 
nepos: this word can signify either the son’s son or a spendthrift based on 
origin. 
Equivocal expressions of the same origin are further subdivided into two 
subspecies: one occurs by means of “transference” and the one through 
“declension”. Transference occurs in many ways: (1) When “by similarity one 
name is used for many things”; (2) when “the part is named from the whole”; 
(3) when the whole is named from the part; or (4) “the species from the genus”; 
or (5) “the genus from the species”; or (6) “the effect from the cause”; or (7) the 
cause from the effect; or (8) “what is contained from the container”; or (9) vice 
versa. 
   
1.7. Conclusion  
The thirty-two-years-old Augustine outlines the rudiments of his theory of the 
sign in a treatise that remains incomplete and that, for years, was considered of 
dubious authorship. The De dialectica poses serious difficulties of interpretation 
for its incompleteness as well as for the lack of sources. In fact, in regards to the 
first point, the work cannot offer conclusive interpretations insofar as only an 
unfinished draft of it was found. It is difficult, if not impossible, to make a 
conclusive judgment on the merits of a work that came to us as an unfinished 
draft. However, despite these difficulties, the De dialectica is not without 
relevant theoretical achievements.  
There are several important points that can be gleaned from Augustine’s 
analysis. We have extracted five main characteristics of the conception of the 
sign as presented in this work: 
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1. The relational nature of the sign; 
2. The twofold nature of the sign; 
3. The social nature of the sign; 
4. The intentional nature of the sign. 
5. The intersubjective nature of the sign. 
 
In addition, there are several important points to be emphasized: 
 
a. the teatradic semiotic theory and the distinction between verbum, 
dicibile, dictio, and res; 
b. the fundamental distinction between object language and metalanguage; 
c. the emphasis placed on the semantic and pragmatic aspect of com-
munication. 
 
The four-fold distinction between verbum, dicibile, dictio, and res as outlined in 
the De dialectica is unique and quite original. It does not occur elsewhere in 
Augustine’s writings with this particular outlook.  
Some of the themes outlined above, instead, are typically Augustinian and 
will recur in other of his writings to which we shall now turn. 
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2. ON THE CONDITIONS AND POSSIBILITIES OF 
KNOWING: PHILOSOPHY OF SEMIOSIS IN  
AUGUSTINE’S DE MAGISTRO  
2.1. Position of the problem 
Many of the themes already treated in the De dialectica are taken up, amplified 
and deepened in the De magistro, locus classicus of the Augustinian dis-
quisitions on the nature of language.1 De magistro, written in the form of a dia-
logue, historically occurred2 between Augustine and his son Adeodatus (just 
sixteen-years-old at that time), is part of the philosophical works of Augustine 
conceived during the period of Cassiciacum.3 The dialogue was composed in 
Thagaste around 389 A.D., therefore placing itself chronologically after the De 
dialectica (387 A.D.). 
Adeodatus, whose name means “given by God”, albeit very young, is 
praised for his remarkable sharp-wittedness, extraordinary power of penetration 
and learning-ability. He was Augustine’s natural son and died prematurely at 
the age of sixteen.4 His father remembers the son’s prodigious intellectual gifts5 
in the Confessions: 
 
He was about fifteen years old, and his intelligence surpassed that of many 
serious and well-educated men. I praise you for your gifts, my Lord God, Creator 
of all and with great power giving form to our deformities. For I contributed 
nothing to that boy other than sin. You and no one else inspired us to educate 
him in your teaching. I gratefully acknowledge before you your gifts. One of my 
books is entitled The Teacher. There Adeodatus is in dialogue with me. You 
know that he was responsible for all the ideas there attributed to him in the role 
of my partner in the conversation. He was 16 at the time. I learnt many other 
remarkable things about him. His intelligence left me awestruck. Who but you 
could be the Maker of such wonders?6 
                                                                          
1 I used the critical edition of Augustine’s De magistro by W. M. Green and K. D. Daur 
(eds.), (Turnhout, 1970), Corpus Christianorum Series Latina (CCSL 29). The quotations 
from Augustine’s De magistro in English, unless it is otherwise indicated, are given in the 
translation of George G. Leckie, St. Aurelius Augustine. Concerning the Teacher and On the 
Immortality of the Soul (Appleton-Century-Croft, inc., New York, 1938). 
2  The historicity of the dialogue is a wide and very vexed question that I do not intend to 
discuss here. For an enquiry of this aspect, see G. Madec, «The Dialogues des historicité de 
Cassiciacum», Reveu des Études Augustiniennes 32, 1986, 207–231, and F. J. Crosson, 
«Show and tell: The concept of teaching in St. Augustine ‘De Magistro’», in: Pizzolato, L. 
F.; Scanavino, G. (eds.) Lectio Augustini. Settimana agostiniana pavese, 1993, 13–65. 
3  Augustine went to Cassiciacum, near Milan, in 386 in preparation for baptism.  
4  The record of Adeodatus’s death is 389 (Confessions 9,6,14). 
5  Adeodatus has also a considerable part in the dialogue De beata vita (386), written at 
Cassiciacum too. Writes Augustine: «The grandeur of his mind filled me with a kind of 
terror» (Beta v. 6). 
6  Conf. 9,6,14 (PL 32, col. 769, trans. Chadwick, Confessions, 164). 
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Father and son are not only the formal interlocutors of the dialogue, but they 
also symbolise the roles of the teacher and the learner. Augustine starts the 
conversation leading the son along a series of thought-provoking and complex 
issues, often introduced in the guise of a question.  
One of the central themes of the dialogue is teaching, intended as theory and 
practice. Very explicit in this regard is Wade (1935: 10): “Thus in the De 
Magistro we see Augustine in the very act of explaining his theory of know-
ledge making use of his own theory in a practical manner. The work is both the 
theory and the practice. A practical exemplification of the theory”.  
As we will see in detail, Augustine’s real concern was the problem of the 
conditions of the possibility and communicability of knowledge itself (Cloeren 
1984; Madec 1975: 71; Manfredini 1960: 17–27; Parodi 1996: 9; Pépin 1950). 
Moreover, in order to discuss this question, he examined a series of issues that 
today are certainly catalogued under the rubric of semiotics. Indeed, Eugenio 
Coseriu (1969: 108), Robert Markus (1957: 65), and Umberto Eco (1984) all 
claim that the De magistro is among the greatest contributions to semiotics from 
antiquity. Commenting in a similar way, Guzzo (1927: 114) states that the 
treatise established the science of expression and general linguistics. Neverthe-
less, not all studies were able to grasp this aspect of the work. Even among 
scholars overtly engaged with the disciplinary field of semiotics, such a pro-
found study of signs and signification as the De magistro does not find the place 
that one would expect it to have.  
Augustine did not explicitly say what is the true subject of the dialogue. The 
various secondary interpretations by other scholars on the content of the work 
are partial. What is, then, the trait d’union of the De magistro? Is there a 
unifying internal logic underlying the whole work?  
On the surface, the De magistro may be largely inaccessible, leading the 
reader to the conviction that s/he is facing a strictly technical work and a hard 
subject. However, if one carefully reads the dialogue, s/he will be undoubtedly 
fascinated not only by Augustine’s skilfulness and expertise in dialectics and 
grammar, as much as for the ability with which he leads his interlocutor to 
philosophise, to seek for answers and, at times, to suggest hypotheses. 
Augustine is firm in guiding the inexperienced Adeodatus, and he is know-
ledgeable in showing, through irony and a maieutic process, the will of 
compassion of the one who teaches. Through a methodology of research 
dialectically modern, Augustine tackles the heart of the problem of the whole 
text, namely, the one of the acquisition and communicability of knowledge. Is 
teaching and showing through signs altogether feasible, or is the learning 
process a relation of compassion where both protagonists, teacher and learner, 
communicate attaining to their own inward richness, longing for the final 
destination that is the attainment of truth? Moreover, what is the place of signs 
and the signifying process in respect to teaching, learning, and communication 
in general? Do signs contribute to the acquisition of knowledge or, instead, can 
the sign-mediation be altogether bypassed?  
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Essentially, in the De magistro, Augustine poses a series of questions whose 
schema is as follows: question–obvious answer; objection that refutes the 
previous answer; student that replies with a counter-objection and, in turn, is 
refuted in what is a dialectical path. Augustine comes to the truth through 
gradual and successive stages in order to lead the interlocutor to the complete 
response. This method is referred to as exercitatio animi (or mentis). Indeed, 
Augustine acknowledged that the discussion that unfolds for most of the 
fourteen chapters of the dialogue is not undertaken “for amusement, but in order 
to exercise the strength and keenness of the mind”.7  
Augustine’s discourse is cumulative and continues with sudden changes in 
directions, which lead him to dismiss the initial argument. Indeed, often, 
throughout the dialogue, a thesis previously substantiated is diametrically 
reversed, so that what seemed consolidated is questioned anew. Many 
illustrations of such a procedure can be found in the dialogue. Indeed, the thesis 
posited at the outset of the book – nothing can be taught if not by means of 
words – is dismissed by asserting exactly the contrary: nothing is learned by 
means of signs. These two opposite convictions are often taken as a point of 
bifurcation of the treatise, which results thus divided into two main parts:  
 
I) Nothing is taught if not by means of signs;  
II) Nothing is taught by means of signs. 
 
In a similar vein, the thesis initially posited that certain actions can be shown by 
enacting them after a question is asked (except for the act of speaking), thus 
avoiding the recourse to signs, is completely reverted, holding the opposite. 
The De magistro is, to a large extent, imbued with such a logic that is also 
the basis for a method of research that is conducive to the critical doubt of 
epistemological foundation. A further example of such a methodology is 
illustrated in chapter 8, paragraph 31. In one of the most evocative passages of 
the dialogue, a sole question formulated by Augustine suffices to wave the 
entire theoretical edifice that, gradually and laboriously, was built up to that 
point. The issues discussed were the following:  
 
(1) Whether anything can be taught without signs; 
(2) Whether certain signs ought to be preferred to the things which they 
signify; 
(3) Whether the cognition of things is superior to their signs.8  
 
The sole enquiry of the father, who asks whether the conclusions reached in 
regard to the three subjects listed above were firm and indisputable, leads the 
son into new doubts:  
 
                                                                          
7  Mag. 8,21 (trans. Leckie, Concerning the Teacher, 30). 
8  Mag. 10,31 (trans. Leckie, Concerning the Teacher, 41). 
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Ad. Vellem quidem tantis ambagibus atque anfractibus esset ad certa peruentum. 
Sed et ista rogatio tua nescio quomodo me sollicitat et ab assensione deterret – 
videris enim mihi non hoc de me fuisse quaesiturus, nisi haberes quod contra-
diceres – et ipsa rerum implicatio totum me inspicere ac securum respondere non 
sinit verentem, ne quid in tantis involucris lateat, quod acies mentis meae lustrare 
non possit. 
Aug. Dubitationem tuam non invitus accipio; significat enim animum minime 
temerarium; quae custodia tranquillitatis est maxima. Nam difficillimum omnino 
est non perturbari, cum ea, quae prona et procliva adprobatione tenebamus, 
contrariis disputationibus labefactantur et quasi extorquentur e manibus. 
 
(Ad. – I wish indeed to have arrived at certainty after such great doubts and 
complications, but your question disturbs me, although I do not know why, and 
keeps me from agreeing. For I see that you would not have asked me about this, 
if you did not have some objection to raise, and the problem is such a labyrinth 
that I am not able to explore it thoroughly or to answer with assurance, for I am 
disquieted let something lie hidden in these windings which evades the keenness 
of my mind. 
Aug. – I commend your hesitation. For it indicates a mind which is cautious and 
this is the greatest safeguard to equanimity. It is very difficult not to be perturbed 
when things we consider easily and readily provable are shaken by contrary 
arguments and, as it were, wrenched from our hands.)9  
 
In this passage, as in many others, Adeodatus shows his critical abilities, and 
the doubt he raised is granted by Augustine, for only the critical spirit and 
methodological doubt lead to the intellectual discovery and truth. 
 
 
2.2. Contemporary interpretations on the form and 
structure of the De magistro 
The structure of the dialogue, defined dialectically, presents a number of 
challenges in relation to both form and content. Several authors have ventured 
into the study of the inner-articulation of the work reaching inconsistent and 
divergent conclusions. Thus, it is not by chance that for some authors the De 
magistro is a pedagogical work (Allevi 1937; Casotti 1931; Eggersdorfer 1907; 
Gentili (2009 [1976]); Valentini 1936), while, for others, it is a dialogue of an 
ontological nature (Mayer 1969; 1974). That, for some, it has a linguistic-
philosophical value (Bermon 2007; Vecchio 1994), whereas for others, its 
significance is merely semiotic (Cenacchi 1985; Leckie 1938).  
The difference in terms of structure between the De dialectica and the De 
magistro is the logical consequence of the diverse approach of the two works –  
where the former is considered as a treatise, while the latter is thought of as a 
dialogue. The De magistro, on the surface, seems to elude objective criteria 
with regard to its internal partition. Massimo Parodi (1996: 5–6), apropos such a 
                                                                          
9  Mag. 10,31 (trans. Leckie, Concerning the Teacher, 41–42). 
54 
point, has observed: “It seems impossible to identify and follow a safe thread 
within a subject that the author himself does not try to expose systematically 
and neatly, even pointing out explicitly, on some occasions, the apparent 
disproportion between the commitment to the research and the results 
achieved”.10 It is only natural that the reader finds the approach given by 
Augustine to the dialogue as being non-linear and non-intelligible, not realizing 
that the purpose of the work is precisely inducing both Adeodatus (and the 
“model reader”)11 not to immediate answers but, rather, to formulate arguments 
meditated at length – in the line of what has been previously referred to as 
exercitatio mentis or animi.  
 Augustine’s auto-critical observations of the Retractationes not only failed 
to clarify the concepts expressed in the work, but increased the difficulties of 
comprehension: “I wrote a book whose title is On the Teacher. In this, there is a 
discussion, an investigation, and the discovery that there is no teacher who 
teaches man knowledge except God”.12 In a very generic fashion, then, he stated 
that the purpose of the dialogue was essentially to clarify that there is no teacher 
able to teach man, except God. In general terms, the latter is referred to as being 
the thesis of the solus magister. The review on the De magistro made by 
Augustine in his Retractationes, thus, disregarded any reference to the doctrine 
of signs, the language analysis and the quest on the conditions of knowledge 
that, as a matter of fact, constitute a large part of the dialogue.13 Many 
contemporary scholars interpreted this observation of Augustine as a reference-
point for the separation of the contents of the dialogue. We shall return shortly 
to this point. 
The difference in judgments on the interpretation of the structure of the 
treatise is due to the non-homogeneity of the criteria used on each occasion by 
the scholars for the elucidation. Some authors, in fact, considered significant the 
formal aspect of the work and the evolution of discourse; others, in contrast, 
opted for a criterion based on the content. 
In general terms, in the analysis of the reading schemes of the De magistro 
two trends are drawn: interpretations that envisage a twofold division of the 
work, and accounts that suggest, instead, a threefold division. Most interpreters 
divided the dialogue into two parts, which, albeit with some slight discrepancy, 
are generally identified as follows: 
                                                                          
10  My own translation from Italian: «Sembra impossibile individuare e seguire un filo 
conduttore sicuro, entro una materia che l’autore stesso non cerca di esporre in modo 
sistematico e ordinato, sottolineando anzi esplicitamente, in alcune occasioni, l’apparente 
sproporzione tra l’impegno nella ricerca e i risultati raggiunti« (Parodi 1996: 5–6). G. Madec 
refers to this issue not in dissimilar terms: «La lecture du De magistro d’Augustin peut être 
déconcertante pour des esprits formés à d’autres types d’argumentation» (Madec 1975: 63). 
11  I refer to the sense that U. Eco (1979b) gave to this notion. 
12  Retr. 1,12 (CPL 0250, trans. Bogan, The Retractations, 50): «… in quo disputatur et 
quaeritur, et invenitur, magistrum non esse, qui docet hominem scientiam, nisi Deum». 
13  The part of the dialogue that is concerned with signs and language, indeed, occupies 37 
sections on a total of 46 (Mandouze 1975: 789). 
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I. Discussion on signs and on language;  
II. Thesis of the solus magister. 
 
Among others, Thonnard (1952) and Wijdeveld (1937) endorsed such a twofold 
division. The reference to the dialogue Augustine made in the Retractationes, of 
which we referred supra, has contributed to lead the interpreters towards a 
similar interpretation, thus serving as a benchmark on which to base the division 
of the content of the De magistro. Hence, following this hypothesis, the work 
clearly consists of two main parts – the first discussing the functions of 
language and signs, the second dealing with the thesis of the interior teacher.  
As briefly noted above, the dissertation written in 1937 by Gerard M. 
Wijdeveld can be catalogued too within this interpretation.14 The partition he 
suggested includes a first section (§ 1–32) – which he called “dialectics” – and a 
second part that coincides with the oratio perpetua (§ 32–46). Both divisions, in 
their turn, are subdivided into quaternary partitions. We can observe Wijde-
veld’s scheme below: 
 
I First Part – Dialectic dialogue (§ 1–32) 
 
I. 1 – Introduction (§ 1–7) 
I. 2 – Signs that can be shown through signs (§ 7–18) 
I. 3 – Pause and summary of what has been said (§ 19–21) 
I. 4 – Things that can be shown through themselves and through signs (§ 22–32) 
 
II Second Part – Oratio Perpetua (§ 32–46) 
 
II. 1 Nothing can be taught by means of signs (§ 32–37) 
II. 2 Inner truth (§ 38–40) 
II. 3 Limited value of words (§ 41–45) 
II. 4 Conclusions (§ 46). 
 
 
 2.2.1. Discussion of the threefold division  
of the De magistro according to G. Madec 
In a scrupulous and detailed analysis of the structure of the De magistro, 
Goulven Madec examined both Wijdeveld’s partition as well as Thonnard’s 
and, briefly, Voss’ of which we shall discuss later. 
According to Madec (1975: 64), Wijdeveld’s hypothesis would not do 
justice of the intentions of the dialogue: “L’analyse de G. Wijdeveld est de 
nature à satisfaire l’esprit moderne épris de symétrie; ma elle ne rende pas 
compte de tous les faits observables”. 
                                                                          
14  Since I was not able to check this work de visu, I refer to the accounts given by Madec 
(1975: 64) and Gonzalez (1986: 189). 
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Both the formal aspect of the work and the evolution of discourse are 
significant for Madec, who suggested that despite the De magistro presenting 
itself as a whole, it is feasible to find two moments of formal discontinuity 
(“deux points de repère d'ordre formel” says Madec), signalled at paragraphs 19 
and 32 of the dialogue (Madec 1975: 63): 
 
(i) The first moment of rupture of the discourse is indicated by the request 
that Augustine made to his son to summarise the contents discussed up 
to that point of the dialogue. It is a sort of interlude – or, if you will, a 
pause for reflection – in which Adeodatus, on his father's request, 
recapitulates what was said (§ 19–21); 
(ii) The second moment of fracture is indicated by the transition from the 
form of the dialogue to the form of the monologue, retraceable at para-
graph 32 and lasting until the conclusion of the work as a continuous, 
uninterrupted speech of Augustine: the oratio perpetua.  
 
If the double suture of the discourse, as just described, is taken as a valid 
criterion for interpreting the entire structure of the work, then the dialogue will 
result in being divided into three fundamental parts determined by the two 
points of formal disjunction (Part one: beginning of the dialogue–summary of 
Adeodatus; Part two: the summary of Adeodatus; Part three: from the summary 
to the oratio perpetua). 
Bernd Reiner Voss (1970) endorsed this division. He identified the three 
partitions as follows: the first one extends from the beginning of the dialogue to 
the summary of Adeodatus; the second goes from the summary up to the 
transition to the oratio perpetua, and the third part from the beginning of 
Augustine’s continuous speech until the end of the work. 
Madec held that the beginning of the oratio perpetua would fall in the 
introductory section of the dialogue and would not form a part on its own within 
the work, as supposed by Voss, whose hypothesis he considered as 
“superficielle sinon artificielle” (Madec 1975: 64). In turn, Madec (1975: 65) 
proposed the following plan of the work:15 
 
I. Discussion sur le langage (§§ I–37) 
1. Les buts du langage (§§ I–2) 
2. Rien ne s’enseigne sans les signes (§§ 3–30) 
3. Rien ne s’enseigne par les signes (§§ 31–37) 
 
II. Le Christ, seul Maître de vérité (§§ 38–46). 
                                                                          
15  I. Discussion on language (§§ 1–37) 
I. 1 – Purposes of speech (§§ 1–2) 
I. 2 – Nothing can be taught without recourse to signs (§§ 3–30) 
I. 3 – Nothing can be taught through signs (§§ 31–37) 
II. Christ, the only teacher of truth (§§ 38–46). 
My own translation from French. 
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A division of the book into three parts, taking Adeodatus’ recapitulation as the 
turning point of the dialogue, is regarded as correct by Gentili (2009 [1976]) 
and Cenacchi (1985) too. While Gentili (2009 [1976]: 9) identified the three 
parts of the work labelling each of them as “semiotics” (§§1–18), “semantics” 
(§§ 19–35) and “didactics” (§§ 36–46), Cenacchi (1985: 290), who explicitly 
adopted the semiotic terminology derived from C. Morris, opted for a slightly 
different division and identified a “syntactic” (§§1–18), a “semantics” (§§ 21–
35) and a “pragmatics” (§§ 36–46). 
 
 
2.2.2. Discussion of the tripartition of the De magistro  
according to Frederick J. Crosson 
The evident difficulty in identifying with precision the parts of the dialogue, 
however, has not prevented scholars from providing novel interpretations of the 
division, as evidenced by some contemporary studies that returned to the vexed 
question of the structure of the De magistro. Indeed, the interpretation suggested 
by Madec was recently taken up and challenged by Frederick J. Crosson (1989) 
who, refuting the previous studies, concluded that the simplest and most logical 
division is the one indicated in the text itself (Crosson 1989: 121). 
Crosson maintained that the dialogue would be more properly subdivisible 
into three parts on the basis of the classification of signs as outlined by 
Augustine at chapter 4 paragraph 7 of the De magistro. We quote, in toto, the 
excerpt where the threefold division is spelled out: 
 
Aug. Cum ergo de quibusdam signis quaeritur, possunt signis signa monstrari; 
cum autem de rebus, quae signa non sunt, aut eas agendo post inquisitionem, si 
agi possunt, aut signa dando, per quae animadverti queant.  
 
(Aug. – If certain signs are asked about, then these signs can be shown by means 
of signs. But when things which are not signs are asked about, they can be shown 
either by means of doing them after the question, if they can be done, or by 
giving signs by means of which they can be called to the attention.)16  
 
In this passage, Augustine made some remarkable discriminations. To start 
with, signs are distinguished from things that are not signs, which, in the 
semiotic terminology he subscribed to, are labelled as res.  
While 1) signs can be shown by means of signs, with reference to 2) res two 
options are spelled out:  
 
a)  Things (that are not signs) can be demonstrated by doing things themselves, 
assuming that the things that are subject to question can be carried out (if 
these are actions), after the request has been addressed; 
b)  Things (that are not signs) can be shown through signs. 
                                                                          
16  Mag. 4,7 (trans. Leckie, Concerning the Teacher, 12). 
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Crosson took the tripertita distributio as the key to interpret the structure of the 
work altogether for, in his view, “it commands the whole of the remainder of 
the dialogue” (Crosson 1989: 122). Thus, the partition he envisaged follows this 
order: 
 
1) §§ 4,7–8,21, where the first case of the tripartition is discussed (“Cum 
ergo de quibusdam signis quaeritur, possunt signis signa monstrari”) 
leading to the conclusion that some things (namely, signs) can be shown 
by means of signs; 
2) §§ 8,22–10,32, where the second case is discussed (“cum autem de 
rubus quae signa non sunt, aut eas agendo post inquisitionem si agi 
possunt”) and it is established that certain things (actions and natural 
phenomena) can be shown without signs; 
3) §§ 10,33–14,46, where the third case is discussed (“aut signa dando, per 
quae animadverti queant”) and is stated that nothing can be shown by 
its sign (namely, the proper name of a thing). 
 
The tripertita distributio spelled out by Augustine at chapter 4, paragraph 7 
deserves emphasis and requires further qualifications. At closer scrutiny, the 
division not only is grafted onto the bifurcation signa/res, but it tacitly 
presupposes a further criterion upon which the members can be distinguished. 
At any rate, the classification is based on a twofold criterion:  
 
a. The object of signification (signa/res); 
b. The means used in signifying. 
 
Indeed, while the bifurcation signa/res rests upon the first criterion (the object of 
the signification), the other subdivisions are made on the basis of the second 
principle, namely, the means used in order to signify the object (Balido 1993: 69).  
An excellent summary of the distinction between objects and means of 
signification with reference to Augustine’s threefold division is provided by 
Giuseppe Balido (1993) in his short but very useful study on the De magistro: 
 
 
Table 1. Objects and means used in signifying (adapted from Balido 1993: 69) 
Objects of signification Means used in signifying 
Signa (Signs) Signs 
Res (Things that are not signs) By execution (whether it is possible) Signs 
 
 
As attentively pointed out in the most recent study on the structure of the De 
magistro (Longo 1994), the abovementioned distinction is of utmost importance 
for the correct interpretation of the dialogue, since Adeodatus, at §20, returning 
to the threefold division formerly outlined by his father at § 4,7, couched it in a 
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rather different fashion. On closer scrutiny, indeed, the two divisions, are 
discordant both in terms of the order of presentation of the three members listed, 
as well as with reference to the criteria used each time as the basis for the 
divisions (Longo 1994: 2).  
The table below shows the difference in the order or presentation followed 
by each division:  
 
 
Table 2. The threefold divisions as presented in §4,7 and §20: their respective order and 
differences. 
§4,7 §20 
1. Signs shown by means of signs 1. Signs showing signs 
2. Things shown by doing them 2. Signs showing things that are not signs 
3. Things shown by means of signs 3. Things shown without signs 
 
 
It is manifest that the order of presentation of the three members forming the 
two divisions, as outlined in different points of the dialogue, is altered. What 
was previously listed as the second case in the division of § 4,7 is referred to as 
the third case in the classification of §20, and vice-versa. Thus, the two 
divisions follow an inverted structure. It is not by chance that the order of the 
second partition in comparison with the former one is altered, for such a shift is 
instrumental in supporting the thesis that nothing is shown by means of signs 
(Longo 1994: 6). 
Furthermore, there are outstanding incongruences also in respect to the 
principles used each time as the basis for the articulation of the divisions. As 
pointed out earlier, the tripartite partition outlined in § 4,7 is based on a twofold 
criterion, namely, 1) the object of signification and 2) the means used in 
signifying. On the contrary, the division discussed at §20 is ultimately grafted 
onto a different internal logic, namely, the opposition between entailing the 
recourse to signs/not entailing the recourse to signs, in order to show the object 
(Longo 1994: 3). This means that the two divisions are arranged to different 
criteria, which ultimately are not homogeneous.  





Figure 6. The threefold division as outlined in 4,7 and the criteria used for the distinc-
tions 
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On this evidence, Angela Longo voiced numerous criticisms towards Crosson’s 
interpretation and suggested a unitary reading of the dialogue. According to 
Longo’s hypothesis, it is exactly the threefold division, as rearticulated by 
Adeodatus at paragraph 20, to be taken as the structure of the remainder of the 
dialogue, rather than the one outlined by Augustine at the paragraph 4,7, as 
instead suggested by Crosson.  
Longo’s proposal has significant implications in regard to the interpretation 
of the dialogue as a whole, for it shows that the fil rouge of the De magistro is 
an enquiry on signs and language, and ultimately, all the themes treated in the 
text revolve around such a discussion (Longo 1994: 12). This also shows that 
the bifurcation of signa and res, as well as the threefold division – which, at any 
rate, is a classification based on the object and means of signification – is 
pivotal and instrumental both for the logical and thematic organization of the 
dialogue, serving as a structure for the work as a whole. From this viewpoint, 
the tripertita distributio, rather than being a mere corollary to the main thesis of 
the inner teacher, should be reckoned as a substantial part of the dialogue and 
can be thought of as an engine, as it were, around which the dialogue revolves. 
This point deserves emphasis, for it paves the way for an interpretative avenue 
that values the language analysis and, ultimately, the theory of signs laid down 
in the De magistro. 
Conclusively, from the cursory overview of the various contemporary 
interpretations of the structure of the De magistro, it is apparent that there is no 
scholarly consensus in regard to how many parts the dialogue should be 
subdivided into, and even within interpretations that are concordant in setting 
the number of the divisions, there are evident incongruences in regards both to 
the length of each partition and the terminology used each time by the 
interpreters to label the different sections identified, not to mention the precise 
point of the dialogue in which each division is meant to start and end.  
It is in plain sight that a judgement as to what is the real content of the 
dialogue, whether it is a disquisition on language and other sign-systems or an 
argument for the thesis of the inner truth, is ineluctably reflected in the 
assessment of the structure of the work and in the emphasis placed on each 
partition. Considering the focus of the present dissertation – namely, Augus-
tine’s theory of signs and signification – both Crosson’s argument that the 
whole dialogue is aligned to the three-fold division of signs set forth in § 4. 7, 
and especially Longo’s conviction that the heart of the matters lies in the 
language analysis and the enquiry on signs, are sound and in tune with the aims 
set by present research. Although the two studies reached different conclusions, 
they both emphasized the analysis of signs through a division that, at any rate, is 
based upon the bifurcation of signs and things, and the ways in which they 
signify. Ultimately, this view shows that the theological conclusion of the 
treatise (only Christ does teach) is grafted onto a skilful and instrumental 
examination of signs, which expounds at length the limits and capacity of signs 
as imperfect tools of communication, showing the implications that both signs 
61 
and the mechanism of signification have for the themes of teaching and the 
acquisition of knowledge.  
 
 
 2.3. Nature and varieties of signs:  
Augustine’s semiotic terminology  
Signum is a key notion of the treatise, and its nature is qualified as something 
that always signifies something else. A sign is, generically, defined as follows: 
 
Aug. …  non esse signum, nisi aliquid significet.  
 
(Aug. – …  a sign is not a sign unless it signifies something.)17  
 
Numerous illustrations of this occur throughout the treatise: 
 
Aug. Quid? Signum nisi aliquid significet, potest esse signum?  
Ad. Non potest. 
 
(Aug. – Can a sign be a sign unless it signifies something? 
Ad. – It cannot.)18 
 
Thus, in the dialogue is echoed the definition of sign as aliquid stat pro aliquo, 
already pointed out in the De dialectica (and discussed in Chapter 1). 
In order to avoid terminological confusions, it is worth pointing out, from 
the outset, that the term signum is used in the text with a twofold meaning: a) as 
a sign; b) as the word /signum/ itself.  
Moreover, in the De magistro the origin of the concept of signum is traced 
back to the signa militaria, the “military ensigns”.19 The latter are considered as 
signs in the proper sense of the term, which could not be said for words that, 
upon analysis, are signs in a derived sense.20 Viewed from this perspective, 
signa militaria are appropriately catalogued amongst signa in the true and 
                                                                          
17  Mag. 2,3 (trans. Leckie, Concerning the Teacher, 7). 
18  Mag. 2,3 (trans. Leckie, Concerning the Teacher, 6). 
19  The Oxford Classic Dictionary defines signa militaria as follows: «The earliest standard 
of the Roman army was the signum of the maniple. Its primitive form was a hand on the top 
of a pole, which later was replaced by a spearhead decorated with phalerae, coronae, and 
zodiac emblems. When the cohort superseded the maniple as the tactical unit, the signum of 
the leading maniple in each cohort became the chief standard of the cohort. The century had 
no separate signum. In pre-Marian army there were also five legionary standards, which 
were placed for safety in battle between the first two lines. In substitutions of these Marius 
gave each legion an aquila of silver or silver gilt with coronae as its sole decoration. The 
aquila was the numen legionis; its loss sometimes entailed the disbandment of the legion». 
(Hammond; Scullard 1949: 857). 
20  Mag. 4,9: «Aug. […] Dicimus enim et signa universaliter omnia, quae significant aliquid, 
ubi etiam uerba esse inuenimus. Dicimus item signa militaria, quae iam proprie signa 
nominantur, quo verba non pertinent». 
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primitive sense of the word, whereas verbal signs are signa only in a secondary 
and derivative meaning.  
Words, however, are not the only signs conceived by Augustine. Un-
doubtedly, the treatise shows a deep awareness of numerous kinds of signs, 
although they are not systematically treated. Signum is thus the genus that 
encompasses both words as well as other varieties of signs: spoken and written 
words, gestures, pointing fingers, pantomimes, and sign language are all 
conceived under the rubric of signs. For this reason, some scholars considered 
Augustine the precursor of the synthesis between words and signs, deeply 
innovating the sign theory with regard to the previous tradition (Eco 1984: 32; 
Todorov 1982 [1977]: 46–70; Manetti 1987: 226). Augustine reiterates the same 
principle throughout the De magistro. Moreover, a relation is evidenced 
between signs and the sensorium of the living being, positing that words pertain 
to the sense of hearing, whereas gestures and written words pertain to the sense 
of sight. Herein, there is outlined a division of signa based on the sensory 
channel through which signs are perceived by the sign-receiver – auditory, 
visual, tactile, etc. – which will be successively taken up and systematically 
outlined in the second Book of the De doctrina christiana (cf. Chapter 3). 
It is worthy of note that, in the De magistro, the notion of significabilia 
(“significables”) is introduced for the first time. The term stands for all those 
things that can be signified by means of signs, while they themselves are not 
signs, just like those things that can be seen are called “visible” and those which 
can be heard are labelled “audible”. Moreover, Augustine traced the difference 
between the written and the spoken word in light of this bifurcation, since 
written words are “visible” and spoken words are “audible”, respectively. 
Augustine also shows how signs refer to other signs, to themselves or to the 
things signified. In due course, we will return to this set of relations. 
Those who are keen to consider, rather unproblematically, Augustine’s 
stance as fundamentally logocentric – mainly due to the emphasis placed on 
words as signs par excellence, as evidenced in his De doctrina christiana –  
ignore the fact that Augustine’s De magistro articulates a ruthless critique both 
to words qua signs as well as to language as a system of signification. 
Ultimately, the commonsensical idea that signs (and words in particular) have 
the capacity of bringing forth someone’s ideas to another subject or that signs 
are able to teach something to someone is radically challenged, and ultimately, 
the office of signs is reappraised, limiting the power of words to a set of very 








2.4. Semantics in the De magistro:  
The relation between signs and significata 
Throughout the dialogue Augustine leads Adeadatus to a discussion of those 
signs that are words – which are, also, perceived through the senses. The word 
is that which is uttered by an articulate voice with some significance; written 
words, however, are signs of words. As is manifest, the definitions – spoken 
words and written words – coherently reiterate similar concepts already 
expressed and treated in the De dialectica. However, the four-fold distinction of 
verbum, res, dictio and dicibile spelled out in the De dialectica is not found in 
any other of Augustine’s works, being a unique trait of his early treatise. 
The De magistro dwells on questions regarding semantics particularly in 
chapter 2 where the relation between signs and significata (what signs refer to) 
is discussed. This is achieved, only partially, through a discussion of textual 
analysis that, however, ends abruptly without conclusion. The logical thread 
followed in the chapter is this: all words are signs; since words are conceived as 
signs, the question remains as to what do words actually signify. To this end, 
Augustine invites the son to make an exercise of textual analysis asking him to 
explain what every single word signifies of a verse taken from Virgil’s Aeneid: 
Si nihil ex tanta superis placet urbe relinqui (“If it please the gods above that 
nothing be left of so great a city”).21 
In agreeing that this verse consists of eight words, and therefore of eight 
signs, Adeodatus begins to explain the meaning of every single word of Virgil’s 
line. He acknowledges the meaning of the word /si/ but he is not able to define 
it. Hence, the father invites the son to search where he could trace the meaning 
of this word, whatever it may be, and he finds it in the man’s soul, for /si/ 
signifies “doubt” and the doubt dwells in the soul.   
In analysing the second word /nihil/ (nothing), Adeodatus encounters a 
contradiction difficult to solve: how can a sign be able to signify nothing, 
namely, that which is not? At any rate, according to the definition given supra, a 
sign must indicate something in order to be considered as a sign. The teacher 
explains that by the word /nihil/ “a certain affection of the mind is signified 
rather than a thing which is not”, “since the mind does not see the thing and yet 
finds, or thinks that it finds, that it does not exist”.22 Thus, this is a word lacking 
a concrete referent.  
Without prior notice, the discussion unfolds in a way that often mixes up 
different levels of analysis that, instead, should be distinguished. Indeed, in the 
discussion of Virgil’s line there occurs an overlapping of semantics with 
pragmatics, since the discussion of the relationship between signs and their 
significata is shifted towards an understanding of the relation between signs and 
the sign-receiver, who decodes and interprets the given sign (Balido 1993: 68). 
                                                                          
21  Virgil, Aeneid 2,659. 
22  Mag. 2,3 (trans. Leckie, Concerning the Teacher, 7): «Aug. Quid igitur facimus? An 
affectionem animi quandam, cum rem non videt et tamen non esse invenit aut inuenisse se 
putat, hoc verbo significari dicimus potius, quam rem ipsam quae nulla est?». 
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The most important point comes with the discussion of the meaning of the 
third sign, for it marks the sudden end of the discussion of the line of Virgil. To 
Augustine’s question as to what the preposition /ex/ signifies, Adeodatus 
answers by means of synonymity: the word /ex/ has the same meaning of /de/. 
This solution irritates Augustine who reminds his son that the posed question 
does not concern the substitution of a term with a synonym, but what it 
signifies. The young Adeodatus, then, replies that /ex/ signifies separation either 
from something that exists no more or from something that still exists: 
 
Ad. Mihi videtur secretionem quandam significare ab ea re, in qua fuerat aliquid, 
quod ex illa esse dicitur, sive illa non maneat, ut in hoc versu, non manente urbe 
poterant aliqui ex illa esse troiani, siue maneat, sicut ex urbe Roma dicimus esse 
negotiatores in Africa. 
 
(Ad. – It appears to mean a sort of separation from a thing in which something 
has been, though the thing no longer remains, as in this line, for example: 
although the city was destroyed, perhaps a few Trojans were left from the city 
[ex illa]; or, if the thing does remain, as when we say, for example, that there are 
traders in Africa from the city of Rome [ex urbe Roma]).23  
 
The exercise on the Virgilian text, thus, remains incomplete, for the remark that 
the father makes to his son about the explication provided, that is – Adeodatus’ 
solution is based on the interpretation of words by means of words, and of signs 
with signs, well known signs to explain well known signs. This is, ultimately, a 
circular definition that does not lead to a revelation of what a sign stands for. 
Quite provokingly, now the teacher asks Adeodatus to substantiate the very 
same things that are signified by means of words.  
The reference to the meaning of /ex/ opens up a new vista on the signifi-
cation of the categorematic and syncategorematic signs, an issue that will be 
much debated in medieval logic and philosophy of language. Umberto Eco, in 
his Semiotica e filosofia del linguaggio (1984), hypothesized that Augustine’s 
De magistro lays the foundations for an “instructional model” that is suitable 
for the contextual decoding of syncategorematic terms. Eco interpreted the 
passage of the dialogue where Virgil’s sentence is analysed in the following 
terms: 
 
Augustine then goes on to ask what /ex/ means. He refuses to accept the syno-
nymical answer, according to which /ex/ would mean «de». This synonym is an 
interpretation that must in turn be interpreted. The conclusion is that /ex/ means a 
kind of separation (secretionem quandam) from that in which something was 
included. Augustine adds a further instruction for contextual decoding: the word 
can express separation from something which has ceased to exist, as when the 
city cited in the line by Virgil disappeared, or it can express separation from 
something which still exists, as when one says that some merchants are coming 
from (ex) Rome. The meaning of a syncategorematic term is, therefore, a set (a 
                                                                          
23  Mag. 2,4 (trans. Leckie, Concerning the Teacher, 8). 
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series, a system) of instructions for its possible contextual insertions and for its 
different semantic outputs in different contexts (all registered by the code). (Eco 
1986: 35) 
 
Costantino Marmo (2017) pointed out several shortcomings of Eco’s 
interpretation of this particular passage of the De magistro. These, in summary, 
are the objections pointed out by Marmo contra Eco’s reading. To start with, 
the one who spelled out the alleged instruction of textual decoding is not 
actually Augustine, but precisely his son; secondly, Eco’s hypothesis is limited 
to the analysis of only one excerpt of the treatises and, thus, does not take into 
consideration the dialogue as a whole. In this regard, Marmo notes that 
Adeodatus’ recapitulation of the result achieved in the previous discussion 
leaves out a reference to the instructional model of meaning. If the latter would 
have been an essential point of the discussion, Adeodatus would have most 
probably included it in his review, but this is not the case. At any rate, 
Augustine does not refer in any other works to what Eco termed the “instruc-
tional model”. 
It is revealing to pay attention to the conclusion of the discussion between 
the two interlocutors, since the suggestion of Adeodatus is ultimately dismissed 
by his father, who hints at some potential hindrances of this proposal, without 
however expanding upon it: “Aug – I admit that, and I prefer not to enumerate 
how many exceptions may be found to your rule. But, surely, you readily 
observe that you have expounded words with words, signs with signs, things 
well known by means of things likewise well known. I wish, however, that you 
would show me, if you can, the things themselves of which these are the 
signs”.24 Five chapters later, Adeodatus will remind his father that the question 
posed earlier was left unattended: “Ad. – Then, avoiding with a jest deep 
matters unknown to me, you put off the explanation until another time; and do 
not think that I have forgotten that you owe it me also”.25 Giving credit to 
Adeodatus’ review, the allegedly “instructional model” provided by Augustine 
in chapter 2 must be taken as a provisional and tentative attempt, rather than a 
definitive solution to the problem. 
 
 
2.5. Beyond signs: ostensive definition 
The language analysis discussed above gives rise to a further enquiry into the 
meaning of meaning. Categorically rejecting the circular definition proposed by 
Adeodatus, a solution ultimately based in interpreting well known signs by 
means of other well known signs, the son is asked to show the things them-
selves instead of indicating them by means of words.  
Following Augustine’s request, Adeodatus replies in absolute rigorous 
terms, thus showing his mental acumen: “You seek the things, however, which, 
                                                                          
24  Mag. 2,4 (trans. Leckie, Concerning the Teacher, 8). 
25  Mag. 2,4 (trans. Leckie, Concerning the Teacher, 27). 
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whatever they are, are surely not words, and yet you also ask me about them by 
means of words. Do first ask me about them without the help of words, and I 
shall then reply in the same way”.26 In this as well as in other passages of the 
dialogue, one cannot point out a certain jocosity that animates the two interlo-
cutores and that makes the De magistro a work full of ironies and subtleties. 
From this point onwards, the dialogue is concerned with the nature and the 
limits of ostension.27 Augustine sets the essential question in these terms: is the 
recourse to signs for the purpose of showing something an inexorable necessity, 
or can one do without the mediation of signs? In other words, can nothing be 
shown if not by means of words or other signs? 
The first objection examined is the pointing finger towards something – that, 
in the example under consideration, is paries (wall) – in order to indicate the 
meaning of the thing indicated: 
 
Aug. Iure agis fateor, sed si quaererem, tres istae syllabae quid significent, cum 
dicitur “paries”, nonne posses digito ostendere, ut ego prorsus rem ipsam 
viderem, cuius signum est hoc trisyllabum verbum demonstrante te nulla tamen 
verba referente? 
 
(Aug. – I admit that you are within your right. But if when paries [wall] is 
expressed, I should ask you what the three syllables mean, could you not point it 
out with your finger so that I might see the very thing itself of which the three-
syllable word is a sign? You would show it to me, and yet you would not employ 
words.)28  
 
Adeodatus admits this possibility, subject to the fulfilment of two conditions: 
 
a) The signification must refer to names that signify corporeal things; 
b) The corporeal things (the subject of signification) must be present. 
 
Not entirely satisfied with Adeodatus’ response, Augustine encourages his son 
to restrict the spectrum of phenomena that he has identified. In fact, he observes 
that the colour of the wall, although it is not a body but a quality of it, may 
nevertheless be indicated with a finger. At this juncture, Adeodatus, aware of 
the oversight, admits that the case in question covers a range of phenomena far 
more restricted than those he had erroneously identified. The scope of the 
                                                                          
26  Mag. 3,5 (trans. Leckie, Concerning the Teacher, 9). 
27 ‘Ostension’, in its etymological sense, derives from the Latin ostendo, ostendere, literally 
means ‘to show’ and it may take various forms. The literature on the concept of ostension 
(and ostensive communication) is quite extensive. Some of the authors that have dealt with 
this concept are Kamlah and Lorenzen (1967), Kotarbińska (1960), Lorenz (1970). For one 
of the most recent studies on ostensive definition in logic and philosophy of language see, 
Engelland (2014). For a survey on the concept of ostension in contemporary semiotics, see 
Gramigna (2016).  
28  Mag. 3,5 (trans. Leckie, Concerning the Teacher, 9). 
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investigation is therefore narrowed from all corporeal things (corporalia) to 
visible things (visibilia) only: 
 
Aug. Considera tamen, utrum etiam hinc aliqua tibi excipienda sint. 
Ad. Bene admones; non enim omnia corporalia, sed omnia visibilia dicere debui. 
Fateor enim sonum, odorem, saporem, gravitatem, calorem et alia, quae ad 
ceteros sensus pertinent, quamquam sentiri sine corporibus nequeant et propterea 
sint corporalia, non tamen digito posse monstrari. 
 
(Aug. – But consider now: should you not make some exceptions? 
Ad. – You advise me well. For I should not say all corporeal things, but all 
visible things. For I confess that sound, odor, taste, weight, heat and others of 
this sort which pertain to other senses, although they cannot be sensed without 
bodies, still they cannot be shown by pointing the finger.)29 
 
Beside sound, smell, taste, weight and heat, also visible things are enumerated 
among the corporalia (all those things that are sensed through the body and 
cannot be sensed without it). However, unlike all these corporeal entities, which 
cannot be signified through the pointing finger, visible things may be pointed 
to. The scope of action that pertains to the showing of something through a 
pointing finger, in the suggestive hypothesis of Adeodatus, must therefore be 
exclusively limited to the visual sensorium.  
 
2.5.1. Semiotic status of non-verbal pointers 
Indeed, this is a remark with a considerable point. In what follows, we should 
spell out the implications that this discussion may have for a general theory of 
signs. It is worth noting that, within semiotics, the pointing finger is considered 
as a particular type of sign. Charles S. Peirce, for instance, considered it as an 
“index”, which is a type of sign characterized by the physical relation between 
the sign and the object.30 This is evident in some of the descriptions of indices 
provided by Peirce himself: 
 
At the same time ‘indicate’ has become so associated with ‘index’ in the sense of 
pointing finger (which sounds much like digit) that we forget that the index is so 
called because it performs the action of indicate (MS 409: 98). 
 
No matter of fact can be stated without the use of some sign serving as an index. 
If A says to B, “There is a fire,” B will ask, “Where?” Thereupon A is forced to 
resort to an index, even if he only means somewhere in the real universe, past 
                                                                          
29  Mag. 3,5 (trans. Leckie, Concerning the Teacher, 9). 
30  In an essay that has attracted much attention in Augustinian studies, Robert Marcus 
presents in the appendix, an attempt to survey the types of signs identified by Augustine in 
light of Peirce’s semiotics (Markus 1957: 82–83). According to the author, Peirce’s index is 
equivalent to the concept of «symptom» (Markus 1957: 83). For a full discussion of Markus’ 
paper, see chapter 3 of the present dissertation. 
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and future. Otherwise, he has only said that there is such an idea as fire, which 
would give no information, since unless it were known already, the word “fire” 
would be unintelligible. If A points his finger to the fire, his finger is dyna-
mically connected with the fire, as much as if a self-acting fire-alarm had directly 
turned it in that direction; while it also forces the eyes of B to turn that way, his 
attention to be riveted upon it, and his understanding to recognize that his 
question is answered (CP 2.305). 
 
An index stands for its object by virtue of a real connection with it, or because it 
forces the mind to attend to that object. Thus, we say a low barometer with a 
moist air is an indication of rain; that is, we suppose that the forces of nature 
establish a probable connection between the low barometer with moist air and 
coming rain. A weathercock is an indication, or index, of the direction of the 
wind; because, in the first place, it really takes the selfsame direction as the 
wind, so that there is a real connection between them, and in the second place, 
we are so constituted that when we see a weathercock pointing in a certain 
direction it draws our attention to that direction, and when we see the weather-
cock veering with the wind, we are forced by the law of mind to think that 
direction is connected with the wind. The pole star is an index, or pointing finger, 
to show us which way is north (EP: 14). 
 
On closer inspection, however, Peirce distinguished the “genuine” indexes from 
the “degenerate” ones and, according to the interpretation given by Eco (1975: 
165), Peirce seems to have wanted to exclude the finger-pointing from the 
category of genuine indexical signs, relegating it under the rubric of signs called 
“sub-indices” or “hyposemes”: 
 
Subindices or Hyposemes are signs which are rendered such principally by an 
actual connection with their objects. Thus a proper name, personal demonstra-
tive, or relative pronoun or the letter attached to a diagram, denotes what it does 
owing to a real connection with its object but none of these is an Index, since it is 
not an individual (CP 2.284). 
 
According to Eco, the exclusion of gestural indices from the notion of index is 
due to the fact that “they do not have a sort of causal connection with the object 
to which they refer, they are not natural signs and are artificially, indeed often 
arbitrarily chosen” (Eco 1976: 115). Eco’s reading of Peirce is somewhat too 
categorical and farsighted, for, granting that Peirce distinguished between 
degenerate indices or “designations” and genuine indices or “reagents”, this is 
still encompassed within his general typology of signs. Thus, Eco’s conclusion 
that Peirce intended to rule out gestural indices from the genus of indices would 
deserve further qualification. 
Nonetheless, it is manifest that Peirce’s typology of indices covers a range of 
phenomena much more vast than the one identified by the example of Augus-
tine. The non-verbal pointer discussed in the De magistro is a “given” or inten-
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tional sign (signa data)31 used by someone in order to show something (e.g. 
/paries/ a wall) to someone else – who has made an explicit request through a 
question – in substitution of a word. Undoubtedly, the indexical sign and the 
pointing finger are not co-extensive phenomena; for, although a pointing finger 
could be interpreted as an index (in the sense that Peirce has taken the term), not 
all indices are pointing fingers. In fact, photographs, natural phenomena such as 
smoke that indicates fire or medical symptoms interpreted as indices of a 
disease, are thought of as indices as well. 
Furthermore, it is important to stress that the pointing-finger is a coded sign 
nonetheless. In other words, there must exist a socially and culturally accepted 
code operating in the community of interpreters, which establishes a rule 
according to which a pointing finger is an indexical sign that is intended to 
signify either the object or the general class of objects that is being pointed to, 
instead of a word. The pointing-finger, then, is not a universal sign, exhibiting 
instead a local and contextual character. In this regard, Roman Jakobson wrote: 
“Such a typical index as a pointing finger carries dissimilar connotations in 
different cultures; for instance, in certain South African tribes the object pointed 
at is thus damned” (Jakobson 1971c [1965]: 349). Ultimately, the language of 
gestures operates within a quite narrow scope but it has a high degree of 
precision in pointing towards an object. 
It is clear that Augustine’s intention was not to discuss the semiotic status of 
pointing-fingers for its own sake, for this is exemplary and instrumental for 
showing to Adeodatus that, by replacing a word with a gesture, as in the 
example discussed, he has not shown him the thing itself (res). The challenge is 
in vain, and Augustine’s request to show the thing itself without the use of 
words is unattended. The object is dismissed with an ad hoc argument by stating 
that a gesture is itself a sign (and not a thing), as it is a word. The signification 
of signs by means of other signs ad infinitum – whether words or indexical 
gestures such as finger pointing – is ultimately a vicious circle. Even by the 
recourse to gestural signs, we are still operating within the realm of a sign 
system, and in this way, it is not possible to reveal of the thing itself, going 
beyond signs and bypassing the sign-mediation altogether. 
The discussion of the example of the wall – /paries/ – ends, categorically, 
with the thesis that nothing can be shown without recourse to signs: 
 
Ad. Qui potest quod quaeris, oro te? 
Aug. Quomodo paries potuit. 
Ad. Ne ipse quidem, quantum ratio progrediens docuit, ostendi sine signo potest. 
Nam et intentio digiti non est utique paries, sed signum datur, per quod paries 
possit videri. Nihil itaque video, quod sine signis ostendi queat.  
 
(Ad. – How, I pray, can what you ask be done? 
Aug. – In the same way in which the wall was shown. 
                                                                          
31  Signa data will be examined in the following chapter devoted to the theory of signs set 
forth in the De doctrina christiana. 
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Ad. – Not even a wall can be shown without a sign, as far as I can see from our 
discussion at this point. For the directing of the finger is certainly not the wall, 
but through it a sign is given by which the wall may be seen. I see nothing, 
therefore, which can be shown without signs.)32 
 
This subject, however, keeps recurring in the dialogue. Indeed, the nature of the 
pointing finger as a modality of signification is revisited and further qualified in 
a subsequent chapter of the treatise. Returning to the subject, here, Augustine 
posits a more substantial argument: 
 
[…] Significationem autem re, quae significatur, aspecta. Nam illa intentio digiti 
significare nihil aliud potest quam illud, in quod intenditur digitus; intentus est 
autem non in signum, sed in membrum, quod caput vocatur. Itaque per illam 
neque rem possum nosse, quam noveram neque signum, in quod intentus digitus 
non est. Sed de intentione digiti non nimis curo, quia ipsius demonstrationis 
signum mihi uidetur potius, quam rerum aliquarum, quae demonstrantur. 
 
(We learn the signification when the thing itself is shown. For the pointing of the 
finger can signify only that towards which the finger is pointed, but it was 
pointed not at the sign but at the member which is called the head; consequently, 
I have not learned by means of the pointing what the thing is, for I knew that 
already, nor did I learn the sign in that way since the pointing was not directed at 
the sign. But I do not wish to place too much emphasis on the pointing of the 
finger, because it seems to me that it is rather a sign of the demonstration itself 
rather than of the things demonstrated.)33 
 
It is worth noting that, with a methodology that often recurs throughout the 
dialogue, a thesis previously held is diametrically reversed, stating the opposite. 
This holds true for the subject at hand, too. Indeed, the thesis formerly 
maintained earlier at 3.5, which established that the signification of a thing can 
be shown by pointing a finger towards it, is recanted. At 10.34 Augustine 
further qualifies the nature of this particular sign, holding that the pointing of 
the finger is itself a sign of the indication, rather than a sign of the things 
pointed to. This explains why Augustine states that the act of pointing neither 
leads to the cognition of the thing – that part of the body that is called “head” –  
for it was already known, nor does it lead to the cognition of the sign, towards 








                                                                          
32  Mag. 3,6 (trans. Leckie, Concerning the Teacher, 10). 
33  Mag. 10,34 (trans. Leckie, Concerning the Teacher, 45). 
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2.6. Augustine’s doctrine of signs 
Augustine outlined a rather sophisticated doctrine of signs based on several 
bifurcations, which is worth following in its complexity. As we have noted, the 
fourth chapter of the De magistro is of utmost importance in this respect, for it 
established the first substantial classification of signs envisaged in the dialogue.  
To start with, three general classes of signs are singled out: 
 
1. Signa signorum (signs shown by means of signs); 
2. Signa mutua (reciprocal signs or signs that signify each other mutually); 
3. A mix of the two former types. 
 
The first member of the division concerns the signa signorum, namely, signs 
signifying other signs: 
 
Aug. In hac igitur tripertita distributione prius illud consideremus si placet, quod 
signis signa monstrantur; num enim sola verba sunt signa? 
Ad. Non. 
Aug. Videtur ergo mihi loquendo nos aut verba ipsa signare verbis, aut alia signa, 
velut cum gestum dicimus aut litteram – nam his duobus verbis quae signifi-
cantur, nihilo minus signa sunt – aut aliquid aliud, quod signum non sit, velut 
cum dicimus lapis. Hoc enim verbum signum est – nam significat aliquid – sed 
id quod eo significatur, non continuo signum est.  
 
(Aug. – In this threefold division let us first consider this, namely, that signs are 
shown by means of signs. For words are not the only signs, are they? 
Ad. – No. 
Aug. – Now it seems to me that in speaking we signify by means of words 
themselves or other signs, as, for instance, when we say “gesture” or “letter” (for 
the things which are signified by the words gesture or letter are also signs); or 
we signify something else which is not a sign, as when we say “stone”, for this 
word is a sign since it signifies something, but that which is signified in this case 
is not in turn a sign. But this genus, that is, the genus in which things which are 
not signs are signified by words, does not belong to the present part of our 
discussion.)34  
 
Not only does this passage reiterate a general tenet of Augustine’s semiotics, 
which we discussed before (in 2.9) – namely, words are fully-fledged signs, 
and, simultaneously, are other types of signs – but it also posits that words may 
signify in three different ways:  
 
1. By signifying other words; 
2. By signifying other signs (that are not words) – such as gestures 
(gestural sign) or a letter of the alphabet (written sign); 
3. By signifying things that are not signs. 
                                                                          




Figure 7. The signification of words 
 
 
Of the three members listed in the division, Augustine leaves out the third one 
(words that signify things that are not signs), deferring its discussion to a later 
time, and proceeds with the discussion of the first two. The consideration of the 
genus of signs shown by means of other signs, thus, revolves around a 
bifurcation that is spelled out as follows: 
 
1) Through signs we teach or call to mind the same signs (as, for instance, 
a word that signifies another word); 
2) Through signs we teach or call to mind other signs (as, for instance, the 
word /gesture/ – which is an audible sign – is used to signify a gestural 
sign; or written signs, which are signs of spoken words). 
 




   
 






2.6.1. Object language and meta-language:  
signs of things and signs of signs 
The discussion of the various divisions of signs leads to a detailed excursus on 
what, in modern parlance, goes under the designation of the extension of names. 
Augustine leads Adeodatus to a disquisition of those signs that are words –  
which are also perceived through the senses.  
The word is defined as that which is uttered by an articulate voice with some 
significance. Verba scripta (written words), however, are signs of spoken 
words, thus constituting an example of those kinds of signs signifying other 
signs: “It thus happens that when a word is read a sign is made in the eyes by 
which that sign which pertain to the ears comes into the mind”.35 Thus, verba 
scripta are catalogued amongst the signa signorum, for written words are 
intended as signs of spoken words. Since written words are visible signs (for 
they are perceived through sight) and spoken words are audible signs (for the 
are perceived through hearing), it follows, logically, that verba scripta are 
visible signs of audible signs. 
The second type of sign distinguished under the genus of signa signorum is 
nomen. Since the term nomen is used in the treatise with different meanings, at 
this juncture it is convenient to spell out some preliminary clarifications of 
terminology. Throughout the De magistro, nomen is thought of as: 
 
a. A name; 
b. A noun; 
c. The word /nomen/. 
 
It is useful to bear in mind such a threefold distinction of the meaning of nomen, 
since it occurs that this term is used in the same chapter with reference to 
different meanings, which are often intertwined with one another, thus 
rendering the discourse particularly ambiguous.  
The intricate and puzzling nature of the subject matter is illustrated by means 
of a very pregnant metaphor:36 
 
Aug. Nam verbis de verbis agere tam implicatum est, quam digitos digitis in-
serere et confricare, ubi vix dinoscitur nisi ab eo ipso, qui id agit, quid digit 
pruriant et qui auxilientur prurientibus.   
 
(Aug. – For discussing words with words is as entangled as interlocking and 
rubbing the fingers with the fingers, in which case it may scarcely be dis-
tinguished, except by the one himself who does it, which fingers itch and which 
give aid to the itching.)37 
  
                                                                          
35  Mag. 4,7 (trans. Leckie, Concerning the Teacher, 13). 
36  For a full discussion of Augustine’s fascination with gestural metaphors, see Gary 
Genosko, «Augustine gave us a finger», Semiotica 104 (1/2): 1995, 81–97. 
37  Mag. 5,14 (trans. Leckie, Concerning the Teacher, 20). 
74 
Nomen [noun] is defined as that which is said when we signify something, 
namely, that which each thing is called, as /Romulus/, /Rome/, /virtue/, a /river/ 
(mag. 4,7). At this point, the discussion concentrates upon the difference 
between nouns and the things they signify. Regarding this point, Augustine 
insists that the hiatus that separates the two entities – that which signifies and 
that which is signified – is pivotal. As it will become apparent in what follows, 
in the hierarchy of signification envisaged by Augustine, res, as compared with 
signa, which are merely instrumental and never completely apt to show the 
thing itself, have a privileged position. This is an idea that was to thread through 
many of his philosophical works and will be deepened in the De doctrina 
christiana. Thus, the question remains as to what is the gap that separates nouns 
from the things signified. The difference is qualified by positing that the former 
are signs, whereas the latter are not. Hence, the notion of “signifiable” 
(significabilia), a novel term that is introduced in order to label those things that 
can be signified by means of signs, while they themselves are not signs: 
 
Aug. Num ista quattuor nomina nullas res significant? 
Ad. Immo aliquas. 
Aug. Num nihil distat inter haec nomina et eas res, quae his significantur? 
Ad. Immo plurimum.  
Aug. Vellem abs te audire, quidnam id sit. 
Ad. Hoc vel in primis, quod haec signa sunt, illa non sunt. 
Aug. Placet ne appellemus significabilia ea, quae signis significari possunt et 
signa non sunt, sicut ea, quae videri possunt, visibilia nominamus, ut de his 
deinceps commodius disseramus? 
 
(Aug. – Do not these words signify things? 
Ad. – Indeed they do signify things. 
Aug. – Is there no difference between the names and the things which are 
signified by means of them? 
Ad. – A great deal of difference. 
Aug. – I should like to hear from you what it is. 
Ad. – This, in the first place, that the former are signs, while the latter are not. 
Aug. – Can we agree to call signifiable those things which can be signified by 
means of signs and yet are not signs, just as we call those things visible which 
can be seen, so that we may discuss these things more conveniently in proper 
order?)38 
 
Indeed, just as there exists a difference between names and things, there is a 
difference between the written and the spoken word, being ‘visible’ and 
‘audible’, respectively.   
On the basis of the difference between nouns and the things signified by 
them, Augustine leads the reader to the pivotal ideation of the meta-designation. 
The four nouns /Romulus/, /Rome/, /virtue/, and /river/, as mentioned supra, 
designate certain things, whether these are tangible realities (such as the capital 
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of Italy or a specific river) or abstract entities (such as virtue). However, 
/Romulus/, /Rome/, /virtue/, /river/, and all the other nouns may, in turn, be 
subject to designation, inasmuch as the word /name/ designates them all. This is 
the reason for the distinction between words that designate other things and 
words that designate other words. Indeed, not all words have the same meta-
designative power. This fundamental idea can be schematized as follows: 
 
 
   
 
Figure 9. Signs of things and signs of signs 
 
 
Following this line of thought, Augustine, in a very sophisticated analysis, 
maintains that the word /name/ is an audible sign of audible signs – in other 
words, /name/ is a sign of signs (or, a meta-sign) – whereas all the previously 
listed examples of nouns (/Romulus/, /Rome/, /virtue/, and /river/) are simply 
audible signs, namely, they are signs of things rather than signs of signs, and, as 
such, they display a different meta-linguistic capacity. 
This bifurcation can be represented as follows: 
 
   
 
Figure 10. Audible signs 
 
 
2.6.2. ‘Noun’ is a word too 
For Augustine, verbum [word] is everything that “is uttered with some signi-
fication by an articulate voice”,39 and it is extended to nouns, too. It is worth 
noting that such a definition of verbum, however, does not include written 
words. 
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Once again, it is important to notice the semantic ambiguity of term verbum, 
which has a threefold meaning in the text: 
 
a) a word; 
b) a verb; 
c) the word /verbum/. 
 
Given the abovementioned definition of verbum [word], it follows that /noun/ is 
a word, too, since it falls under the definition (it is uttered with some 
signification by the articulate voice). Proceeding with a chain of definitions that 
follow a deductive-reasoning pattern, one can see that when it is uttered /word/, 
also noun is signified and, therefore, /word/ is a sign of /noun/. Mutatis 
mutandis, /noun/, in turn, is a sign of /river/ as well as many other nouns, and 
/river/ is sign of a visible thing (that reality designated by the audible sign 
/river/): 
 
Aug. Concedis igitur his duabus syllabis, quas edimus, cum dicimus verbum, 
nomen quoque significari et ob hoc illud huius signum esse.  
Ad. Concedo. 
Aug. Hoc quoque respondeas velim: cum verbum signum sit nominis et nomen 
signum sit fluminis et flumen signum sit rei quae iam videri potest, ut inter hanc 
rem et flumem, id est signum eius et inter hoc signum et nomen, quod huius signi 
signum est dixisti quid intersit, quid interesse arbitraris inter signum nominis 
quod verbum esse comperimus et ipsum nomen, cuius signum est? 
 
(Aug. – You grant, therefore, that by these two syllables which we pronounce 
when we say “verbum” [word] name [noun] is also signified, and that, accor-
dingly, word is a sign of name. 
Ad. – I agree. 
Aug. – I also want you to answer this. Since word is a sign of name, and name is 
a sign of river, and river is a sign of a thing which can now be seen, so that 
between what can be seen and river which is its sign, and between this sign and 
the name which you have said to be is sign, there is a difference, what do you 
think is the difference between the sign of name, which we find to be word, and 
name itself of which it is the sign?)40 
 
Along these lines, Adeodatus concludes that everything that is signified by a 
name [noun] is also signified by a word, inasmuch as /name/ is a word too. 
Conversely, not all those things that are signified by /word/ are signified also by 
a /noun/. In a nutshell, in regard to the extension of words and nouns, the two 
concepts are not co-extensive. As a matter of fact, /word/ has a wider extension 
than /noun/, and in turn, /noun/ has a wider extension than the single nouns 
/Romulus/, /Rome/, /virtue/ and /river/. This is so inasmuch as /noun/ designates 
all nouns and not exclusively the ones mentioned. In conclusion, /river/, which 
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is a noun, can be said to be both a noun and a word, since nouns are words, too 
(Guzzo 1927: 39). 
The difference in extension of these concepts may be summarized as 
follows: 
 
   
 
Figure 11. The extension of verbum (word) and nomen (noun) 
 
 
To conclude, for Augustine the difference between a word and a noun is the 
following: the former is “the sign of that sign which signifies no other signs”, 
while the latter is “sign of that sign which in turn signifies other signs”. 41 
Just as every horse is an animal, but not every animal is a horse, by the same 
token every noun is a word, but not every word is a noun. Thus, word is the 
genus to which the noun is subordinate. The same proportion is extended to the 
relation between the sign, which is the general category, and the word, which is 
a species of the genus sign: every word is a sign, and not vice versa.  
 
2.6.3. Reflexive signs 
Throughout this research, it has been claimed that signs derive their own natures 
from the fact that they signify something else. Augustine is careful enough to 
show that certain signs are very peculiar in this respect, since the signs them-
selves are encompassed among their significata, that is, what they signify. 
Indeed, amongst the genus of signa signorum, there is a subclass of signs that 
have a particular feature: namely, among the things signified these signs also 
signify themselves: 
 
Aug. Num omnia signa tibi videntur aliud significare quam sunt, sicut hoc 
trisyllabum, cum dicimus animal, nullo modo idem significat quod est ipsum? 
Ad. Non sane; nam cum dicimus signum, non solum signa cetera quaecumque sunt, 
sed etiam se ipsum significat; est enim verbum et utique omnia verba signa sunt. 
 
(Aug. – Do all signs seem to you to signify something other than what they are, as 
when we say “animal” this three-syllable word in no way signifies what it is itself? 
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Ad. – Surely not, for when we say “sign” it signifies not only other signs, what-
ever they are, but it also signifies itself; for it is a word and all words certainly 
are signs.)42 
 
Such signs, which can be termed as “self-reflexive” (Alici 1976: 21) or self-
signifying signs, are at once: 
 
a. Signum [sign];  
b. Verbum [word],  
c. Nomen [noun]. 
 
Signum [sign] not only signifies the innumerable and particular types of signs, 
but signifies also itself, by virtue of the fact that /sign/ is also a word and, as has 
been said, all words are signs. The same logic holds for the verbum [word], 
inasmuch as everything that is uttered by an articulate voice and has 
significance is included in the genus, without exception of the word /verbum/. 
The same can be said for nomen [noun], for it signifies every species of nouns, 
as well as itself.  
It is worth noting, however, that from the notion of self-signifying signs is, 
however, excluded the tetrasyllable ‘conjunction’ since the things it signifies are 
not names. 
 
2.6.4. Inter-designation and reciprocal signs 
A further issue that needs to be pondered is whether there exist signs that 
signify each other mutually (signa mutua), to the extent that one sign is 
signified by the other, and vice-versa. The four-syllable conjunctio [con-
junction] is ruled out from this genus of signs from the outset. The reason for 
this exclusion is that the things signified by it, as for instance, “si [if], vel [or], 
nam [for], namque [for indeed], nisi [except], ergo [therefore], quoniam 
[whereas], and the like, are not reciprocal, since the items enumerated are 
signified by conjunctio, but it in turn is not signified by any of them”.43 
To Adeodatus’ inquisitiveness of knowing what are the signs that mutually 
signify, Augustine replies in the following terms. To start with, he holds that 
/noun/ and /word/, when uttered, are two words. Likewise, /noun/ and /word/ 
are also two nouns. This said, this proportion is posited: as noun is signified by 
means of a word, so word is signified by means of a noun. Thus, the question 
remains as to what is the difference that exists between the two terms.  
Adeodatus’ approach reiterates the same tenet expounded previously, which, 
to be accurate, can be thus synthesized: every noun – including the term /noun/ 
itself – is a word, but not the other way around, although /word/ itself is a noun. 
This explication, which correctly stresses the difference between the extension 
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of word and noun, is, however, curiously dismissed by Augustine without 
further ado.  
Augustine intends to show that both noun and word have instead an equal 
extension, and yet they have distinct significations. To this end, word and noun 
are compared to visible and coloured things, which, despite having a co-
extensive extension (what is visible is coloured, and vice-versa), differ in their 
significance. He further qualifies the difference between word and noun –  
resorting to their etymological derivation, clarifying, at this point, also the 
process that is implicit in speaking: 
 
Aug. Omne, quod cum aliquo significatu articulata voce prorumpit, animadvertis 
ut opinor et aurem verberare, ut sentiri, et memoriae mandari, ut nosci possit.  
 
(Aug. – You observe, I think, that everything which is expressed by the articulate 
voice with some signification both strikes the ear so that it can be sensed and is 
committed to memory so that it can be known.)44 
 
Thus, two things are at stake when one speaks; the one pertains to the senses 
(hearing), the other pertains to the mind (memory). Verbum (word), which 
derives from verbere (striking), invests the aural organs; nomen (noun), from 
noscere (to known), involves the mental faculties and therefore entails the 
process of knowing.  
 In comparison to Adeodatus, who seems to address the issue from the 
correct angle, Augustine’s argument is not only roundabout but also weaker and 
too stretched. In what way, then, should the thesis that every word is a noun be 
understood?  
In order to interpret accurately Augustine’s thought, it is worth pointing out, 
in the light of Guzzo (1927: 47), that the various parts of speech – nouns 
included – could be considered from two different points of view, namely the 
grammatical and the logical: 
 
In grammar, “noun” – more commonly today we say a “substantive” – is one 
amongst the parts of speech; conjunctions, verbs, etc. are other parts of speech, 
not “nouns”. Yet, logically, conjunctions, verbs, pronouns, etc. designate, ex-
press, that is, name something too: and if they name it, in this logical sense and 
not grammatical, are names, even though in grammar, these would be parts of 
speech different from substantives.45 (Guzzo 1927: 47) 
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When Augustine specified that a word is a noun and a noun is a word, one must 
interpret this principle from the logical perspective. In this sense, it can be said 
that the naming functions of words is granted by the fact that every word 
designates something, even though, from the grammatical viewpoint, this word 
may not be a noun but rather another part of speech.  
Augustine supports his argument with several examples – pronouns and 
conjunctions – which precisely are thought of as names from the point of view 
of logic, and yet from the vantage point of grammar are indeed labelled as other 
parts of speech. 
Without resorting to the authority of Cicero, who in the Verrines called the 
preposition coram (before) a noun, and stressing that the name is that with 
which one names something, it can be observed that in the expression of the 
Apostle Paul, “In Christ there was not is and is not, but is was in Him”, also the 
verb /is/ is a name inasmuch as it designates what was in him. However, if one 
wonders what part of speech /is/ stands for, one would undoubtedly answer that 
it is a verb, without hesitation.  
Thus, every part of speech signifies something, and on the basis of such 
signification, it derives its naming function; and if it has a name, it is called by 
that name, and if it is called by a name, it is a noun, as is discerned in different 
languages (mag. 4,15).  
In order to strengthen his argument even in the eyes of those who are un-
willing to understand, Augustine turns to the highest authority in the field of 
knowledge of the Latin language: Marcus Tullius Cicero, who teaches that a 
complete sentence, which is a pronouncement, is comprised of a noun and a 
verb. Analysing grammatically the propositions “A man takes his seats” and “A 
horse runs”, it is immediately noted that in each of them there is only one noun 
and one verb. Yet if both propositions were formed only from the verb – /sit/ or 
/runs/ – one could not absolutely identify the subject who perform these actions. 
Therefore, in order to complete them the verb must be placed next to the name. 
The same rule can be extended to other parts of speech, such as conjunctions. 
To simplify we cite the following example.  
Augustine says: 
 
Aug. Adtende cetera et finge nos videre aliquid longius et incertum habere, 
utrum animal sit an saxum vel quid aliud, me que tibi dicere: quia homo est, 
animal est nonne temere dicerem? 
 
(Aug. – But attend to the rest. Suppose we see something remote and are 
uncertain whether it be an animal or a stone or something else, and suppose I say 
to you: “Because it is a man, it is an animal”. Would I not speak rashly?)46 
 
Adeodatus concurs with Augustine that the expression is hasty and that to speak 
rightly, one ought to say: “If it is a man, it is an animal”. Both acknowledge that 
in the propositions cited above, /if/ is used appropriately while the use of 
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/because/ is inappropriate. At this juncture, Augustine introduces some senten-
ces in which the two conjunctions become nouns: “If pleases”; “because 
offends”, showing accordingly that the two conjunctions are nouns and, coupled 
with verbs, form complete sentences. 
 
2.6.5. Signs signifying themselves  
Among the signs that signify each other, there is a further variety that deserves 
attention, namely, “those signs which mutually signify each other, differing 
only in sound, and which signify themselves as well as all the other parts of 
speech”.47 This issue concerns the relation between nouns and vocabula 
[words]. Being coextensive – nouns are vocabula [words] and vocabula [words] 
are nouns – they seem to differ only in respect to the sound of the syllables.  
On the contrary, upon closer inspection, the difference that separates them 
seems clear. Here Augustine calls attention to the twofold meaning of nomen: 
 
a. As a name (nomen in the general sense); 
b. As a noun (nomen in the particular sense); 
 
Nomen can thus be understood with a generic or specific meaning. Nomen in 
general [name] is that which designates any part of speech (nouns included); 
nomen in particular [noun] is that particular part of speech, labelled as noun or 
substantive. Thus, nomen in particular [noun] is one of the eight parts of speech, 
which does not encompass the other seven.  
The difference between nouns and vocabula [words] becomes apparent when 
nomen is taken in its specific meaning, as a noun, rather than in its general 
sense. The two concepts, therefore, are distinguished not only for the sound of 
the syllables, but also because vocabula [words] are not included in the eight 
parts of speech, whereas nouns are. However, if nomen is taken exclusively in 
its generic meaning, then the two terms signify each other. Moreover, both 
nomen [name] and vocabula [words] include themselves among the names these 
two concepts signify.  
Conversely, when nomen is compared to ὄνομα (“onoma”) the situation is 
different, for these words are distinguished for the different sound used in Latin 
and Greek languages only. Thus, they form a separate subclass of signs within 
the type of signs signifying each other: 
 
Aug. Peruentum est ergo ad ea signa, quae se ipsa significent et aliud ab alio 
invicem significetur, et quicquid ab uno hoc et ab alio et nihil praeter sonum 
inter se differant; nam hoc quartum modo invenimus; tria enim superiora, et de 
nomine et verbo intelliguntur.  
Ad. Omnino peruentum. 
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(Aug. – Then we have discovered those signs which (1) signify themselves, and 
(2) of which each is signified reciprocally by the other; (3) whatever is signified 
by one is signified by the other, (4) sound being the only difference between 
them. Of these only the fourth is a new discovery; for the three former are 
understood of noun and of word [verbum]. 
Ad. – It is entirely clear.)48 
 
From what has been said, we can infer that there is a fourfold typology of signs 
that is arranged according to this logic: 
 
Some signs signify each other mutually:  
 
I. Some signs are unequal in extension;  
Signum (sign) and verbum (word) are unequal in extension, since all 
words are signs but not all signs are words. 
 
II. Some signs are equal in extension;  
Verbum (word) and nomen (name) have the same extension, since 
every word (taken in its general and logical sense) designates some-
thing, and therefore is a name. 
 
III. Some signs signify also themselves; 
Signum (sign), verbum (word), nomen (noun) signify themselves 
among the things they signify. 
 
IV. Some signs are identical and differ only in sound. 
Nomen has the same extension of ὄνομα (“onoma”), so they differ 
only in the sound of syllables. 
 
The various divisions of signs envisaged in the De magistro can be schematized 
as shown below: 
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Figure 12. An outline of the division of signs in the De magistro 
 
2.7. Relation of signs to reality 
The randomness in the order of presentation of the subjects discussed in the De 
magistro is only apparent. On closer inspection, the dialogue is structured 
according to a rigorous logic. As we have seen supra, a discussion of signs and 
signification entails the treatment of the issues of intra-designation and inter-
designation, namely, the relations of signs with themselves as well as of signs 
with other signs. Yet a full-fledged discussion on the subject of signification 
must come to terms with the pivotal issue of the relation between signs and 
reality. As a matter of fact, all the previous disquisition of the nature and 
varieties of signs served as a basis to discuss this point. 
After the recapitulation of Adeodatus, who is praised by his father for the 
precision of his review and the order in the exposition of what he had learned 
thus far, Augustine takes up the issue of signs that signify objective realities. 
Through a fine dialectical tactic and at times misleading questions, Augus-
tine draws attention to a natural law of reason that rules the signification by 
means of signs, according to which, once heard, signs carry the mind of the 
listener immediately towards the thing signified by the signs. Such a law of 
speaking operates automatically and inadvertently even when signs are 
discussed with reference to their sounds only. Indeed, one may converse of 
words qua words or of things that words signify.  
Indeed, if one were asked, as in the purposively ambiguous Augustinian 
example, if the sign /homo/ [man] is a man, the interlocutor would most 
probably be puzzled by such a request, since this is a mere tautology, which 
obfuscates the specificity of the question asked. And yet such an example shows 
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that the attention of the human mind, when triggered by words, oscillates 
between two poles, namely, the significable – the thing signified by the sign 
(man as a reality) – and /homo/ as a verbal sign, that is, a name. Augustine’s 
example, which is based on a skilful equivocation, shows that it is very common 
to confuse and overlap different levels of semiosis: on the one hand, the noun 
/homo/ taken as a verbal sign in the object language and, on the other, man as 
significable (something that is subject to signification, but itself is not regarded 
as a sign). Nonetheless, in virtue of the aforementioned natural law of speaking, 
the mind of the listener is immediately prompted to consider the things signified 
and, therefore, to marvel at the of question whether the word /homo/ is equal to 
man as a reality, as a rational, mortal animal. 
 
 
2.8. The hierarchy of signification 
On the background of the distinction between signa and res, Augustine 
envisaged a true “hierarchy of signification” (Clark 1977: 6), where four 
elements enter into a relation of subordination: 
 
 (1) nomen, the noun; 
 (2) res, the thing signified; 
 (3) cognitio nominis, the cognition of the noun; 
 (4) cognitio rei, the cognition of the thing.  
 
He sets his objectives as follows: 
 
1) The thing signified is worth more than the sign that signifies the thing; 
2) The cognition of the thing signified is worth more than of the cognition 
of the sign that signifies the thing. 
 
Given such premises, the hierarchy Augustine conceives stands as follows: 
 
1. Res – the thing signified; 
2. Nomen – the noun; 
3. Cognitio rei – the cognition of the thing signified; 
4. Cognitio nominis – the cognition of the noun. 
 
Thus, Augustine maintains the pre-eminence of things (res) over the signs 
(signa) and, respectively, of the cognition of the thing over the cognition of the 
noun. He thus envisages a relation of subordination according to the principle 
that everything that stands for something else is worth less than the thing of 
which it is the surrogate: 
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Aug. Proinde intellegas volo, res quae significantur, pluris quam signa esse 
pendendas. Quicquid enim propter aliud est, vilius sit necesse est, quam id 
propter quod est, nisi tu aliud exstimas. 
 
(Aug. – Now then, I wish you to understand that things which are signified are 
more to be depended upon than signs. For whatever exists because of another 
must of necessity be inferior to that because of which it exists, unless you think 
otherwise.)49 
 
This view is challenged by Adeodatus, who acutely objects that, in the case of 
things considered as filthy, such as coenum (filth), the sign is superior to the 
thing signified, thus departing from the rule set by his interlocutor. Indeed, we 
place the sign before the thing, insofar as hearing the word coenum is far more 
acceptable than perceiving the thing signified with other senses.  
Extending this relation to the sign and to the cognition that is gained by 
means of it, Augustine asks Adeodatus for what purpose one says coenum. He 
correctly answers by explaining that the sign’s function is to indicate a certain 
thing to someone else in order to warn or admonish him. The purpose of 
speaking – teaching – is placed prior to speaking itself, as the former is a 
function of the second. Accordingly, the knowledge of the thing should be 
given primacy over the sign, as the definiendum is worth more than the 
definiens. By the same token, one must eat to live and not vice versa, as the 
cultor ventris50 would like in the Pauline epistle, and one speaks in order to 
teach and not the opposite.  
The issue of the signum-res nexus and the relationship of subordination in 
which they stand in respect to each other is left open and will be taken up in 
another work, the De doctrina christiana, which we will deal with later (in 
Chapter 3). 
Adeodatus, misinterpreting, sets forth the following relationship: if the noun 
is worth more than the thing signified, accordingly, the knowledge of the noun 
ought to be superior to the knowledge of the thing. This argument, which may 
seem sound, is refuted by an analysis of the word vitium. If, between the sign 
vitium and the thing it signifies, one must prefer the first to the second, this does 
not justify the extension of the same relation of subordination to the other two 
terms – that is, to place the knowledge of the noun before the knowledge of the 
thing (namely, the experience of vices). Indeed, the knowledge of the thing –  
knowing the vices in order to avert them – is worth more than the knowledge of 
the noun vitium; this does not alter the fact that, with regard to real vice, the 
word vitium ought to be preferred. 
In conclusion, Augustine prioritizes the direct experience of reality over the 
knowledge of signs, thus stressing the supremacy of res over signum: the 
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concrete knowledge of vices and virtues is worth more than their respective 
signs, as the latter are only instrumental to knowledge.   
 
2.9. Augustine’s theory of showing 
Augustine is regarded as one of the first thinkers who envisaged a theory of 
showing (Sebeok 1986: 657). This is the logical conclusion of the idea that res 
are more valuable than signa. The next logical step is to prove that certain 
things can be shown without recourse to signs. 
 Although it is not explicitly pointed out in the text, two types of showing 
could be inferred from reading the dialogue:   
 
a. Showing as an intentional act; 
b. Showing as an unintentional act.  
 
Some scholars spelled out such a distinction, pointing out that there is a type of 
learning that is general (or natural) and another type that is intentional 
(Valentini 1936: 84). While the latter presupposes an intentional communi-
cation, the former does not entail a recourse to it, and it operates through three 
main modalities: 
 
1. From the enactment of an action; 
2. From nature; 
3. From history. 
 
Of these two kinds of showing, we shall now be concerned with the second 
type. When the dialogue seemed to converge with Adeodatus’ thesis – nothing 
can be shown without signs – Augustine poses a counter-objection: 
 
Aug. Quid? Si ex te quaererem, quid sit ambulare, surgeres que et id ageres, 
nonne re ipsa potius quam verbis ad me docendum aut ullis aliis signis utereris? 
 
(Aug. – What if I were to ask you what walking is, and you should get up and 
walk. Would it not be shown me through the thing itself rather than through 
words, or would you use some other signs?)51  
 
Embarrassed by his superficiality, Adeodatus acknowledges that there are many 
other things like eating, drinking, sitting, standing up, shouting (as well as 
others) that can be shown by themselves and not by means of signs. He, then, is 
invited by Augustine to ponder: if a person, who is not aware of what the word 
“to walk” means, asks someone else who, at that specific moment is making the 
very same action, how could he explain its meaning? Adeodatus suggests 
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walking a little more quickly so that, noting the acceleration of the pace, the 
other should deduce its meaning. 
Augustine clarifies that the answer given could mislead the interlocutor for 
he could believe that the action of walking is tantamount to hurrying, whereas 
the two actions are not in a biunivocal relationship. One can walk briskly as 
well as many other actions can be enacted at an accelerated rhythm, yet the 
essence of walking is not ‘hurrying’. 
Adeodatus, reassessing his position, takes stock of the situation:  
 
Ad. Fateor non nos posse rem monstrare sine signo, si cum id agimus inter-
rogemur; si enim nihil addamus, putabit qui rogat nolle nos ostendere contempto 
que se in eo quod agebamus perseverare. Sed si de his roget, quae agere 
possumus, nec eo tamen tempore quo agimus roget, possumus post eius inter-
rogationem id agendo re ipsa potius quam signo demonstrare quod rogat, nisi 
forte loquentem me interroget, quid sit loqui; quicquid enim dixero, ut eum 
doceam, loquar necesse est.  
 
(Ad. – I admit that we cannot show a thing without a sign if we are questioned 
while we are in the act of doing it. For if we add nothing, the questioner will 
think that we do not wish to show him and will suppose that, to ridicule him, we 
are continuing what we are doing. But if he asks about things which we are able 
to do, and yet does not ask while we are in the act of doing them, we can, by 
doing what he asks after his question, show him what he asks by means of the 
thing itself rather than by a sign. Unless perhaps the questioner should ask me 
what speaking is while I am in the act of speaking, since when I say anything in 
order to teach him the answer to this question it is necessary for me to speak.)52 
 
Thus ends the third chapter of the dialogue, establishing that, except for 
speaking, other actions can be shown ostensibly, provided that (i) the actions 
subject to question can be enacted and that (ii) the question does not happen 
simultaneously with the making of the action itself. Thus, the two interlocutors 
contemplate that, in addition to things that are indicated by means of signs –  
whether words or gestures – there are others that can be signified through their 
execution immediately after having posed a question concerning the action.  
Exhausted the treatment of signs signifying things, Augustine goes on to 
look at those things that may be shown without signs, thus re-examining the 
issue raised in the third chapter of the dialogue and concluded with the thesis 
that, except for speaking, one may show the thing itself by enacting it, when this 
is an action that can be performed if the person is not doing it while he is asked 
about its meaning. 
At chapter ten, Adeodatus completely reverses the thesis substantiated 
earlier, claiming that both speaking and teaching may be signified without 
signs. What was previously regarded as an exception to the rule (actions may be 
shown through performance, except for speaking and teaching) at this point 
turns into the essence that illustrates the modus operandi of such signification 
                                                                          
52  Mag. 3,6 (trans. Leckie, Concerning the Teacher, 11). 
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with no signs (speaking and teaching are the only two actions that can be shown 
by executing them): 
 
Ad. Ego vero etiam atque etiam genus hoc totum considerans nihil adhuc 
invenio, quod sine signo valeat doceri, nisi forte locutionem, et si forte id ipsum 
quispiam quaerat, quid sit docere. Video enim me quicquid post eius inter-
rogationem fecero, ut discat, ab ea ipsa re non discere quam sibi demonstrari 
cupit; nam si me cessantem, ut dictum est, vel aliud agentem roget quispiam, 
quid sit ambulare, et ego statim ambulando eum quod rogavit sine signo coner 
docere, unde cavebo, ne id tantum putet esse ambulare quantum ego 
ambulavero? Quod si putaverit, decipietur; quisquis enim plus minus ve quam 
ego ambulaverit, hunc ille ambulasse non arbitrabitur. Et quod de hoc uno verbo 
dixi, transit in omnia, quae sine signo monstrari posse consenseram, praeter duo 
illa, quae excepimus. 
 
(Ad. – Running through the items of this whole genus time and again, I do not 
find anything in it which can be taught without some sign, except perhaps 
speaking and also possibly teaching. For I see that whatever I do after his 
question in order that he may learn, the questioner does not learn from the thing 
itself which he desires to have shown him. For if I am asked what walking is 
when I am still, or doing something else, and if I, by walking immediately, try to 
teach without a sign what has been asked – all of which has been discussed 
earlier – then how shall I avoid having the asker think that walking consists in 
walking only so far as I walked? And if he did think that he would be mis-
informed, for if someone walked not so far or farther than I did the questioner 
would think that this individual had not walked. And what I have said about this 
one word will be true of all the others which we thought could be shown without 
a sign, except the ones we excluded talking and teaching.)53 
 
It is the task of Augustine to show that also speaking and teaching do not make 
an exception to the general principle according to which nothing can be shown 
without recourse to signs and, therefore, without a process of signification. 
Indeed, does not showing what is speaking by means of speaking imply the use 
of words? And is not speaking itself a means of expression? Likewise, does not 
expressing what teaching means through the same act of teaching, rest upon the 
use of language as a semiotic system warranting such an expression? 
Augustine urges his son to think upon the difference that exists between 
speaking and teaching (mag. 10,30). For Adeodatus, one teaches by means of 
words, thus by speaking, as well as by means of other kinds of signs. Thus, 
from this perspective, teaching is more general in regard to speaking. According 
to Augustine, on the contrary, the relation between these two actions is of a 
different nature, as by ‘speaking’ he meant, more generally, ‘signifying’ (Guzzo 
1929: 82). Not by accident, the following question appertaining to the contrast 
between speaking and signifying is solved by acknowledging that one signifies 
for the sake of teaching, the one being the means, the other the end: “Aug. – If 
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then we signify that we may teach and do not teach in order to signify, teaching 
is one thing, signifying another”.54 Having established this proportion, Augus-
tine proves that Adeodatus’ hypothesis – one can teach without signs when the 
question is about what is teaching – is unsound, as teaching presupposes 
signifying. Indeed, those who teach what is teaching, do so by means of signs.  
If teaching and signifying are two different things, and if the former relies on 
the latter (that is, teaching relies on the use of signs), this means that teaching 
cannot be shown by means of itself.  
Thus, Augustine concludes: 
 
Aug. Quam ob rem nihil adhuc inventum est, quod monstrari per se ipsum queat 
praeter locutionem, quae inter alia se quoque significat; quae tamen cum etiam 
ipsa signorum sit, nondum prorsus extat, quod sine signis docere posse videatur. 
 
(Aug. – Consequently, nothing has yet been found which can be shown through 
itself except speaking which also signifies itself as well as other things. Yet since 
this is a sign also it is still not entirely clear what things can be taught without the 
aid of signs.)55  
 
The conclusion reached up to this point is that nothing can be expressed without 
any sign. It was said that teaching entails speaking, and the latter implies the use 
of words and, thus, of signs. The corollary to this is that not only is speech able 
to express other things as well as being the basis for other actions (as, precisely, 
teaching), but it also signifies itself. In other words, Augustine is fully aware 
that the symbolism of languages accounts for a self-reflexing ability and a 
potential for meta-description. To borrow a technical term coined within the 
Tartu-Moscow school of semiotics, language is thought of as a “primary 
modeling system”, that is, a semiotic system having the capacity – which is 




2.9.1 Unintentional showing: knowledge by sight 
Having placated Adeodatus’s doubts by the reassuring intervention of 
Augustine, the dialogue goes back to the nodus dolens, reconsidering, through a 
novel example, the issue of those things that can be shown without signs. 
To this end, Augustine submits to Adeodatus a case of examination in which 
a man, ignorant about the deceptions set for birds by means of canes and 
birdlime, were to meet a bird-catcher who, provided with his tools, at that 
instant was not intent on practicing his art but merely on walking. At the sight 
                                                                          
54  Mag. 10,29 (trans. Leckie, Concerning the Teacher, 40). 
55  Mag. 10,30 (trans. Leckie, Concerning the Teacher, 41). 
56  For a full discussion of the concept of «primary modeling systems» in light of Juri M. 
Lotman’s semiotics, see Remo Gramigna, «The place of language among sign systems: Juri 
Lotman and Émile Benveniste», Sign Systems Studies 41(2/3) (2013): 339–354. 
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of the bird-catcher, the man quickened his pace as is usual in similar cases, 
thought and wondered, with astonishment, what the equipment was there for. 
The bird-catcher, for his part, feeling as if he was under observation, drew his 
tools in order to catch some birds, with the purpose of making himself known. 
This way, the bird-catcher would teach his onlooker what he wanted to know, 
without signs but by means of the thing itself: 
 
Aug. Nam quaero abs te, si quisquam ignarus deceptionis avium, quae calamis et 
visco affectatur, obuiam fieret aucupi armis quidem suis instructo non tamen 
aucupanti, sed iter agenti, quo viso premeret gradum se cum que, ut fit, admirans 
cogitaret et quaereret quidnam sibi hominis ille vellet ornatus, auceps autem cum 
in se videret adtentum, ostentandi se studio cannas expediret et prope anim-
adversam aliquam aviculam fistula et accipitre figeret subigeret et caperet, nonne 
illum spectatorem suum doceret nullo significatu, sed re ipsa quod ille scire 
cupiebat? 
 
(Aug. – For consider, if someone unskilled in the art of bird-catching, which is 
done with reeds and bird-lime, should happen upon a fowler, carrying his 
instruments as he walked along though not fowling at the time, he would hasten 
to follow and in wonderment he would reflect and ask himself, as indeed he 
might, what the man’s equipment meant. Now if the fowler, seeing himself 
watched, were to exhibit his art, and skilfully employ the reed, and then noting a 
little bird nearby, if he were to charm, approach, and capture it with his reed and 
hawk, would the fowler not teach his observer without the use of signification, 
but rather by means of the thing itself which the observer desired to know?)57  
 
The concern of Adeodatus, who does not see the difference between this and the 
analogous cases treated earlier, is dispelled by a caveat added by Augustine in 
order to substantiate his argument. The discriminating factor that ensures the 
teaching that takes place by means of the demonstration of the thing itself rather 
than by sign-mediation lies in the disposition of the mind of the one who 
observes, whose intelligence is such that it enables him to deduce the essence of 
the performed technique from what he has observed: 
 
Aug. Facile est hac cura te exuere; addo enim, si ille intellegens esset, ut ex hoc 
quod vidit, totum illud genus artis agnosceret; satis est namque ad rem et de 
quibusdam rebus tametsi non omnibus et quosdam homines doceri posse sine 
signo. 
 
(Aug. – It is easy to free you from that worry. For I suggest that an observer 
might be intelligent enough to recognize the whole complexity of the art from 
what he saw. It is enough for our purpose if certain men can be taught without 
signs about some things, if indeed not about all things.)58 
 
                                                                          
57  Mag. 10,32 (trans. Leckie, Concerning the Teacher, 42). 
58  Mag. 10,32 (trans. Leckie, Concerning the Teacher, 43). 
91 
Having made this clarification, Augustine re-establishes the original stance, 
postulating, indeed, that some can teach some things without signs: 
 
Ad. Hoc etiam ego possum illi addere: si enim sit bene intellegens, paucis passi-
bus ambulatione monstrata totum quid sit ambulare cognoscet. 
Aug. Facias per me licet nec tantum nihil resisto, verum etiam faveo; vides enim 
ab utroque nostrum id effici, ut quaedam quidam doceri sine signis queant 
falsum que illud sit, quod nobis paulo ante videbatur nihil esse omnino, quod 
sine signis possit ostendi. 
 
(Ad. – To that I can add that if the learner be very intelligent he will know what 
walking is fully when it has been shown by a few steps.  
Aug. – That is agreeable. And I not only do not object, but I approve of your 
statement. For you see that the conclusion has been reached by both of us, 
namely, that some men can be taught certain things without signs, and that what 
we thought awhile back is false, that is, that there is nothing at all which can be 
shown without signs.)59  
 
In the remainder of the work, Augustine ceases the dialogue and begins what is 
termed as the oratio perpetua, that is, the continuous speech of Augustine. Only 
at the end is Adeodatus brought back into the discourse, and concludes by 
acknowledging the human teacher for having led him towards the divine 
teacher. 
Having ascertained that some things may be shown without the medium of 
any sign, Augustine enumerates other similar examples, from theatrical spec-
tacles – where actors represent things without signs – to natural and divine spec-
tacles in which the universe reveals itself through natural phenomena such as 
the moon and other celestial bodies, the earth and the seas: 
 
Aug. Iam enim ex his non unum aliquid aut alterum, sed milia rerum animo 
occurrunt, quae nullo signo dato per se ipsa monstrentur. Quid enim dubitemus 
oro te? Nam ut hominum omittam innumerabilia spectacula in omnibus theatris 
sine signo ipsis rebus exhibentium solem certe istum lucem que haec omia 
perfundentem atque vestientem, lunam et cetera sidera, terras et maria quaeque 
in his innumerabiliter gignuntur, nonne per se ipsa exhibet atque ostendit deus et 
natura cernentibus? 
 
(Aug. – For now of that sort, not one thing only or another, but thousands of 
things occur to the mind, which may be shown through themselves when no sign 
has been given. Why then do we hesitate, I pray you? For passing over the 
innumerable spectacles of men in every theatre where things are shown through 
themselves without signs, surely the sun and this light bathing and clothing all 
things, the moon and the other stars, the lands and the seas, and all things which 
are generated in them without a number, are all exhibited and shown through 
themselves by God and nature to those who perceive them.)60  
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The example of the fowler and the intelligent onlooker discussed above reveals 
the intentionality on behalf of the first, who, having noticed that he was the 
subject of attention, intends to show his dexterity to the one who observes it. 
Thus, the intentionality-factor on the part of the bird-catcher in showing his skill 
to the other agent, as well as the condition, added by Augustine, that the 
onlooker is intelligent enough to draw the necessary conclusions from what he 
observed, are equally key elements for the interpretation of the example. None-
theless, this does not mean that the fowler wishes to communicate intentionally 
to the spectator what the meaning of his art and his tools is. Therefore, there 
exists a subtle but fundamental difference between providing the observer with 
an opportunity for learning and presupposing a communicative intentionality on 
the part of the bird-catcher, which cannot be inferred from the examples as 
described by Augustine.  
This point was raised by Myles Fredric Burnyeat (1987: 14–15) who writes:  
 
The birdcatcher knows that he is being watched by someone who wants to know 
what his equipment is for and he catches a bird with the intention of satisfying 
the spectator’s desire to know. That is all. It is not said or implied that the 
birdcatcher has the further (Gricean) intention that the spectator should realize 
that he is putting on the show for this very purpose, in order that the spectator 
may learn from it what he is so curious to know. In no sense is the birdcatcher 
trying to communicate the information that the equipment is for catching birds. 
 
That is why Augustine, after having expounded the case of the bird-catcher, 
then proceeds with a list of examples where natural phenomena in themselves 
are presented to the ones who observe them. It is the universe that shows itself 
to the eyes of men as a divine spectacle.  
In semiotic terms, and probably going beyond what Augustine himself 
would have said, it could be affirmed that he anticipated a ‘semiotics of the 
natural world’. Moreover, it is revealing that he considers in a work of this 
maturity, the De doctrina christiana, that the signa naturalia as a distinct 
species of signs occurs without intention. These signs can be interpreted as a 
source of information by an interpreter. The correlation between the divine 
ostension which is mentioned in the De magistro, and the “natural signs” briefly 
treated in the De doctrina christiana, is a nexus that has gone unnoticed by the 
majority of interpreters. Arguably, this can be interpreted instead as an element 
of continuity in Augustine’s thought.  
 
 
2.10. The symbolism of language 
It is now worthwhile to shed light on the language analysis that forms a 
conspicuous part of the treatise. The De magistro opens with a question by 
Augustine, as incisive as it is unexpected, on the purpose of speech. First 
introduced at the very outset of the work, the theme of language returns at the 
end of the dialogue in what looks like an elliptical or circular structure. 
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Undoubtedly, it is revealing that Augustine’s opening words introduce ex 
abrupto a reference to speech (loqui) and an enquiry into its functions, for this 
is not a mere mention but the tuning fork, as it were, used by the author to set 
the thematic pitch of the dialogue: 
 
Aug. Quid tibi videmur efficere uelle, cum loquimur?  
 
(Aug. – What does it seem to you we wish to accomplish when we speak?)61 
  
Indeed, as pointed out by Charles Connaghan (2004: 19), the language analysis 
laid out at the outset of the dialogue is instrumental to the enquiry about 
knowledge acquisition and the way in which knowledge is transmitted. Since 
speech is one of the main modalities by means of which knowledge is com-
municated among men, an investigation of the conditions and possibilities of 
knowing rests, at any rate, upon an enquiry into the nature and functions of 
speech. Thus, the opening question of the De magistro is a necessary and 
preliminary corollary to the enquiry concerning the nature of knowing.  
Furthermore, in the incipit of the treatise is glimpsed the dual-nature of 
interpretation of the Augustinian method: the study of language and its purposes 
presupposes language itself as a means for discussion. Thus, as in a meta-
linguistic and dialectical exercise, language is found as an object and as a 
subject of the dialogue. Succinctly, language is discussed by means of language, 
just as teaching is discussed in the same act of teaching.  
Adeodatus answers that by speaking we intend either to teach (docere) or to 
learn (discere): 
 
Ad. Quantum quidem mihi nunc occurrit, aut docere aut discere.  
 
(Ad. – As it occurs to me now, either to teach or to learn.)62 
 
Alfonso R. Gonzalez (1986: 198) observed that the use of the disjunctive 
conjunction in the form of aut ... aut ... expresses the provisional, introductory 
nature of Adeodatus’ answer and is an index of his dilemmatic style. The two 
purposes of speech, teaching (docere) and learning (discere), however, do not 
satisfy the question of the interlocutor. Augustine, in fact, while in agreement 
that when we speak we intend to teach (docere), dissents from his son with 
regard to the alleged purpose of learning something (discere). To the question 
posed by Augustine, whether by speaking one learns something, Adeodatus 
replies that one learns also by asking questions. This statement is confuted by 
Augustine, who argues that questions, too, do have a function of teaching and, 
consequently, “in speaking we desire only that we may teach”.63   
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62  Mag. 1,1 (trans. Leckie, Concerning the Teacher, 3). 
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2.10.1. Definition and functions of speech 
Speaking as teaching (docere) is the first function of speech outlined in the 
treatise. This, however, does not exhaust the subject, since the issue is far more 
complex. Upon closer scrutiny, indeed, the functions of speech that can be 
drawn from the dialogue are four:  
 
1) Speaking as docere (teaching); 
2) Speaking as commemorare (reminding); 
3) Speaking as admonere (stimulating to know); 
4) Speaking as significare loquentis mentem (to express the thought of the 
speaker) (Longo 1994: 12). 
 
It is important to clarify from the outset that the verb docere (to teach) is used in 
this work in the general sense of “making known” or “communicating know-
ledge”.64 Teaching, therefore, ought to be interpreted in a broader sense and not 
only limited to its pedagogical-educative value. The meaning of docere that 
Augustine had in mind has to do with the conditions of the possibility of know-
ledge and the ways in which knowledge itself is conveyed and inter-subjectively 
transmitted. Ultimately, this is about an epistemological problem.  
The purposes of speech are gradually introduced, with a provisional and 
indefinite style that characterizes almost the entire dialogue. This trait becomes, 
at times, more pronounced. As remarked by Colleran (1945: 3), “here there is 
not the scientific order, the finished conclusiveness, the precision of termino-
logy that would contribute much to the correct understanding and just 
evaluation of the work”.  
Augustine’s own definition of speech is tailored against the background of 
two additional communicative forms evoked by his son in the first chapter of 
the treatise, since they both entail the use of language. Right after, indeed, 
speaking is compared with singing and praying. It is by means of this com-
parison that the very first occurrence of loqui found in the dialogue is sketched 
out. Moreover, this discussion leads to an explication of additional functions of 
speech that are not limited to docere.  
The notion of speech (loqui) is first introduced by Adeodatus, who intends it 
as a simple emission of words:  
 
Ad. … Loqui quam verba promere. 
 
(Ad – … speaking is only expressing words.)65 
                                                                          
64  A. Guzzo (1927: 20) noted that docere stands for «to warn», «to inform» someone, or 
«to communicate», «to express», «to signify» to others our own will. For A. Mandouze 
(1975: 793), «one is doomed to understand nothing of the De magistro if one insists on 
translating docere by a word of invariably prescriptive type such as ‘to teach’». According to 
C. Ando (1994: 47), «teaching, as Augustine construes it, encompasses practically all 
communication». 
65  Mag. 1,1 (trans. Leckie, Concerning the Teacher, 3). 
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This definition will be proved to be provisional, rather general and, ultimately, 
misleading. The doubt that speaking consists only in teaching makes Adeodatus 
produce two counterexamples, singing and praying, considered as exceptions to 
the general principle that with speech we want nothing more than to teach, 
insofar as both involve the expression of words and, therefore, the use of 
language.  
After having briefly dwelt on the connection between melody and word, 
Adeodatus emphasises the difference between speaking, singing and praying, 
comparing the former to the other two forms of communication. 
Let us consider his first objection: singing. It is a verbal expression that, 
insofar as it can be made by one person only, does not teach anything to anyone, 
lacking both the intention to teach someone as well as an interlocutor to be 
addressed. Augustine writes in this regard: 
 
Aug. At ego puto esse quoddam genus docendi per commemorationem, magnum 
sane, quod in hac nostra sermocinatione res ipsa indicabit. Sed si tu non arbitraris 
nos discere cum recordamur nec docere illum qui commemorat, non resisto tibi 
et duas iam loquendi causas constituo, aut ut doceamus aut ut commemoremus 
vel alios uel nos ipsos; quod etiam dum cantamus efficimus; an tibi non videtur?  
 
(Aug. – Ah, but I think there is a kind of teaching by means of reminding, indeed 
a very important kind, which will be revealed in this dialogue of ours. But, if you 
do not think that we learn when we remember things, and that the man does not 
teach who reminds, I shall not object. And now I posit two reasons for speaking: 
either that we may teach, or that we may remind either others or ourselves; and 
the latter is what we do when we sing. Or does it not seem so to you?)66  
 
This passage introduced a new notion into the conversation – the concept of 
memory (commemoratio), which will prove to be not only a pivotal theme of 
the dialogue but also a further function of speech. Indeed, the reminding of 
something to oneself or others (commemorare), coupled with docere, is the 
second function of speech singled out in the dialogue. 
At this juncture it is worth noting, along with Connaghan (2004: 25), that for 
Augustine the notion of commemoratio has a twofold meaning: on the one hand, 
there lies the concept of commemorare (to remind), which concerns the act of 
teaching and is understood as reminding someone else of something through 
language. On the other hand, there is the notion of ricordari (to remember), 
which is slightly different inasmuch as it relates to the process of learning, and 
it means to be able to recall something to one’s mind. As Connaghan (2004: 25) 
put it, “Commemoratio, therefore, involves two similar but distinct processes, 
the reminding of others and the recollecting to oneself”.  
It is important to stress that whereas the function of language as teaching is 
ruthlessly challenged throughout the dialogue, ultimately leading to the para-
doxical conclusion that verbal signs do not have the office of teaching, the 
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function of commemorare, on the contrary – in its twofold meaning of 
reminding/remembering – is constant throughout the whole treatise (Longo 
1994: 20). This is an issue not sufficiently emphasized by the interpreters that 
often tend to emphasize the function of docere and downplay the other one 
(commemorare). 
Returning to the first counterexample, singing is further qualified by 
Adeodatus, who rebuts that no one sings in order to remember, but simply to 
delight. Instead, Augustine specifies that music and speech are not the same 
thing, insofar as singing is a mere modulation of the voice and, as such, can 
occur both in conjunction with the word as well as in isolation from it, as sheer 
melody. Therefore, singing, unlike speaking, does not necessarily presuppose 
language. The singing of birds that produces melodies, not being words, and the 
melody instrumentally produced with flutes and harps are examples brought in 
order to corroborate Augustine’s hypothesis (mag. 1,1). 
The second objection enumerated by Adeodatus toward the general principle 
that with speech we do not wish anything but teaching, is the prayer: “while we 
are praying we are certainly speaking, and yet it is not right to believe that God 
is either taught anything by us or that He is reminded”.67 
Speaking and praying must be distinguished, for they serve different func-
tions. On the surface, the prayer implies the use of language for its expression 
(indeed, for Adeodatus when we pray we simultaneously do speak). It is, how-
ever, misleading to grant to the prayer the same functions of speech. Un-
doubtedly, it is a paradox to think that men can teach or remind something to 
God himself by means of the prayer. The latter is, therefore, for Adeodatus, an 
exception to the thesis that speaking answers the purpose of either reminding or 
teaching. 
Immediately dismissing this objection, Augustine, in turn, implicitly refers 
to the twofold dimension of inwardness-outwardness, and he postulates, on one 
hand, a nexus between praying and inwardness and, on the other, the connection 
of speech with outwardness. This is a fundamental idea in Augustine’s thought, 
which proves to be pivotal for the enquiry concerning sincerity and mendacity, 
to which we will devote a special discussion (in Chapter 4). 
The function of externalization, proper to language, is altogether absent in 
the prayer, which, on the contrary, is an inner and individual act, secret and 
silent, which as such does not require uttered words. Praying is akin to the 
speaking of a silent language – “speaking within oneself” as put by Augustine. 
This explains why, as pointed out in the dialogue, it was prescribed by the 
sacred scriptures to pray in “closed rooms”, that is, in the inwardness of the 
soul,68 with the exceptions of priests, who, expressing with words their own 
                                                                          
67  Mag. 1,2 (trans. Leckie, Concerning the Teacher, 4): «Ad. Uideretur, nisi me moueret 
quod dum oramus utique loquimur, nec tamen deum aut doceri aliquid a nobis aut com-
memorari fas est credere». 
68  The evangelic passage quoted by Augustine (Matthew 6: 5–6) says, «And when you 
pray, do not be like the hypocrites, for they love to pray standing in the synagogues and on 
the street corners to be seen by others. Truly I tell you, they have received their reward in 
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thoughts, intend to communicate with men (rather than with God) in order that 
they would elevate to God (mag. 1,2). Ultimately, the objection of Augustine to 
the counterargument of Adeodatus is based on the relation between praying and 
inwardness. True prayer is altogether an inner act that does not involve the 
expression of words. 
It is manifest that the analysis and confutation of Adeodatus’ counter-
examples are instrumental to Augustine, for they lead to a more fine-tuned 
definition of speech. Remodelling the very generic and tentative notion of loqui 
formerly couched by his son – loqui quam verba promere (speaking is only 
expressing words) – Augustine redefines the concept, spelling out a more 
sophisticated formula: 
 
Aug. Qui enim loquitur, suae voluntatis signum foras dat per articulatum sonum. 
 
(Aug. – For he who speaks expresses the sign of his will by means of articulate 
sound.)69 
 
In line with the definition of loqui as outlined in the De magistro by the words 
of Augustine, the one who speaks manifests outwardly his will by means of 
signs, phonic and articulated. Thus, three members are tied together in such a 
definition: the one who speaks gives (foras dat) an external sign of his own will 
(suae voluntatis signum), by means of an articulate sound (per articulatum 
sonum).  
The signifying mechanism of loqui is illustrated in the diagram below: 
 
 
Figure 13. The signifying mechanism of speaking 
 
 
This definition of loqui mirrors the one previously outlined in the De dialecti- 
ca  – which was examined at length before (in Chapter 1) – where speaking was 
thought of as the giving of a sign by means of the articulate sound (vox 
articulata):  
 
Loqui est articuata voce signum dare. Articulatam autem dico quae comprehendi 
litteris potest. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
full. But when you pray, go into your room, close the door and pray to your Father, who is 
unseen. Then your Father, who sees what is done in secret, will reward you». 
69  Mag. 1,2 (trans. Leckie, Concerning the Teacher, 4). 
98 
(To speak is to give a sign by means of an articulate utterance. By an articulate I 
mean one which can be expressed in letters.)70 
 
This parallel shows some continuity in Augustine’s vision of speech, which is 
coherent and remains constant in many of his works. In the De trinitate, the 
word serves the function of communicating and externalizing ideas and 
thoughts,71 and in the De fide et symbolo speaking of the verbum dei, Augustine 
takes this opportunity to dwell also upon human language: he articulates how in 
speaking, we try, insofar as it is possible, to transfer our mind, our thought, over 
to the hearer to be grasped and held by him also.72 Although man resorts to 
signs in order to externalize what he has within himself, the speaker’s “soul” 
can never be known completely, which makes language an imperfect tool of 
communication. Augustine in the De magistro, as well as in other works, does 
not fail to emphasize this imperfection of language that is manifested in various 
ways, from the ambiguity of words to the will to assert what is false that is the 
proprium of the lie (see Chapter 4). 
Such picture of language is reiterated throughout the dialogue, and at 4,8 
verbum (word) is defined as everything that is proffered with the articulate 
voice and has significance: 
 
Aug. […] ut verbum sit, quod cum aliquo significatu articulata voce profertur. 
 
(Aug. – A word is that which is uttered by the articulate voice with some 
meaning.)73 
 
It is, however, important to note that in the De magistro the expression vox 
articulata is generally coupled with the locution cum aliquo significatu (with 
some significance). This sets aside the uses of the term vox articulata in the De 
dialectica (that which can be trasnscribed in letters) and in the De magistro (the 
link between a phonic expression and its meaning).  
Moreover, in the De magistro there is a shift in the conception of language 
from a triadic model to a binary one, as evidenced from the following excerpt: 
 
Aug. In quo tamen signo cum duo sint, sonus et significatio […] 
 
(Aug. – Since, however, two factors are involved with the sign, namely, sound 
and signification […])74 
 
In this passage, Augustine theorized a binary model of the linguistic sign 
intended as the combination of two entities, sonus and significatio, thus 
advocating for a model that will be taken up by much of the linguistics and 
                                                                          
70  Dial. 5. 
71  Trin. 15,11–20. 
72  F. et sym. 3,4. 
73  Mag. 4,8 (trans. Leckie, Concerning the Teacher, 13). 
74  Mag. 10,34 (trans. Leckie, Concerning the Teacher, 44). 
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semiotics of the twentieth century.75 I have argued elsewhere that an extension 
of this binary model of the linguistic sign to the concept of sign tout cour, 
following in Jakobson’s footsteps, is misleading (Gramigna 2014). Indeed, a 
similar equation does not give justice to the depth and sophistication of the 
Augustinian conception of signum. 
 
 
2.11. Opacity and transparency of signs 
Although the De magistro posits that one of the functions of speech is to 
express the mind of the speaker, the dialogue does not fail to notice that the 
power of words in this regard is limited in its capacity. Words are caught in a 
deep contradiction, for on one hand, their intent is to reveal one’s mind, and on 
the other, they are always imperfect means of communication. Indeed, there are 
numerous hindrances that hamper the capacity of words as a means of com-
munication inter homines. In the dialogue is already glimpsed a subject that will 
be treated at length by Augustine, which leads to a genuine typology of mis-
understandings that span from linguistic errors and lapsus linguae to the 
voluntary uttering of lies in order to mislead the listener. 
The cases briefly listed in the dialogue are the following: 
 
a. One knows what has been said, although the speaker himself does not 
know; 
b. Lying and deceiving; 
c. When something which has been committed to memory and often 
repeated is expressed by one who is preoccupied with other things 
(when we sing a hymn); 
d. When against our will we make a slip in speech, for in this case, too, 
signs are expressed which are not of the things which we have in mind; 
e. When he who speaks signifies the thing which he is thinking, but for the 
most part only to himself and certain others, while he does not signify 





                                                                          
75  «Some interpreters of Saussurian doctrine are prone to believe that his theory of the two-
fold structure of linguistic entities is a novelty, but Saussure’s approach to the sign both in 
concepts and terms originates, in fact, from a tradition lasting over two thousand years. His 
definition of the total signe as a combination of signifiant and signifié literally corresponds 
both to the Stoic semeion consisting of two primordial aspects – semainon and 
semainomenon – and to St. Augustine’s adaptation of the ancient Greek model: signum = 
signans + signatum» (Jakobson 1971a [1959]: 267). For a full discussion on this subject, see 
Remo Gramigna, «Roman Jakobson on signs» (2014), Blityri 3 (1–2), 177–207.   
100 
2.12. Signs don’t teach: Augustine’s “semiotic scepticism” 
and the “admonitive” office of signs 
The treatise shows an unexpected change of direction for what concerns the 
functions of speech. Augustine argues, through a reductio ad absurdum and 
after a long and difficult analysis, that, as it stands, nothing is learned by means 
of signs. This leads to the conclusion, however paradoxical it may seem, that 
signs do not lead to knowledge. In doing so, Augustine reiterates the same 
paradox that is at the kernel of Plato’s Meno: 
 
Aug. Quod si diligentius consideramus, fortasse nihil inveniens, quod per sua 
signa discatur. Cum enim mihi signum datur, si nescientem me invenit, cuius rei 
signum sit, docere me nihil potest; si vero scientem, quid disco per signum? 
 
(Aug. – If we consider this more carefully, then perhaps you may find there is 
nothing which is learned by means of signs. For when a sign is given me, if it 
finds me not knowing of what thing it is a sign, it can teach me nothing, but if it 
finds me knowing the thing of which it is a sign, what do I learn from the 
sign?)76 
 
This is the theoretical background against which Augustine reassesses the 
function of speech. If teaching is intended as an exchange of new knowledge 
between two subjects, no sign can be said to undertake such an office – since if 
the cognition of what the sign signifies is lacking, the sign does not lead to 
anything new. Furthermore, without such a prior cognition, a sign altogether 
cannot be recognized as such by an interpreter who lacks such competence. 
Conversely, if someone is already competent, being aware of the significance of 
a particular sign, when this sign is given to him, it is in plain sight that the sign-
receiver will not apprehend anything new from that sign (mag. 10,33). Augus-
tine’s stance was interpreted as a thesis of “semiotic scepticism”, for “the sign 
is, strictly speaking, useless” (Simone 1969: 112–113).77 To state that signs do 
not have value tout court is probably a too stretched position. However, signs 
themselves do not teach anything, although they show a purely instrumental 
value that yet must be explained. 
The thesis that nothing is learned by means of signs certainly deserves 
further qualification. In order to explain this concept, the dialogue discusses a 
series of examples. The first one contemplated is a word whose meaning is very 
obscure: ‘saraballae’ (head covering) (mag. 10,33). This example relates to the 
episode narrated by Daniel – of his companions Hananiah, Azariah, and 
Mishael thrown into a fiery furnace by the tyrant Nebuchadnezzar and were 
miraculously unharmed, so that their tunics did not even change colour: Et 
                                                                          
76  Mag. 10,33 (trans. Leckie, Concerning the Teacher, 43–44). 
77  My translation from Italian: «il segno è, propriamente parlando, inutile» (Simone 1969: 
112–113). 
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saraballae corum non sunt immutatae (Dan., III, 94).78 A person, who is 
completely unaware of the word ‘saraballae’, could hardly infer its significance 
(significatio) entirely from perceiving only the sound of the word (sonus). It is 
clear that the cognition of what a sign is significant of is a necessary condition 
in order for a word to be perceived as such by the one who hears the sound. 
Without this prior cognition, it would remain merely an incomprehensible 
sound, for it is deprived of its significance due to the lack of competence of the 
interpreter. Thus, the word as such, by means of its sound only, does not lead to 
the significance that it is meant to convey. Indeed, having heard the word 
‘saraballae’ does not imply teaching what this particular word signifies to the 
one who does not already possess such a knowledge (mag. 10,33). Hence, 
hearing the sound of a word does not lead to knowing the significance that it 
conveys. In reality, the meaning of a particular thing is learned through direct 
experience of reality – for instance, by seeing it. Indeed, one learns what is 
‘head’ and ‘covering’ not by having heard it being mentioned by means of an 
articulate sound, but through sight. Hence, two models of knowing are spelled 
out throughout the dialogue: telling and showing. 
Augustine, at this juncture, states what follows: 
 
Aug. Ita magis signum re cognita quam signo dato ipsa res discitur.  
 
(Aug. – Therefore that the sign is learned after the thing is cognized is rather 
more the case than that the thing itself is learned after the sign is given.)79 
 
In order to examine the issue in greater depth, Augustine contemplates a second 
example in which the word caput (head) is heard for the first time and, without 
knowing what it signifies, one seeks to understand what this sign stands for. 
Augustine clarifies that the question does not concern the real object that is 
signified (the part of the body called caput), but it relates to the knowledge of 
the sign – which is lacking as long as one does not know of what thing it is the 
sign (mag 10,34). Although he does not overtly point this out, a sign without 
significance – that is, a sign whose meaning is unfamiliar or is unknown – has 
little value. Without the knowledge of the sign, the word caput is a sounding 
voice only, and thus not a sign. 
Indeed, the thesis previously held that signs – and especially verbal signs –  
have the purpose of teaching is diametrically reversed to hold exactly the 
contrary: namely, that nothing is taught by means of signs. Indeed, after a 
lengthy excursus on the symbolism of language, it is established that the value 
(utilitas) of words lies in a rather different realm than the office of teaching –  
namely, admonishing the sign-receiver in order to lead him in the search for 
knowledge. The semiotic part of the De magistro reaches its climax with the 
conclusion that signs, even though they do not convey the knowledge of the 
thing, have the function of directing the attention of the one who perceives 
                                                                          
78  «Their sarabarae were not changed» (Dan. 3: 27). 
79  Mag. 10,33 (trans. Leckie, Concerning the Teacher, 44). 
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them. Hence, their utilitas, purely instrumental, lies mainly in having an “admo-
nitive” function for the sign-receiver. Commenting on this point, Augustine 
writes: 
 
Aug. Non enim, cum rem ipsam didici, verbis alienis credidi, sed oculis meis; 
illis tamen fortasse ut adtenderem credidi, id est ut aspectu quaererem, quid 
viderem.  
 
(Aug. – For when I learned the thing itself I was not indebted to the words of 
others but to my eyes; yet perhaps I accepted their words in order to attend, that 
is, in order that I might find what was to be seen.)80 
 
Although this conclusion is partially negative, failing to envisage that signs 
have no teaching function, Augustine does not disparage the office of words, to 
which he still grants a limited yet important, function. Signs, indeed, are far 
from being useless; however, they urge the sign-receiver to actively seek for 
signification by directing the attention to things: 
 
Aug. Hactenus verba valuerunt, quibus ut plurimum tribuam, admonent tantum, 
ut quaeramus res, non exhibent ut norimus. Is me autem aliquid docet, qui vel 
oculis, vel ulli corporis sensui vel ipsi etiam menti praebet ea, quae cognoscere 
volo.   
 
(Aug. – To give them as much credit as possible, words possess only sufficient 
efficacy to remind us in order that we may seek things, but not to exhibit the 
things so that we may know them. He teaches me something, moreover, who 
presents to my eyes or to any other bodily sense or even to my mind itself those 
things which I wish to know.)81  
 
According to Guzzo, Augustine’s direction of research is a “theory of expres-
sion” (a semiotics, we would say today), which however remains incomplete, 
inasmuch as the “admonitive” function of signs is not fully-developed, but 
simply evoked (Guzzo 1927: 93). 
                                                                          
80  Mag. 10,35 (trans. Leckie, Concerning the Teacher, 46). 
81  Mag. 11,36 (trans. Leckie, Concerning the Teacher, 46). 
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3. OF THINGS AND SIGNS IN AUGUSTINE’S  
DE DOCTRINA CHRISTIANA 
3.1 Setting the significance of the  
De doctrina christiana 
Augustine devoted a study ex professo to the subject of signification: De 
doctrina christiana. This treatise probably fulfils the promise of returning to the 
subject of the utility of words (utilitas verborum) in a subsequent enquiry that 
Augustine made eight years before in the De magistro: “But we shall, God 
willing, inquire at some other time about the utility of words, which if it is well 
considered is no mean matter”.1 For Augustine words are the signs par 
excellence and the semiotics of the word is paramount for interpreting the signs 
of the Bible. 
Augustine’s treatise presents a variety of relevant themes woven into its 
pages, some of which became subjects in their own right. H. R. Drobner, in his 
excellent summary of recent scholarship on Augustine’s works, enumerates 
three main branches of research on the De doctrina christiana: 
1) “Augustine’s theory relating the acts of ‘enjoying’ (frui) and 
‘using’(uti) objects surrounding us;  
2) His theory of signs (signa), and 
3) His critique of the rules of Tyconius” (Drobner 2000: 25).2  
It is noteworthy, however, that the historian Robert Markus (1996) initiated the 
study on “interpretative communities” with reference to the De doctrina 
christiana – that is to say, the idea that “meaning has meaning only in commu-
nities: linguistic, textual and interpretative communities, constituted by shared 
traditions of speaking, reading and interpreting” (Markus 1996: xi). This is a 
highly interesting facet of Augustine’s scholarship and should be included in the 
list of the relevant branches of research outlined above. 
Because this is a much-travelled scholarly ground, we must now determine 
the special province of our enquiry. The present chapter deals with one corner 
of the issue – namely, to study, sub specie semiotica, Augustine’s De doctrina 
christiana. Yet this is in no way intended to claim that Augustine’s aim in 
writing the treatise was to establish a science of signs. Indisputably, this was 
never his primary intention. As we have noted, the context of the work remains 
theological-hermeneutical. Yet Augustine included in his treatise a theory of 
                                                                          
1  Mag. 14,46. (trans. Leckie, Concerning the Teacher, 55). 
2  I was not aware of H. R. Drobner’s research had not Tarmo Toom’s Thought Clothed 
with Sound. Augustine’s Christological Hermeneutics in De doctrina Christiana (2002) 
pointed me in that direction. For a review of additional literature on the De doctrina 
christiana, see Eugene Kevane, «St. Augustine as an educator in the recent literature», The 
American Ecclesiastical Review 152 (1965), 217–232. 
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signs, which he expounded particularly in Book II, and he relied on his exper-
tise as a skillful master of rhetoric to tailor such a theory. Augustine was the 
heir of a rich and long-lasting tradition of ancient theories of the sign, and he 
made use of this tradition for setting forth his own theory, which is, in some 
respect, original. Ultimately, the scope of the present chapter is assessing 
Augustine’s sign theory with a keener eye to its legacy to contemporary se-
miotics, yet bearing always in mind the inherently instrumental character of 
Augustine’s undertaking.  
More specifically, what follows examines four main questions: 
 
1)  To discuss Augustine’s definition of signum against the background of 
the concept of res;  
2)  To explore the debate around the long-lasting division between signa 
naturalia and signa data and discuss its sources;  
3)  To examine the place of intentionality in Augustine’s theory of signs;  
4)  To explore the various divisions of signs. 
 
The abovementioned issues are essential nodes within Augustine’s approach to 
signs, and they also amount to pertinent research areas within the history of 
semiotics. However, such theoretical nodes are particularly cumbersome and 
have been the source of several misconstructions with reverberations within 
semiotic scholarship too.  
In order to facilitate the presentation of the subject matter, a general back-
ground on the treatise in its entirety is initially provided. It follows a brief 
review of the scope, the method and the structure of the treatise with the aim of 
providing the reader with sufficient background knowledge about the source 
text. Looking at the structure of the work will hopefully benefit the gauging of 
its content, too. It is essential to bear this general background in mind if the 
nature of Augustine’s theory of signs is to be comprehensively appraised.  
 
 
3.2. The debate around the De doctrina christiana 
At the age of 43, Augustine set himself a task that, borrowing a formula from 
Cicero,3 he described as “great and arduous” (magnum onus et arduum)4: to 
provide the students (studiosi) of the Bible with a set of rules (praecepta) for 
interpreting the Sacred Scriptures.5 Before giving these rules Augustine sets 
forth a theory of signs. With this precise intent, in the year 396 A.D. Augustine 
began the drafting of the De doctrina christiana, which he did not complete 
until 427.6  
                                                                          
3  Cic. Orator, 10,33. 
4  Doctr. chr. 1,1 (trans. Robertson, On Christian Doctrine, 7). 
5  Doctr. chr. Prooem. 1. 
6  The date of composition of the treatise and its genesis is subject to debate and much has 
been written in this regard. I will not dwell on the history of the composition of the tract in 
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The De doctrina christiana comprises four books and a Prooemium. In Book 
I, Augustine divides the treatise into two main parts, which he terms as “in-
vention” and “exposition”. The two parts discuss the search for the method of 
scriptural interpretation – modus inveniendi quae intellegenda sunt (Books I–
III)  – and the method with which to show the interpretation – modus proferendi 
quae intellect sunt – respectively. The first part includes Books I–III, while the 
second part coincides with Book IV. Atkinson (1979: 15) claims that such a 
division derives from Cicero’s De partitione oratoria.  
Like the De magistro, the De doctrina christiana too has raised numerous 
interpretations regarding the form, the content, and the circumstances of its 
composition. Indeed, the subject matter, the nature and purpose of the treatise, 
the date in which Augustine penned the text and the date of publication of its 
various parts, its title, the target audience Augustine intended to address, the 
precise sources for the numerous divisions of the subject matter – all these 
issues are yet to be conclusively answered. Gerald Press’s overall appraisal of 
the work is, therefore, understandable: “there is no agreement about what the De 
doctrina christiana is actually about” (Press 1980: 100). This is rather 
surprising considering the importance of this treatise within Western philosophy 
and theology. A comprehensive enquiry in all the abovementioned areas of 
research would definitely transcend the limits of the present study. In what 
follows, thus, we outline the main points of the debate around the work and 
refer to the relevant specialized studies for further details on specific issues.7 
Although it is clear that Augustine’s intention was to lay down and convey a 
set of precepts for the interpretation of the Sacred Scriptures, the target audience 
of the work is still a disputed question. In the preface, Augustine writes that he 
wishes to teach the “students” (studiosi) of the Scriptures and those who are 
willing to learn.8 The debate revolves around the meaning of the word studiosi, 
which Augustine employs throughout the text. Such a term has a twofold 
meaning: one narrow and one broad. In the narrow sense, this word refers 
exclusively to the clergy and, in the broad sense, it indicates all those who 
intend to venture into the study of the Scriptures. The term studiosi is, thus, 
ambiguous because it could mean both. Did Augustine intend to address his 
work exclusively to the clergy, or did he have a more generic target in mind so 
that the book meant for anyone interested in studying the Scriptures?  
There is a fundamental split in the secondary literature regarding this point. 
Franz X. Eggersdorfer (1907) opts for a narrow view and argues that Augustine 
wrote his work as a handbook for the clergy only.  For Belford D. Jackson 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
detail.  For this issue, see E. Hill, «De doctrina christiana: A Suggestion», Studia Patristica, 
VI (1962), 443–446; Eugene Kevane, «Augustine’s De doctrina christiana: A treatise on 
Christian Education», Recherches Augustiniennes, 4 (1966), 97–133.  
7  For a review of views and controversies about many of such issues, see Eugene Kevane, 
«Augustine’s De doctrina christiana: A treatise on Christian Education», Recherches 
Augustiniennes, 4 (1966), 97–133. The author provides abundant references to the relevant 
secondary literature as well.  
8  Doctr. chr. Prooem 1. (trans. Robertson, On Christian Doctrine, 3). 
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(1967: 32), the term means all those that studied the Scriptures and that were or 
would have been teaching within the church. Thus, Jackson argues that 
Augustine addressed the De doctrina christiana to them. E. Kevane advances 
the suggestion that “Augustine has adolescent young people in mind when 
writing his treatise” and that the book addresses “teachers and to those, like 
Bishop Aurelius, who are responsible for the planning of teaching and the 
supervision of teachers” (Kevane 1966: 101–102).  
The editorial circumstances of the De doctrina christiana are quite unique 
and intricate. As pointed out before, the treatise in its entirety consists of four 
books and a preface (Prooemium). Yet Augustine did not edit all four books 
consecutively. In the Retractationes, he provides sufficient evidence regarding 
the plan of the composition of the work: 
 
Libros de doctrina Christiana, cum inperfectos conperissem, perficere malui 
quam eis sic relictis ad alia retractanda transire. Conplevi ergo tertium, qui 
scriptus fuerat usque ad eum locum, ubi commemoratum est ex evangelio 
testimonium de muliere quae fermentum in abscondit tribus mensuris farinae, 
donec totum fermentaretur’. Addidi etiam novissimum librum, et quattuor libris 
opus illud inplevi, quorum primi tres adiuvant ut scripturae intellegantur, quartus 
autem quomodo quae intellegimus proferenda sint. 
  
(When I discovered that the books, On Christian Instruction, were not 
completed, I chose to finish them rather than leave them as they were and go on 
to the reexamination of other works. Accordingly, I completed the third book 
which had been written up to the place where mention is made of a passage from 
the Gospel about the woman who “buried leaven in three measures of flour until 
all of it was leavened”. I then added a last book and thus completed this work in 
four books. The first three of these are a help to the understanding of the Scriptu-
res, while the fourth explains how we are to present what we understand.)9 
 
Augustine, thus, penned the De doctrina christiana in two separate stages. 
While writing the Retractationes he realized that the De doctrina christiana was 
truncated. He, then, interrupted the composition of the Retractationes and 
finalized the uncompleted De doctrina christiana. Initially, Augustine wrote the 
first three books of the treatise (he stopped at Book III, Chapter 25). Then, he 
completed the abridged third book and, in addition, wrote a completely new 
one. The latter became the fourth and final part of the work.  
There has been a lot of debate around the date of the two parts of the treatise 
and it is still a disputed matter whether Augustine wrote the Prooemium before 
the composition of the four books or after it. We need not be concerned with the 
details of this intriguing issue because several accurate studies have already 
treated it at length.10  
                                                                          
9  Retr. 30,1 (trans. Bogan, The Retractations, 125). 
10  On the subject of the date of the two parts of the De doctrina christiana, see Atkinson 
(1979: I–XI). See also Alberto Pincherle, «Sulla composizione del ‘De doctrina christiana’ 
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The title Augustine selected for his treatise is, at best, puzzling, and it has 
been the subject of long and heated speculations. Not surprisingly, Kevane 
(1966: 103) claims that it is a “mysterious” and “disconcerting” title. The De 
doctrina christiana has been generally translated in English as “On Christian 
Doctrine” (Robertson 1958) or as “On Christian Teaching” (Green 1995). 
Likewise, the translations of the title in Italian are not dissimilar, opting for “La 
Dottrina Cristiana” (Alici 1989; Belli 1920; Capone 1840) or “L’Istruzione 
Cristiana” (Simonetti 1994). However, to date there is no adequate equivalent in 
the English-speaking world apt to capture the significance of Augustine’s title 
in its fullness and depth. Indeed, several scholars have pointed out the in-
accuracy of such translations. Kevane (1966) has argued against using the 
English term “doctrine” in place of doctrina because the active meaning 
conveyed by the term doctrina gets lost in translation. He argues that “doctrine” 
in English has a passive connotation and, thus, is not an accurate translation to 
convey the nuances of the term doctrina, whose meaning involves an “active 
process of teaching” (Kevane 1966: 122). We shall see shortly how this word 
entails an active element. Atkinson (1979: 1), too, has expressed perplexity 
towards the term “doctrine” as an adequate translation for doctrina, not only for 
the reason Kevane pointed out, but also because “Christian Doctrine” refers to 
“a particular branch of theology and could be applied only to book 1 of the 
work”. Sullivan (1930: 44), instead, has argued that Augustine used the term 
doctrina “in the classical sense of ‘teaching’ or ‘instruction’”. 
Undoubtedly, the crux of the matter lies in the meaning of doctrina and how 
this word should be properly understood. The indeterminacy of Augustine’s title 
ultimately derives from the meaning one assigns to this term. Indeed, doctrina 
is a rather elusive word, especially if one seeks to discern only one conclusive, 
precise, and definite meaning that encapsulates it. Press (1980: 103) has shown 
that such an approach is rather fruitless because doctrina is a multilayered term, 
and it is all too easy to interpret it as a single-sided concept. In a similar vein, 
Erickson (1985: 106) has regarded doctrina as a “multidimensional concept” 
and as “the most significant passage” of the entire work.  
In general terms, two kinds of interpretations can be discerned regarding the 
meaning of doctrina: a broad and a narrow interpretation. The first approach 
coincides with the historian Henri-Irénée Marrou’s seminal work, St. Augustin 
et la Fin de la Culture Antique (1938). He has interpreted doctrina in a broad 
sense as “Christian culture” and has concluded: 
 
De doctrina christiana is un traité en quatre livres consacré expressément à la 
culture chrétienne, de Doctrina christiana, ouvre longuement méditée et mûrie 
où saint Augustin nous a exposé tout l’essentiel du point de vue auquel il s’ent 
arrêté à la fin de sa vie sur la culture intellectuelle, sa place dans sa vie, son but, 
sa technique, ses méthodes … Elle se resume d’un mot, celui-la-même 
qu’Augustin a choisi comme titre pour l’ouvrage où il a traité ex professo du 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
di S. Agostino», Storiografia e storia. Studi in onore di Eugenio Duprè Theseider, Volume 2 
(1974), 541–559. 
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sujet qui nous occupe: doctrina christiana, un culture chrétienne … un culture 
entièrement consacrée à Dieu. (Marrou 1938: 332) 
 
Indisputably, Marrou’s view has been highly influential. It is, however, worth 
noting that, before Marrou, Eggersdorfer (1907) argued for a narrower inter-
pretation. Eggersdorfer envisaged Augustine’s undertaking as tailored to a spe-
cific target and with a particular aim, namely, the teaching of the clergy. Mar-
rou’s thesis, thus, grew somewhat as reaction to Eggersdorfer’s precedent 
argument.11 We need not discuss in detail these two opposing approaches here.12 
Instead, we should look more closely how the meaning of “doctrina” can be 
spelled out. 
There is absolutely no conclusive argument in the secondary literature on the 
subject as to how the meaning of the term doctrina must be understood. Nearly 
all scholars, however, have stressed that, when Augustine was writing, this term 
was indeed polysemous. Moreover, both Marrou (1934) and Kevane (1966) 
have noticed that doctrina involves both the act of teaching and learning. Thus, 
this concept entails an active element. This explains the difficulties in trans-
lating such a word into English. Capitalizing on the richness and on the seman-
tical depth that doctrina possessed in the Latinitas, Augustine employed it in a 
new context, which was religious and Christian. 
The term doctrina has a very ancient and rich semantic history. In one of the 
most outstanding studies on the subject, Marrou (1934) has shown the 
indebtedness of Augustine’s use of this term to the previous tradition. Because 
Marrou’s 1934 paper is by far less known than his seminal monograph, Saint 
Augustin et la Fin de la Culture Antique (1938), and because it is curiously not 
so often referenced in the debate on the meaning of doctrina, it is worth 
reviewing his initial thesis.  
In his research conducted in 1934, Marrou examined the terms doctrina and 
disciplina under the reciprocal light that one shed upon the other because, 
initially, their meaning can hardly be discerned. Scrupulously reviewing the 
similarities and differences between the two terms, Marrou explained that 
doctrina derives from docere (teaching) and disciplina from discere (learning) 
and that their root was initially pagan. The historian argued that both terms 
mean “enseignement” and refer to the subject matter of systematic and scientific 
teaching. In this respect, thus, doctrina and disciplina are synonyms (Marrou 
1934: 6). Yet doctrina, in contrast to disciplina, has a more strictly intellectual 
character, and it seldom refers to “culture” in the active sense of the word – as 
an effort towards the cultivation of a science of the spirit (Marrou 1934: 6). The 
concept of disciplina, instead, has a pedigree in military education and it refers 
to slavishly and rigorously following a set of prescribed rules. By making 
                                                                          
11  For details on the controversy between Eggersdorfer and Marrou, see Eugene Kevane, 
«Augustine’s De doctrina christiana: A treatise on Christian Education», Recherches 
Augustiniennes, 4 (1966), 105–109. 
12 For a discussion on Marrou’s interpretation, see Kevane (1966: 105–109). 
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references to Augustine’s works, Marrou showed that the bishop of Hippo 
employed both doctrina and disciplina with the meanings outlined above.  
In light of Marrou’s study, it is evident that Augustine’s selection of the 
word doctrina for the title of his treatise draws on an ancient and well-known 
tradition that harkens back to Cicero, who was the father of the term. Augustine 
retained from this tradition the meaning of doctrina as a peculiar kind of 
teaching that involves, at one and the same time, both teaching and learning. He 
then transposed this meaning from the pagan context into the ecclesiastical one. 
Skilfully tracing the semantic history of the term from its inception to the 
reception in the ecclesiastical Latin, Marrou (1934: 14–15) pointed out that the 
transfer of doctrina from one context to another ultimately altered its original 
meaning. As a result, the initial proximity of the terms doctrina and disciplina 
became gradually diluted and the word doctrina acquired new connotations 
while it lost others.  
From this discussion, it can be gleaned that the notion of doctrina presents a 
highly complex set of ideas, and is not readily reducible to any one single con-
cept. Thus, the title De doctrina christiana synthesizes a plurality of meanings 
that are transposed into the context of Christian exegesis. The stakes of using 
the term doctrina are high because the word conveys a bundle of meanings, 
which makes it hard to grasp for the contemporary reader. And yet doctrina 
refers back to the active sense of teaching and learning, to a set of knowledge (a 
science) that can be mastered by setting the good intent and by means of tireless 
devotion and, ultimately, to the teaching of God.  
As a corollary, we should emphasize that Augustine used the term doctrina 
also with reference to the theory of signs. As we shall see in what follows, he 
writes that every doctrine is either a “doctrine of things” (Doctrina rerum) or a 
“doctrine of signs” (Doctrina signorum). Because Augustine refers to the theory 
of signs as “doctrina”, here he probably uses this term to mean a set of know-
ledge – a science – devoted to a specific subject (signs). This explains why 
semiotics is referred to – after J. Locke – as the “doctrine of signs”. As is clear, 
however, this meaning is already present in Augustine.13 
 
 
3.3. The scope of the De doctrina christiana  
In the preface (Prooemium), Augustine protects himself against possible 
reproaches. The prologue of the book is significant for two main reasons: first, 
because here Augustine clarifies the scope of his enquiry; second, because while 
                                                                          
13  For a discussion of the notion of «doctrine of signs», see John Deely (1982b), «Semiotic’ 
as the doctrine of signs», Ars Semeiotica 1/3, 41–68; «On the notion doctrine of signs», 
Appendix I in Deely, J. Introducing Semiotic: Its History and Doctrine (1982a), Blooming-
ton, Indiana University Press.  
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dealing with his potential critics he provides further reflections on the nature of 
the work itself.14  
The incipit of the treatise testifies that Augustine’s intention was drafting a 
handful of principles for interpreting the Scriptures and for setting such a 
method down for posterity: 
 
Sunt praecepta quaedam tractandarum scripturarum, quae studiosis earum video 
non incommode posse tradi, ut non solum legendo alios, qui divinarum 
litterarum operta aperuerunt, sed etiam ipsi aperiendo proficiant. 
 
(There are certain precepts for treating the Scriptures which I think may not 
inconveniently be transmitted to students, so that they may profit not only from 
reading the work of expositors but also in their own explanations of the sacred 
writings to others).15  
 
The set of rules or principles (praecepta) discussed in the book is instrumental 
both for interpreting the Bible through reading the text, as well as for those who 
become teachers themselves and, in turn, will pass on to future generations the 
knowledge they have acquired. Thus, Augustine’s method shows a double 
utility because it can be used both for learning and teaching. By positing that the 
rules for interpreting the Scriptures have a twofold function, the preface tacitly 
relates to the overall theme of the book, which is epitomized by the word 
doctrina. As noted before, such a term is highly significant, and its meaning is 
rich and ancient.  The word entails a twofold sense because it involves both the 
active process of teaching and learning, as well as the subject matter – what is 
taught and learned (Marrou 1934).  
In the Prooemium, Augustine mitigates, at the outset, the potential criticisms 
of his work. To this end, he follows the argumentative figure of the praesumptio 
(presumption or anticipation), whose aim is to prevent eventual objections in 
order to confute them in advance. He divides the detractors of his undertaking 
into three main categories:16 
 
1) Those who criticize the work because they fail to understand the content; 
2) Those who understand the content and nonetheless are not able to use it. 
Because they cannot benefit from the rules offered to them, they regard 
such a method as unnecessary tout court; 
                                                                          
14  On the prologue of the De doctrina christiana, see Eugene Kevane, «Paideia and anti-
paideia: The prooemium of St. Augustine’s De doctrina christiana», Augustinian Studies 1 
(1970), 153–180. See also Ulrich Duchrow, «Zum Prolog von Augustins De doctrina 
christiana», Vigiliae Christianae 17 (1963), 165–172; Luigi Alici, «Il primo libro del ‘De 
doctrina christiana’, o della mediazione impossibile», in «De doctrina christiana» di 
Agostino d’Ippona, Roma, Città Nuova (1995), 11–37. 
15  Doctr. chr. Prooem 1. (trans. Robertson, On Christian Doctrine, 3). 
16  Doctr. chr. Prooem 2. 
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3) Those who consider the set of praecepta as superfluous. They variously 
insist on the dispensability of the mediation of men for learning how to 
understand the Scriptures. 
 
These three kinds of opponents are left unanimous. Out of the three, the third 
one receives more attention than the others. Here, Augustine outlines a real 
typology of textual reception based on the strategy with which the audience 
relates to the text. He replies firmly to all of them by resorting to an approach 
that is recurrent throughout his works (see the discussion in Chapter 2), the 
digito ostendo, namely, the pointing finger as a sign of an object. In this 
passage, Augustine anticipates a specific type of sign that he will take up later 
on (in Book II). Indeed, there Augustine refers to hand gestures as visual signs 
(“Some signify many things through the motions of their hands” – he mentions 
actors who “give signs to those who understand with the motions of all their 
members as if narrating things to their eyes”) and “banners and military 
standards”.17 It is instructive to notice that Augustine deals with his potential 
critique by relying on the sign-object distinction as the basis for his counter-
argument. This point is often overlooked. The passage is particularly poignant 
because the sign-object distinction is a metaphor for the Augustinian approach 
in its entirety. Indeed, throughout the treatise he contends that “things are 
learned by signs”.18 Augustine, thus, postulates an epistemological relation 
between the knowledge of things and the learning through signs that a subject 
can experience. This is why he pays a great deal of attention to signs of all sorts. 
Signs are the gateways to things. It goes without saying that, in the case that the 
signs are not intelligible and cannot be grasped due to the negligence of the 
interpreter who is unable to discern them, things cannot be learned altogether. 
Augustine uses this type of counterargument against the first kind of critique 
and it refers to the connection between the sign and the thing signified, which 
becomes intelligible through the sign. In other words, Augustine brings out 
vividly a link between apprehension of signs and knowledge of things. 
Moreover, in the preface, he envisages an analogy between sight and under-
standing. He compares non-understanding with short-sightedness. For Augus-
tine, the critics of the first kind are like those who do not have enough sight 
even for discerning the sign that directs them to the object – “If they wished to 
see the old or the new moon or some very small star which I was pointing to 
with my finger and they did not have keen enough sight even to see my 
finger”.19 The negligence which is in the eye of the beholder cannot be imputed 
as a sufficient reason to censor Augustine’s undertaking. Along the same lines, 
the second type of critic is seen as parallel to those who, despite being able to 
distinguish the sign (the finger pointing), yet fail to see the object to which the 
sign is pointing to (the moon). The third type of critic insists that the human 
                                                                          
17  Doctr. chr. 2,3 (trans. Robertson, On Christian Doctrine, 35). 
18 Doctr. chr. 1,2 (trans. Robertson, On Christian Doctrine, 8). 
19  Doctr. chr. Prooem 3 (trans. Robertson, On Christian Doctrine, 4). 
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mediation for approaching the Bible is without value and is unnecessary 
altogether. These critics pride themselves on understanding the Scriptures with-
out resorting to any of the rules imparted to them by other men. Thus, they 
dismiss any intermediary in approaching the Scriptures. They rely on insights 
received from the divine illumination, as a pure effect of a gift from God. Thus, 
they regard Augustine’s intent as superfluous and instead advocate for 
bypassing the mediation of any human teacher for the apprehension of the 
Bible. Augustine tempers their enthusiasm by reminding them that anyone –  
without exception – must have been schooled in how to read by other men 
nonetheless. Moreover, every man has acquired language by means of hearing it 
spoken by others. Likewise, any foreign language is learned by listening to 
other members of the linguistic community speaking it or by someone who 
teaches it to them. The teaching to others and the intergenerational transmission 
of knowledge by means of teaching is pivotal and should not be dismissed. This 
contention is somewhat different from the thesis unravelled in the De magistro, 
where, as we have noted (in Chapter 2), sign mediation is vigorously chal-
lenged.  
 
3.4. The method of division and  
the structure of the treatise  
Unlike the De magistro, where – as pointed out earlier (in Chapter 2) – there is 
an apparent fragmentariness and lack of organic development, the De doctrina 
christiana shows a systematic treatment of the subject matter. The structure of 
the treatise follows the principle of division and subdivision (divisio and 
partitio) of the content. However, Augustine’s method of making partitions is 
not original. This method has a long pedigree and was used in antiquity in 
technical treatises. The characteristic feature of such a model is the close 
relationship between the subject treated and the structure of the treatise. In order 
words, the theory (the subject matter) shapes the structure of the work. More-
over, each partition of the subject treated is of fundamental importance both in 
reference to the other partitions as well as to the entire book (Atkinson 1979: 
13).  
Both Jackson and Atkinson point out that numerous works in antiquity 
exhibited a similar form. Jackson (1967: 42) identifies the roots of such a 
scientific method (scientia) of division in several ancient authors, hearkening 
back to Plato. Along the same lines, Atkinson (1979: 14) notices that a similar 
method is traceable in works of the first century B.C. (such as Varro’s Res 
rusticae, Vitruvius’ De architectura), in works of the first century A.D. (such as 
Celsus’ Libri medicinae, Gaius’ Institutiones), as well as in works of rhetoric 
(such as Cicero’s De partitione oratoria and the Rhetorica ad Herennium). The 
author argues that Augustine must have been familiar with such a systematic 
method of division by reading Varro, and she points out remarkable similarities 
between Augustine’s De doctrina christiana and Cicero’s De partitione 
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oratoria. The latter work is the one that influenced Augustine the most 
(Atkinson 1979: 15–16). 
We are not so much concerned here with studying the sources of Augus-
tine’s method of partition. As noted above, both Jackson (1967) and Atkinson 
(1979), independently, discussed this issue and reached similar conclusions: a) 
Augustine used a systematic method for making divisions, which was a 
commonplace in antiquity; b) such a method was used in the context of rhetoric 
as well as in logic; c) through this method, Augustine achieved clarity and pre-
cision in the exposition of the subject matter. However, although Jackson and 
Atkinson draw similar conclusions, they disagree on the sources for Augustine’s 
method.20  
This issue is not only remarkable in its own right – because it shows that 
Augustine follows an ancient tradition for structuring his own work, and 
therefore, in this regard he is less original than one might think – but it also has 
relevant implications for the topic of the present research. Indeed, all the 
divisions Augustine makes within the theory of signs result from an application 
of such a method of partition to the subject treated, namely, signs (signa).  This 
means that the division of signs Augustine envisages in the De doctrina 
christiana is in fact the result of applying this method of scientific partition to 
the subject treated, namely, signs. We will see that although Augustine lists 
several divisions of signa, he does not treat all of them exhaustively because 
some signs (as for instance the signs of animals), although part of the general 
subject treated and, as such, deserving to be mentioned, nonetheless fall outside 
the scope of his enquiry. 
Throughout the book, Augustine points out eleven divisions, as shown in the 
diagram below:  
 
                                                                          
20 It is somewhat curious and, however, inaccurate, that Atkinson (1979: 28) reproached 
Jackson for failing to note this issue in his own study of the De doctrina. This is definitely 






Figure 14. The structure of the De doctrina christiana 
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Out of eleven divisions, seven concern the theory of signs. Consequently, these 
are the nodes that we must study more closely: 
 
1. The distinction of res and signa; 
2. The distinction of signa naturalia and signa data; 
3. The distinction of the signs of men and the signs of animals; 
4. The distinction of words and other signs used by men;  
5. The distinction of the written and spoken word; 
6. The distinction of signa ignota and signa ambigua; 
7. The distinction of signa propria and signa translata. 
 
In what follows, we proceed with a discussion of each division.  
 
 
3.5. Things and signs  
After clearing out the way for potential criticisms in the prologue, Augustine 
begins the first book of his De doctrina christiana with these words: 
 
Omnis doctrina vel rerum est vel signorum, sed res per signa discuntur. Proprie 
autem nunc res appellavi, quae non ad significandum aliquid adhibentur, sicuti 
est lignum, lapis, pecus atque huiusmodi cetera, sed non illud lignum, quod in 
aquas amaras Moysen misisse legimus, ut amaritudine carerent, neque ille lapis, 
quem Iacob sibi ad caput posuerat, neque illud pecus quod pro filio immolavit 
Abraham.  Hae namque ita res sunt, ut aliarum etiam signa sint rerum.  
Sunt autem alia signa, quorum omnis usus in significando est, sicuti sunt 
verba. Nemo enim utitur verbis nisi aliquid significandi gratia. Ex quo intelle-
gitur quid appellem signa; res eas videlicet quae, ad significandum aliquid adhi-
bentur. Quam ob rem omne signum etiam res aliqua est; quod enim nulla res est, 
omnino nihil est; non autem omnis res etiam signum est.  
Et ideo in hac divisione rerum atque signorum, cum de rebus loquemur, ita 
loquemur, ut etiamsi earum aliquae adhiberi ad significandum possint, non 
impediant partitionem, qua prius de rebus, postea de signis disseremus, memo-
riter que teneamus id nunc in rebus considerandum esse, quod sunt, non quod 
aliud etiam praeter se ipsas significant.  
 
(All doctrine concerns either things or signs, but things are learnt by signs. 
Strictly speaking, I have called a “thing” that which is not used to signify 
something else, like wood, stone, cattle, and so on; but not that wood concerning 
which we read that Moses casts it into bitter waters that their bitterness might be 
dispelled, nor that stone which Jacob placed at his head, nor that beast which 
Abraham sacrificed in place of his son. For these are things in such a way that 
they are also signs of other things. There are other signs whose whole use is in 
signifying, like words. For no one uses words except for the purpose of signi-
fying something. From this may be understood what we call “signs”; they are 
things used to signify something. Thus every sign is also a thing, for that which 
is not a thing is nothing at all; but not every thing is also a sign. And thus in this 
distinction between things and signs, when we speak of things, we shall so speak 
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that, although some of them may be used to signify something else, this fact shall 
not disturb the arrangement we have made to speak of things as such first and of 
signs later. We should bear in mind that now we are to consider what things are, 
not what they signify beyond themselves.)21 
 
The first fundamental distinction in regard to signs outlined in the De doctrina 
christiana is, thus, the division between “things” (res) and “signs” (signa). The 
abovementioned excerpt is rather dense and contains valuable information that 
deserves attention. Before qualifying the relevant points, however, some pre-
liminary remarks are necessary. 
The term res in Augustine is highly complex and polysemic. This concept 
has a long pedigree and its philosophical and semantic history is as rich as it is 
difficult.22 The term has been generally translated in English as “thing” or 
“something” and seldom as “reality”.23 As said earlier, studies conducted within 
semiotics, except for Todorov (1977) who partially treated the topic, have 
generally focused on Augustine’s definition of the “sign” (signum) and have 
emphasized the characteristics of farsightedness, a high degree of generality, 
and powerful synthesis that this notion possess with respect to previous 
traditions (Todorov 1977; Manetti 1987; Deely 2009; Eco 1981; Eco 1984). 
Nonetheless, by placing emphasis on the definition of signum, contemporary 
semiotics has almost completely dismissed Augustine’s concept of res, which, 
at any rate, is as essential as its congener concept of the sign. We shall see, in 
fact, that conceptualizing the concept of signum without resorting to the notion 
of res, that is, out of context, is incomplete and does not align with Augustine’s 
own thought. 
Previous research of the meaning of res in Augustine has been rare (Simone 
1969; Catapano 2017; Jackson 1967). In light of the centrality that the doublet 
res/signum plays in Augustine’s thought, this is certainly striking.  
In contrast to previous studies on the De doctrina christiana conducted 
within semiotics, we begin with a different premise. While these studies typical-
ly tend to over-emphasize Augustine’s concept of signum at the expense of the 
notion of res, the present work begins the study of signum with a philosophical 
discussion of the concept of res and its possible sources. We argue that this 
approach is in line with Augustine’s own plan of the work. It will be seen how 
in the De doctrina christiana and elsewhere (see, for instance, the dialogue De 
magistro as well as the De dialectica), res and signum are discussed one in 
reference to the other. In point of fact, the division res/signum is consistent 
                                                                          
21  Doctr. chr. 2,2 (trans. Robertson, On Christian Doctrine, 8–9). 
22  A propos to the history of the concept of res, see the outstanding review of this term 
written by Jean-François Courtine, in Barbara Cassin (ed.) Dictionary of Untranslatables. A 
Philosophical Lexicon (2014), Princeton and Oxford, Princeton University Press, especially 
897–898 for a discussion of res in Augustine. 
23  In The Philosophy of Teaching: A Study in the Symbolism of Language (1924), which is 
a translation of Augustine’s De magistro in English, Fr. Francis E. Tourscher used the term 
«reality» as a translation for res. 
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throughout Augustine’s works and should not be overlooked. The concept of 
res, thus, deserves equal attention as the notion of signum. 
This said, let us now discuss the excerpt from Book I quoted above and 
outline the definitions of the concept. Initially, we identify two different defi-
nitions of res, one narrow and one broad: 
 
Definition 1:  
 
[…] Quae non ad significandum aliquid adhibentur. 
 
([…] That which is not used to signify something else).24 
 
Definition 2:  
 
[…] Quod enim nulla res est, omnino nihil est. 
 
([…] That which is not a thing is nothing at all).25  
 
Both Karel Kuypers and Belford D. Jackson notice that such definitions refer to 
a twofold meaning of the term res and, therefore, must be distinguished one 
from the other. While Kuypers (1934: 78) identifies a “narrow” (“eng”) and a 
“broader” (“weit”) meaning of res,26 Jackson (1967; 1969) distinguishes a 
“proper” and “improper” use of the notion. Definitions 1 and 2 outlined above 
overlap with the “narrow” or “proper” use of the term res, and with the “broa-
der” or “improper” use of res, respectively.  
In order to emphasize the different meanings that the word res takes for 
Augustine in the two formulations outlined above and to avoid terminological 
confusions, we refer to Definition 1 and Definition 2 adopting our own termi-
nology. In what follows, thus, we will refer to a primary and a secondary 
meaning of the concept of res. 
However, Augustine did not explicitly spell out the distinction exactly in the 
terms described above. Here, one should go beyond Augustine and deduct the 
distinction between “narrow/broad”, “proper/improper” or “primary/secondary” 
from the tacit logic implied in the text. Indeed, Augustine did employ the term 
“proper” (proprie) in the first definition of res. In its “proper” use, res is that 
which is not used to signify something else.  
The “improper” use of res must be inferred from the second definition 
because Augustine did not provide a term for it. Thus, the opposition “proper/ 
improper” or “narrow/broad” must be extrapolated in order to draw a line 
between the two definitions of res, as both Kuypers and Jackson have done. The 
                                                                          
24  Doctr. chr. 2,2 (trans. Robertson, On Christian Doctrine, 8). 
25  Doctr. chr. 2,2 (trans. Robertson, On Christian Doctrine, 9). 
26  «Der allgemeine aufbau beruht auf der unterscheidung zwischen sache und zeichen. 
Sache hat eine weitere und eine engere Bedeutung» (Kuypers 1934: 78). 
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“improper” definition of res qualifies the concept as anything whatsoever that is 
(Jackson 1967: 64). 
Let us now describe the two meanings more in depth.  
 
 
3.5.1. The primary meaning of res 
Initially, Augustine discriminates the notion of res negatively against the con-
cept of signum: res is a thing that is not signum. Indeed, res are described as 
things which are not employed to signify something. Here, Augustine sketches 
out with some care the division between res and signum as an opposition 
between things that do not signify and things that do signify. Accordingly, res 
are things that do not signify other things, whereas signa are things that do 
signify other things. Thus, the discriminating factor is the capability of signi-
fying that things may have versus the absence of such a feature. Augustine 
provides illustrations of things that do not signify, like “wood, stone, cattle and 
so on”.27 
However, there is more to it. In fact, there is a subtle distinction to be con-
sidered. Objective entities can serve a significative function. Wood, stone, cattle 
can be signs of other things, without ceasing to exist as things. The piece of 
wood that Moses threw into the water to remove any trace of bitterness, the 
stone which Jacob used as a resting place for his head, and the sheep which 
Abraham sacrificed in place of his son are employed for signifying something 
else, thus such objective entities are also signs. However, this type of signs, as it 
were, is of a mixed nature because these signs are equally things and signs at the 
same time. This thing-sign is somewhat an intermediary category between res 
(things) and signa (signs). Augustine coins the term signum translatum in order 
to refer to this particular kind of sign. The nature of the signum translatum can 
be grasped with more ease if one considers it in relation to the signum 
proprium, which is a sign whose sole function is to signify, such as words. We 
have, then, the following threefold distinction:  
 
1. res; 
2. signum translatum; 
3. signum proprium. 
 
This triplet of concepts can be distinguished according to whether such entities 
retain their nature of things (and to what degree) and whether they signify other 
things.  
From here, it follows that, the difference between things and signs could be 
conceived in terms of degrees. Signs may retain their nature of things, and we 
may call such a property – going beyond Augustine – the “thingness” of signs, 
as it were. This quality can be more or less accentuated or calibrated differently. 
Signa translata are somewhat of a middle ground in between res proprie and 
                                                                          
27  Doctr. chr. 2,2 (trans. Robertson, On Christian Doctrine, 8). 
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signum proprium. We can imagine this as a degree of thingness of the sign that 
is gradually diluted when one arrives to the signum proprium. We can represent 
this difference with a schema: 
 
(a) Res proprie – things that do not signify; 
(b) Signum translatum – things that signify something else and yet retain 
their nature of things up to a certain degree; 
(c) Signum proprium – things whose whole nature is rounded off the 
quality of signification. They retain little of their nature as things. They 
are used only for the purpose of signifying. 
 
 
3.5.2. The secondary meaning of res 
Let us now consider the secondary meaning of the notion. Here the concept of 
res is envisaged in quite an extensive and general sense as anything whatsoever 
that is, because what does not exist cannot be anything – “that which is not a 
thing is nothing at all”.28 From this perspective, res is the wider category that 
encompasses anything that is, including the notion of signum (Jackson 1967: 
65). In other words, signum is a specification of the genus res.  
To sum up, the two definitions of res outlined above – primary and secon-
dary – account for two different types of relationships between things and signs: 
one is a relationship of opposition and the other one a relationship of inclusion. 
While the primary meaning of res rests upon a relation of opposition to the 
notion signum – things are that which are not used to signify – the secondary 
meaning of res is based on a relation of inclusion in respect to the concept of 
signum – signs are things, too, because that which is not cannot exist altogether.  
The schemes below show the two definitions of res and the types of relations 
between res and signum that each definition presupposes: 
 
 
          
Figure 15. The primary meaning of res 
 
 
              
Figure 16. The secondary meaning of res 
 
 
                                                                          
28 Doctr. chr. 2,2 (trans. Robertson, On Christian Doctrine, 9). 
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Figure 15 depicts the primary meaning of the concept of res (Resp). Here, res 
and signum define in relation to one another. To reiterate: res are things that do 
not signify other things. Raffaele Simone (1969: 105) has called this notion the 
semiotic definition of res (“la definizione semiotica di res”). This is an either/or 
type of relationship in which the two horns oppose one another. Thus, such a 
relationship is negative and oppositional: what is res is not signum and vice-
versa. 
Figure 16 presents the secondary meaning of the concept of res (Ress). This 
illustration differs from the former one (Fig. 15) because here signum is thought 
of as a subcategory of the more general concept of res. This entails that, in one 
respect, a sign is a thing, too. Augustine posits that every sign is always a thing 
because what is nothing cannot be anything at all. At any rate, the sign too, 
must be something. It is useful to bear such a distinction in mind because 
Augustine in Book II returns to it as a background for the discussion about 
signs.  
In conclusion, by looking at the secondary meaning of the concept of res, res 
and signum are not coextensive: the sign is always a thing; yet not all things are 
signs.  
 
3.6. Augustine’s sources for the division res/signum  
Numerous and accurate studies of the sources of the De doctrina christiana 
have shown Augustine’s tribute to the previous tradition. Such enquiries have 
typically focused on the relationship between Book IV of the treatise and 
ancient rhetoric (Eskridge 1903; Sullivan 1930). In contrast, few researches 
have addressed the problem of the philosophical roots of the concept of res in 
Augustine and its sources. Both Jackson (1967) and Atkinson (1979) provide 
some essential clues on the subject that are worth reviewing.  
Augustine deals with the “doctrine of things” (doctrina rerum) in Book I of 
the De doctrina christiana. Atkinson (1979: 17–18) suggests Cicero, who 
distinguished between res and verba in relation to the vis oratoris, as a possible 
source of Augustine. Undoubtedly, this is an obvious source for Augustine, and 
it is well documented that Cicero had a profound influence on him (Testard 
1958). Although Atkinson’s suggestion is sound, the author remarks that, unlike 
Augustine, Cicero did not conceive of words as signs. For Cicero signum was a 
technical term used as “a part of a class of rhetorical argument”, and for this 
reason, his influence on Augustine for the division res/signum is less evident 
(Atkinson 1979: 18). 
Jackson notes that the res/signum distinction was a commonplace in the 
Latin tradition, so much so that this opposition is found in numerous authors –  
Cicero, Quintilian, Varro, Seneca. All these scholars referred to a similar 
distinction, although the terminology they employed from time to time was not 
uniform. Indeed, the term res couples with a range of various terms – signum, 
verbum, nomen, vocabulum, vox – depending on the writers’ disciplinary 
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backgrounds (Jackson 1967: 65). Summarizing Jackson’s results, we can single 
out three main meanings of the concept of res (Jackson 1967: 65–67). The 
terms used in each opposition vary from context to context:  
 
(1) Res – verbum (the subject of a discussion – what is said); 
(2) Res – verba (facts – words);  
(3) Res – vocabula (meaning – term). 
 
Originating in the context of forensic rhetoric, Jackson explains that the first 
opposition refers to what one is talking about as opposed to the talking itself. 
Indeed, in rhetorical tradition, the terms res and verbum were used to dis-
tinguish the subject or content of a discussion (res) and what was said about it 
(verbum), respectively. Both Cicero and Quintilian used such a doublet. For 
Cicero, res is the content of an orator. More precisely, in Quintilian, the oppo-
sition between verba and res consists of the mismatch between the writer’s 
written word and his own intention (Eden 1987: 77). 
The second type of distinction Jackson outlines is based on the Ciceronian 
motto Rerum enim copia, verborum copiam gignit (“a full supply of facts begets 
a full supply of words”). This division relates to the opposition between “know-
ledge of facts and ability with words”. The third type of distinction originates in 
the contexts of logic and semantics, and it refers to the meaning (res) of a term 
(vocabula) (Jackson 1967: 66). 
There are two crucial conclusions Jackson draws:  
 
(1) although the oppositions res/verbum and res/vocabula are generally 
traceable through numerous authors, res is rarely used in opposition to 
signum, as instead did Augustine;29  
(2) Augustine’s use of the concept of res shows a “high degree of 
 generalization” (Jackson 1967: 68). This particularly broad use of the 
 term sets Augustine apart from the previous tradition.  
 
To conclude, Augustine, in a stroke of genius, synthesizes in one word all the 
connotations that the previous rhetorical, forensic and semantic traditions 
assigned to concept of res. In other words, his concept is so broad and general 
as to include all the earlier uses of the term: res as the subject of a discussion, 
res as a fact, res as a meaning of a term or as an event, are all encompassed in 
Augustine’s concept of res (Jackson 1967: 68). Here lies Augustine’s origi-
nality: (a) in contrast to the previous tradition, he explicitly used res in oppo-
sition to signum; (b) he included under the same head an array of meanings that 
were formerly used in different contexts and are now grouped under the same 
umbrella term.  
                                                                          
29  Jackson mentions a single instance of this by referring again to Cicero, who, in the 
context of a legal debate in forensic rhetoric, refers to murder as res and blood as signum of 
the murder. And when it appears, as in Cicero’s case, it is out of a linguistic context to 
denote the «evidence pointing to an event» (Jackson 1967: 68). 
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Hitherto, we have discussed the meaning of res and its possible sources. 
Now we must examine how Augustine used such a term in his other works. To 
trace the meaning of the term in the entire Augustinian corpus would exceed the 
scope of the present study. Thus, we limit our enquiry by looking at how 
Augustine used such a term in the works relevant for the present research, 
namely, in the Dialectica and in the De magistro. 
As revealed in Chapter 1, in the De dialectica, Augustine defines res as 
“whatever is sensed or is understood or hidden” (Res est quidquid vel sentitur 
vel intelligitur vel latet).30 In this context, res is the external referent, the object. 
It is the corporeal thing perceived directly through the senses or the incorporeal 
thing grasped by the mind or what remains hidden both from direct sense 
perception and from the mind. This is all we can glean from Augustine’s earlier 
treatise. 
In the De magistro, we can trace back both the primary and secondary 
meaning of the concept of res outlined in the De doctrina christiana and dis-
cussed above. Almost no one, except for Giovanni Catapano (2017) has pointed 
out this parallel with clarity and precision. As we wrote in Chapter 2, the 
semiotics of the De magistro is based on the division between things and signs. 
In the dialogue, Augustine defines res as “those things which can be signified 
by means of signs and yet are not signs” (ea quae signis significari possunt et 
signa non sunt).31 He calls those things which are not signs “signifiable” 
(significabilia). The opposition between things that signify/things that do not 
signify is similar to the primary meaning of res and is retained in the De doctri-
na christiana. 
If one carefully reads the dialogue, one can realize that the secondary 
meaning of res as described in the De doctrina christiana is traceable to the De 
magistro as well. First Augustine and his son agree that a sign must signify 
something (Aug. – Can a sign be a sign unless it signifies something? Ad. – It 
cannot).32 Then it is also posited that a sign must also be something because that 
which is not cannot be something: 
 
(Ad. – What does nihil nothing signify except that which is not? 
Aug. – Perhaps you are right. But I cannot agree with you because of your recent 
admission, namely, that a sign is not a sign unless it signifies something. And 
that which is not cannot in any way be something. Accordingly, the second word 
in the line is not a sign because of the fact it does not signify anything, which 
would mean that we have agreed falsely that all words are signs or that every 
sign signifies something.)33 
 
If one reads Augustine’s statement in the De magistro “that which is not cannot 
in any way be something” in light of the secondary definition of res he gives in 
                                                                          
30   Dial. 5 (trans. Jackson, De Dialectica, 87). 
31  Mag. 4,8 (trans. Leckie, Concerning the Teacher, 13). 
32  Mag. 2,3 (trans. Leckie, Concerning the Teacher, 6). 
33  Mag. 2,3. (trans. Leckie, Concerning the Teacher, 6–7). 
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the De doctrina christiana, “what is not a thing does not exist”, one can realize 
the remarkable similarity. It is clear that the distinction res/signum is consistent 
throughout the works analyzed and holds a central place in Augustine’s 
semiotics. 
 
3.7. Types of res and division between  
enjoyment (frui) and use (uti) 
We now discuss the next division Augustine takes up in Book I, namely, the 
distinction between “enjoyment” (frui) and “use” (uti). As said earlier, this 
subject became a branch of research in its own right.34 We shall, thus, limit the 
present discussion only to the implications that the division frui/uti has for the 
distinction between res/signa. 
Augustine defines what is “enjoyment” (frui) and “use” (uti) as follows: 
 
Frui est enim amore inhaerere, alicui rei propter se ipsam. Uti autem, quod in 
usum venerit, ad id, quod amas obtinendum referre, si tamen amandum est. Nam 
usus inlicitus abusus potius vel abusio nominanda est.  
 
(To enjoy something is to cling to it with love for its own sake. To use 
something, however, is to employ it in obtaining that which you love, provided 
that it is worthy of love. For an illicit use should be called rather a waste or an 
abuse.)35  
 
Frui, thus, refers to the enjoyment of a thing for its own sake, while uti refers to 
the use of anything that can be employed in order to obtain what is to be 
enjoyed. On the basis of this distinction, Augustine points out a threefold 
division of res: 
 
1) Things which are to be enjoyed (res quibus fruendum est); 
2) Things which are to be used (res quibus utendum est); 
3) Things which are to be enjoyed and used (res quibus utendumet 
fruendum est).36 
 
Todorov provides an interesting interpretation of the frui/uti distinction, which 
we now seek to elaborate further. He writes: 
 
                                                                          
34  On the frui/uti distinction, see O. O’Donovan, «Usus and fruitio in Augustine, De 
Doctrina Christiana I», Journal of Theological Studies 33, Pt. 2, (1982), 361–397.  
35  Doctr. chr. 1,4 (trans. Robertson, On Christian Doctrine, 9). 
36 Doctr. chr. 1,3 (trans. Robertson, On Christian Doctrine, 9) : «Res ergo aliae sunt, 
quibus fruendum est, aliae quibus utendum, aliae quae fruuntur et utuntur. Illae quibus 
fruendum est nos beatos faciunt. Istis quibus utendum est, tendentes ad beatitudinem 




The articulation between signs and things is further developed through the articu-
lation between two basic processes, use and enjoyment. The second distinction is 
located in fact within the category of things but things used are transitive, like 
signs, and things enjoyed are intransitive (here we have a category that allows us 
to oppose things to signs). (Todorov 1982: 1977: 41) 
 
Todorov’s insight is worth considering and can be further developed. Along the 
same lines, Giovanni Manetti (1987) and Rowan Williams (1989) have reached 
similar conclusions. They all suggest that things and signs can be distinguished 
through the scheme frui/uti. Prescinding from an ethical and theological con-
sideration of the issue, this division can be understood through the doublet 
transitive/intransitive. Accordingly, things to be used, as well as signs, are con-
sidered as transitive, whereas things to be enjoyed are intransitive. Thus, 
extending the same logic to the division of things and signs, the former are 
intransitive while the latter are transitive (Fig. 16):  
 
 
   
 
Figure 17. The res/signum division in light of their intransitive/transitive character 
 
 
This is a theme that deserves careful handling. Although we endorse Todorov’s 
suggestion, it is still relevant to assess to what extent his view overlaps with 
Augustine’s own thought. To be sure, Augustine does not cast explicitly the 
scheme of enjoyment and use in terms of transitivity or intransitivity of the 
object enjoyed or used, nor does he overtly state that the division frui/uti should 
be superimposed onto the doublet res/signum. However, there is abundant 
evidence that the somewhat unsophisticated distinction of propter se/propter 
aliud, namely, things considered in reference to themselves or in reference to 
something else, is at the kernel of the division of things and signs and should be 
maintained. There is a corollary to this that must be added to this picture. If we 
cast things and signs in these terms, it might seem that the division between the 
two classes is sharp and unassailable. In reality, the boundary between res and 







3.8. Augustine’s concept of the sign (signum):  
nature and definitions 
Augustine treats the subject of signs chiefly in Book II of the De doctrina 
christiana, whose title is, revealingly, De signis or Doctrina signorum. In Book 
III, he takes up the issue of ambiguous signs (signa ambigua) and provides 
remedies for dealing with ambiguities and obscurities in the interpretation of the 
Sacred Scriptures. Both Jackson (1969) and Deely (2009) succinctly remark that 
the theory of signs in the De doctrina christiana is slight. Undoubtedly, this is 
the case, especially if this theory is compared with the exposition of signs in the 
De magistro, which is Augustine’s lengthiest treatment on the subject. Although 
condensed in terms of space, the sign theory of the De doctrina christiana is 
remarkable nonetheless. 
Augustine outlines three times the definition of the sign (signum). The first 
two definitions are explicit; the third one is implicit.  
First, Augustine formulates a more succinct definition of the sign in Book I, 
in the context of a discussion of the concept of res. Then, he spells it out further 
with more precision in Book II, in the context of a treatment ex professo of 
signs, with a second definition. Accordingly, let us divide our analysis into two 
parts. First, we discuss the earliest definition of signum, and then we proceed to 
a detailed exposition of the second formulation. We will discuss the implicit 
definition of signum at last. 
 
 
3.8.1. Signum: the initial formulation 
The earliest reference to the notion of signum in the text is the following: 
 
Signa, res … quae ad significandum aliquid adhibentur. 
 
(Signs are things used to signify something.)37 
 
The first formulation of signum is broad and generic. Yet it is not quite an 
explicit definition. Augustine does not qualify what is the mechanism of 
signifying and how it should be understood. Moreover, this definition does not 
explore how signs relate to the things signified. This issue, discussed at length 
in the De magistro, is not accurately expounded in the De doctrina christiana. 
This led Todorov (1982 1977: 40) to conclude that in the De doctrina 
christiana the concept of res, conceived as a referent of the sign, is neglected.  
Augustine states that the sign must signify another thing. It is precisely in 
virtue of this distinctive feature that the sign acquires its own status. Although 
this point may seem obvious to the contemporary reader, it should be not taken 
for granted. In contrast to things, signs possess a peculiar status. As pointed out 
                                                                          
37  Doctr. chr. 2,2 (trans. Robertson, On Christian Doctrine, 8). 
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earlier, the sign is always a thing, too. The first definition of signum reiterates 
this principle. As compared to res, signum is a thing of a specific kind because 
signs are things, and yet at the same time they are also signs of other things. 
Thus, signs possess a twofold nature: on one hand, signs are things, and on the 
other hand, they are propter aliud, that is, something that stands for something 
else. Indeed, signs and things differ in one respect – that the sign must signify 
other things, whereas the res must not. Elsewhere, Augustine explicitly remarks 
that a sign is a sign only if it signifies another thing: “Can a sign be a sign un-
less it signifies something?”.38 To express this point in a more contemporary 
language, the distinctive feature of the sign lies in its relational nature. The sign 
is a thing that relates to something different than the sign itself. The relation of 
the sign to something different than the sign itself is altogether absent in things 
that are not signs, which Augustine calls res. Therefore, such a characteristic is 
essential to signs only and it serves as a point of bifurcation between the 
concept of res and the concept of signum.  
There is a corollary to the definition of the sign that is worth pondering. 
Augustine explicitly and consistently conceives of the concept of res in a two-
fold way: 
 
Et ideo in hac divisione rerum atque signorum, cum de rebus loquemur, ita 
loquemur, ut etiamsi earum aliquae adhiberi ad significandum possint, non impe-
diant partitionem, qua prius de rebus, postea de signis disseremus, memoriter que 
teneamus id nunc in rebus considerandum esse, quod sunt, non quod aliud etiam 
praeter se ipsas significant.  
 
(And thus in my distinction between things and signs, when we speak of things, 
we shall so speak that, although some of them may be used to signify something 
else, this fact shall not disturb the arrangement we have made to speak of things 
as such first and of signs later. We should  bear in mind that now we are to 
consider what things are, not what they signify beyond themselves.)39  
 
Res can be conceived either in itself or as referring to something else. These are 
two separate points of view, and one does not impinge on the other. From this 
vantage point, emphasis can be placed either on the thing in itself – existence –  
or on the thing as signifying something else – signification.40 It is clear that the 
initial definition of the sign outlined above conceives of res from the point of 
view of its signification rather than its existence. This means placing emphasis 
on the aspect of signification of things, irrespective of a consideration of their 
own existence. 
 
                                                                          
38  Mag. 2,3 
39  Doctr. chr. 1,6. (trans. Robertson, On Christian Doctrine, 8). 
40  J. Deely has argued that «by existence here we should understand what exists 
independently of human awareness, not those many objects and facets of objects that exist 
only in and as a consequence of human awareness and social life» (Deely 2009: 36). 
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3.8.2. The “classical” definition of signum  
We shall now discuss Augustine’s second definition of signum: 
 
Signum est enim res praeter speciem, quam ingerit sensibus, aliud aliquid ex se 
faciens in cogitationem venire. 
 
(A sign is a thing which causes us to think of something beyond the impression 
the thing itself makes upon the senses.)41 
 
Described in Book II, such a definition became canonical. Deely (2009: 37) 
refers to it as the “tentative first formula for ‘sign in general’”.42 This definition 
is a refinement of the preceding description. It is more complex than the earlier 
one because it shows a significant degree of sophistication. The two 
formulations of the concept signum share one common feature: both definitions 
qualify signum as res. Yet here Augustine offers a more fine-grained definition 
by encapsulating in the formula a reference to “the mechanism of signifying” 
(Jackson 1969: 12). Indeed, Augustine not only points out that a sign is “some 
thing” (enim res) that stands for another thing, but he also qualifies the 
relationship in which the terms stand. Indeed, Augustine points out that the sign 
entails a twofold process. On the one hand, something is perceived through the 
senses, and on the other hand, something else – which is different from the 
impression gained through the sense perception – is conveyed to the mind. 
This formula clearly echoes the notion of signum that Augustine singled out 
out in the De dialectica. As pointed out earlier (in Chapter 1), for Augustine the 
sign entails a sensible and an intelligible dimension. This aspect is present in 
both definitions of the sign outlined in the De dialectica as well as in the De 
doctrina christiana. Yet the two works employ a slightly different terminology. 
While in the De dialectica Augustine uses the term “mind”, in the De doctrina 
christiana he opts for the word “thought” or “thinking” (cogitatio) (Jackson 
1969: 12; Todorov 1982 1977: 52). This is not a substantial difference because 
the similarity of the two definitions outweighs the discrepancy. 
There is a further general definition of the sign that could be added to the 
two definitions discussed above. This third definition is implicit and must be 
inferred from the definition of signa naturalia (“natural signs”), which 
Augustine makes later on. Indeed, Engels (1962: 367) aptly notes that the 
definition of signa naturalia includes within itself an additional definition of the 
sign, which is more general. Signs are those which: 
 
praeter se aliud aliquid ex se cognosci faci unt. 
 
(makes us aware of something beyond themselves).43 
 
                                                                          
41  Doctr. chr. 2,1. (trans. Robertson, On Christian Doctrine, 34). 
42  For Jackson (1969: 11), instead, «both definitions are general». 
43  Doctr. chr. 2,2. (trans. Robertson, On Christian Doctrine, 34). 
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If we add this definition to the other two discussed earlier, then we have three 
definitions of signs in the De doctrina christiana. We can recapitulate all three 
definitions of signum discussed so far: 
 
(1) Signs are things used to signify something; 
(2) A sign is a thing which causes us to think of something beyond the 
impression the thing itself makes upon the senses; 
(3) A sign makes us aware of something beyond themselves. 
 
Augustine provides four illustrations of signs: 
 
1. The track of an animal taken as a visual cue by an interpreter; 
2. The sight of smoke as a sign of fire; 
3. The hearing of someone’s voice as a sign indicating the emotions that 
agitate one’s heart; 
4. The trumpet sound (precisely a “tuba”) used as a military sign to indicate 
to soldiers whether to proceed or retreat on a battlefield.  
 
Interestingly, Augustine’s list does not include words as signs yet. This does not 
mean that Augustine restricts the notion of signum to non-linguistic signs. On 
the contrary, as we will soon see, he extends it to words, which play a 
preeminent role in the treatise. Yet words are discussed in a subsequent part of 
the chapter, in conjunction with the division of signa data.  
The examples of signs listed above are remarkably similar to those outlined 
in the De magistro, where Augustine refers both to the military ensigns (signa 
militaria) as well as to the sight of smoke as a sign of fire, which the De 
doctrina christiana thus reiterates. Notably, the example of smoke signifying 
fire was commonplace in ancient theories of signification, several illustrations 
of which are found in the Stoics. Shortly after dividing signs into naturalia and 
data, Augustine returns to the list of illustrations and divides the four examples 
accordingly. We shall return to this point shortly. Let us now dwell on the 
triadic nature of Augustine’s conception of the sign. 
 
 
3.9. The sign relation as triadic  
There have been enlightening discussions of Augustine’s theory of signs. The 
earliest and most prominent accounts on his concept of the sign (with special 
reference to the De doctrina christiana) are the studies of the British historian 
Robert A. Markus (1957) and the American philosopher Belford D. Jackson 
(1967; 1969).  
Augustine’s definition of signum is generally regarded as involving a triadic 
relation. Markus (1957: 71–72) argues that the three terms of this relation are: 
1) the object or significatum, 2) the thing itself, and 3) the subject. Along the 
same lines, Jackson (1969: 13) holds that the three terms involved in the sign 
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relation are 1) “the sign”, 2) “what is signified by it”, and 3) “the subject to 
whom the sign indicates something”.  
It should, however, not sound paradoxical the claim made earlier that the 
sign is bi-dimensional in its nature and yet that the sign relation is instead 
triadic. These two features of the sign must be read as complementary rather 
than as contradictory. In this section, we proceed to a more detailed exposition 
and critical assessment of the argument that the sign relation in Augustine is 
triadic. First, we present a critical review of Markus’ thesis.  
Undoubtedly, Markus’ Augustine on signs (1957) has been a groundbreaking 
work because it paved the way to the study of signification and signs in Augus-
tine prescinding from the context of sacramental theology. His essay was 
reprinted as a part of a larger collection entitled Signs and Meanings: World and 
Text in Ancient Christianity (1996). Notably, to our knowledge, he was not only 
the first one who emphasized the triadic nature of Augustine’s definition of 
signum, but he was also one of the rare scholars who interpreted Augustine’s 
theory of signs in light of Peirce’s semiotics.44 Whereas the first aspect of 
Markus’ study has been widely acknowledged in Augustinian scholarship, the 
second aspect has not received significant attention. Not only is Markus’ take 
on Augustine’s sign theory influenced by an evident Peircean approach, but he 
also explicitly compared Augustine’s division of signs with Peirce’s three types 
of signs (index, icon, and symbol). In fact, Markus’ study included an appendix 
devoted to a terminological comparison between Augustine and Peirce with 
reference to signs typology. So far as we know, we have no substantial attention 
given to such a parallel, and because this is a corner of Markus’ paper that 
overtly bridges Augustine’s sign theory with contemporary semiotics, it is 
definitely an aspect worth studying. 
As noted earlier, for Markus, three things occur in Augustine’s definition of 
the sign: “A sign […] is an element in a situation in which three terms are 
related. These we may call the object or significatum for which the sign stands, 
the thing itself, and the subject to whom the sign stands for the object signified” 
(Markus 1957: 71–72). Markus (1957: 82) aptly claims that this view anti-
cipated Peirce’s definition of the sign as “something which stands to somebody 
for something in some respect or capacity”. Markus’ model was effective in 
emphasizing the triadic nature of Augustine’s definition of signum, yet we have 
some reservations regarding his interpretation of Peirce. We argue that the 
effects of Markus’ triadic model of the sign relation are not applicable to the 
comparison between Augustine’s and Peirce’s conceptions of the sign as 
outlined in the appendix of Markus’ study (Markus 1957: 82–83). 
At any rate, Markus provides a comparison that does not overlap with 
Peirce’s view and ultimately conceals Augustine’s thought. Indeed, Markus 
equates the notion of the “subject” or “interpreter” – which is one of the three 
                                                                          
44  For a discussion of Augustine and Peirce, see T. L. Short, Peirce’s Theory of signs 
(2007) especially chapter 1, paragraph 6, «Aristotle, the Stoics, St. Augustine»; see also R. 
H.  Ayers «Language theory and analysis in Augustine», Scottish Journal of Theology 29, 1 
(1976): 1–12. 
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terms in Augustine’s definition of the sign – with Peirce’s notion of the inter-
pretant. In the appendix attached to his study, Markus takes Peirce’s termino-
logy to be as follows: 
 
Sign (Representamen) – Object – Subject (Interpretant): This is Peirce’s termi-
nology, and it coincides closely with Augustine’s. (Markus 1957: 82, italics in 
original) 
 
Then, he compares the three terms outlined above with Augustine’s termino-
logy, which he describes as follows: 
 
Sign – Object (Significatum) – Subject 
 
It is clear that Markus envisages an analogy between Peirce and Augustine in 
which Peirce’s concept of the interpretant overlaps with the term subject in 
Augustine. Although Markus (1957: 82) states that “the correlations of termino-
logy noted here are given merely to avoid some of the opportunities for mis-
understanding”, in point of fact, such a parallel is a potential source of con-
fusion. At any rate, according to Peirce, interpretant and subject (or interpreter) 
are not the same thing, as Markus instead seems to suggest. The confusion 
between interpreter and interpretant in reading Peirce’s semiotic terminology is 
rather common. Indeed, Peirce used a rather idiosyncratic and highly cryptic 
jargon, and the two terms, on the surface, may resemble each other. Yet it is 
essential to avoid such drawbacks. To clarify, the notion of the interpreter 
stands for the sign-receiver, the agent who takes up the interpretation of a sign. 
To be sure, this notion became much more prominent because of C. Morris’ 
own interpretation of Peirce, rather than Peirce himself. The interpretant, on the 
contrary, is something quite different. Indeed, Peirce defines the term inter-
pretant as “a more developed sign” (CP 2.228).45 Ultimately, the overlapping of 
the two notions – interpreter and interpretant – conceals Augustine’s thought 
and distorts Peirce’s account of signs. If one wants to maintain the parallel 
between Augustine and Peirce, then one must take the interpreter as the subject 
in the sign relation rather than the interpretant of the sign. It is somewhat 
curious, however, that throughout Markus’ enquiry this pitfall is not evident and 
the author is consistent in using the term “subject” to refer aptly to the “inter-
preter”. However, the appendix on terminology unhappily betrays such a view. 
In addition to the triadic nature of Augustine’s definition of the sign, there is 
a second aspect to be considered. This concerns the parallel Markus envisaged 
between Augustine’s varieties of signs and Peirce’s index, icon, and symbol, 
which is a corollary to the analogy between Peirce and Augustine. We shall 
return to this point only after having clarified Augustine’s divisions of signs, 
since this is essential to our critical discussion. 
As a conclusion of this discussion there is a something to ponder. The triadic 
nature of the sign relation is not explicit in Augustine. The presence of the 
                                                                          
45  From a fragment of 1896 (MS 798). 
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3.10. Sources of signs: the division between  
signa naturalia and signa data 
The second essential branching concerning signs is the division between signa 
naturalia and signa data. Augustine defines signa naturalia as follows: 
 
Naturalia sunt, quae sine voluntate atque ullo appetitu significandi praeter se 
aliquid aliud ex se cognosci faciunt, sicuti est fumus significans ignem. Non 
enim volens significare id facit, sed rerum expertarum animadversione et 
notatione cognoscitur ignem subesse, etiam si fumus solus appareat.  
 
(Natural signs are those which, without any desire or intention of signifying, 
make us aware of something beyond themselves, like smoke which signifies fire. 
It does this without any will to signify, for even when smoke appears alone, 
observation and memory of experience with things bring a recognition of an 
underlying fire.)46 
 
Augustine explains the meaning of signa data as follows: 
 
Data vero signa sunt, quae sibi quaeque viventia invicem dant ad demonstrandos, 
quantum possunt, motus animi sui vel sensa aut intellecta quaelibet. Nec ulla 
causa est nobis significandi, id est signi dandi, nisi ad depromendum et 
traiciendum in alterius animum id, quod animo gerit, qui signum dat. Horum 
igitur signorum genus, quantum ad homines attinet, considerare atque tractare 
statuimus, quia et signa diuinitus data, quae scripturis sanctis continentur, per 
homines nobis indicata sunt, qui ea conscripserunt.  
 
(Given signs are those which living creatures show to one other for the purpose 
of conveying, in so far as they are able, the emotions of their spirits or something 
which they have sensed or understood. Nor is there any reason for signifying, or 
for giving signs, except for bringing forth and transferring to another mind the 
action of the mind in the person who gives the sign. We propose to consider and 
to discuss this class of signs in so far as men are concerned with it, for even signs 
given by God and  contained in the Holy Scriptures are of this type also, since 
they were presented to us by the men who wrote them.)47  
 
By bringing forth the class of signa naturalia, Augustine refers to an existing 
debate on natural semiosis that was a commonplace when he was writing and, 
for this reason, it could not be entirely dismissed. In other words, the reference 
to the issue of natural signification matters because it is part of the division of 
                                                                          
46  Doctr. chr. 2,2. (trans. Robertson, On Christian Doctrine, 34). 
47  Doctr. chr. 2,2. (trans. Robertson, On Christian Doctrine, 34–35, slightly modified). 
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signs but this is not the main subject of the treatise. A brief mention of it is 
therefore sufficient. Although Augustine mentions, in passing, the topic of 
natural signification as a part of the division of signs, the subject in fact falls 
outside the scope of his enquiry as not directly relevant (alia quaestio) for his 
enquiry. Augustine makes reference to such a division and then moves on to the 
real focus of his treatise, that is, the signa data. This point is worth pondering. 
Because he explicitly rules out the subject from his enquiry, a full assessment 
regarding signa naturalia in Augustine cannot be satisfactorily made. The 
sources for signa naturalia should be found elsewhere, and this would entail a 
separate study that tracks back the debate Augustine was referring to. 
Augustine includes among the genus of signa naturalia several examples: 
 
(1)  the smoke as a sign of fire;  
(2)  the tracks (vestigia) of an animal in the environment;  
(3)  the face of an angry or a sad man or any other “movement of the soul” 
that unwillingly manifest itself through the physiognomics.  
 
It is revealing that Augustine’s illustrations are not exclusively confined to the 
realm of natural events or phenomena, but he also refers to what today goes 
under the rubric of non-verbal communication. Indeed, Augustine includes 
among natural signs the expressions of an angry or sad man as involuntary cues 
of one’s emotions (anger or sadness) that are perceived and interpreted by an 
onlooker for whom such cues become meaningful. The examples provided 
indeed show the reference to an ancient debate on natural semiosis.48  
Arguably, there is a striking analogy between Augustine and Aristotle with 
regard to the example of facial expression as natural signs. In the pseudo-
Aristotelian treatise Physiognomica, Aristotle refers to the “doctrines of the 
semeiotics of human character” and he writes: 
 
Gesture and the varieties of facial expression are interpreted by their affinity to 
different emotions: if, for instance, when disagreeably affected, a man takes on 
the look which normally characterizes an angry person, irascibility is signified.49 
 
Likewise, the illustration of smoke as a sign of fire also shows that Augustine is 
particularly cognizant of the Stoic theory of meaning. Although the fire is not 
visible, the common experience established a connection between the visible 
smoke and the (unseen) fire. Thus, smoke is taken as a sign of fire not in virtue 
of an arbitrary determination but because of a common recorded experience 
among mankind. In other words, such a knowledge – the inference that if there 
                                                                          
48  On the large bibliography available on the tradition of the medics and their view on 
natural semiosis, see Charlotte L. Stough (1969) Greek Skepticism. A Study in Epistemology, 
Berkley and Los Angeles, University of California Press; H. C. Shands and J. D. Melzer 
(1975) «Clinical semiotics», Language Sciences 38,  21–24. 
49  Physiognomica (trans. T. Loveday and E. S. Forster, in The Works of Aristotle, Vol. VI, 
W. D. Ross, ed.) 806b, 29–32. 
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is smoke then there is fire – is acquired from a preexisting experience. Augus-
tine’s example clearly echoes the Stoic “admonitive sign”, and he probably 
shapes the idea of signum naturale on the model of the Stoics. The latter 
distinguished between “Indicative sign” and “Admonitive sign”:  
 
The object of our knowledge we find distinguished as either evident or obscure. 
That we can know of the things evident is plain, but can we know of the things 
obscure? Shall this be the case it must be by some sign, by some thing evident, 
and this sign be either by its own nature a priori and absolutely indicative of that 
which is obscure, or as one of two appearances formerly remarked by us, in 
connection and relation one with another, remind us of the other subject of that 
relation, now accidentally removed from apprehension. Thus, motion would be 
held to be an indicative sign of the principle of life, and smoke be an admonitive 
sign of fire, or scar of the wound. (Prentice 1858: 10) 
 
The point of interest is that Augustine retains the idea of the “admonitive sign” 
and yet he adds to it the factor of volition or intentionality (voluntas), which he 
most likely draws from the field of forensic rhetoric, with which he was 
acquainted.   
Initially – at least until Engel’s study (1962) – the division between signa 
naturalia and signa data has not been properly understood. Because this 
branching has been a source of confusion, let us first elucidate Augustine’s use 
of the terms.  
Unhappily, there is no equivalent English translation for Augustine’s termi-
nology. The first member of the division – signum naturale – has been 
generally translated into English as “natural sign”, while the second – signum 
datum – has been a hard nut to crack for the translators. Regrettably, the history 
of such a term is a quite infelicitous chapter in the history of ideas. Signum 
datum has been generally translated as “conventional sign”. Robertson (1958), 
for instance, in his English translation of Augustine’s text, used the term 
“conventional” as opposed to “natural”. Likewise, G. Combès and J. Farges 
(1949: 238) in their French translation S. Augustin, Le Magistère Chrétien 
translated Augustine’s terms according to the opposition natural/conventional. 
Many other scholars translated Augustine’s terms along the same lines 
(Cenacchi 1985: 303). As a result, they bring Augustine’s division naturalia/ 
data under the larger rubric of natural versus conventional signs. A glance at the 
literature on semiotics testifies to the same association. Nöth, for instance, in his 
monumental Handbook of Semiotics writes, “Augustine opposed natural and 
conventional signs” (Nöth 1990: 107). The semiotic literature using the same 
distinction is abundant (Danesi 2014: 16).50 
                                                                          
50  In semiotics, the distinction between «natural signs» and «given signs» led to the 
branching of the discipline into two distinct trends: a «semiotics of signification» and a 
«semiotics of communication». For a good overview on these two general trend lines, see 
Augusto Ponzio, La semiotica in Italia, Bari, Dedalo (1976), particularly the chapter 
«Comunicazione e significazione», 11–49.  
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Yet J. Engels (1962) pointed out that such a translation is inaccurate and 
profoundly misleading. He aptly argued that such a translation is a mis-
conception because it conceals the ratio of Augustine’s distinction. Engels 
realized that Augustine, with the distinction naturale/datum, did not intend to 
follow the motivated/unmotivated opposition, which became traditional from 
Plato’s Cratylus onwards. Instead, it was apparent that Augustine’s intention 
was to determine such opposition in virtue of the presence or absence of inten-
tionality in the emission of signs. Engels suggests “given sign” (“donnés”) as a 
more appropriate term for translating Augustine’s signum datum. He correctly 
interprets Augustine’s division of signa naturalia and signa data as opposition 
between non-intentional versus intentional signs. We endorse Engels’ trans-
lation because it preserves Augustine’s original intention. Jackson (1969), 
Todorov (1977) and Deely (2009) all acquiesce with Engels’ conclusion. 
In light of the terminological clarification discussed above, we can now 
proceed with a more detailed discussion of the division. Signa naturalia are 
“those which, without any desire or intention of signifying, make us aware of 
something beyond themselves, like smoke which signifies fire”.51 Natural signs, 
thus, signify independently from the will or desire to signify something else 
(sine voluntate atque ullo appetitu significandi). Natural signs are “preformed 
things of physical nature” and belong to “the analogical network of nature, 
[and] are preformed things or sensibles which invade the senses. They are not 
made by man, but rather they are said to be discovered” (Leckie 1938: xxx-xxi). 
Signa data, on the contrary, are “those which living creatures show to one 
other for the purpose of conveying, in so far as they are able, the emotions of 
their spirits or something which they have sensed or understood”.52 This kind of 
sign is the product of a voluntary operation.  
It is in plain sight that the discriminating factor for discerning the bifurcation 
of the two kinds of signs is the concept of voluntas (intention). This is pivotal 
for understanding Augustine’s division. Signa naturalia signify without the 
intention to signify (sine voluntate significandi), thus the will is absent, whereas 
signa data are given intentionally in order to show or express (ad demostran-
tum) the movements of the sign-giver’s mind (motus animi), what one feels or 
thinks. This is why Engels argued against the use of the term “conventional 
signs” and favored the use of “given signs” because the element of intentio-
nality remains concealed in the opposition natural/conventional. 
To sum up, the difference between signa naturalia and signa data should be 
understood as an opposition between willed/not willed signs, and thus the 
concept of will is of cardinal importance. With good reason, the theory of signs 
of the De doctrina christiana has been called a “volitional theory” (Sirridge 
2000). We also pointed out that this distinction was misunderstood. The root of 
this misconception is that the naturalia/data division was absorbed in the 
longlasting discussion of nomos and physis (convention and nature). The 
                                                                          
51  Doctr. chr. 2,2. (trans. Robertson, On Christian Doctrine, 34). 
52  Doctr. chr. 2,2. (trans. Robertson, On Christian Doctrine, 34–35). 
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nominalism versus conventionalism debate need not concern us here, since the 
position of Augustine does not fit into this dualism. It suffices to say that the 
distinction between natural and conventional meaning has a long pedigree and 




3.10.1. The place of voluntas in Augustine’s theory of signs: 
sources for Augustine’s division 
In what follows, we are concerned with three main questions: 1) because the 
ruling principle underlying the division naturalia/data is the concept of 
voluntas, an enquiry about the sources of this concept is relevant; 2) whether 
this is a systematic division or not; 3) whether this is a distinction of types of 
signs or of sources of signs. 
The first node is particularly difficult. Previous studies conducted on Augus-
tine’s theory of signs have not identified one extant source that stands out for 
the division naturalia/data but rather a network of interrelated possible sources 
that are elaborated and synthesized in Augustine’s position. Atkinson (1979) 
regards Aristotle as a plausible source for Augustine because they share several 
principles regarding the treatment of words. Like Augustine, Aristotle also 
regards words as signs or symbols. It is worth mentioning Aristotle’s passage of 
the De interpretatione, where he discusses words: 
 
By a noun we mean a sound significant by convention … The limitation ‘by 
convention’ was introduced because nothing is by nature a noun or name – it is 
only so when it becomes a symbol; inarticulate sounds such as those which 
brutes produce are significant, yet none of these constitute a noun.53 
 
Like Augustine, Aristotle conceives of written words as signs of spoken words. 
Moreover, both concur that words express the “affection of the soul”. Lastly, 
there is an apparent analogy between Augustine’s distinction of signa naturalia 
and signa data and Aristotle’s distinction between natural and conventional 
meaning (Atkinson 1979: 22). 
Despite the numerous analogies between the two thinkers, unlike Augustine, 
Aristotle did not include the concept of the will in his treatment of signs. 
Nevertheless, there is a good reason to believe that Aristotle should not be dis-
missed as a source for Augustine (Atkinson 1979: 23). And yet, since Aristotle 
disregarded the notion of will in his theory, the question we seek to answer 
cannot be satisfactorily determined. 
The Stoic theory of meaning identified two classes of beings, namely, the 
given and the non-given. The Stoics had a threefold division of non-given 
things: (1) completely non-given, (2) obscure at the time, and (3) obscure by 
                                                                          
53 De int. 2: 16a19–29. 
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nature (Allen 1935: 16). The example of smoke signifying fire – which Augus-
tine reiterates in his own theory – is catalogued among the second class of non-
given things and later understood as “admonitive sign”.  
 
3.10.2. The debate on “natural signs” and “given signs”  
There has been an interesting debate between Markus and Jackson on the 
accurate interpretation of Augustine’s distinction between signa naturalia/data. 
As promised earlier, it is now time to return to Markus’ interpretation and 
discuss a further node of his argument. This specifically concerns his reading of 
Augustine’s natural/given signs. 
On the basis of the triadic structure of the sign discussed above – sign, 
object, and subject – Markus initially interpreted the distinction of signa natu-
ralia and signa data “according to whether the relation of dependence is 
between the sign and the object, or between the sign and the subject” (Markus 
1957: 72). His triadic model of the sign is thus modelled in dyads in order to 
account for the distinction. Viewed from this theoretical perspective, signa 
naturalia entail a dyadic relation between sign and object, whereas signa data 
presuppose a two-term relation between sign and subject. Moreover, drawing on 
Peirce’s semiotic terminology, Markus used the term “symptom” to refer to 
signa naturalia and “symbol” for signa data. This is how he describes the issue:  
 
I shall call this type of sign signa naturalia ‘symptoms’. A ‘symptom’ … is 
anything which ‘goes together with’ that of which it is taken to be the sign. It 
may be a ‘symptom’ in the conventional sense, a ‘portent’, or ‘evidence’ in a 
more general sense; it might depend on its significatum as an effect on its cause, 
as for instance, smoke depends on fire; it might be a part of a total condition as a 
rash is of measles; or it might give rise to its significatum, as a southwesterly 
wind may both bring and signify rain. (Markus 1957: 73) 
 
A ‘symbol’ in his Peirce’s terminology denotes roughly the same sort of sign as 
Augustine’s signa data: ‘A symbol is a sign which refers to an object that it 
denotes by virtue of a law, usually an association of general ideas, which 
operates to cause the symbol to be interpreted as referring to that object’. 
(Markus 1957: 82) 
 
We must express some reservations regarding Markus’ interpretation of Augus-
tine’s distinction. The first point to be addressed is the claim that a symbol for 
Peirce amounts to a relation between sign and interpreter. In point of fact, both 
types of sign (index and symbol) have to do with the relation between the sign 
to its object. Thus, the separation of symptom and symbol “according to 
whether the relation of dependence is between the sign and the object, or 
between the sign and the subject” (Markus 1957: 72) does not hold, or at least 
does not overlap with Peirce’s conception.  
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More importantly, however, Markus proposes, as the basis of the division, a 
ratio that does not overlap with Augustine’s. Markus’ interpretation reduces 
Augustine’s natural signs to an argument of causality or real connection 
between signs and object. We express reservations towards such a parallel. As 
shown earlier, the crux of the matter is different – namely, whether the source of 
the sign is natural and involuntary or voluntary. Finally, Markus claims that 
“what we are dealing with is the distinction between the two fundamentally 
different types of sign” (Markus 1957: 74). This view is far from being accurate 
since what we are dealing with in Augustine’s division is not a matter or kind 
but an explication of the source of signs: “The natural-conventional meaning 
dualism is a mode of classifying the origins of meanings. To argue from a 
difference in origin to a difference in kind is mistaken” (Rollin 1976: 94). 
Jackson does not comment upon Markus’ terminology, although he was 
critical in relation to Markus’ interpretation of signa data. Markus’ view that in 
the case of signa data, “the thing or event which is the sign is the product of the 
sign-maker’s activity and owes its significance entirely to this” (Markus 1957: 
73). Jackson pointed out a fundamental distinction in this regard. He noticed 
that “significance” and “occurrence” of signs are different issues that must be 
not blurred. This distinction, he claims, is pivotal to an understanding of Augus-
tine’s bifurcation of signa naturalia and data. 
Contra Jackson (1969: 14), who holds that “Augustine does not comment in 
other places on the place of will in meaning”, we contend that, although the 
distinction of signa naturalia/data is unique to the De doctrina christiana, 
Augustine did comment on the voluntas in signification in other of his writings. 
As a proof of this, we refer to the discussion we engaged in Chapter 2. Indeed, a 
hint of the distinction of willed/not willed signs is traceable already in the De 
magistro. This point is endorsed by Toom (2002: 170). Furthermore, in the next 
chapter we will show that a volitional theory of signs is fundamental to 
Augustine’s writing devoted to the subject of the lie, which he crafted in terms 
of false signs. 
 
 
3.11. The apprehension of signs among animals 
Augustine defines signa data (given signs) as “those which living creatures 
mutually show to one another for the purpose of conveying, in so as far as there 
are able, the motions of their spirits or something which they have sensed or 
understood”.54 As said before, those signs are thought of as deliberate and 
intentionally given. Augustine insists on this point by stating that there is no 
reason to give a sign except for making manifest and conveying to another mind 
what one has in his own soul: “Nor is there any other reason for signifying, or 
for giving signs, except for bringing forth and transferring to another mind the 
action in the mind in the person who makes the sign”.55 Augustine is parti-
                                                                          
54  Doctr. chr. 2,2. (trans. Robertson, On Christian Doctrine, 34–35). 
55  Doctr. chr. 2,2. (trans. Robertson, On Christian Doctrine, 35). 
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cularly concerned with this kind of sign because the “signs given by God” 
(signa divinitus data) go under this rubric. This is so because signs of God are 
embedded into the sacred scriptures by the men who wrote them. This is why 
Augustine’s treatment of signs is directed towards signa data and disregards the 
other types of sign: the other kinds of sign, although they are to be included in 
the general subject of signa and in the doctrine that studies them (doctrina 
signorum), are nonetheless irrelevant for the subject at hand. Augustine is clear 
and explicit in limiting his enquiry by focusing on the signs of men, and among 
the latter he focuses chiefly on “given signs” produced by men because the 
signs given by God and contained in the sacred scriptures were given by means 
of men who wrote them. This explain Augustine’s selectiveness and the 
restriction of his focus to one particular class of signs. 
Both men and animals do employ the signa data. This is an aspect that 
deserves attention. Despite the fact that among signa data, words, as we shall 
see, are the most common signs, this does not mean that signa data are an 
exclusive byproduct of men. On the contrary, there is abundant evidence that 
Augustine conceived of signa data as a kind of sign used among animals other 
than humans, too. The issue, however, is not treated with precision here, and it 
shows Augustine’s hesitation in taking up an issue that is not directly relevant 
for his enquiry: “Augustine is uncertain whether or not noises of animals may 
be classed as deliberate, signa data” (Atkinson 1979: 24). Jackson (1969: 13) 
contends that Augustine’s use of terms like cogitatio and animus may lead to 
think that signa data have an anthropomorphic connotation, yet the reference to 
“living creatures” he makes in the definition of this type of sign is general 
enough to include both men and other animals among the subjects who produce 
and employ such signs. 
Throughout Book II, Augustine indeed explicitly refers to the signs of 
animals, although he rules out a discussion on this subject because it is not 
immediately relevant for his enquiry (alia quaestio): 
 
Habent etiam bestiae quaedam inter se signa quibus produnt appetitum animi sui. 
Nam et gallus gallinaceus reperto cibo dat signum vocis gallinae ut accurrat, et 
columbus gemitu columbam vocat vel ab ea vicissim vocatur, et multa huius-
modi animadverti solent. Quae utrum, sicut vultus aut dolentis clamor, sine 
voluntate significandi sequantur motum animi an vere ad significandum dentur, 
alia quaestio est et ad rem quae agitur non pertinet. Quam partem ab hoc opere 
tamquam non necessariam removemus.  
 
(Animals also have signs which they use among themselves, by means of which 
they indicate their appetites. For a cock who finds food makes a sign with his 
voice to the hen so that she runs to him. And the dove calls his mate with a cry or 
is called by her in turn, and there are many similar examples which may be 
adduced. Whether these signs, or the expression or cry of a man in pain, express 
the motion of the spirit without intention of signifying or are truly shown as 
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signs is not in question here and does not pertain to our discussion, and we 
remove this division of the subject from this work as superfluous.)56 
 
Undoubtedly, the excerpt quoted above is a clear hint for the zoosemiotician 
because signa data “include those actions of signs that are labeled today as 
‘zoösemiotic’, the realm of animal communication with no involvement of 
words, but with clear intention and aim of communicating” (Deely 2009: 53). 
With this final note, however, Augustine does not fully satisfy the curiosity of 
the contemporary zoosemiotician. The passage shows a clear allusion to a long-
lasting debate on the subject – the distinction between animals and men on the 
basis of the use of articulate or inarticulate sound was indeed a commonplace in 
antiquity – and proves that Augustine is very cognizant of this subject. Yet after 
having hinted toward the subject of animal signs and the crucial node of 
whether these signs are intentional or not, he dismisses the issue as not 
essential. 
Yet the issue of whether animals which are not humans are endowed with 
the voluntas significandi (namely, the intention to signify) exerted its fasci-
nation upon contemporary scholars, especially semioticians. Indeed, Umberto 
Eco and his colleagues (R. Lambertini, C. Marmo, A. Tabarroni) conducted 
research on the subject, the results of which were published in the article “On 
animal language in the medieval classification of signs” (Eco et al. 1986) and 
were later republished in different volumes. The point of interest was that the 
so-called latratus canis, namely the dog’s barking, as well as other animal 
pseudo-languages such as “the horse’s whinney, the pigeon’s coo, the cow’s 
moo, the pig’s oink has had an ambiguous position among the medieval theories 
of language and consequently it is placed in a different position within medieval 
classifications of signs” (Eco et al. 1986: 63–73). 
Eco and colleagues argued that the latratus canis was catalogued under 
different rubrics within the medieval classifications of signs according to the 
model adopted from time to time, either a model of the sign in general 
(stemming from the Stoics) or a theory of voces (Aristotelian and Hippocratic in 
origin). This distinction corresponds to two different models of the sign: (1) 
signs as a particular class of natural events (signs in general) and (2) signs as 
verbal language signs (voces). Within the first line of thought, following the 
Stoic tradition and the Augustinian synthesis, the dog’s barking was thought of 
as a given sign (signa data), whereas according to the second line of thought the 
latratus canis belonged to the realm of natural signs together with the wail of 
the infirm (Eco et al. 1986: 63–73). This ambiguity in classifying the sounds 
animals emit is indicative of the revolutionary shift Augustine inaugurated by 
linking together the theory of language with the theory of the sign. Only this 
shift allows Augustine to assess the latratus canis as an intentional sign, 
eliminating its connotation as vox animalia, which considered the dog’s barking 
as a natural sign. 
                                                                          
56  Doctr. chr. 2,2. (trans. Robertson, On Christian Doctrine, 35). 
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Augustine’s uncertainty in treating the subject is revealing. First, “with a 
stroke of genius, Augustine, places among the signa data, without a tremor of a 
doubt, both the words of the Scriptures”, but soon after he mitigates his claim 
showing a wavering position: “whether these signs, or the expression or cry of a 
man in pain, express the motion of the spirit without intention of signifying or 
are truly shown as signs” (Eco et al. 1986: 16). 
Summing up Augustine’s stance we can state that signa data include three 
orders of signs: 
 
1) Signs of men; 
2) Signs of God; 
3) Signs of animals. 
 
Signs of men are the real focus of Augustine’s treatise. Signs of God are to be 
found in the Sacred Scriptures, and because the latter are made of written signs 
used by man, signs of men remain the primary focus of his enquiry. Augustine, 
however, shows a semiotic awareness of signs among animals. He is very 
cognizant of the debate on animal language versus men language in antiquity, 
yet because this is not his primary focus the issue is left aside. In this respect, 
Augustine shows some hesitation and ambiguity. Are animal signs and the cry 
of a man in pain ultimately to be placed among “natural signs” or “given 
signs”? Augustine hints towards a general statement – there are given signs 
amongst beasts too – yet he does not provide conclusive answers. It remains an 
open issue that falls outside his treatise whether this kind of sign is emitted 
intentionally or not. This is an alia quaestio for Augustine. The same can be 
said if one considers an additional case that, although not listed in the Augus-
tinian example, finds a logical place is his classification – that is, words un-
wittingly uttered by men. This would probably be placed under the rubric of 
natural signs (Atkinson 1979: 25). It is clear that Augustine’s division of signa 
naturalia and signa data, as well as the distinction between signs of animals 
and signs of men, shows some areas of ambiguity and indeterminacy.  
 
 
3.12. Signs of men and their varieties 
As pointed out before, signa data are thought of as deliberate and intentionally 
given signs. Augustine provides numerous examples that illustrate this species 
of sign. He classifies signs used by men according to the sense to which they 





(1) Sight. Among visual signs Augustine includes:57 
a.  Nodding; 
b.  The motions of the hands; 
c.  Gestures and the movements of their members by actors and 
pantomimes; 
d.  Banners and military ensigns and standards (vexilla). 
e.  Written words as visual signs of spoken words. 
(2) Sound. Among the many signs that pertain to the sense of hearing, 
Augustine lists: 
a.  Spoken words; 
b.  The sound of the trumpet, the flute, and the harp. 
(3) Smell. Among olfactory signs he includes the following: 
a. The odor of the ointment with which Jesus’ feet were anointed. 
(4) Taste. 
a. The Eucharist. 
(5) Touch. 
a. The reference is to the healing of a woman who touches the 
hem of Jesus’ garment.58 
 
Among such a great variety of signs, words have the most important place. 
Indeed, words are thought of as the signs par excellance. In contrast to all the 
other signs, which are scant in number, words are both quantitatively and 
qualitatively predominant. Not only words are larger in number and widely used 
as compared to other signs, but they also possess a wider semiotic capacity, as it 
were: “words have come to be predominant among men for signifying whatever 
the mind conceives if they wish to communicate it to anyone”.59 Language is 
thought of as a system of signs and it is set aside from other signs systems 
because it can be used to signify and describe all other sign systems. This 
feature is unique to language. No other sign systems, except for language, can 
be employed to describe all the others systems of signs. For Augustine, this 
makes language logically superior to the other systems and, in this respect, 
more powerful.60 
Linguistic signs (words), in turn, can be fixed as visible signs (written 
words). The fixation of signs is important because it provides the signs with the 
                                                                          
57  He considers all these signs as “visible words” (verba visibilia). We already pointed out 
that Augustine in the preface envisaged an analogy between sight and understanding and 
used it as an argument to answer those who criticise his undertaking. 
58  Among signs which pertain to the other senses (smell, taste and touch), Augustine refers 
to the following illustrations: «Our Lord gave a sign with the odor of the ointment with 
which His feet were anointed; and the taste of the sacrament of His body and blood signified 
what He wished; and when the woman was healed by touching the hem of His garment, 
something was signified» (Doc. chr. 2,3). 
59  Doc. chr. 2,3 (trans. Robertson 35–36). 
60  I have treated this subject elsewhere in more details. See, Remo Gramigna (2013), «The 
place of language among sign systems: Juri Lotman and Émile Benveniste», Sign Systems 
Studies 41(2/3), 339–354. 
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possibility of duration in time. It is worth pointing out that the distinction of 
written words as signs of spoken word was already identified by Aristotle. 
A further division of signs is between signa ignota (unknown signs) and 
signa ambigua (ambiguous signs). Both are thought of as impediments to the 
understanding of the Scriptures and are the two main reasons that hinder the 
comprehension of written signs. Moreover, signs are further discerned into 
signa proria (literal signs) and signa translata (figurative signs):  
 
Sunt autem signa uel propria uel translata. Propria dicuntur, cum his rebus 
significandis adhibentur propter quas sunt instituta, sicut dicimus bouem, cum 
intellegimus pecus quod omnes nobiscum latinae linguae homines hoc nomine 
uocant. Translata sunt, cum et ipsae res quas propriis uerbis significamus, ad 
aliquid aliud significandum usurpantur, sicut dicimus bouem et per has duas 
syllabas intellegimus pecus quod isto nomine appellari solet, sed rursus per illud 
pecus intellegimus evangelistam, quem significauit scriptura interpretante 
apostolo dicens, bouem triturantem non infrenabis.  
 
(They are called literal when they are used to designate those things on account 
of which they were instituted; thus we say bos ox when we mean an animal of 
a herd because all men are using the Latin language call it by that name just as 
we do. Figurative signs occur when that thing which we designate by a literal 
sign is used to signify something else; thus we say “ox” and by that syllable 
understand the animal which is ordinarily designated by that word, but again by 
that animal we understand an evangelist, as is signified in the Scripture, 
according to the interpretation of the Apostle, when it says, “Thou shalt not 
muzzle the ox that treadeth out the corn”.)61 
 
Both signa ignota (unknown signs) and signa ambigua (ambiguous signs) can 
be taken literally or figuratively, thus, yelding to the following matrix of signs:  
 
(1) Signa ignota 
a. Propria 
b. Translata 
(2) Signa ambigua    
a. Propria 
b. Translata 
Although T. Todorov (1977) pointed out that there is a lack of coordination in 
Augustine divisions of signa, he formulated a typology of signs based on the 
interpretation of Augustine’s De doctrina christiana. Todorov’s classification is 
articulated in five main groups of signs arranged: 
(1) According to the mode of transmission: visual/aural; 
(2) According to origin and use: natural signs/intentional signs; 
(3) According to social function: natural signs/conventional signs; 
                                                                          
61  Doctr. chr. 2,10,15 (trans. Robertson, On Christian Doctrine, 35). 
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(4) According to the nature of the symbolic relation: proper/transposed; 
(5) According to the nature of the designatum: sign/thing. 
In the conclusive chapter of the present study, we will return to the divisions of 
signs Augustine outlined and will attempt to provide our own synthesis.  
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4. MALA FIDE COMMUNICATION:  
MISDIRECTION, MISLEADING AND LYING 
Do we imagine that the heart of a man is not an abyss? 
Is there, then, a deeper chasm? 
Augustine 
 
There is a common theme that runs throughout Augustine’s works. Words are 
ineluctably caught in a perennial contradiction because, on one hand, verbal 
signs are necessary for the intersubjective expression of thoughts, intentions, 
and states of mind, and, on the other hand, they are imperfect means of com-
munication. This vision is typically Augustinian. It is along this apparent 
contradiction – the expression of the inexpressible by means of words – that 
Augustine develops his view on language and communication.   
Although man resorts to signs in order to externalize what he has within 
himself, the speaker’s mind can never be known completely, which makes 
language an imperfect tool of communication. This imperfection of language is 
manifested in various ways, from the obscurity and ambiguity inherent in the 
word, to the will to actually speak what is false, which is a property of a lie. 
Both the De dialectica and the De magistro show that the word can be 
ambiguous and obscure and, by its very nature, has some limits that may be an 
obstacle to the function which it fulfils. The power of the word, understood as 
the ability to convey meanings inter-subjectively intelligible and to affect the 
hearer, is counterbalanced by the intrinsic limitations that make speech ambi-
guous, obscure and guileful. 
As set out above (in chapter 1), the De dialectica reveals that there are two 
kinds of impediments that may hinder the hearer from the attainment of what is 
signified by means of words. Obscurities and ambiguities, in all their variations, 
can impede, interfere with or limit the discernment of truth.  
The same issue is taken up, in a slightly different fashion, in the De doctrina 
christiana within the paradigm of the interpretation of written texts. Every 
culture is expressed through texts and the text par excellence for the man of the 
Middle Ages was undoubtedly the Bible. Symbolism was a fundamental feature 
of the epoch in which Augustine penned his works. This type of culture starts 
from the presupposition of the inscrutability of texts. As Le Goff (1993: 46) 
pointed out, the medieval man is constantly asked to “decipher”, and his modus 
operandi and his mentality are eminently “symbolic”. Within this type of 
cultural milieu, texts are often considered as obscure and ambiguous. Written 
texts can be interpreted through the application of a very precise method of 
interpretation, namely, a set of rules that must be learned and passed on from 
generation to generation. Such rules serve the purpose of providing the guidance 
system for the correct decoding of texts in the forest of symbols. Indeed, 
Augustine is very cognizant in formulating the rules for textual interpretation so 
as to be able to decode the many obscurities and ambiguities found in the Bible. 
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Furthermore, the De magistro shows that, besides obscurities and ambi-
guities, there exist numerous hindrances that may become the sources of 
misunderstandings between sign-givers and sign-recipients. As noted in Chapter 
3, in the De magistro Augustine envisaged a real typology of misunder-
standings, which we report, once again, below: 
 
a. One knows what has been said, although the speaker does not know; 
b. Lying and deceiving; 
c. When something which has been committed to memory and often 
repeated is expressed by one who is preoccupied with other things 
(when we sing a hymn); 
d. When against our will we make a slip in speech, for in this case, too, 
signs are expressed which are not of the things which we have in mind. 
e. When he who speaks signifies the thing which he is thinking, but for the 
most part only to himself and certain others, while he does not signify 
the same thing to the one to whom he speaks nor to some others. 
 
In what follows, we take up an in depth analysis of point b), that is, the issue of 
lying and deceiving. Our contention is that not only is this subject of great 
interest for Augustine, but it is of intrinsic importance for a general theory of 
signs. For this reason, a study of the nature of the lie shoud be included in a 
work that deals with signs and signification. This is a feature of novelty because 
no one else, expect for Marcia L. Colish (1978), has underscored this point.  
In order to analyse and explicate Augustine’s doctrine of the mendacium (the 
lie), we rely principally on two of his works that dealt with the subject: the De 
mendacio and the Contra mendacium. This will be the conclusive chapter of the 
present dissertation. After the discussion and analysis of the problem of the lie in 
Augustine, we shall make some conclusive remarks on Augustine’s theory of 
signs. 
 
4.1. Truth and falsity of signs 
Lie and deceit are very complex phenomena that take place in socio-cultural 
domains as well as in nature. Guy Durandin, in his study Les Fondements du 
Mensonge (1972), pointed out a parallel between deception and concealment –  
used either for offensive (prevarication) or defensive (survival) purposes –  
inasmuch as both these strategies alter the informational capital at the disposal 
of a living organism. Using a situation (also an unfavourable one) to one’s own 
advantage is a common trait that can be traced both in terms of human relation-
ships as well as those between different species (including between humans and 
other animals).1 The metis of the Greeks is a good example of such logic.2  
                                                                          
1  Recent studies have investigated the subject of deception in animal communication with 
particular focus on the phenomenon of mimicry (Maran 2017; Martinelli 2004; 2007). The 
bibliography on this subject is vast. Useful indications can be found in R. Mitchell and N. 
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If it is true that social life depends upon the existence of mutual trust 
between the members of a society and that “all relationships of people rest upon 
the precondition that they know something about each other”, as Georg Simmel 
(1906: 441) stated more than a century ago, the lie, thought of as a breakdown 
of trust and mutual confidence, can undermine the foundations of society itself. 
Lying is made possible due to the altering of the relationship between the one 
who puts through the lie and the one to whom it is intended – in regard to the 
access to knowledge as well as the distribution of power. The privileged 
position of the liar (both in terms of knowledge and power), as compared to the 
one to whom the lie is directed alters the relationship between the commu-
nicators, compromising its balance in favour of the one who lies.3  
Concealment and coercion are two dimensions of lying. Moreover, deception 
can be seen as having an intrinsic connection with violence. This is particularly 
illuminated in the seminal study of Sissela Bok (2003 [1978]: 27), where deceit 
and violence are “the two forms of deliberate assault on human beings”. The 
privilege inherent in the lie, as has been described, affects the exercise of power 
in an identical measure in which the access to knowledge confers supremacy. 
Therefore, there exists, for Bok, a biunivocal correspondence between deceit 
and power. The lie manifests an insidious influence through the manipulation of 
information to the extent that it coerces the choice-making process of the dupe.  
The altering of information operates through the manipulation of signs. 
Lying, in fact, is nothing else but a corollary to the informative use that signs 
are called to fulfil. It goes without saying that since signs may be used to 
inform, they can be used as well in order to wilfully misinform or misdirect 
someone else. Charles Morris has remarked this point: 
 
Lying is the deliberate use of signs to misinform someone, that is, to produce in 
someone the belief that certain signs are true which the producer himself believes 
to be false. The discourse of the liar may be highly convincing. The mere making 
of false statements is not lying, nor are the forms of misrepresentation lying – as 
in painting which portrays objects with characteristics which they do not in fact 
have. Lying is connected with the informative function, regardless of which 
kinds of signs are used for the purpose of misinforming. (Morris 1955 [1946]: 
200) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Thompson (eds.), Deception. Perspectives on Human and Nonhuman Deceit, Albany, State 
University of New York Press, 1986. 
2  «Mêtis is itself a power of cunning and deceit. It operates through disguise. In order to dupe 
its victim it assumes a form which masks, instead of revealing, its true being. In mêtis appea-
rance and reality no longer correspond to one another but stand in contrast, producing an effect 
of illusion, apate which beguiles the adversary into error and leaves him as bemused by his 
defeat as by the spells of a magician» (Detienne, Vernant 1991 [1974]: 21). 
3  In this chapter, we often use the term «liar» in order to refer to the subject who tells a lie. 
However, it would be more appropriate to use this expression to refer to those who have the 
habit of lying. For Augustine, the liar – in the proper sense of the word is the one who utters 
lies for the love of lying and out-of- habit. On this point, see section 4.13.4. 
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Undoubtedly, signs do provide man with the possibility of transcending the hic 
et nunc, thus creating an avenue for conceiving of possible worlds. The ways of 
signifying may take different modalities; some are informative and reliable, 
while others are fictitious, erroneous or mendacious. To put it with John Locke 
(1836: 281): 
 
For truth and falsehood ... is not to be found but where signs are joined or 
separated, according to the agreement, or the disagreement of the things they 
stand for. The signs we chiefly use, are either ideas, or words, wherewith we 
make either mental or verbal propositions. Truth lies in so joining or separating 
these representatives as the things they stand for do in themselves agree or 
disagree; and falsehood in the contrary. 
 
It is possible to lie in various ways and through various types of signs, via 
words and even by means of an eloquent silence (Colish 1978; Mazzeo 1962), 
or through gestures (Genosko 1995). Yet without signs, a lie would be 
altogether inconceivable. Hence, the concept of the sign became interlocked 
with the logic of the lie in the often-quoted formula of Umberto Eco: we should 
consider, as a sign, everything that can be used in order to lie (Eco 1975).4 
Ultimately, the study on the nature of the lie sheds light on the fundamental 
semiotic approach that is at the core of such a complex phenomenon and that is 
bound to the wider issue of information and communication. 
Despite Eco’s famous definition, however, semioticians, in comparison to 
philosophers,5 theologians, psychologists, linguistists, journalists and political 
scientists, have devoted little attention to the subject of lying and deception, as 
witnessed by the paucity of semiotic research on the subject, despite a few 
exceptions (Anderson 1986; Danesi 2014; Eco 1997; Gramigna 2011; 2013; 
Levin 1974; Levin 1998; Maran 2017; Nöth 1997; Nuessel 2013; Pelc 1992; 
Sebeok 1975). To be sure, some interpreters did point out the significance for 
semiotics of Augustine’s analysis of lying. Marcia L. Colish (1978: 16), for 
                                                                          
4  It is worth noting that elsewhere Umberto Eco recanted this formula. In his later 
writings, he stated that semiotics is not to be conceived as a theory of lying but rather as a 
theory of how it is possible to say what is not the case: «La semiosi nasce perchè vogliamo 
parlare circa il mondo. Ma la si capisce se si intende la semiotica come la teoria – non della 
menzogna (e correggo una mia definizione del Trattato di semiotica generale) – bensì di 
come si possa dire ciò che non è il caso, o comunque ciò di cui non si può dire se sia il caso 
o no)» (Eco 1997: 37). 
5  The literature on the subject from the standpoint of analytical philosophy,  philosophy of 
language, and linguisticts is vast. For a recent account on the subject, see Jennifer M. Saul, 
Lying, Misleading, and What is Said. An Exploration in Philosophy of Language and Ethics 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012). See also James E. Mahon «The definition of lying 
and deception», in Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Standford, Standford University, 
2008; A. Isenberg, «Deontology and the ethics of lying», Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, 24/4, 1964, 463–480; Frederick A. Siegler, «Lying», American Philosophical 
Quarterly, 3, 1966, 128–136; L. Coleman, P. Kay «Prototype semantics: the English word 
lie», Language 57/1, 1981, 26–44; F. D’Agostini, Menzogna (Torino: Bollati Boringhieri, 
2012). 
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instance, held that the De mendacio and the Contra mendacium “contain 
Augustine’s most detailed analysis of the semiotic significance and ethical 
import of lying”. Augustine’s semiotic import for what concerns his doctrine of 
the lie is, thus, acknowledged and yet left unattended. The ambition of the 
present chapter is, therefore, to fill in such gap.  
The lie is often associated with deception and blurs with many other 
phenomena (simulation, feigning, hypocrisy, disguise, error, non-serious talk, 
and many others) that, despite sharing some similarities, must be distinct. A 
universally accepted definition of the lie does not yet exist and, at present, there 
is “no independent and objective means for identifying certain messages as lies 
or truth” (Bavelas et al. 1990: 175).  
The field of study that focuses on lying and deception is fascinating as it is 
vast and complex. In order to delimit the province of our enquiry, the present 
chapter will focus all its efforts on what can be seen as Augustine’s thought on 
the subject.  
It is in plain sight, however, that the topic of lying, of its ethics, its lawful-
ness or wrongfulness, has drawn the commitment of various thinkers starting 
from the classical epoch until the present, formulating, on one hand, rigid and 
absolutist positions that prohibited any kind of mendacity, and, on the other, 
relatively flexible positions that admitted, exceptionally, the recourse to it.6 In 
the Greek world, for instance, Aristotle was among those condemning the lie as 
mean and guilty, while Plato argued that sometimes one was allowed to lie to 
public magistrates to prevent evil in the interest of the polis. Among the 
Romans, despite there being a unanimous condemnation of lies, there were 
those who, like Cicero and Quintilian, felt it is right to resort to an “honest lie” 
(Dorszynski 1948: 15). 
The discussion of this subject in the classical world is based mainly on two 
fundamental approaches: the first one conceives of the lie as a part of the 
general category of falsehood, which could concern either speaking or acting 
(Plato is one of the leaders of this first front). In this sense, both lie and error are 
treated as a part of the concept of falsehood. In fact, the word pseudos, in 
Greek, refers to “false” as either an error or a lie. The latter is conceived by the 
Greeks “mainly as an objective phenomenon, framed within the broad issue of 
non-truth” (Tagliapietra 2001: 189). The second approach, instead, typical of 
the position of the Stoics, is based on the intentionality of lies, a crucial feature 
that divorces lying from other types of false statements (Fleming 1993: 41). The 
same discussion that Augustine devoted to this subject, as we shall see, is based 
on the distinction between objective-falseness (an error) and subjective-
falseness (a lie).  
It is not surprising that a subject so ethically loaded found a privileged place 
among Catholic writers. During the Middle Ages, the Catholic-thought 
                                                                          
6  For an interdisciplinary overview on the subject of lying, see J. Vincent Marrelli, 
Truthfulness, Deception, Lying across Cultures and Disciplines (Napoli, Edizioni 
Scientifiche Italiane, 2004). 
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attributed so much importance to this issue that it raised awkward questions 
such as those that deal with the lawfulness of voluntarily asserting what is false 
in order to save a life or in order to make the life of a sick person less 
burdensome. 
More than fifteen hundred years ago, Augustine raised the magna quaestio 
of the lie7 and became a pioneer in this field. He provided the first systematic 
study on the lie, an analysis that will remain the terminus a quo – a place from 
which many other authors have taken their starting point and which was 
something to use as a comparison in the following centuries.8  
Andrea Oddone has identified a twofold tendency among the Fathers of the 
Church in respect to the ethics of the lie: “moderate” and “intransigent” 
(Oddone 1931: 268). Augustine expressed a firm position concerning the 
morality of the lie: there should not be lying under any circumstances,9 insofar 
as anyone who lies commits iniquity.10 Due to this position, he was, with good 
reason, included among those who followed an “intransigent” tendency.  
While the authority of the intransigent Augustinian position remained un-
disputed, there were – at the time when he was writing – also partially 
discordant trends within Catholicism, which admitted, in particular cases and in 
specific circumstances, that it was permissible to lie. Notwithstanding the 
principle that the lie should be generally condemned, those who fall into the 
“moderate” trend allowed that, in some cases and under exceptional circum-
stances, it would have been permissible to lie. On the less intransigent front, we 
can include, first of all, John Cassian, who advocated for the lawfulness of the 
lie, and St. Clement of Alexandria (in his Stromata), who, despite considering 
that the perfects never lie, admitted, by way of exception, an occasional and 
“therapeutic” deception, as the one to which doctors sometimes resort to in 
order to deceive their patients (Ramsey 1985: 517). To the aforementioned 
names should also be added St. John Chrysostom (in his De Sacerdotio), John 
Cassian, who admitted the recourse to a lie in case of absolute necessity in order 
to prevent a great evil (Dorszynski 1948: 17), Origin (in his Stromatum), St. 
Hilary of Poitiers (in his Tractatus super Psalmos) and John Climacus (in his 
Scala Paradisi). 
Ultimately, the authority of Augustine did not prevent opening a debate 
among Catholic writers about the morality and ethics of the lie. In the remainder 
                                                                          
7  Mend. 1,1 (CSEL 41, 413): «Magna quaestio est de mendacio». 
8  As Carla Casagrande and Silvana Vecchio (1987: 254) highlighted, «non è possibile 
parlare di menzogna nella cultura medievale al di fuori delle coordinate fissate da Agostino. 
Qualunque analisi intorno a questo tema, a qualunque livello si ponga, non solo presuppone 
inevitabilmente la riflessione agostiniana, ma si muove completamente all’interno dei 
parametri stabiliti una volta per tutte dal vescovo di Ippona». On the influence of 
Augustine’s thought on later thinkers, see Rosier-Catach, «Les développements médiévaux 
de la théorie augustinienne du mensonge», Hermès 15–16 (1995), 87–99. 
9  Mend. 21,42 (CSEL 41, 463): «Elucet itaque discussis omnibus nihil aliud illa testimonia 
scripturarum monere nisi nunquam esse omnino mentiendum». 
10 Doc. chr. 1,36: «Omnis autem qui mentitur, inique facit, et si cuiquam videtur utile 
aliquando esse mendacium, potest videri utilem aliquando esse iniquitatem». 
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of this chapter, it will be argued that exactly this context in which Augustine 
penned his De mendacio played a significant role in tailoring the definition of 




4.2. Augustine’s doctrine of the mendacium11 
The lie (mendacium), with Augustine, becomes the object of a systematic 
analysis. He treats it ex professo, devoting two treatises to this subject: the De 
mendacio and the Contra mendacium.  
The first tract was penned shortly before Augustine was appointed bishop of 
Hippo (395 AD), and it is an enquiry into the nature of mendacity in which he 
raises the question of the lawfulness of the lie, discusses some biblical passages 
related to the theme, and finally proposes a typology of eight species of lies 
(Muldowney 1952: 47).  
We can list the key points of this work as follows: 
 
1. What a lie is; 
2. What its iniquity consists of; 
3. What are the cases and the circumstances in which it is recommended, 
permitted or forbidden to lie; 
4. What are the moral degrees of the lie (Augustine’s eight-fold division of 
lies is ranked in order of decreasing seriousness). 
 
The Bishop of Hippo returned to the same issue almost a quarter of a century 
later with a second work, the Contra mendacium, penned in 420 AD. Addressed 
to Consentius, a bishop of Hispanic origin with whom Augustine had under-
taken an assiduous correspondence, the book raises the delicate question of 
lying to convert someone else. Indeed, in one of his letters, Consentius had 
expressly asked Augustine whether it were permissible for a Catholic Christian 
to pass off as an adept of Priscillian in order to infiltrate the Priscillianists them-
selves, which, at the time, were riddled with lies and deception.12 In the 
Retractationes, one can infer the reason that prompted Augustine to address the 
problem: 
                                                                          
11  A bibliography on the position of Augustine in respect to the subject of the lie is very 
vast. For a first overview on the subject, useful information can be found in the commented 
translation in Italian of Augustine’s De mendacio by M. Bettetini: Agostino, Sulla bugia, 
(ed.) Maria Bettetini, Rusconi, Milano 1994. See also A. Tagliapietra, Filosofia della bugia. 
Figure della menzogna nella storia del pensiero occidentale, Momdadori, Milano 2001, 
244–262. For an historical overview on the subject of the lie, from antiquity to modernity, 
see Gregory Müller, Die Wahrhaftigkeitspflicht und die Problematik der Lüge, Freiburg, 
Verlag Herder, 1962. Very useful are also the studies conducted by Feehan (1988; 1990; 
1991) as well as Chisholm and Feehan (1977). 
12  For background on the Priscillianists, see Henry Chadwick, Priscillian of Avila: The 
Occult and the Charismatic in the Early Church, Oxford, Oxford University Press 1976. 
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At that time also, I wrote a book against lying. The purpose of this work was to 
track down the Priscillianist heretics who think that their heresy ought to be 
concealed, not only by denying, but also by lying. It seemed to certain Catholics, 
that they ought to pretend that they were Priscillianists in order to uncover their 
artifices. I composed this book to prevent this from being done.13 
 
Questioning whether it is permissible to lie in the religious sphere (which, as we 
will see, is the most pernicious type of lie in Augustine’s 8-fold gradation), the 
second opusculum has a more specific and limited object of study than the first 
treatise, which is more general. In the words of Boniface Ramsey (1985: 509), 
the Contra mendacium adds little to the doctrine of the earlier book, whereas 
according to Michel-Ange Gomez (1929: 5), the two works complement each 
other: the De mendacio is more comprehensive in its theoretical exposition, 
whereas the Contra mendacium exposes more practical aspects. The latter is an 
overt assault upon the lie, while the De mendacio discusses the process of 
research.14  
Augustine himself, after the completion of his tracts, highlights the diffe-
rence between the two treatises in the first book of the Retractationes, where, 
reviewing his previous works, he admits that the De mendacio seemed to him 
obscure, intricate and all together troublesome (obscurus et anfractuosus et 
omnio molestus).15 For this reason, he had explicitly requested to remove the 
book from the collection of his works, but his request was not granted. Only 
later, after composing the Contra mendacium, did Augustine realize that the De 
mendacio comprised other important aspects that were absent in the other, for 
which reason he decided to retain his initial work.16  
Unquestionably, De mendacio is a complex text and difficult to read, and the 
intricacy of the subject, which Augustine compares to the anfractuosity of a 
cavern – at one and the same time obscure and full of twists and turns17 – tends 
to be a recurring aspect in his works. Although the two treatises treat the lie ex 
professo, Augustine’s reflection on the subject is not limited to the two works 
cited and is frequently taken up in others: from the Soliloquia, to the Enchiri-
dion and, as pointed out earlier (in Chapter 2), the De magistro, through the 
dispute with St. Jerome,18 up to the De trinitate. Hereinafter, this chapter will 
illustrate the elements of continuity and rupture that are found in the doctrine of 
the mendacium in Augustine. 
 
 
                                                                          
13  Retr. 2,86. (trans. Sister M. Inez Bogan, The Retractations, 254–255). 
14  Retr. 1,26. 
15  Retr. 1,26. 
16 Retr. 1,26. 
17 Mend. 1,1 (CSEL 41, 413): «Latebrosa est enim nimis et quibusdam quasi cavernosis 
anfractibus saepe intentionem». 
18  On the controversy between Augustine and Jerome cf. A. Oddone, SJ, «La dottrina di 
Sant’Agostino sulla menzogna e la controversia con San Girolamo», Rivista di Filosofia 
neo-Scolastica  23 (1931), 264–285.  
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4.3. Lying, speech, and the communication breakdown 
The lie is, for Augustine, an act of speech and, as such, is catalogued amongst 
the “sins of the tongue” (Casagrande, Vecchio 1987). In order to examine 
Augustine’s position on the nature of the lie in a clear and exhaustive way, we 
will briefly review, at the outset, the theory of language he subscribed to, 
inasmuch as lie and speech are inextricably intertwined one to the other. This 
serves as a basis for the discussion that follows.  
The nexus between speech and lie (or, in a more general sense, between 
signs, lying, and the process of signification) justifies the undertaking of this 
subject within the present work that is concerned with the study of sign theory 
and signification in Augustine. These two subjects (signification and lying), we 
contend, are totally interwoven and should be treated in tandem because one 
presupposes the other. The lie, conceived both as a theoretical topic on its own 
as well as a very practical problem, is a good example of how to employ a 
semiotic in order to deal with urgent and very practical matters.19  
Indeed, speech and lying are inextricably welded to information and 
signification. The lie is manifested through speech; thus, the use of language is 
an essential prerequisite for the lie to manifest itself. The issue of whether a 
non-verbal lie is altogether conceivable – that is, the phenomenon of simulation 
and hypocrisy – will be briefly discussed in due course. For the time being, we 
shall be concerned, however, with the nature of the lie seen as a speech act 
exclusively.  
As shown by recent studies (Bettetini 2004: 7), the word (verbum), through-
out the entirety of Augustine’s work, is elevated to a role of excellence, and 
among the various types of signs available to man, it is viewed as the most 
important. As noted before (in Chapter 1), in the De dialectica Augustine 
defined the word as “a sign of any sort of thing. It is spoken by a speaker and 
can be understood by a hearer”, and the sign, in turn, is defined as “something 
that is itself sensed and which indicates something beyond itself to the mind”.20 
Augustine identified four elements of the sign (verbum, dicibile, dictio and res) 
and exposed the very limits of language summarizing the obscurity and 
ambiguity of the word. He considered that, prescinding from speech, there is 
something in the mind that is expressed by the word and which, in turn, is 
grasped through it by those who understand it (Jackson 1975: 127); this element 
is called the dicibile.  
In the De trinitate, the word serves the function of communicating and exter-
nalizing ideas and thoughts,21 and in the De magistro speaking of the theme of 
teaching (docere) Augustine dwells at length upon the function of speech. As 
we saw before (in Chapter 2), in the De magistro Augustine envisaged speaking 
as significare loquentis mentem (to express the thought of the speaker) so that it 
                                                                          
19  It suffices to notice the revival of the issue of lying to others as reflected in the 
contemporary debate on the so called “fake news” to support such a claim.  
20  Dial. 5. (trans. Jackson, De dialectica, 87). 
21  Trin. 15, 11–20. 
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can be grasped by the hearer. The sensibility towards the communicative 
dimension is one of the characteristic features of Augustine’s picture of 
language (Ruef 1981: 86). 
However, words are ineluctably caught in a perennial contradiction because, 
although they are necessary for the intersubjective expression of thoughts, 
intentions, and states of mind, verbal signs nonetheless remain imperfect means 
of communication. The communicative function which is inherent in speech can 
be perverted through the lie.  
Ultimately, although Augustine points out the limits of speech and the 
imperfection of words, he nonetheless acknowledges the necessity of signs. 
Notwithstanding the imperfect nature of language as tool for communication 
between sentient beings and acquisition of knowledge, this alone does not grant 
for the altering of its function in order to pursue evil ends. Since men lack the 
ability to look in one another’s minds, the institution of language was 
established to fill in this gap by providing men with the faculty of speaking one 
to another.  
Notice that Augustine distinguished the communication that goes on 
between men and God from communication amongst men only. Whereas the 
former does not require sensible signs (for God is cordis inspector), commu-
nication amongst men does need the resort to signs as vehicles of thoughts: 
 
When a statement is made to God alone, then only in the heart is truth involved; 
but, when the testimony is given to man, then the truth must be expressed by the 
mouth of the body, because man cannot see the heart.22  
 
Essentially, the lie is a breach of faith. For Augustine, lying is sinful to the 
extent that the liar breaks the rules of communication between men, and, thus, it 
alters the natural purpose that language possesses – that is, the communication 
of truthful knowledge (each speaker saying something according to his own 
mind). As Harald Weinrich pointed out, “language should reveal thought, not 
hide it. At stake is the signifying function of language, its most elementary, 
consequently most fundamental, achievement. Lying perverts it” (Weinrich 
2005: 9). 
As it will become apparent from the analysis that follows, the essence of the 
lie is the incongruence between thought and speech, which is deliberate and 
conscious. This is the crux of the matter. Viewed through this prism, false 
speech or a false sign is a breakdown of communication, because it alters the 
original and natural purpose of language, namely, the sincere communication of 
one’s thoughts to another by means of speech. As Edwin David Craun (1997: 
43) wrote: 
 
                                                                          
22  Mary Sarah Muldowney, S. S. J., trans., «Lying», in Saint Augustine. Treatises on 
Various Subjects (The Fathers of the Church. A new translation, Vol. 16) ed. Roy J. 
Deferrari (New York: Fathers of the Church, third reprint 1981, 106 vols.), Mend. 27,36.  
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To pervert words by using them to convey what is not in the mind, then, is to 
commit a fundamental injustice against other humans and against the natural 
order as reason perceives it. To lie is to violate the communion of mind which 
speech makes possible. 
  
To sum up, lying is an infraction of speech, for its natural purpose is the truthful 
signification of one’s thoughts and ideas to another. False speech, as we saw 
above, is a distortion of this function and, as such, must be avoided. This is 
epitomized in the following excerpt from the Enchiridion: 
 
Surely words have therefore been appointed, not as means whereby men may 
deceive each other, but as means whereby each one may convey his own 
thoughts to another’s knowledge. Therefore to use words for the purpose of 
deceit, not for what they were appointed, is a fault.23  
 
Viewed from such a vantage point, the communicative context envisaged by 
Augustine, as “rigid” as it might seem, is governed by a rule requiring truth-
telling. It is the breaking of this convention that confers to the lie its sinful 
character. 
 
4.4. Augustine’s definition of the lie and  
the role of the falsa significatio 
The great majority of interpreters acknowledged that the authority of Augustine 
on the subject of lying remains undisputed and that his definition is often 
considered as the quintessential one (Vecchio 2000: 848).  
To begin with, it must be observed that there is a close parallelism between 
the definitions of the lie given in the De mendacio and in the Contra 
mendacium, respectively:  
 
Definition 1:  
 
Quapropter enuntiationem falsam cum voluntate ad fallendum prolatam 
manifestum est esse mendacium.  
 





                                                                          
23  Ench.7,22 (trans. Parker and Rivington, Enchiridion to Laurentius on Faith, Hope and 
Charity, 101): «Et utique verba propterea sunt instituta non per quae invicem se homines 
fallant sed per quae in alterius quisque notitiam cogitationes suas perferat. Verbis ergo uti ad 
fallaciam, non ad quod instituta sunt, peccatum est». 
24  Mend. 4,5 (CSLE 41, 419, trans. Muldowney, On Lying, 60). 
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Definition 2:  
 
Mendacium est quippe falsa significatio cum voluntate fallendi.  
 
(A lie is a false signification told with the desire to deceive.)25 
 
What is outlined in the Contra mendacium is generally regarded as the “classic” 
Augustinian definition (Lanahan 1972: 18), the most frequent and clear-cut of 
all Augustinian definitions of the lie (Gomez 1929: 27). This definition is based 
on what can be traced to two characteristics of the lie:  
 
(i) the falsa significatio; 
(ii) the voluntas fallendi. 
These two characteristics will be first treated individually and, in a second 
moment, the question of what is the place of each of these features in the 
essential definition of the lie will be attended to. 
 
 
4.5. Objective and subjective falseness  
How should the falsa significatio (false signification), which holds such an 
importance that it recurs in both definitions, be interpreted? One may, in fact, 
wonder whether the falseness inherent in a lie is to be considered as an objective 
(factual) or subjective phenomenon.  
The meaning of falsity in Augustine is complex and multifaceted. As we will 
see in what follows, n the Soliloquia Augustine tackles this subject from an 
ontological viewpoint. In his treatment of the lie, however, he seems to have a 
very different perspective in mind. The falseness of a statement could refer to 
the mismatch between what was said by the speaker and what is the case, or, in 
other words, between what is said and the state of affairs. No one could object, 
however, that there is at least another meaning of falseness, which can be 
termed as subjective falseness. Rather than the mismatch between words and 
state of affairs, subjective falseness is characterized by the incongruity between 
thought and speech – what one thinks, assumes, or believes and what one 
actually expresses by means of words. This aspect characterizes the lie as a 
subjective falsity. Paul J. Griffith interprets Augustine’s “false signification” as 
duplicity or double-heartedness. He takes the following meaning of the concept 
of falsa significatio to be the most accurate: 
 
                                                                          
25  Mary Sarah Muldowney, S. S. J., trans., «Against Lying», in Saint Augustine. Treatises 
on Various Subjects (The Fathers of the Church. A new translation, Vol. 16) ed. Roy J. 
Deferrari (New York: Fathers of the Church, third reprint 1981, 106 vols.), C. mend. 12,26. 
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False signification (falsa significatio) here means duplicitous signification. 
Augustine does sometimes use “false” as shorthand for “duplicitous” […] The 
confusion between “false in itself” and “false in the mind of the speaker” is, 
however, common in both English and Latin, and often causes trouble in discus-
sions of lying. (Griffiths 2004: 27) 
 
Several authors emphasized the twofold interpretation of falseness – objective 
and subjective – including St. Bonaventure who pointed out that a statement can 
be compared both to the intention of the speaker and to the thing signified. 
Based on this distinction, he identified a twofold meaning of truth or falsehood: 
in respect to the thing signified a word is said to be true (verus), whereas in 
respect to the intention of the speaker a word is said to be truthful (verax). In the 
same way, a false statement (falsus) is that in which there is not conformity 
between the word and the thing signified, and a word is mendacious or 
misleading (mendax) when there is not conformity between the word and the 
intention of speaker (Lanahan 1972: 54). 
It is falseness taken in its subjective meaning that is to be considered in the 
formal definition of the lie that Augustine subscribed to. The one who lies is 
said to be lying not because he says something contrary of what is de facto true, 
but because he says the contrary of what he knows or believes to be true. It is 
important to stress that this type of falseness is formal, namely, it is intentional 
and conscious (Gomez 1929: 269). This difference is pivotal in Augustine’s 
picture of the lie. 
 
 
4.6. Images, likeness, and false resemblances  
in the Soliloquia 
The Soliloquia is an early dialogue composed in 386–387 A.D. and it takes the 
form of an inner soliloquy between Augustine and Ratio (or Reason).26 In 
common with the De magistro, the subject of this dialogue is very intricate, and 
its form is full of twists and turns. Our interest lies in the disquisition about the 
problem of falsity and likeness because these issues equate well with the general 
subject of the present chapter. 
In the second book of the Soliloquia Augustine engages in a discussion on 
the concept of falsity, its nature and characteristics, as well as a classification of 
types of perceptual errors. What is falsity (falsum) and how should this concept 
be defined? Throughout the Soliloquia, Augustine and Reason put forth, 
analyse, and discuss numerous definitions of falsity in a tentative manner. Four 
                                                                          
26  The term “soliloquy” is used for the first time by Augustine. The meaning of this word is 
explained throughout the dialogue: “As we alone take part, I wish the work to be called and 
entitled ‘Soliloquies’, a new and harsh name perhaps, but quite suitable to describe what we 
are doing. There is no better way of seeking truth than by the method of question and 
answer”. 
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definitions of falsity, presented and discussed one after the other, could be 
singled out in this work.  
To start with, falsity is defined as “that which is other than it seems” (quod 
aliter sese habet quam videtur).27 This definition presupposes perception. In 
other words, it implies the subject who perceives what is sensed as false. Thus, 
falsity is not in the things themselves but depends upon the perception of a 
subject – it is dependent upon sense perception.28 Error, in turn, occurs when the 
subject assents to a perceived falsity: 
 
R. – Non igitur est in rebus falsitas, sed in sensu: non autem fallitur qui falsis non 
assentitur. 
 
(R. – There is, then, no falsity in things but only in our senses. But no one is 
deceived who does not assent to what is false.)29  
 
However, without perception there would not be falsity altogether. For this 
reason, the first definition of falsum is easily disputable.  
In the second definition what is true is conceived as that which is, and what 
is false, in turn, is defined as that which is not. The objection to this conception 
is that, given this definition, nothing can be said to be false anymore because 
anything that is, is true. Augustine, here, admits being lost in such an intricate 
and obscure subject and he is admittedly very perplexed. 
The third attempt to define falsity revolves around the idea of falsity thought 
of as verisimilitude (similitudines veri). The kernel of verisimilitude is to bear 
some resemblance to the truth. From this vantage point, false is defined as 
“what is not as it seems” (quam quod non ita est ut videtur).30  
At this juncture, the nature of falsity intertwines with the concept of likeness, 
similitude or resemblance. Something is in fact false because it resembles what 
is true: 
 
R. – Nam certe quod oculi vident, non dicitur falsum, nisi habeat aliquam 
similitudinem veri. 
 
(R. – What the eyes see is not said to be false unless it has some resemblance to 
the truth.)31 
 
The illustrations provided to expound the idea of false as an effect of 
verisimilitude are insightful:32 
                                                                          
27  Sol. II,3,3 (trans. Burleigh, The Soliloquies, 43). This definition of falsity could also be 
translated as «that which is other than it is perceived to be». This translation facilitates the 
comparison with the third definition of falsity  («what is not as it seems») which is almost 
identical to the first one. 
28  Sol. II,3,3.  
29  Sol. II,3,3 (trans. Burleigh, The Soliloquies, 43). 
30  Sol. II,6,10. (trans. Burleigh, The Soliloquies, 46). 
31  Sol. II,6,10. (trans. Burleigh, The Soliloquies, 46). 
32 Sol. II,4,10. 
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 Dreams (the images seen by a dreamer in a dreamscape – as for instance 
the image of man – are not real. The image of a man in a dream is false 
because it resembles a real man, but actually is not a man); 
 Perceptual errors (if a man, in his waking state, sees a horse and 
erroneously takes it to be a man, the man is deceived by the false 
appearance of something that he has perceived as alike to the shape of a 
man); 
 Painted images (the image of a tree portrayed in a painting is false on 
the same ground of the examples described above. The tree portrayed in 
a painting is a likeness of a real tree, hence, for this reason it is false 
tree);  
 Mirror reflections (along the same lines, the image of a man’s face 
reflected in a mirror is thought of as a false face); 
 False motions (the example describes the false movements of towers as 
seen by navigators); 
 The image of a broken oar immersed in water; 
 Two twins resembling each other; 
 Two eggs; 
 Different seals stamped with one signet-ring.  
 
All these illustrations of likeness are based on visual perception. Reason states 
that “as regards visible things it is resemblance that is the mother of falsity”.33 
Thus, the connection between likeness and falsity is reiterated. 
These instances of visible things that resemble other things are divided into 
two larger classes:  
 
(i)  Resemblance between things that are equal or equivalent (aequales);  
(ii)  Resemblance between things that are not equal but inferior (deteriores) 
 one in respect to the other.  
 
Equal things are those things which both resemble each other. In other words, 
there is a biunivocal relation of likeness between the two things. This first class 
encompasses examples such as two twins or the impressions of a signet-ring.  
The second class includes things that are not equally resemblant one to the 
other. In other words, the resemblance is between something inferior that 
resembles something superior (or better). In this respect, the relation of likeness 
is univocal (something worse wants to imitate something better). The face of a 
man reflected in a mirror falls into this class. It is the image reflected in the 
mirror (the inferior thing) that tends to be like the face of the man who projects 
his own image into the mirror, and not vice versa. Philip Cary pointed out that 
these two classes of resemblances (resemblance between equals and 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
  
33  Sol. II,6,10. (trans. Burleigh, The Soliloquies, 46): «Similitudo igitur rerum quae ad 
oculos pertinet, mater est falsitatis». 
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resemblance between not equals) are respectively “horizontal” and “vertical”, 
“for the one is a similarity between equals and the other between higher and 
lower things” (Cary 2008: 62).  
The class of likeness between an inferior thing that resembles a better one is, 
in turn, divided into two subclasses. One subclass refers to “misreadings of 
what the soul receives” (in eo quod anima patitur), and the other subclass refers 
to “error in visual perception” (iis rebus quae videtur) (Stock 2010: 192).34 The 
likeness that occur as the “misreadings of what the soul receives” is in turn 
divided into two further species: perceptual errors of what the senses perceive 
(in sensu patitur) and what the mind receives by itself (apud se ipsam ex eo 
quod accepit a sensibus).35 An example of perceptual errors of what the senses 
perceive is the false movement of the towers as perceived by a sailor. 
Illustrations of false images that the mind receives by itself are the visions of 
dreamers and madmen. 
Moreover, the subclass of error in visual perception (iis rebus quae videntur) 
is divided into two subspecies: resemblances of visible things expressed or 
represented either by nature (a natura…finguntur), or by living creatures 
(animantibus…finguntur).36 Resemblances of visible things brought about by 
nature are of two types: begetting (gignendo) and reflection (resultando). An 
example of inferior resemblance naturally caused by begetting is when parents 
have children who resemble them.37 An illustration of the type of inferior 
natural resemblance caused by reflection is the already mentioned mirror 
image.38 Another example of these types is the “shadows of bodies which 
closely resemble bodies, and may be called false bodies”.39 
Among the resemblances of visible things brought up by living creatures, 
manmade pictures as well as “figments of demons” are listed. 
To sum up, several division were made to explicate the various ramifications 
of the concept of falsity: 
 
                                                                          
34  Sol. II,6,11. 
35  Sol. II,6,11. 
36  Sol. II,6,11. 
37  Sol. II,6,11: «[…] gignendo, cum parentibus similes nascuntur». 
38  Sol. II,6,11: «[…] resultando, ut de speculis cuiuscemodi». 
39  Sol. II,6,11(trans. Burleigh, The Soliloquies, 47): «Umbrae autem corporum, quia non 
nimis ab re abest ut corporibus similes et quasi falsa corpora dicantur, nec ad oculorum 
iudicium pertinere negandae sunt; in illo eas genere poni placet, quod resultando a natura 
fit». 
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Falsity as an effect of verisimilitude: 
(i) Resemblance between things that are equal (e.g. twins, impressions of a 
signet-ring); 
a. Misreadings of what the soul receives (in eo quod anima patitur); 
i. Perceptual errors of what the senses perceive (in sensu patitur); 
(e.g. false movements of the towers perceived by a sailor); 
ii. What the mind receives by itself (apud se ipsam ex eo quod 
accepit a sensibus) (e.g. visions of dreamers and madmen); 
b. Error in visual perception (iis rebus quae videtur); 
i. Naturally caused inferior resemblance (a natura finguntur); 
1. Caused by begetting (gignendo) (e.g. parents and children 
who resemble them); 
2. Caused by reflection (resultando) (e.g. mirror reflections, 
shadows of bodies); 
ii. Resemblances brought up by living creatures (e.g. pictures, 
figments of demons). 
(ii) Resemblance between inferior things (mirror reflections). 
 
Up to this point, the dialogue revolved around the realm of visible things. 
However, the phenomenon of likeness is not limited to the visual sensorium. 
Classes of resemblances in fact can be singled out also in connection to other 
human senses: 
 
1. Hearing:  
a. “We hear a voice but do not see the speaker, and think it is 
someone else whose voice resembles the one we hear”;40 
b. The echo is an instance of an inferior type of resemblance 
based on the sense of hearing; 
c. Ringing in the ears; 
d. “The imitation of the merle or the raven that we hear in 
clocks”;41 
e. Sounds heard by dreamers in dreams or sound heard by mad 
men; 
f. False soft notes that resemble true notes. 
2. Smell: 
a. Distinguishing one lily from another by smelling; 
3. Taste: 




                                                                          
40  Sol. II,6,12 (trans. Burleigh, The Soliloquies, 47): «[…] veluti cum loquentis vocem, 
quem non videmus, audientes, putamus alium quempiam, cui voce similis est». 
41 Sol. II,6,12 (trans. Burleigh, The Soliloquies, 47): «[…]vel in horologiis merulae aut 
corui quaedam imitatio». 
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4. Touch: 
a. The softness of the plumage of the swan and the goose.42 
 
When the dialogue seemed to have reached the point that “resemblances, 
whether equal things or unequal, wheedle all our senses and deceive us”, this 
conclusion is questioned anew.43 Reason in fact brings up two new questions 
that challenge Augustine’s understanding of the subject: 
 
R. – Bene facis. Sed attende utrum tibi videatur, cum ova similia videmus, 
aliquod eorum falsum esse recte nos posse dicere. 
A. – Nullo modo videtur. Omnia enim si ova sunt, vera ova sunt. 
R. – Quid, cum de speculo resultare imaginem videmus? quibus signis falsam 
esse comprehendimus? 
A. – Scilicet quod non tenetur, non sonat, non per se movetur, non vivit, et 
caeteris innumerabilibus, quae prosequi longum est. 
R. – Video te nolle immorari, et properationi tuae mos gerendus est. Itaque, ne 
singula repetam, si et illi homines quos videmus in somnis, vivere, loqui, teneri a 
vigilantibus possent, nihilque inter ipsos differret, et eos quos expergefacti ac 
sani alloquimur et videmus, numquidnam eos falsos diceremus? 
A. – Quo pacto istud recte diceretur? 
R. – Ergo si eo veri essent, quo veri simillimi apparerent, nihilque inter eos et 
veros omnino distaret, eoque falsi quo per illas vel alias differentias dissimiles 
convincerentur; nonne similitudinem veritatis matrem, et dissimilitudinem 
falsitatis esse fatendum est? 
 
(R. – Do you think that when we see two similar eggs we can say that one of 
them is false? 
A. – By no means. If they are eggs, both of them are true eggs. 
R. – When we see an image reflected from a mirror, how do we know that it is 
false? 
A. – Because it cannot be grasped; it makes no sound; it does not move of itself; 
it is not alive […] 
R. – If the men we see in dreams could live and speak and be grasped by us when 
we awake, and there was no difference between them and those whom we see 
and address when we are awake and of a sound mind, would we say that they 
were false? 
A. – We could not correctly say so. 
R. – Then, if they were true so far as they were very like the truth and there was 
no difference at all between them and real men, but were also false so far as they 
were proved to be unlike real men by the tests you have mentioned or by other 
tests, must we not admit that similitude is the mother of truth and dissimilitude 
the mother of falsity?)44 
                                                                          
42  Sol. II,6,12: «R. – Ergo, ne moremur, videturne tibi aut lilium a lilio posse odore, aut mel 
thyminum a melle thymino de diversis alveariis sapore, aut mollitudo plumarum cycni ab 
anseris tactu facile diiudicari?». 
43  Sol. II,6,12 (trans. Burleigh, The Soliloquies, 48): «R. – Ergo apparet nos in omnibus 
sensibus siue aequalibus, siue in deterioribus rebus, aut similitudine lenocinante falli». 
44  Sol. II,7,13 (trans. Burleigh, The Soliloquies, 48). 
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There is a conundrum about the subject of falsity because what is false can have 
at the same time some similitude and some dissimilitude to what is true: “both 
likeness and unlikeness together entitle a thing to be called false”.45 The reso-
lution of such a theoretical difficulty is given by Reason. In a very poignant 
passage of the dialogue two main forms of falsity are singled out. These are 
called fallacious (fallax) and mendacious (mendax) and their difference is 
explained in these terms: 
 
R. – Video enim, tentatis quantum potuimus omnibus rebus, non remansisse 
quod falsum iure dicatur, nisi quod aut se fingit esse quod non est, aut omnino 
esse tendit et non est. Sed illud superius falsi genus, vel fallax etiam, vel mendax 
est. Nam fallax id recte dicitur quod habet quemdam fallendi appetitum; qui sine 
anima intellegi non potest: sed partim ratione fit, partim natura; ratione, in 
animalibus rationalibus, ut in homine; natura, in bestiis, tamquam in vulpecula. 
Illud autem quod mendax voco, a mentientibus fit. Qui hoc differunt a fallacibus, 
quod omnis fallax appetit fallere; non autem omnis vult fallere qui mentitur: nam 
et mimi et comoediae et multa poemata mendaciorum plena sunt, delectandi 
potius quam fallendi voluntate, et omnes fere qui iocantur, mentiuntur. Sed fallax 
vel fallens is recte dicitur, cuius negotium est ut quisque fallatur. Illi autem qui 
non id agunt ut decipiant, sed tamen aliquid fingunt, vel mendaces tantum, vel si 
ne hoc quidem, mentientes tamen vocari nemo ambigit. 
 
(R. – After all our inquiry I see that nothing remains that we may justly term 
false except that which feigns itself to be what is not, or pretends to be when it 
does not exist. The former kind is either fallacious or mendacious. Fallacious, 
strictly speaking, is that which has a certain desire to deceive and this cannot be 
understood apart from the soul. But deceit is practised partly by reason and 
partly by nature; by reason in rational beings like men, by nature in beasts like 
foxes. What I call lying is done by liars. The difference between the fallacious 
and the mendacious is that the former all wish to deceive while the latter do not 
all wish to do so. Mimes and comedies and many poems are full of lies, but the 
aim is to delight rather than to deceive. Nearly all who make jokes lie. But the 
fallacious person, strictly speaking, is he whose design is to deceive. Those who 
feign without intent to deceive are mendacious, or at least no one hesitates to call 
them liars.)46  
 
First, falsity takes two forms of manifestation and two definitions of falsity can 
be given accordingly: 
 
1) Falsity as that which feigns itself to be what is not (se fingit esse quod 
non est); 
2) Falsity as that which pretends to be when it does not exist (esse tendit et 
non est); 
                                                                          
45  Sol. II,8,15 (trans. Burleigh, The Soliloquies, 59): «A. – Sed fac me non metuere illud 
respondere, similitudinem ac dissimilitudinem simul efficere ut aliquid falsum recte 
nominetur; quam mihi evadendi viam dabis?». 
46  Sol. II,9,16 (trans. Burleigh, The Soliloquies, 49–50). 
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Another way to look at this difference is to understand that one thing is to will it 
to be false and another thing is not to be able to be true. 
Falsity conceived as, what feigns to be what is not, can be divided into two 
heads: a deceitful form of falsity (fallax) and non-deceitful (mendax). The 
rationale of this distinction is that the fallacious form of falsity displays a 
tendency or inclination towards deception. On the contrary, the mendacious 
type of falsity does not have such an inclination: it feigns without being 
deceitful.  
The second species of falsity, that which pretends to be when it does not 
exist, is of an entirely different nature. Its characteristic lies in that it tends to be 
something else and is not (pretends it is and is not). Under this rubric are 
included many of the examples discussed above: “every picture, statue, or 
similar work of art tries to be that on which it is modelled”, dreams, visions of 
madmen, shadows of bodies, the oar plunged in water, the false movement of 
the towers and so forth.47  
 
 
4.6.1. Image, equality, and likeness in the De diversis 
quaestionibus octoginta tribus, in the De Genesi ad litteram 
imperfectus liber, and in the De trinitate 
The interest towards the themes of image and likeness is not limited to the early 
Soliloquia but cut across the Augustinian intellectual itinerary. These themes 
are in fact discussed and refined in other later works. Augustine develops his 
semiotics of the image particularly in the De diversis quaestionibus octoginta 
tribus (388–396). This work consists of a series of eighty–three different 
questions. Question 74 is of particular interest to the present discussion because 
here Augustine raises the issue and explains the difference between three inter-
related concepts, image (imago), equality or identity (aequalitas), and likeness 
(similitudo): 
 
Imago et aequalitas et similitudo distinguenda sunt: quia ubi imago, continuo 
similitudo, non continuo aequalitas; ubi aequalitas, continuo similitudo, non 
continuo imago; ubi similitudo, non continuo imago, non continuo aequalitas. 
Ubi imago, continuo similitudo, non continuo aequalitas: ut in speculo est imago 
hominis; quia de illo expressa est, est etiam necessario similitudo, non tamen 
aequalitas, quia multa desunt imaginis, quae insunt illi rei de qua expressa est. 
Ubi aequalitas, continuo similitudo, non continuo imago: velut in duobus ovis 
paribus, quia inest aequalitas, inest et similitudo; quaecumque enim adsunt uni, 
adsunt et alteri; imago tamen non est, quia neutrum de altero expressum est. Ubi 
similitudo, non continuo imago non continuo aequalitas; omne quippe ovum 
omni ovo, in quantum ovum est, simile est; sed ovum perdicis, quamvis in 
quantum ovum est, simile sit ovum gallinae, nec imago tamen eius est, quia non 
                                                                          
47  Sol. II,9,16 (trans. Burleigh, The Soliloquies, 50): «R – Quid omnis pictura vel cuiusce-
modi simulacrum, et id genus omnia opificum? nonne illud esse contendunt, ad cuius quid-
que similitudinem factum est?». 
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de illo expressum est, nec aequale, quia et brevius est alterius generis ani-
mantium.  
 
(Image and equality and likeness must be distinguished. For where there is an 
image, there is necessarily a likeness, but not necessarily an equality; where an 
equality, necessarily a likeness, but not necessarily an image; where a likeness, 
not necessarily an image and not necessarily an equality.  
Where there is an image, there is necessarily a likeness, but not necessarily 
an equality. For example, there is in a mirror the image of a man. Because the 
image has been copied from him, there is also necessarily a likeness; but, 
nonetheless, there is no equality, because there is absent from the image much 
that is present in that thing of which it is the copy. When there is an equality, 
there is necessarily a likeness, but not necessarily an image. For example, 
between two identical (paribus) eggs there is a likeness because there is an 
equality, for whatever belongs to one belongs also to the other. Still, there is no 
image, because neither one is the copy of the other. Where there is a likeness, 
there is not necessarily an image and not necessarily an equality. For every egg is 
like every other egg insofar as it is an egg; but a partridge egg, although like a 
chicken egg insofar as it is an egg, is, nonetheless, neither its image, because it is 
not a copy of that one, nor its equal, because it is smaller and of another species 
of living being.)48  
 
Although the concepts of image, equality (or identity), and likeness are inter-
connected, the specific relations between these three concepts must be spelled 
out. Augustine points out that an image entails likeness, but not equality. We 
may notice that Augustine gives an example (the mirror reflection) that echoes 
the one he had already brought up and discussed in the Soliloquia. Although the 
mirror reflection entails a high degree of likeness to the object reflected, the 
image reflected in a mirror does not result in an identity between the image and 
its source. 
Equality, in turn, implies likeness but not necessarily an image. Once again, 
the example cited to illustrate this point (two identical eggs) was already 
mentioned in the Soliloquia. Equality between two things presupposes likeness 
between them. However, equality does not necessarily involve an image 
because one thing is not the derivation of the other.  
Likeness does not imply neither image nor equality. Two eggs of two diffe-
rent species (a partridge egg and a chicken egg) illustrate this point. Because 
both are eggs, one is like the other. However, strictly speaking, the two eggs are 
not the image of one another (because they originate from different sources, e.g. 
a partridge and a chicken) and they are not equal (because these eggs differ in 
size and are eggs of different species). 
R. Markus (1964), C. Marmo (2017b), O. Boulnois (2008), and E. Zuccotti 
(2015) all underscored the relevance of Augustine’s use of Quia non de illo 
expressum est in the passage quoted above. The use of expressum est further 
specifies the nature of the concept of image which is based on a link of causality 
                                                                          
48 Diu. qu. 83,74. (trans. Mosher, Eighty–three different questions, 189–190). 
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or derivation from its source. Marmo is very explicit in this regard: “The verb 
which characterizes the image is only the passive voice of exprimere […]: the 
idea repeated here is again that of the causal derivation of the image from the 
model, which brings along with it likeness (and participation)”.49 
The theoretical knot between image and likeness is further documented and 
perfected in another excerpt from De Genesi ad litteram imperfectus liber (426). 
In this work, the thematic thread and the context in which the concepts of image 
and likeness are brought up is the idea that human beings are in the likeness or 
image of God: 
 
Omnis imago est similis ei cuius imago est; nec tamen omne, quod simile est 
alicui, atiam imago est eius. Sicut in speculo et pictura quia imagines sunt, etiam 
similes sint necesse est ei cuius imagines sunt. Homines autem duo etiam si inter 
se similes sunt, tamen, si alter ex altero natus non est, nullus eorum imago 
alterius dici potest. Imago enim tunc est, cum de aliquo exprimitur. 
 
(Every image is like that of which it is an image, but not everything which is like 
something is also its image. Thus, because in a mirror or in a picture there are 
images, they are also alike. But if the one does not have its origin from the other, 
it is not said to be the image of the other. For it is an image only when it is 
derived from the other thing.)50 
 
Image entails a relation of similitude to its model. However, things that are like 
other things are not necessarily images. Thus, image and likeness are not co-
extensive.  
In this text, the idea of the image as bearing a “genetic” (Zuccotti 2015: 87) 
connection with its source of origin, or, in other words, a “derivation from 
something (a model or a cause)” (Marmo 2017) is spelled out with clarity.  
By comparing the two excerpts from De diversis quaestionibus octoginta 
tribus and De Genesi ad litteram imperfectus liber Marmo (2017b) not only has 
observed the passive use of the verb exprimere, already mentioned before, but 
also a change in respect to the examples provided in the two texts:  the mirror as 
an illustration of the image is recurrent, whereas the example of the picture is 
not.  
If we extend the comparison by including also the second book of early 
Soliloquia, we could notice, however, that Augustine in this work mentions all 
these examples (mirror, pictures, as well as statues). The link between, likeness, 
image, and falsity, however, seems to be limited to the Soliloquia and not 
reiterated in the two other works. 
But there is another aspect that seems to be the fil rouge between these 
works in their discussion of the concept of image. Like the Quaestio 74 and the 
De Genesi ad litteram imperfectus liber, also in the Soliloquia the concept of 
                                                                          
49 «Il verbo che caratterizza l’immagine è solo la voce passiva di exprimere […]: l’idea qui 
ribadita è ancora quella della derivazione causale dell’immagine dal modello, che porta con 
sé somiglianza (e partecipazione)» (Marmo 2017b: 45), my translation from Italian. 
50 Gn. litt. inp. 16,57. (trans. Teske, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, 183) 
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image is tailored as having a generative connection with its source. However, 
this connection is not only “generative” as in the case of parents and children, 
but also “reflective” (resultando) as in the case of the mirror. The images in the 
mirror are the result of a model (the object reflected). In this category also 
pictures, figments of demons, and shadows are included.  
The concept of image also cuts through the whole De trinitate, a theological 
work of Augustine’s maturity. This work is of fundamental importance to 
understand how revolutionary Augustine’s doctrine of trinity was, not only in 
relation to Christianity, but also in respect to the ancient world. The novelty of 
the De trinitate is that it offers a theological key to interpret an epistemological 
and gnoseological problem (the relation between notitia and cogitation, and the 
structure of the verbum).51  
By analysing the numerous contexts in which Augustine writes about images 
in the De trinitate we can find pictures, paintings, and mental representations. In 
book VIII, Augustine examines mental images through the specific example of 
those images that prompt the recollection to the mind of the cities that were 
familiar to the author (Chartage and Alexandria). The mental image is that 
which is interposed between man and the world that is experienced through it, 
and without which there would be neither sense perception, nor memory, nor 
thought.  
In book XI Augustine makes an accurate and sophisticated analysis of the 
phenomenology of sense perception. Out of the five senses, Augustine selects 
vision as an object for his analysis because he considers it the most noble of the 
senses and the most suitable for understanding. Augustine distinguishes three 
factors in the act of vision: the object (res) that is perceived, the vision (visio) 
itself, and the animi intentio, namely, that which fixes the vision upon the object 
of perception.52 These are three distinct factors and each of them has a different 
nature: the object is corporeal and is external to the subject, the vision is an 
inner phenomenon because it dwells within the subject, and the animi intentio 
lies within the soul (Rovighi 1962: 26). It is important to stress that in this work 
intentio and voluntas are alike and they both refer to the intentional attention 
that the mind places upon the object of perception through the act of vision. 
Intentio, thus, entails an active and voluntary desire to see.  
The relation between Augustine’s theory of sense knowledge and his theory 
of the image is tailored in the following terms. The act of vision equates well 
with the concept of image because vision is a similitude or image of the object 
perceived. The image is inferred and impressed (by the mind and reason) from 
the perception of an external object (sense perception) and they form a unity 
(Rovighi 1962: 26).  
 
 
                                                                          
51  We cannot provide a full analysis of this work in the limited province of our enquiry. For 
a full discussion on the concept of image in the De trinitate, see Daniels (1977), McCool 
(1956), Zuccotti (2015). 
52  De trin. 11,2,2. 
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4.7. Cor duplex: the lie as duplicitous 
Returning to the two definitions gleaned from the De mendacio and the Contra 
mendacium, the meaning of falsa significatio and enuntiatio falsi, interpreted in 
their respective contexts, almost coincide. Very explicit in this regard is A. 
Sieradsky (1952: 6–7), who conceived the lie in terms of false speech or false 
sign: the word that, being a sign of the ideas and a medium of communication 
between intelligences, is false when there is an incongruence between the thing 
signified (that which resides in the mind) and the thing expressed by the sign. 
The lie, therefore, explains Augustine, is identified with the speaking contrary 
to what one thinks:  
 
Quapropter ille mentitur, qui aliud habet in animo et aliud verbis vel quibuslibet 
significationibus enuntiat.  
 
(He lies, moreover, who holds one opinion in his mind and who gives expression 
to another through words of any other outward manifestation.)53  
 
The concept of double heartedness (cor duplex) is essential for an understanding 
of the nature of the lie. For Augustine, the nature of lie is duplicitous: the one 
that lies has a “double-heart” (cor duplex), because in the interiority of the 
mind, he knows or thinks one thing, while he expresses another by giving 
signs.54 Thought is to word as inwardness is to outwardness: the inconsistency 
between the two is the well of a lie. This tragic schism characterizes the lie: the 
mismatch between what is in one’s “heart” and what one has on the “lips”. 
According to Augustine, the one who lies can be described as having a ‘double-
heart’ and a ‘double-thought’ (duplex cogitatio): one part remains opaque and 
inscrutable, being concealed inside one’s mind, the other is externalized by 
means of signs. With this poignant metaphor, Augustine represents the essence 
of the lie: its twofold, contradictory, and ambivalent character.  
As Paul J. Griffiths (2004: 25–26) pointed out: 
 
The characteristic mark of the lie is duplicity, a fissure between thought and 
utterance that is clearly evident to the speaker as he speaks. [...] The lie has only 
to do with whether there is a mismatch, a gap, a contradiction, a fissure, between 
what you think is true and what you claim as true. 
 
The question of whether the sole duplicity constitutes the essential and suffi-
cient mark of the lie, as Griffiths seems to suggest, will be discussed in due 
course. For the present, let us ponder the nature of duplicity as a constituent 
feature of the lie. 
                                                                          
53  Mend. 3,3 (CSLE 41, 415, trans. Muldowney, On Lying, 55). 
54  S. 133, 4 (PL 38): «Aliud in se cogitat verum esse, aliud foras profert pro veritate. 
Duplex cor est, non simplex: non quod ibi habet hoc profert». 
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Cor duplex literally means “two-faced” or “duplicitous”.55 This duplicity is 
manifested in the hiatus existing between inwardly concealed believed-truth and 
outwardly manifested expressed-truth. Lying involves concealment to the extent 
that one “face”, as it were, of the liar’s thoughts remains concealed in the back-
stage of his mind and he takes it as true, while another “face” of his thoughts is 
communicated to others by means of signs as if being believed to be true by the 
liar. In other words, when a lie occurs thought and speech do not match each 
other in a sincere act of communication.  
Griffiths holds that Augustine drew on Sallust’s definition of the lie. This 
connection is quite plausible, and the similarity between the two definitions is 
striking. Let us recall here, then, the definition proposed by Sallust: 
 
Ambition led many to become false, to keep one thing concealed in the heart and 
to have another ready on the tongue, to judge friendships and enmities not as 
they are but in terms of benefit, to look good rather than to have a good 
character. (Sallust quoted in Griffiths 2004: 26) 
 
The notion of “heart” (cor) is key. This is a recurrent concept in Augustine’s 
work and it is very nuanced. The semantic history of this term and its biblical 
sources have been studied by Donald J. Novak (1978). He pointed out that cor 
duplex, is conceived as the “inconsitency [within the subject] of its being with 
its projection” and is included among “the four ways in which the heart is 
subject to concupiscence” together with cor immundum, cor tortum, and cor 
durum (Novak 1978: 82): 
 
Speech gives some access to the heart; but the heart projects itself in voce cata-
ractarum suarum: in the outflow of its action. But the heart can externally dissi-
mulate itself. Duplicity is not the refusal of the exterior to represent the heart, but 
the work of the heart itself. (Novak 1978: 83) 
 
Thus, the mechanism of the lie entails a conscious substitution of one part (what 
is known or believed as true) with another part that does not correspond to it, 
which the liar is aware to be false. In doing so, the liar pretends to signify that 
which he knows to be false as being true. He, therefore, passes off what he takes 
to be false as being true: 
 
Unde etiam duplex cor dicitur esse mentientis, id est duplex cogitatio: una rei 
eius quam veram esse vel scit vel putat et non profert; altera eius rei, quam pro 
ista profert sciens falsam esse vel putans. 
 
                                                                          
55  Griffiths holds that Augustine drew on Sallust’s definition of the lie. This connection is 
quite plausible, and the similarity between the two definitions is striking. Let us recall here, 
then, the definition proposed by Sallust: «Ambition led many to become false, to keep one 
thing concealed in the heart and to have another ready on the tongue, to judge friendships 
and enmities not as they are but in terms of benefit, to look good rather than to have a good 
character» (Sallust quoted in Griffiths 2004: 26). 
169 
(For this reason the heart of the liar is said to be double, that is, twofold in its 
thinking: one part consisting of that knowledge which he knows or thinks to be 
true, yet does not so express it; the other part consisting of that knowledge which 
he knows or thinks to be false, yet expresses as true.)56 
 
It should be emphasized that in this context the concepts of “true” and “false” 
refer to the liar’s state of mind, namely, what the liar believes or thinks to be 
true or false. In other words, these terms do not refer to an ontological con-
ception of truth as correctness or correspondence between what is said and the 
state of affairs in the world. Rather, the terms true and false refer to the notion 
of truthfulness that is based on what the subject takes to be true, regardless of 
the adequacy of the statement given and the state of affairs. 
Because the liar is cognizant that some sort of falseness is being expressed, it 
is manifest that the awareness on the side of the production of the lie plays a 
pivotal role in Augustine’s semiotics of deception. In this regard, Griffiths 
(2004: 37) noted that 
 
The speaker is the privileged authority on the question of whether he lies. Since 
the Augustinian definition of the lie is indexed to the speaker’s understanding of 
the relation between her thought and speech, you will always know better than 
anyone else whether a particular utterance of yours was duplicitous. 
 
In conclusion, the lie entails a duplicitous signification, conceived as a split 
between inner thought (what one knows or thinks within himself) and outwardly 
expressed signs, that is, a gulf between thought and speech.  
It is also worth noting that the tradition of referring to the lie in terms of cor 
duplex was still present and alive in 1265–1274 when Thomas Aquinas wrote 
his Summa Theologiae. Indeed, Aquinas acknowledged Augustine’s principle of 
the duplicity inherent in the act of lying, recalling the etymology of the term 
‘lying’ (mendacium) that “derives from the lie’s being speech contra mentem”.57 
Aquinas took this criterion of duplicity to be the moral and ‘formal’ aspect of 
the lie and considered it so essential as to be the sufficient ingredient for the lie. 
A similar view is shared by other commentators, such as Alexander Carpenter, 
who writes that “to lie is to go against the mind, whence the lie, which is a sign 





                                                                          
56  Mend. 3,3 (CSLE 41, 415, trans. Muldowney, On Lying, 55). 
57  St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae. Vol. 41 (2a2ae 101–122), Virtues of Justice in 
the Human Community, Quest. 110, (trans. O’Brien, 149). 
58  E. D. Craun refers to Carpenter (1516), Speculum Morale 1277: «mentiri est contra 
mentem ire, & inde mendacium quo est falsum mentis signum» (Carpenter, Alexander 1516. 
Destructorium viciorum. Paris: C. Chevallori). 
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4.8. Deliberate verbal misdirection vs saying what is false 
Thus far, it has been argued that one of the cornerstones of the lie is the in-
consistency between thought and speech that occurs in a false sign. One of the 
most clear and effective arguments to which Augustine resorts in order to 
explain the nature of the lie is the difference that exists between saying a false-
hood and lying. He dwells at length, and in several works, on this fundamental 
question that is clearly comprehensible in the following passage: 
 
Ex animi enim sui sententia, non ex rerum ipsarum veritate vel falsitate mentiens 
aut non mentiens iudicandus est. Potest itaque ille, qui falsum pro vero enuntiat, 
quod tamen verum esse opinatur, errans dici et temerarius; mentiens autem non 
recte dicitur, qui cor duplex cum enuntiat  non habet nec fallere cupit, sed 
fallitur. Culpa vero mentientis est in enuntiando animo suo fallendi cupiditas.  
(For, a person is to be judged as lying or not lying according to the intention of 
his own mind, not according to the truth or falsity of the matter itself. He who 
expresses the false as true because he thinks it to be true may be said to be 
mistaken or rash, but he cannot, in fairness, be said to be lying, because, when he 
so expresses himself, he does not have a false heart nor does he wish to deceive; 
rather, he himself is deceived. In reality, the fault of the person who tells a lie 
consists in his desire to deceive in expressing his thought.)59 
The crux of the problem that Augustine seem to want to make clear is that the 
one who lies speaks knowingly and willingly against what he assumes or knows 
to be true. The one who knows he is lying, then, is considered mendacious, 
whereas the one who makes a mistake, saying a falsehood while holding it to be 
true, does it out of ignorance. On the contrary, the liar, as will be seen, is fully 
aware of his mistake, and despite that, he intends to induce someone else into 
error, making him believe that which the liar himself does not believe. This 
shows that accidental lying cannot occur and that one who makes a mistake is 
acting in good faith.60 
This distinction leads to the first conclusion that the claim that the one who 
speaks a falsehood lies is not necessarily accurate, for if what it is said is 
assumed or believed to be truthful by the one who proffers the statement, it 
could be considered to be merely an error. In the latter circumstance, therefore, 
in the case where the statement made is de facto false (what is said and what is 
the case do not match) and is uttered bona fide, no lie does actually occur. 
Some discoveries, for example, believed to be scientific have been sub-
sequently refuted. Umberto Eco (1997: 33) notes the case of Ptolemy who, 
claiming that the sun revolved around the earth, said what in fact was not the 
case, because he was mistaken by conviction rather than by the will to lie. In 
this regard, one must add that, in order for any scientific discovery to be con-
sidered erroneous, it is necessary to find a response in the facts or an advance-
                                                                          
59  Mend. 3,3 (CSLE 41, 415, trans. Muldowney, On Lying, 55–56). 
60  S. 133, 4: «Fallitur ergo, quia falsum est, et verum putat; dicit autem nonnisi quia verum 
putat. Error est in humana infirmitate, sed non est in conscientiae sanitate». 
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ment of knowledge that enables one to determine the accuracy or inaccuracy of 
the theory – or, in scientific terms, the testability and repeatability of the 
phenomenon. In reference to Eco’s example, the heliocentric model of Coper-
nicus confuted the previous geocentric paradigm; therefore, only through the 
specialization of science and a subsequent confirmation between the initial 
assumptions and the following discoveries have we been able to re-formulate 
the starting hypothesis and, finally, correct the previous paradigm, labelling it 
now as “wrong” or inaccurate. As Eco (2017) underlined, “In order to say that 
something is wrong or false or it being a result of falsification, it is necessary to 
find a notion of what is right, true or authentic”;61 therefore, “while saying what 
is false is an alethic problem, that is to say it has to do with the notion of 
aletheia, namely truth, lying is an ethical and moral problem”.62 
As Suzanne Thalberg (1963: 7) has remarked “falsity as criterion for lying 
must be rejected if only because an honest error is false, though asserted. It must 
be kept in mind that there is no assurance that a statement is a lie merely 
because it is false”. 
Augustine, distinguishing the lie from the error, identified a cornerstone that 
allows us to define two types of truth: the ontological one, intended as 
correspondence between what is said and what is the actual case, and the moral 
one, which also conforms to the label of “veracity” or “truthfulness”, under-
stood as the conformity between what is said and that which is in one’s mind 
(Dorszynski 1948: 1). 
For Augustine, in the comparison between the one who is inadvertently 
mistaken, holding to be true what is actually false, and the one who deliberately 
expresses what he knows or believes to be false, i.e. telling a lie, the former is in 
a more favourable position than the latter, inasmuch as “the former has not one 
thing in his mind, and another in his speech; but the latter, whatever in fact that 
which is said by him may be of itself, yet has one thing shut up within his 
breast, and another ready on his tongue”.63  
One can draw several distinctions when citing the difference between 
speaking a falsehood inadvertently and deliberately lying: one who lies 
knowing s/he is lying, one who believes he is telling the truth while being mis-
taken, one who tells the truth believing that he is lying, and one who mistakenly 
asserts what is de facto the case. 
 
                                                                          
61  «Per dire che qualcosa è sbagliato o falso o che è effetto di una falsificazione, occorre 
avere una nozione di ciò che è corretto o vero o autentico» (Eco 2017: 2), my translation 
from Italian. 
62  «Mentre dire il falso è un problema aletico, e cioè a che vedere con una nozione di 
aletheia e cioè di verità, mentire è un problema etico o morale» (Eco 2017: 2), my 
translation from Italian. 
63  Ench. 28,6 (trans. Parker and Rivington, Enchiridion to Laurentius on Faith, Hope and 
Charity, 97): «Potiusque e contrario, quantum in ipso est ille mentitur qui dicit verum quod 
putat falsum. Quantum enim ad animum eius attinet, quia non quod sentit hoc dicit, non 
verum dicit, quamvis verum inveniatur esse quod dicit».  
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The cases inferred from the aforementioned distinction are: 
1. Saying the opposite of what is believed to be true (the lie); 
2. Saying what is mistakenly believed to be true (the error); 
3. Lying while accidentally saying what is the case; 
4. Being mistaken, asserting what is the case de facto. 
 
 
4.9. The intention to deceive:  
a reappraisal of Augustine’s voluntas fallendi 
We shall now come to a consideration of what is the place of the voluntas 
fallendi (the intention to deceive) in Augustine’s definition of the lie and attend 
to the crucial question of whether he granted to it a place in the essential notion 
of the lie. The intention to deceive is a rather difficult concept and, regretfully, 
Augustine’s treatment of this fundamental aspect is far from being crystal-clear 
and exhaustive. Indeed, in many passages of his works, one may be easily led to 
believe that he takes the voluntas fallendi as a necessary characteristic of the lie. 
It sufficient to quote the following excerpts to get acquainted with this idea: 
 
Exceptis igitur iocis, quae numquam sunt putata mendacia  –  habent enim evi-
dentissimam ex pronuntiatione atque ipso iocantis affectu significationem animi 
nequaquam fallentis, etsi non vera enuntiantis. 
 
(In this treatise I am excluding the question of jocose lies, which have never been 
considered as real lies, since both in the verbal expression and in the attitude of 
the one joking such lies are accompanied by a very evident lack of intention to 
deceive, even though the person be not speaking the truth.)64  
 
Omnis autem qui mentirur, contra id quod animo sentit loquitur, voluntate 
fallendi. 
 
(For everyone who lies, speaks contrary to what he thinks in his mind, with the 
will to deceive.)65 
 
On closer scrutiny, however, one must cast doubts on such a conviction or, at 
least, place this stance under a ruthless critique before encapsulating it as a 
feature in the essential notion of the lie.  
It goes without saying that lying traffics with deception. Yet how should the 
intention to deceive be conceived? This is a pivotal question that opens a breach 
in Augustine’s scholarship as to how his ‘true’ position on this notion should be 
interpreted. In general terms, in the debate around the concept of voluntas 
fallendi, two main interpretations can be discerned. The first and most wide-
spread conception takes the intention to deceive to be part of the essential 
                                                                          
64  Mend. 2,2 (CSLE 41, 414, trans. Muldowney, On Lying, 54). 
65  Ench.7,72 (trans. Parker and Rivington, Enchiridion to Laurentius on Faith, Hope and 
Charity, 101). 
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definition of the lie and, thus, lacking this element, there would be no lie 
altogether. The second and less known interpretation, instead, takes an explicit 
intention to deceive to be ruled out from what is essential to the lie. Among this 
second trend we could include L. Thomassin (1691), G. Faure (1847), A. Ver-
meersch (1920), M. Ledrus (1943), M. Gomez (1929), A. Sieradsky (1952), A. 
Ruolt (1996). In what follows, we seek to deepen the second route not only 
because, of the two interpretations, this is the less known, but also because we 
believe that such an effort could cast light on an unprecedented and more 
nuanced view on defining the lie that is most probably in alignment with the 
original intention of the author.  
Surely, Augustine himself did not take for granted the assumption that the lie 
presupposes an intention to deceive from the side of the speaker as its necessary 
constituent. He openly questioned this conviction and, to this end, he engaged 
with an elaborated, albeit roundabout and ultimately unsatisfactory, analysis. As 
will be clear in what follows, Augustine’s enquiry leaves some margins of 
uncertainty, which makes the reader wonder about the author’s own conclu-
sions. Although his position is firm and has had a tremendous weight in the 
treatment of the lie in the successive centuries and has inspired an impressive 
fascination for later scholars, his analysis (as set forth especially in the fourth 
chapter of the De mendacio) is not as clear and unwavering as one may have 
wanted it to be. As described above (in 4.1), Augustine himself, in the Retracta-
tiones, expressed concerns towards the clarity of the arguments of the De 
mendacio, which he termed as “obscurus et aufractuosus et omino molestus”. 
As T. Bohlin (2003: 18) pointed out: 
 
If St. Augustine’s position were a black and white denial of the licitness of all 
lies, as is generally accepted in the schola, why, Ledrus asked, did he so be-
labour the question? Why did he refer to it as a “difficillima and latebrosissima” 
question? Why did he lament after much rumination that about “this question, 
considered and treated from whatever point of view, it is not easy to render an 
opinion”? Why did St. Augustine probe problematic cases of speaking falsely in 
the two entire treatises and repeatedly address the question throughout his 
writings? The answer, according to Ledrus is that “Augustine never considered 
that he had grasped the question of the lie in an absolute way”. 
 
Next to the falsa significatio, thus, Augustine seemed to consider the will of 
deception as a characteristic feature of the lie. This is demonstrated in one of the 
most frequently cited passages of the De mendacio, where the well-known 
definition of the lie is extrapolated: 
 
Nemo autem dubitat mentiri eum, qui volens falsum enuntiat causa fallendi. 
Quapropter enuntiationem falsam cum voluntate ad fallendum prolatam mani-
festum est esse mendacium. 
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(However, no one doubts that he lies who deliberately says what is false with the 
intention of deceiving. It is clear, then, that a lie is a false statement made with 
the desire to deceive.)66 
 
If severed from the context where it was originally woven into, this excerpt may 
be misleading. The question that one should ask is whether, given such a 
definition, there are any other types of lies that do not fall within such a frame-
work or whether Augustine’s definition must be interpreted as all-encom-
passing. 
Immediately after having defined the lie, he added a clause of equal 
importance:  
 
Sed utrum hoc solum sit mendacium, alia quaestio est. 
 
(But, whether this alone is a lie is another question.)67  
 
This addition sparks a concern that also the definition formulated earlier did not 
exhaust conclusively the concept of the lie, for it is questionable whether there 
would be other categories that are not included in the given concept and may 
still be thought of as lies. With this caveat, Augustine seems to be wanting to 
suggest that, while a full-blown lie consists of a false signification uttered with 
the intention to deceive, this does not rule out the possibility of conceiving other 
kinds of lies that are not incorporated in this clear-cut definition. In other words, 
given that a manifest lie is captured by the Augustinian definition, the notion 
does not exclude that other more essential or minimal forms of lies may be 
manifested. The answer to the dilemma is not given and this excites doubts, 
leaving something to be desired. 
For what reasons did Augustine indicate a similar notion? To begin with, he 
set forth a similar definition for very practical purposes. In order to corroborate 
this hypothesis, one may consider the fact that, as was mentioned earlier, in the 
Middle Ages, the lawfulness of the lie was a much-debated question. A 
universally accepted definition of the lie was lacking, and therefore, Augustine 
was prompt to formulate a firm and indisputable notion in the face of those who 
held that some lies were allowable under certain circumstances. It is precisely 
the historical milieu and the circumstances in which the De mendacio came to 
light that provided the author with the opportunity to probe into a descriptive 
analysis of the nature of the lie, preliminarily as well as in support of his 
successive argumentation. Before articulating his position, Augustine could not 
but take into account the concerns that were circulating about the issue of lying 
and proposed a definition around which consensus was created. Ultimately, 
what we are dealing with is an ingenious expedient – useful to the author in 
order to support his thesis. This interpretation helps us to comprehend why 
Augustine began his treatment with a definition evident and incontrovertible: 
                                                                          
66  Mend. 4,5 (CSLE 41, 419, trans. Muldowney, On Lying, 60). 
67  Mend. 4,5 (CSLE 41, 419, trans. Muldowney, On Lying, 60). 
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the lie is a false statement intentionally uttered in order to deceive. No one 
would have objected to a definition that is cast in such a way. With this strategy, 
Augustine set forth a definition of the lie that is manifest and indisputable. This 
statement, however, is counterbalanced by the highly revealing concern 
expressed by Augustine immediately after giving the definition, which ques-
tioned whether that case alone would be a lie (a false statement voluntary 
proffered in order to deceive another). Yet this quest, as previously shown, is 
left unattended, raising serious doubts as to whether, besides what is manifestly 
a lie, we can account for something else.  
 
 
4.10. The lie and the mistrustful hearer 
The Augustinian method of studying the lie is investigative, and chapter IV of 
the De mendacio is proof of this. He introduces this chapter with the question of 
whether a “very penetrating investigation may be made as to whether there be 
any lie at all when the deliberate will to deceive is lacking”68 and continues his 
enquiry proposing two interesting cases: 
 
a) Saying what is false not to deceive; 
b) Saying the truth in order to deceive. 
 
He described the two case studies as such: 
 
Unde si appareat fieri posse, ut aliquis propterea falsum dicat ne fallatur ille cui 
dicitur, exstitit aliud e contrario genus, propterea verum dicentis ut fallat. 
[…] Qui enim verum ideo loquitur, quia sentit sibi non credi, ideo utique verum 
dicit, ut fallat; scit enim vel existimat propterea falsum putari posse quod dicitur, 
quoniam ab ipso dicitur. 
 
(Wherefore, if it appears that a person may tell what is false without the intention 
of deceiving his hearer, so a person may tell the truth so that he may deceive.  
[…] He who tells the truth because he realizes that he will not be believed tells 
the truth in order to deceive, since he knows or, at least, expects it to be 
considered false simply because he says it.)69 
  
Augustine’s investigation seeks to divorce the two features that allegedly 
constitute a lie with the purpose of attending to the question whether either the 
falsa significatio or the voluntas fallendi, or both, are part of the essential 
concept of the lie. Indeed, this is a brilliant move. 
He introduces these two cases on the assumption that the hearer is in any 
case sceptical – that is, he has no trust in the speaker. According to this 
prerequisite, the speaker has to calibrate his communication strategy to this 
particular system of beliefs. Thus, if someone expects not to be believed, the 
                                                                          
68  Mend. 4,3 (CSLE 41, 416, trans. Muldowney, On Lying, 56). 
69  Mend. 4,4 (CSLE 41, 416, trans. Muldowney, On Lying, 56). 
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speaker could follow one of these two strategies: either telling a falsehood so 
that the truth could be inferred from a false statement, or vice-versa.  
The conditions supposed by Augustine for the analysis of case a) are, 
therefore, the following: 
 
1) The listener’s mistrust; 
2) The speaker’s benign intention; 
3) The speaker saying what is de facto false (in fact, it turns out that 
there are robbers along a certain road, while the contrary is stated). 
 
Augustine’s two scenarios involve what Robert W. Mitchell (1986: 3) has 
termed the “awareness of another’s awareness on the part of the deceiver”. 
Mitchell distinguished four levels of deception. Mitchell’s (1986: 26) fourth-
level deception involves the intention to deceive and also a modification of the 
deceiver’s behaviour or deceptive strategy “based on knowledge of the other’s 
past and present behaviour” (Mitchell 1986: 26). This point is worth pondering 
because Augustine, through such skilful examples, considers the way in which 
the liar models his behaviour or strategic moves of deception according to the 
knowledge of the dupe’s present attitude. Thus, at this level of deception, there 
exists, as Mitchell says, the “recognition of the other animal’s belief about 
actions” (Mitchell 1986: 25). Along the same lines, the philosopher Daniel 
Dennett (1978) subscribes to a similar view holding that in order to inten-
tionally deceive someone there must be a second-order intentional system, that 
is, the deceiver must have beliefs about the intended victim’s beliefs.  
Hitherto, Augustine’s vision on lying is based mainly on the perspective of 
the one who produces the lie. We have seen that he gave great importance to the 
liar’s intentions and beliefs. However, when considering the two cases 
discussed above, Augustine widens his theoretical horizon in order to include an 
additional element, that is, the perspective of the dupe (the one who lies forms a 
model of the dupe), and, specifically, the predisposition of the listener to believe 
the speaker. As Colish (1982: 32–33) has noted, here Augustine “has the 
rhetorician’s sensitivity to the importance of the speaker’s credibility as a factor 
affecting the function of his words as means of communication to the hearer”. 
By widening his view on lying so as to encompass the dupe’s system of beliefs 
as well, Augustine’s perspective on the lie becomes more sophisticated inas-
much as his view now takes into account an additional and important level of 
analysis, namely, the listener’s belief – the mistrust towards the speaker. This 
aspect has to do with the reliability of communication. As Roy A. Rappaport 
(1979: 226) aptly pointed out, “when the communication system can accom-
modate lies it becomes a problem to assure the recipients of messages that the 





4.10.1. First scenario: saying what is false not to deceive  
(indirect deception) 
The first scenario a) considers the situation in which someone, knowing that a 
certain road is besieged by robbers, tells to a traveller, who is mistrustful 
towards the speaker and whose intention is to walk exactly along that way, the 
contrary of what he assumes to be the case. In fact, he says that there are no 
robbers on that particular road, whereas, on the contrary, the opposite is actually 
the case. The speaker is concerned that the traveller may be in jeopardy, and this 
prompts him to speak the falsehood. His own intention is, thus, benevolent. 
Capitalizing on the traveller’s mistrust, he tells him the contrary to what he 
takes to be true in order to protect him from potential harm. Due to his 
mistrustful belief, the traveller would then opt for a different direction from the 
one indicated by the speaker, thus avoiding the encounter with the bandits.  
This analysis casts light on the case of a falsehood that is put through not for 
deception but in order not to deceive. Augustine pictures this first scenario in 
the following way: 
 
Quid enim? Si quisque falsum loquens, quod falsum esse existimat, ideo tamen 
facit, quia putat sibi non credi, ut eo modo falsa fide absterreat eum, cui loquitur, 
quem sentit sibi nolle credere? 
[…] Unum, qui scit aut putat se falsum dicere et ideo dicit, ne fallat velut si 
aliquam viam noverit obsideri a latronibus et timens, ne per illam pergat homo 
cuius saluti prospicit et eum scit sibi non credere, dicat eam viam non habere 
latrones ad hoc, ut illac non eat, dum ideo credit latrones ibi esse, quia ille dixit 
non ibi esse, cui non credere statuit, mendacem putans. 
 
(Let us consider a person who says what he believes is false and what is actually 
false but with the expression of not being believed, so that in this way, by a kind 
of false faith, he may deter from action the hearer who, he realizes, will not 
believe him.  
[…] In the first place, we have a person who knows or thinks that he is speaking 
falsely, yet speaks in this way without the intention of deceiving. Such would be 
the case of a man who, knowing that a certain road is besieged by bandits and 
fearing that a friend for whose safety he is concerned will take that road, tells 
that friend that there are no bandits there. He makes this assertion, realizing that 
his friend does not trust him, and because of the statement to the contrary of the 
person in whom he has no faith, will therefore believe that the bandits are there 
and will not go by the road.)70 
 
What does occur in the aforementioned example, as well as in the one that 
follows, is a sort of reverse signification, wherein the speaker asserts something 
in order to mean the opposite, and vice- versa. This takes place due to the lack 
of the convention of truthfulness between the two communicators; that is, the 
speaker is fully aware that in the hearer’s mistrustful interpretation of his words 
                                                                          
70  Mend. 4,4 (CSLE 41, 416, trans. Muldowney, On Lying, 56–57). 
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he will assume the contrary of what is expressed. This example, thus, casts light 
on the context in which the reliability of the source is altogether lacking. Hence, 
Augustine’s example reduces lying to a sort of communicative game that 
resembles very much the joke told by Sigmund Freud based on a train con-
versation between two Jews: 
 
Two Jews met in a railway carriage at a train station in Galicia. ‘Where are you 
going?’ asked one. ‘To Cracow,’ was the answer. ‘What a liar you are!’ broke 
out the other. ‘If you say you are going to Cracow, you want me to believe you 
are going to Lemberg. But I know that in fact you are going to Cracow. So why 
are you lying to me’. (Freud 1960: 137–138) 
 
Shortly after having considered this critical case, Augustine questioned the 
definition of the lie proposed earlier in Chapter II of the De mendacio, in order 
to discuss its correctness in light of this example. If lying entails the intention to 
deceive, the abovementioned case is not to be considered as a lie since it lacks 
the intent to mislead, although a falsehood was indeed put forth.  
There are at least two orders of issues here. In the case under consideration, 
there seems to occur a confusion of different levels of analysis. In other words, 
the criterion of deceptive intentionality is mixed up with to the intended effects 
or ends of the deceit; the two levels are, thus, overlapping. The interlocking of 
the levels of analysis yells to a view that, rather than clarifying the issue at stake 
in the Augustinian example, contributes to obfuscate it. At any rate, the speaker 
is still duping the sceptical traveller by means of a trick. Yet this stratagem was 
perpetrated with a benevolent goal, for it served as a proxy in order to prevent 
the man from falling into the hands of the bandits. To our understanding, thus, 
this example accounts for a case of indirect deception. 
 
 
4.10.2. Second scenario: saying the truth in order to deceive 
The second scenario b) is the reverse of the first one: 
 
Alterum autem, qui sciens aut putans verum esse quod dicit, ad hoc tamen dicit, 
ut fallat; tamquam si homini non sibi credenti dicat latrones in illa via esse, ubi 
re vera eos esse cognovit ut ille, cui dicit per illam viam magis pergat atque ita in 
latrones incidat, dum putat falsum esse quod ille dixerit. Quis ergo istorum 
mentitur: ille, qui elegit falsum dicere, ne fallat, an ille, qui elegit verum dicere, 
ut fallat? 
(In the second place, there is the case of a person who, knowing or thinking what 
he says true, nevertheless says it in order to deceive. This would happen if the 
man mentioned above were to tell his mistrustful acquaintance that there are 
bandits on that road, knowing that they actually are there and telling it so that his 
hearer, because of his distrust of the speaker, may proceed to take that road and 
so fall into the hands of the bandits. Now, which of these two men is lying? Is it 
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he who chooses to tell a falsehood without the intention to deceive, or is it he 
who chooses to tell the truth with the intention to deceive?)71 
In the example above, the speaker is consciously asserting something that he 
knows to be true in order to deceive his listener. He uses the truth strategically 
in order to lead the hearer into error, albeit, technically, he asserted what his 
true, both subjectively (what he thinks to be true) and factually (what is actually 
the case).  
In comparison with the conditions set by Augustine for the analysis of case 
a), without prejudice to condition 1), in case b) Augustine alters conditions 2) 
and 3), whereby the speaker intends to deceive and says that which is de facto 
true. The conditions supposed by Augustine for the analysis of case b) are, 
therefore, the following: 
 
1) The listener’s mistrust; 
2) The bona fide intention of the speaker; 
3) The speaker saying what is de facto the case (in fact, it turns out 
that there are robbers along a certain road). 
 
In case a), although a de facto falsehood is expressed, the will of deception is 
altogether absent; in case b), one has the opposite situation: there is the 
intention to deceive without any factual falsehood being expressed. The two 
cases can be organized as in Table 3. 
 
 
Table 3. Two scenarios of deception: false speech told not to deceive and truthful 





The question posed by Augustine is: which of the two persons is actually lying? 
The one who says a falsehood not to deceive or the other one who says the truth 
in order to deceive? What if they were both lying? The answer to these 
questions depends upon the type of definition of the lie that one has in mind. 
                                                                          
71  Mend. 4,4 (CSLE 41, 416, trans. Muldowney, On Lying, 57). 
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It is possible to outline a quartet of options, according to the factors con-
sidered necessary to determine whether there is a lie being told: 
 
I. If one considers, solely and exclusively, the criterion of falsity, then 
only the first one lies since he asserts something he assumes or believes 
to be false; 
II. This is in reverse, if one considers solely the factor of the intentionality 
of deception; then there is a lie only in case b); 
III. If, on the contrary, one defines a lie as “any pronouncement whatsoever 
if it be accompanied by the desire of any falsity”,72 we have a lie in both 
cases: in the first because one says what is false and in the second 
because it leads one to believe what is false, while telling the truth; 
IV. Finally, if the lie is “the utterance of one who desires to speak un-
truthfully in order to deceive”,73 both criteria that define a lie are 
present, and, in neither of the two cases does lying occur. 
 
To conclude this discussion, it is worth remembering that Augustine did not 
provide any ultimate answer to the questions arising from these two puzzling 
cases. It seems that he concluded his analysis with a shortcut and by giving the 
reader topics for discussion and reflection, leaving the door open to alternative 
readings. It is important to dwell longer on this conclusion, for it leads to 
interpretations with regards to the conception of the nature of lying Augustine 
had in mind that depart from previous scholarship. 
 
 
4.11. Augustine’s indecisiveness   
The crux of the matter is left partially unresolved, and the examination of the 
two cases ends without a definitive pronouncement in regards to the necessity of 
the intention to deceive in defining the nature of lying. The sentence with which 
Augustine concludes the paragraph is, thus, understandable if not obvious: “But, 
whether this alone is a lie is another question”.74 This conclusion leaves the 
reader of the De mendacio puzzled, at best.  
Arthur Vermeersch (1920: 14) and Michael Ledrus (1943) have interpreted 
this point as Augustine’s indecisiveness – providing us with a definition of the 
lie which includes the element of the intentionality of deceit. The context in 
which Augustine set forth his famous definition is now being expounded. It is 
clear that the definition he gave comes as the conclusion of a difficult and 
complex analysis at the end of which he shows a wavering attitude as to how to 
solve the dilemma. It is crucial to emphasize this aspect, for it indicates that the 
definition of the ‘manifest lie’, as outlined at the end of Chapter IV, should not 
be taken uncritically and in an unproblematic fashion. A few other scholars 
                                                                          
72  Mend. 4,4 (CSLE 41, 416, trans. Muldowney, On Lying, 59). 
73  Mend. 4,4 (CSLE 41, 416, trans. Muldowney, On Lying, 59). 
74  Mend. 4,4 (CSLE 41, 416, trans. Muldowney, On Lying, 60). 
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remarked this point. Michel-Ange Gomez acquiesced in his interpretation of the 
issue: 
 
A propos de cette prétendue definition augustinienne du mensonge, on remarque 
donc: a) elle n’est pas exclusive, b) elle vis un plus sûr. St. Augustin ne l’adopte 
que pour ce motif: elle ne donne prise à aucune contestation, elle est admise 
partout. Ce n’est point en vertu d’une opinion fixe, mais pour la commodité de la 
discussion, que St. Augustin l’emploie telle quelle. La question traitée était si 
complexe qu’il était de prudence élémentaire d’user d’une formule indiscutée. 
(Gomez 1929: 31) 
 
Likewise, Gianbattista Faure (1847: 55) considered it erroneous that the 
intentionality of deception is a constituent element of the lie. He claimed that 
Augustine included in the definition of the lie the element of the intention to 
deceive due to the circumstances of the composition of the treatise. Since there 
were many disagreements on this subject, Augustine provided a definition cast 
in a clear-cut fashion in order to have a basis for discussion on which everyone 
would have to agree. Although along similar lines, Alfred Sieradski (1952: 16–
19) provided a two-fold reading of intentionality: “explicit” and “implicit”. 
Explicit intentionality falls within the primitive definition of the lie; the implicit 
angle is taken up in other works of Augustine, including the Enchiridion, where 
all kinds of lies are condemned, even those not inclusive of the will of de-
ception.  It is not clear, however, whether Augustine takes the intention to de-
ceive to be interpreted as explicit or implicit. There are yet serious arguments to 
challenge the generally acknowledged claim that the intention to deceive must 
be taken as explicit and that it is a necessary feature of the lie. Some authors 
voiced clear doubts in this regard (Faure 1847; Gomez 1929; Sieradski 1952; 
Waffalaert 1884). Indeed, the matter is by far more subtle and the argument is 
much more fine-grained that many believed it to be. 
In conclusion, the cornerstone of the lie seems to dwell in the falsa 
significatio, namely, in the intention to say what is believed to be false. The 
single discrepancy between thought and speech, abstracting from an explicit 
intention to deceive, is per se potentially misleading inasmuch as it may lead 
someone into error. Seen from this vantage-point, there would then be a kind of 
implicit deception in any deliberate falsehood (Sieradski 1952: 18).  
 
 
4.12. Fallax and mendax: what lies and what deceives  
In favour of this thesis, Sieradski (1952: 17) refers to the revealing distinction 
proposed by Augustine between mendax (what lies) and fallax (what deceives) 
that we have already discussed. The first (mentiens) – a liar – wishes to appear 
or to be taken for what he really is not, and he does so intentionally; the second, 
by contrast, is unwillingly or mistakenly considered by someone to be other 
than he really is. Therefore, the first lies, whereas the second is deceiving –  
which can be linked to “fool’s gold for gold hunters”. Augustine uses this 
182 
criterion to distinguish the liar (mentiens) from what deceives (fallens): “There 
is in every liar the will to deceive, even though is not believed”.75 By the mere 
fact of saying the contrary of what one thinks, the liar intends to give the false 
impression that this is indeed his genuine thought, whereas in reality it is not. 
Therefore, when speech is contradicting what one has in his mind, in the sole 
wilful expression of what is regarded as false as if it were true, regardless of 
whether or not there is an explicit intention to deceive, there is an intrinsic 
aspect of deception by reason of inducing the listener to fall into error.  
The Augustinian distinction between fallax and mendax could be inter-
preted, in a more abstract way, by looking at the parties involved in an act of 
communication and assessing whether there exists an intentional addresser or 
not. In semiotic scholarship, Roman Jakobson (as well as others) drew attention 
to a similar distinction. He briefly considered the case in which there is a lack of 
an intentional addresser. Drawing on C. S. Peirce, he posited that “the sign 
demands nothing more than the possibility of being interpreted, even in the 
absence of an addresser” (Jakobson 1985 [1975]: 206). Jakobson used the 
presence of an intentional addresser as a criterion for discerning between 
“communication”, which “implies a real or alleged addresser”, and “infor-
mation”, where this aspect is lacking (Jakobson 1971b [1968]: 703). Un-
intended signs are “signs interpreted by their receivers without the existence of 
any intentional sender” (Jakobson 1971b [1968]: 703). These signs are not 
intentionally produced by an addresser; nonetheless, the process of inter-
pretation still takes place via an interpreter who exploits the potentiality that 
each sign may have in terms of interpretation. Classical examples of this type of 
sign are symptoms of diseases interpreted by physicians as indexes, tracks left 
by animals and used by their hunters, and various forms of divination (Jakobson 
1971b [1968]: 703). We will return to the difference between mendax and fallax 
in a successive section, since it will be useful in the discussion of non-deceitful 
untruthfulness.  
In conclusion, Augustine did not refer to an explicit intention to deceive –  
distinct from the wilful false speech, as a criterion for judging the presence of 
the lie, but rather the false speech itself is sufficient. The voluntas fallendi, if it 
is to be considered as an essential element of every lie, must always be con-
sidered as “implicit”, insofar as an explicit intention to deceive seems to be 
ruled out from what is essential to the lie (Sieradski 1952: 20; Waffelaert 1884: 
12–13). It is manifest that this view challenges the mainstream interpretation of 
the Augustinian conception of the lie as necessarily including an explicit 
intention to deceive.76 
 
                                                                          
75  Vera relig. 23, 61 (trans. Ramsey, True Religion, 72):«Nam ita discernitur mentiens a 
fallente, quod inest omni mentienti voluntas fallendi, etiamsi non ei credatur, fallens autem 
esse non potest, quim non fallit» 
76  I have argued elsewhere (Gramigna 2013) that the layers of intentionality in Augustine’s 
doctrine of the lie is twofold.  
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4.13. The morality of the lie 
Augustine, drawing on the Holy Scriptures, expressed his position on the 
morality of the lie quite neatly and firmly: there should not be lying under any 
circumstances,77 insofar as anyone who lies commits iniquity. The lie derives its 
inherent “sinfulness” from the mismatch between thought and speech, insofar as 
“to use language in order to deceive, and not as it was designed to be used, is a 
sin”.78 As pointed out earlier, due to this position, he was included among those 
who followed an “intransigent tendency” (Oddone 1931: 268). Contrary to the 
“moderate” tendency, which sometimes allowed certain lies, the “intransigent” 
one, of which Augustine is the forefather, condemned all lies without 
exceptions.  
Although Augustine recognized that all lies are transgressive and are there-
fore to be avoided, he did not grant the same seriousness, indiscriminately, to 
every kind of lie. Both the intention that urges to tell a falsehood and the object 
of the lie (the matter about which a falsehood is told), play a pivotal role in 
deciding the degree of sinfulness to be assigned to it. In general, it can be stated 
that lying in order to bring some advantage to another would not be such a 
grave violation compared to who is lying with the intent to cause harm to 
others. As Sieradski (1952: 36) pointed out, this intention, evidently, violates 
the principle of charity and, if the harms induced were serious, it would con-
sidered to be as a “mortal sin”. When, however, one is moved by a benign 
intention towards others, it would violate the virtue of veracity, and therefore, it 
would be to most an acceptable wrongdoing. Also the object of the lie (that 
about which one were to lie or the subject-in-question of the false statement) 
bears some weight on the moral evaluation-scale. The situation in which one 
misdirects a traveller by providing him with deliberately-erroneous directions is 
not comparable to a lie that concerns more grave matters, such as those that 
have to do with morality. It seems clear that, in the comparison between these 
two cases, the first is considered the least serious. 
 
4.14. Augustine’s eight-fold division of the lie 
Within the De mendacio, Augustine formulated an eight-fold division of the 
kinds of lies according to the gradation of the gravity of the sin: the latter is 
inversely proportional to the place that every lie carries in the ladder between 
the first and the eighth type. As shown by L. Godefroy (1928: 557), rather than 
“species” of lies – as Augustine labelled them – it would be more appropriate to 
consider them as eight “degrees” of culpability that vary depending on the effect 
                                                                          
77  Mend. 21,42 (CSLE 41, 463): «Elucet itaque discussis omnibus nihil aliud illa testimonia 
Scripturarum monere nisi numquam esse omnino mentiendum». 
78  Ench. 7, 22: «[…] omne mendacium ideo dicendum est esse peccatum quia homo, non 
solum quando scit ipse quid verum sit sed etiam si quando errat et fallitur sicut homo, hoc 
debet loqui quod animo gerit, sive illud verum sit sive putetur et non sit». 
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intended by the liar. As Feehan (1976: 126) pointed out, “the division is rooted 
not in the lie itself but rather in the end intended, the motive”. 
The eight degrees of the lie are as follows:79  
 
1. The lie in matters of religion; 
2. The lie that brings injury to some and has no benefit to anyone;  
3. The lie that brings injury to someone and benefits another; 
4. The lie said for the love of lying – the lie by itself; 
5. The lie told from a desire to please others; 
6. The lie that does not cause any harm and brings an advantage to 
someone; 
7. The lie that does not affect any harm and prevents someone from 
death; 
8. The lie that is harmful to no one and protects someone from physical 
defilement. 
 
Augustine’s eightfold gradation is a system where each lie is catalogued 
according to the gravity of sinfulness. This system is ranked in a descending 
order (from the most serious to the less evil lie). The gravity of sinfulness 
exacerbates or mitigates according to both the intended effect of the liar as well 
as its topic (the matter about which one were to tell a falsehood). The more one 
approaches the first types of the division, the more he sins; conversely, moving 
towards the lower grades of the scale, the less one sins.  
In discussing of types of lies in regard to the degree of sinfulness they 
display, we deliberately used the word “effect” rather than “intention” in order 
to avoid unduly misunderstandings that may get in the way. Misinterpretations 
may arise due to the semantic overlapping of the “intention that prompts one to 
lie” with the concept of the “intention to deceive” (as described before). These 
issues have to do with two levels of analysis in the study of the lie and, as such, 
should not be confused. Here, Augustine discussed the reasons that prompt one 
to lie, and this is a slightly different way of conceiving intentionality, inasmuch 
as it engages with the effects that the liars intend to achieve by means of wilful 
false speech. 
Hence, it is clear that the culpability of the lie is understood as being a 
gradual phenomenon and accordingly, the degrees of the lie are ranked on a 
descending order of gravity – from the most criminal (degree 1) to the most 
venial (degree 8). 
 
4.14.1. The lie in religious doctrine 
The lie said in doctrina religionis (religious doctrine) is the most serious of all, 
and must be avoided by all means.80 The emphasis placed on the gravity of this 
                                                                          
79 Mend. 14, 25. 
80  Mend. 21,43. 
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first kind, compared to the other “degrees”, is seen by Ledrus (1943: 5) as 
revealing Augustine’s hesitation in expressing an absolute reprobation also in 
regard to the other types of lying. Religious doctrine, circumscribed by Augus-
tine as the first kind of lie, ranges from the lies uttered by those who are offi-
cially responsible for the teaching of religion, to anyone else (Godefroy 1928: 
557). This means that doctrina religionis,81 as a domain selected by the author 
for the first type of lie, rests upon quite a vague ambit insofar as it seems to 
include any lie whatsoever in connection with catholic doctrine told not only by 
religious teachers – that are normally appointed to such a task – but also by 
anyone relating to ordinary everyday-life (Sieradski 1952: 41). This kind of lie 
should not be justified under any circumstances, it is stated. Augustine's 
position is firm and absolute: once the authority of truth is questioned – giving 
rise to doubt – the certainty in matters of faith will be lost.82 
Part of the book Contra mendacium is devoted to a discussion of this 
particular type of lie and prompted by the difficulty glimpsed by Consentius: “Is 
it permitted to one of the faithful to pretend he is a Priscillian in order to 
discover the secrets of that sect which imposes false oaths on its adherents in 
order to preserve its secrets?”.83 Augustine answers without hesitation that all 
lies are to be condemned, yet especially those concerning religion.  
 
 
4.14.2. The lie told with the sole intention of injury 
Set by Augustine in the second place of his 8-fold gradation is the lie that brings 
injury to someone and benefits no one (et nulli prosit et obest alicui). Maria 
Bettetini (2001: 7) considers this type of lie as harm being done tout court, since 
the harm caused does not have any counterpart. The dictate of not harming 
one’s neighbour is universally recognized, and a lie that unjustly harms 
someone else is likewise to be avoided  – being seen, undoubtedly, as sinful.84  
 
 
4.14.3. The lie intending advantage to  
one through injury of another 
Going down to the third degree of gravity, Augustine placed the lie intending 
advantage to one through injury of another (quod ita prodest alteri ut obsit 
alteri). In contrast to the second degree of lies, in the third kind there is 
someone who benefits from the lie. The third kind of lie is beneficial to one 
person while it harms another. This lie is not permitted even when, through it, 
we can prevent a graver injury to one man unjustly causing a lesser injury to 
                                                                          
81  Mend. 10,17.  
82  Mend. 10,17. 
83  C. mend. 1,1: «Quid est enim aliud mentiamur, ut haereticos mendaces ad veritatem 
adducamus, nisi: faciamus mala, ut veniant bona?». 
84  Mend. 21,42. 
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another.85 Thereby, this type of lie is compared to a violent action with which 
the bread is taken by force from one prosperous man in order to feed a hungry 
person. Taking the bread from the strong in order to give it to the weak would 
be unjust. Likewise, killing an innocent person in order to prevent the death of 
another is reprehensible: no good that benefits someone can justify the unjust 
harming of someone else, even if lightly.86 
 
 
4.14.4. The real lie (mendacium nudum) 
The “real lie” (mendacium nudum) embodies what may be regarded as the 
quintessence of the lie, namely, the lie told only for the pleasure of lying and 
deceiving. It is the lie-in-itself (lying for the sake of lying), without being 
weathered by any good or bad intent, and moreover, it is said without any 
necessity – purely and simply to lie. This type of mendacium is less serious than 
the preceding one, for it involves no significant harm to others. Equally, 
however, it is considered more serious than the lie of the third kind, whose 
benign effect alleviates its harm. It is worth noting that in Augustine’s eight-
fold division of lies the fourth degree is somewhat of an anomaly because it 
does not meet the criteria of harming or benefit others.87 
It is also worth mentioning that Augustine distinguishes the liar – in the 
proper sense of the word (mendax) from the one who lies (mentiens): the former 
is the one who utters lies for the love of lying and out-of-habit. Augustine iden-
tifies, by contrast, mentiens – the one who lies (in this regard like the mendax) 
albeit reluctantly as if he were “forced” to use the lie to gain some end.88 In the 
case of the mentiens, the effect (some harm or benefit resulting from the lie) 
prevails over the cause (lying for its own sake). 
  
 
4.14.5. The lie told from desire of pleasing others  
The lie told to please others in smooth discourse (mendacium quod sit placendi 
cupiditate de suaviloquio) has almost the same degree of seriousness of the 
former type of lie (mendacium nudum), even though Augustine recognizes it has 
some usefulness derived from the pleasure it may spark in others (in a con-
versation). Those who indulge in this kind of lie are not driven by a morbid love 
for lying, nor are they necessarily addicted to lies, as in the fourth case, yet they 
lie in order to ostensibly show others supposed qualities of acuteness or 
                                                                          
85  Mend. 9,16: (CSLE 41, 435): «Et omnino numquam pro aliquo mentiendum est eo 
mendacio, quod alterum laedat, etsi levius laeditur, quam ille, nisi ita mentireris, laederetur». 
86  Mend. 9,16. 
87  It would be fruitful to compare Augustine’s conception of the lie with Frankfurt’s 
«bullshit»: «Lies in this category are not told as means to any end distinct from the 
propagation of falsehood. They are told simply for their own sake – i.e. pureöy out of love of 
deception» (Frankfurt 2005 [1986]: 58–59). 
88  Mend. 9,16 (CSLE 41, 437): «[…] mentiens est etiam qui mentitur invitus». 
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brilliance. There is no particular end towards harming or benefiting others, but 
simply to please the listeners in the sense of delighting them in conversation. In 
other words, they lie to gain recognition from others. They would certainly 
prefer to be appreciated saying the truth, yet not finding authentically-true 
things easy to come by – with which they can delight the audience – they prefer 
telling lies rather than remaining silent.89 Therefore, this type of lie stems from 
the sheer wish to pretend to be what one is not and being reputed as witty, 
funny, or simply better than what one actually is. 
At this juncture, it is important to table a clarification. The latter type of lie 
must be distinguished from jokes themselves, statements that, both for the way 
they are said and for the predisposition of the speaker, are not misleading, even 
though one is not telling the truth.90 To put it briefly, the joke has no intention 
of deception, for the playful-intention is evident from the tone of voice and the 
expression of the speaker, proper meta-communicative markers within a 
recognised and known context. Lies, Augustine says, “are indulged in by liars in 
a serious way, not jokingly”.91  
The connection between lying and joking proves to be a quite fertile ground 
for further discussion. That said, we shall devote a separate section of this 
chapter to joking – that elaborates on the specific difference between the nature 
of lying and joking (cf. 4.15). 
 
 
4.14.6. The lie that harms no one and benefits someone 
Proceeding to the lower steps of the division, we find those lies that do not 
harm, being of benefit to someone (quod et nulli obest et prodest alicui). This 
kind of lie, normally attributed to the kindly disposed and benevolent people, 
has been the subject of much-heated discussion, as Augustine pointed out in 
chapter XII of the De mendacio. This kind of lie is forbidden because compro-
mising the truth for temporal advantages or for the safety of another would be 
unlawful. Also, the lie that, not effecting any harm, prevents someone from 
death is to be understood as a subtype of the sixth-type in the Augustinian 
taxonomy of lies. 
Finally, in the eighth and last degree of Augustine’s division of lies, we find 
those lies indulged in in order to protect themselves or others from the harm of 
undergoing physical defilement. Even though this can be seen as the least 
severe the cases, lying should be avoided: “The eighth type of lie is forbidden, 
because, both in good deeds, such as are chastity of soul and purity of body, and 
in evil deeds what we ourselves do is of greater import than what we permit to 
be done”.92 
                                                                          
89  Mend. 9,18. 
90  Mend. 2,2. 
91  Quaestionum in heptateuchum 145: «Mendacia enim a mendacibus serio aguntur, non 
ioco; cum autem quae non sunt tamquam ioco dicuntur, non deputantur mendacia». 
92  Mend.21 (trans. Muldowney, On Lying, 108–109). 
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4.15. Augustine’s 8-fold gradation revisited  
Augustine’s division of lies was subsequently taken up by St. Thomas Aquinas 
in the Summa Theologiae where the species of lies are grouped into three major 
members: the “pernicious lie” (perniciosum) that tends to harm one’s neigh-
bour, the “jocose lie” (iocosum), told for delight, and, finally, the “officious lie” 
(officiosum), with which one tends to help others.93 This tripartite division will 
remain the foundation of the Catholic doctrine on mendacity.  
Apart from the specificities of Aquinas’ threefold division and his particular 
view on the essence of the lie, what is germane to our immediate purposes is the 
logic behind it. Being grafted onto the precedent division elaborated by 
Augustine, the tri-partition of Aquinas is useful in view of the clarification of 
the logic used by his predecessor in formulating his own gradation. Similarly to 
the work of Aquinas, Augustine’s eight degrees of the lie can, in fact, be 
grouped into three larger categories.  
As can be inferred from the following passage, Aquinas’ division is based on 
the criterion of the end or result of the lie: 
 
The lie that is sinful can be divided on the basis of factors that worsen or lessen 
its sinfulness by reasons of the end intended. On the one hand the malice of the 
lie is worsened should anyone intend by it to injure another; and this is what is 
called a pernicious lie. On the other hand, the fault is lightened should the 
purpose be some good, whether pleasurable, the case with the humorous lie; or 
practical, the case with the useful lie, intended for another’s advantage or 
protection. This is the basis of the division of the lie into these three members 
(Summa Theol. II-II, q. 110, 2). 
 
In light of Aquinas’ partition, we can now attempt at revisiting Augustine’s 
division as shown in table 4.  
Table 4 summarizes Augustine’s division informed by Aquinas’ tri-partition 
of lies. The eight species or degrees proposed by Augustine are grouped into 
three larger members – that is, “pernicious”, “jocose” and “officious” lies. A 
similar structure presents the advantage of helping to clarify the internal logic 
upon which Augustine’s division of lies was grafted. Needless to say, a full-
fledged comparison between the positions of the two Church Fathers on the 
subject of lying would deserve a much lengthier, scrupulous and deeper study 
than the one sketched out in these pages. This task, however, would fall outside 
the purpose of the present work. Nevertheless, we found such a comparison a 
useful heuristic tool that aids the interpretation of Augustine’s own taxonomy. 
 
 
                                                                          
93  St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae. II II, q. 110 a. 2.   
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4.16. False as deceitful and false as fictitious 
In what follows, we shall go beyond Augustine and turn to the formal dis-
tinction between lying and joking in order to evaluate the semiotic significance 
of this comparison. We believe this endeavour is worth the effort, since the 
nature of joking in connection with lying is a topic that has been overlooked in 
Augustinian studies, except for the excellent study of Christopher Levenick 
(2004). 
Augustine, in the incipit of the De mendacio, ruled out jokes from his 
enquiry about the nature of the lie, for it is evident that jokes are not lies, and 
thus, this subject falls outside the scope of his investigation. As mentioned 
above (in 4.13.5), in his picture of the mendacium the true, real lie is dis-
tinguished from the “jocose lie”. Jokes and lies cannot be confused “since both 
in the verbal expression and in the attitude of the one joking such lies are 
accompanied by a very evident lack of intention to deceive, even though the 
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person be not speaking the truth”.94 Ultimately, the joke does not present any 
will of deception as the playful intent is signalled by the tone of voice as well as 
by the expression of the speaker. Gillian R. Evans (1982: 67) succinctly 
summed up this point: 
 
The man who tells a joke makes it clear to his listener that he does not intend 
what he says to be taken seriously. His tone of voice, the sting in the tail of the 
joke, the revelation that he was jesting or teasing, when his listener has been 
taking him seriously, all make it impossible to confuse a joke with a lie, because 
the true state of affairs is made plain in the end. 
 
On the basis of this evidence, jokes and lies cannot be confused. Although lying 
and joking are two distinct phenomena, nonetheless they do have a least one 
trait in common: namely, both the joke and the lie meet the criterion of dealing 
with some sort of falsehoods. Indeed, without hesitation, Augustine posited that 
those who are joking do not assert genuine things. In this respect, despite the 
element of intentional deception being absent, the joke is still catalogued as a 
type of untruthfulness. As remarked by Christopher Levenick (2004: 304–305), 
“a joke, by its nature, involves the joker signifying something other than what 
he believes to be the actual case”. As is manifest, this issue opens up a new vista 
on non-mendacious types of deceptions, inasmuch as the joke is a falsehood that 
does not intend to mislead (except the case in which one is pretending to be 
joking). 
As Augustine correctly pointed out, from the attitude and tone of voice of 
the speaker one understands that he is engaging in a non-serious talk. This 
means that such talks involve the showing of some meta-communicative 
markers in order to signal to the listener that what is at stake is not to be taken 
as a serious speech act. These markers, thus, aid the audience in framing the 
context in which these words are spoken and taking them as a joke. In other 
words, the communicative situation in which the joke takes place presupposes a 
shared competence by the interpreters. This common code allows both the 
speaker and the listener to interpret the meta-communicative markers in the 
appropriate way, signalling the talk as a non-serious speech act. In a way, this 
logic is similar to what happens in animal communication when animals engage 
in play. As Gregory Bateson (1987 [1972]: 139) observed, in such cases there is 
an exchange of “signals that would carry the message this is play”.  
Full awareness of the nature of a joke is, thus, essential. It is a tacit con-
sensus given by the parties in being, as it were, playfully deceived. This 
distinctive feature sets jokes aside from lies inasmuch as the intention of the 
speaker is overt, whereas in the case of lies it is usually covert. Moreover, the 
full awareness of the nature of the joke from both sides of communicators 
contradicts one of the characteristic feature upon which lying operates – that is, 
the altering of the relation between the liar and the dupe in regards to the access 
to knowledge. As pointed out above, lies are generally based on a knowledge 
                                                                          
94  Mend. 2,2 (CSLE 41, 414, trans. Muldowney, On Lying, 54). 
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disparity between the parties of the communicative act (since the liar knows 
something more than the dupe and the situation is therefore unbalanced). This 
does not occur in non-serious talks. 
The logic at stake in jokes entails the “suspension of the disbelief”, and thus, 
any intent to deceive is lacking.95 As Paul Ekman (1985: 27) pointed out, “In a 
lie the target has not asked to be misled, nor has the liar given any prior notifi-
cation of an intention to do so. It would be bizarre to call actors liars. Their 
audience agrees to be misled, for a time; that is why they are there”. From what 
has been said, it is evident that not all falsehoods do have a desire to deceive 
and that beside guileful deceit there are other categories of non-truthfulness to 
be considered. 
At this juncture, it is congenial to recall the distinction between fallax 
(‘fallacious’) and mendax (‘mendacious’) which Augustine laid out in one of his 
early writings, the Soliloquia. The former (fallax) is the falsity that strives to 
deceive, whereas the latter (mendax) is the falsity understood as a product of 
fiction whose purpose is not to deceive but to entertain. One is deceptive, while 
the other is “that which presents harmless falsehoods for enjoyment” (Dox 
2004: 38).  
This is how Augustine himself explained this distinction. We report in toto 
the passage where he posits this bifurcation inasmuch as it is very revealing for 
the purposes of the present discussion: 
 
I see, indeed, by our many experiments in all these things, that nothing remains 
which can justly be called false, save that which feigns to be what it is not, or, in 
general, that which tends to be and is not. Of the former type of false things are 
those which are either actually misleading or those which are simply fictitious. 
Of the misleading it may be said truly that it has a certain appetite for deceiving, 
which cannot be conceived to exist apart from soul, and results, on the one hand 
from reason, on the other from nature. But the fictitious I call that which is 
produced by makers of fiction: these differ from the misleading in this, that 
every misleader has a desire to deceive: while not every fiction-maker has.96  
 
Falsity can thus be of two kinds: deceptive or non-deceptive. Deceptive falsity 
can be either intentionally misleading (as in the case of lies) or non-intentionally 
misleading, that is, potentially leading to errors due to the nature of being what 
is not. Non-deceptive falsity, on the contrary, does not intend to mislead, and it 
                                                                          
95  This point is emphasized by many scholars. The study of Roger Caillois (2001[1958]: 
19) is illuminating in this regard: «All play presupposes the temporary acceptance, if not of 
an illusion (indeed this last word means nothing less than beginning a game: in-lusio), then 
at least of a closed conventional, and, in certain respects, imaginary universe. Play can 
consist not only of deploying actions or submitting to one’s fate in an imaginary milieu, but 
of becoming an illusory character oneself, and of so behaving. One is thus confronted with a 
diverse series of manifestations, the common element of which is that the subject makes 
believe or makes others believe that he is someone other than himself. He forgets, disguises, 
or temporarily sheds his personality in order to feign another». 
96 Sol. 2,9,16. 
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encompasses products of fictions, poetry, comedies, literature and also jokes 
and jests.  This distinction can be summarized in the following diagram (Fig. 
17): 
 
        
 
Figure 18. False as deceitful and false as fictitious 
 
 
The Augustinian difference of mendax and fallax allows us to branch out to a 
similar distinction underscored in general semiotics, providing a more com-
prehensive interpretation. In this direction, it is worth recalling that both Marina 
Mizzau (1997) and Umberto Eco (1997) pointed out a distinction between false 
as fake and false as fictitious. The difference between the two lies in that the 
former does not display the signs of being fake – therefore pretending to be 
taken as authentic or true – whereas the latter, on the contrary, exhibits the signs 
of being untruthful. This is the same logic that is at stake in the difference 
between lies and jokes. 
An example of the fictitious type of falsity is the theatrical masking, inas-
much as it does not pretend to be taken as serious; in other words, the audience 
is fully aware of the fictional nature of the theatrical masking. In this respect, 
the fictitious has the same logic of jokes that, as described supra, exhibit the 
signs of their fictional nature. On the other hand, faking involves an intention of 
being taken as genuine and to hide the signs that are evidence of fakery, such as, 
for instance, a woman’s wig, for it aims at being taken as real. From the 
aforesaid, it is apparent that the fictitious is ruled by the logic of the as if. As 
Umberto Eco pointed out, acting as if being someone else by wearing a mask on 
a theatrical stage is different than putting on a mask of Diabolik and faking to 
be another person in order to rob a bank (Eco 1997: 33). To put it differently, 
the fictitious and the fake belong to the family of pretending, considered in a 
broad sense. In both cases, faking and fiction, there is the pretence of being 
someone else or something else. The difference lies in the fact that the latter, the 
fictitious, does not involve any intention to deceive, whereas the former, the 
fake, does involve the intention to mislead. Another way of tackling this issue 
would be to draw a difference between “pretending” and “acting”, the former 
conceived as “an intentional deceptive move obtained through counterfeiting 
that which the hearer is intended to assume”, as for instance “by limping, one 
can counterfeit lameness” (Vincent, Castelfranchi 1981: 754–755). On the other 
hand, “acting” can be seen as “the non-deceptive sister of pretending” inasmuch 
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as the one who acts and the addressee of such action are “accomplices in a game 
which involves the entertainment of two contradictory worlds: one, the real 
world, where x is false (a pretence), and the other, a fictional or imaginary 
world, where x is true” (Vincent, Castelfranchi 1981: 755). 
 
 
4.17. Wolf in sheep’s clothing:  
on feigners, simulators and hypocrites 
What remains to be discussed is the question of whether non-verbal lies are 
conceivable in the frame of Augustine’s doctrine of the mendacium. 
Undoubtedly, Augustine’s focus is on the lie understood as false speech. This is 
in alignment with his own semiotics where words are thought of as the most 
widespread signs, and respectively, they received a great deal of attention in his 
corpus. Indeed, throughout his life Augustine devoted much more space to the 
study of words than to other signs. This preference was germane to his general 
design, that is, to pin down principles of scriptural interpretation, and since the 
signs used in the Bible are conventional verbal signs, the latter received a great 
deal of attention. The supremacy of words among other signs is manifest chiefly 
in De doctrina christiana, whose relevance was discussed in the previous 
chapter. 
Augustine’s stance concerning the overwhelming importance of words is an 
important corollary to the study of the lie. Since he envisaged words as the most 
suitable signs designated for human communication, it could be argued that the 
lie is a phenomenon that is entirely confined to written or spoken words. 
Griffiths (2004: 33) endorsed a similar view: 
 
Nonverbal actions cannot be lies. It is possible to make public one’s thought 
without words (by gesture or other nonverbal sign), and it is also possible to 
choose to misinterpret what one thinks in these ways. But such cases lie outside 
Augustine’s definition. He is, for the most part, concerned only with speech (or 
writing). He does say that one can lie with nonverbal signifiers. But once having 
said so, he scarcely returns to such cases.  
 
This point is indisputable. Yet a question of whether lies are confined exclusi-
vely to the realm of language can still be raised. In what follows, it will be 
argued that although Augustine’s emphasis was clearly on the lie as a speech 
act, other types of deceit, that prescind from the use of language, can none-
theless be accounted for in light of Augustine’s thought. From the corpus of his 
writing, there is evidence that he was not unfamiliar with other forms of deceit 
and dissimulation that were not encompassed in the single phenomenon of the 
lie. 
To start with, the very “classic” definition of the lie may offer some room for 
a broader interpretation, if read it carefully: “He lies [...] who holds one opinion 
in his mind and who gives expression to another through words or any other 
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outward manifestation.97 The point to be made here is that, according to the 
abovementioned definition, it is not too much of a stretch to think that for 
Augustine one can lie with words or by means of signs of whatever kind. Can 
one lie only though words, or are there any other instruments to manifest a lie? 
Thomas Aquinas, whose undisputed Augustinian influence was pointed out 
supra, picked up this point in an overt fashion when he stated, “As Augustine 
says, among all signs words occupy the first place. In the saying, then, that 
lying is a false meaning in words, by ‘words’ every sort of sign is meant. Hence 
were one intend to convey something false by nodding he would not be 
innocent of lying (Summa theol. 2a2ae, 110, 1.3). If Aquinas’ rendering of 
Augustine is accurate, then the view that he argues for the lie conceived as an 
exclusively linguistic phenomenon may be too restricted.  
This said, there are at least two forms of dissimulation to be considered: 
hypocrisy and simulation. Augustine did not treat them in a systematic fashion 
as he did instead with the subject of the mendacium.  
The idea of double-heartedness is not limited exclusively to the definition of 
the lie since this is clearly the mark that characterises other forms of dissi-
mulation, too. In this regard, it is revealing the description of the “hypocrite” 
that Augustine made in the De sermone domini in monte: 
 
(It is manifest that hypocrites do not carry in their heart what they flash before 
the eyes of men. Hypocrites are pretenders, like mouthpieces of other persons, as 
in the plays of the theatre. For one who in tragedy takes the part of Agamemnon, 
for example, of or any other person involved in the story or myth being enacted, 
is not really the person himself, but impersonates him and is called a hypocrita. 
So, too, in the Church or in any phase of human life, whoever wishes to seem 
what he actually is not is a hypocrite. He pretends to be a right-doing person, but 
is not such in practice. The whole purpose of his behaviour is to win the praise of 
men.) (DSD II 2,6) 
 
                                                                          
97 Mend. 3,3 (trans. Muldowney, On Lying, 55, emphasis mine). 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Having reached the conclusion of our study, let us now take a general glance at 
Augustinian semiotics and extract the key points. Our original intention in 
undertaking the present enquiry has been to expound and interpret Augustine’s 
theory of signs on the basis of the textual interpretation of some of the most 
relevant works that dealt with the subject. Upon interpretation of the texts –  
from the early De dialectica to the De doctrina christiana – there can be no 
doubt that reflections on signs, words, and language are all-pervasive in Augus-
tine. However, let us be clear that there is no complete agreement among 
experts on this complex subject, and as such we feel that our enquiry is totally 
justifiable.  
Considering the general character of Augustine’s theory of signs – which is 
always thought of as utilitarian or instrumental – this assessment is not surpri-
sing. Augustinian semiotics is not an autonomous science; the analysis of signs 
must be approached with the realization that Augustine is concerned with the 
use (utilitas) of his theory and that his thought is theocentric. It is important to 
emphasize that Augustine’s doctrine of signs is generally conceived of as the 
means to achieve a certain end. Indeed, he never envisaged the conceptions of 
signum or verbum – in all their variations and nomenclatures – for their own 
sake, as could be done in a contemporary scholarly debate. The definitions and 
concepts Augustine outlined in his works were ancillary to a wider scope, and 
the application of the theory is often more important than the theory itself.  
The doctrine of signs set forth in the De doctrina christiana served the 
purpose of developing a method for the textual interpretation of the Scriptures. 
Indeed, some commentators have argued that Augustine’s originality lies in the 
application of a theory of signs to the interpretation of the Bible (Jackson 1969). 
Similarly, the De dialectica was part of a larger project on the liberal arts, and 
its aim was to use material things as a ladder towards more spiritual things. The 
De magistro expounded the thesis of the ‘inner teacher’ after an articulate and 
lengthy analysis of signs used as an instrument for teaching as well as a medium 
for intersubjective communication. Seen through this perspective, it is also not 
surprising to find apparent mismatches within Augustine’s own sign concep-
tions – which in fact do not always overlap and diverge in several significant 
respects. Not only has the theory been reworked and redeveloped in time, but 
the analysis of signs is always tailored for different purposes and shaped 
accordingly. Thus, the theocentric, exegetical and instrumental outlook of 
Augustine’s works must be considered, if one intends to pin down a full-fledged 
extrapolation of an organic and general theory of signs on the basis of Augus-
tine’s works.  
Rather than one single, compact and clear-cut theory of the sign in Augus-
tine, it is advisable to refer to his theories of the sign. Mary Sirridge (2000), 
with good reason, has referred to Augustine’s approach by identifying two 
models of language – which she has termed as the “volitional” and the 
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“intrisicist” theories – that coexist within his works. Based on the conception of 
the sign as intentionally given and stressing the will to signify, the volitional 
model is predominant in the De doctrina christiana, whereas the intrinsicist 
model, whose emphasis is on “the contract between inner word and the external 
word which is formed and expressed in some language” (Sirridge 2000: 48), is 
presented in the De trinitate. To these two models outlined by Sirridge, we 
could add a third one, which we term the epistemological model. In the latter, 
the sign functions as a means of knowing and is predominant in the De 
magistro.  
It is, therefore, clear that there exist many strands of thought that became 
confluent in Augustine’s sign theory and were commingled, although it can be 
pointed out that there are some common themes, core concepts and key 
definitions. Although each Augustinian work contains a different analysis of the 
symbolic relation and, correspondingly, the theory of the sign pursues a diffe-
rent scope, the similarity of problem is not obscured. 
Considering this key feature of Augustine’s analysis of signs – the instru-
mentality of his approach – throughout the present study we always considered 
his theories of the sign in context. This feature sets apart our enquiry from the 
preceding research on the subject conducted within the scientific community of 
semiotics. To get a perspective on the works analyzed, we placed the emphasis 
on the specifics of the context where the definitions, which were extrapolated 
and discussed in the thesis, found their initial formulations. 
Particular attention was also given to the analysis of the structure of Augus-
tine’s works in order to show the place of the theory of signs within the overall 
organization of the treated subject. The interplay between the original context 
and purpose of Augustine’s works and the concepts he outlined are pivotal and 
must not be overlooked. Indeed, it is within this orientation that Augustine’s 
works can be most meaningfully examined. 
Moreover, it seems endemic to a type of contemporary semiotic analysis or 
historiographical reconstructions of semiotics (Deely 2001; 2007; Eco 1984; 
1997; Todorov 1977) to lean towards taking the De doctrina christiana as the 
point of reference in the debate about the birth of Western semiotics and to 
extract Augustine’s theory of signs pre-eminently from this treatise. Outside of 
theological and philosophical circles, knowledge of other works of Augustine, 
such as the De dialectica, the De magistro and the De mendacio, is undoubtedly 
too small. Without minimizing the relevance of a masterpiece such as the De 
doctrina christiana, our purpose has been to show that all the aforementioned 
works are of tremendous interest for the semiotician. Augustine’s own fasci-
nation towards signs and the process of signification was a lifelong concern. 
Indeed, his keen interest in the business of signs and words is not exclusively 
limited to the De doctrina because, as this study has shown, many other works 
provide interesting clues for reflection. Prior to the De doctrina, the young 
Augustine, in fact, laid the theoretical foundations for his theory of signs, 
language, and knowledge both in the De dialectica and in the De magistro. Both 
works have intrinsic importance and are essential landmarks for understanding 
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and assessing Augustine’s picture of signs and language. We believe that the 
study of these texts, coupled with the De doctrina christiana, certainly repay the 
student for his time and trouble.  
Augustine also had a very profound theory of the lie. Indeed, his doctrine of 
the mendacium was couched in terms of signs. What Ogden and Richards (1946 
1923: 19) referred to as “verbal treachery” – which is the very essence of 
language – constitutes a fascinating sub-topic of Augustinian semiotics by and 
large, which is worthy of study. The one who lies has a “double heart” because 
he does not manifest through signs what his heart keeps secretly inside (hence 
the existence of false signs). The treatment of the lie as a scholarly subject 
proves to be instrumental to our research because lying involves a consideration 
of the uses and misuses of signs – how signs affect sign-users.  
 In a nutshell, the study of the lie involves a consideration of the pragmatic 
aspect of communication. The inclusion of this subject within Augustine’s 
theory of signs is an additional feature that is characteristic to our study and sets 
it apart from previous research. From the point of view of a general theory of 
signs, the semiotics of the lie deserves careful consideration and study. As was 
hinted at the end of the last chapter, the theory of the lie could be expanded, 
branching out into the study of the types of devious uses of signs that do not 
involve a linguistic means of expression. A semiotics of simulation and 
hypocrisy is undoubtedly a fruitful and fairly unexplored trajectory for future 
research on the problem of the lie. 
Needless to say, the present work does not exhaust the entire field of sym-
bolism and meaning in Augustine. We are cognizant of the limitations that the 
present research inexorably encounters. However, we hope that such an 
endeavor will inspire other scholars to take up the subject and to extend the 
study of signs and signification throughout the entire Augustinian corpus, thus 
covering additional works that, due to an obvious limitation of time and space, 
were left out from the present enquiry. 
 
 
General features of Augustine’s theories of the sign 
What remains to be done is to bring into focus the material analyzed, and to 
point out the relations in order to provide a synthesis of the Augustinian 
approach to the subject of signs. As a culmination of the present study, we can 
now dwell on an overall assessment of Augustine’s analysis of signs and seek to 
connect the dots within his own general theory. These conclusive remarks 
therefore, attend to an assessment of the significance of Augustine’s thought 
within the broader disciplinary field of semiotics.  
To start with, let us list some of the main principles of Augustine’s theory of 




1. There are things and signs. The former, in their proper sense, are things 
that are not used to signify; the latter are things being used to signify. 
2. Every sign is always a thing, but not all things are signs. Some things, 
however, are used as signs of other things, thus being simultaneously 
things and signs. 
3. Generally speaking, signs are those things that are used to signify 
something. 
4. That which is signified by a sign can be termed as “signifiable”. At 
times, also the generic term “thing” is used in this respect. 
5. Language is a semiotic system. 
6. Words are signs whose sole scope is to signify; they are signs used to 
express thoughts inter-subjectively. 
7. There are numerous impediments to a conception of the word as a tool 
for expressing thoughts. These are identified as obscurities, ambiguities, 
equivocations and lies of various kinds. 
8. Thus, words are an imperfect means of communication. 
9. No sign can be said to be known perfectly unless it be known exactly 
what it is a sign of. 
10.  A theory of signs presupposes cognition of the things signified. 
11. In a more specific sense, a sign can be defined as a thing which causes 
us to think of something beyond the impression the thing itself makes 
upon the senses. 
12. Generally speaking, signs are natural or given (according to their 
source), but their variety is not limited to this division.  
13. Natural signs are already existing things (they are not man-made) and 
belong to the analogical network of nature.  
14. Natural signs occur non-intentionally; given signs occur intentionally. 
15. Given signs are those which living creatures show to one another for the 
purposes of conveying, as far as they are able, their states of mind (the 
motions of their spirits), or something which they have sensed or 
understood. 
16. There also exist conventional signs. These signs are based on a cove-
nant between the members of a society. 
17. Signifying means to give signs. The main purpose of signifying is to 
bring forth and transfer to another mind what is conceived in the mind 
of the sign-giver. 
18. Signs occur in myriad varieties, and their divisions are numerous. There 
are several criteria to divide signs, some of which are as follows: 
a. Source: natural signs or given signs; 
b. Sign-users: humans or animals other than humans; 
c. According to the five senses through which the sign is perceived by 
a sign-receiver: 
i. Sight (gestures – such as a nod, movements of the hands and the 
eyes, military standards, written words); 
ii. Hearing (words, the sound emitted by musical instruments); 
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iii. Smell (“our Lord gave a sign with the odor of the ointment by 
which his feet were anointed”); 
iv. Taste (“‘the taste of the sacrament of his body and blood’ 
signified what he wished”); 
v. Touch (when the woman was healed by touching the hem of his 
garment, something was signified).  
d. Obscurity: unknown signs; 
e. Ambiguity: ambiguous signs; 
f. In reference to the designation of the thing signified: literal signs and 
figurative signs; 
g. According to the object of signification: signs signified by signs and 
things signified by signs. 
h. According to the means used in signifying: signs (such as words or 
gestures) and things shown directly (ostensive signs). 
i. According to whether the sign-giver is reliable or not, signs can be 
genuine or false. 
19. Words are the signs par excellence used by mankind. 
20. Words can express the meaning of all signs but not vice versa.  
 
 
General import of the Augustinian semiotics 
An analysis of Augustine’s theories of the sign reveals several important ideas. 
There are indeed some recurrent themes that run throughout Augustine’s 
doctrine that are worth spelling out. In this respect, we shall briefly discuss four 
key issues that bear significance to the subject. These focal nodes account for 
the main contributions of Augustine to the disciplinary field of semiotics: 
 
1. The conceptions of signum and verbum; 
2. The analysis of signs from the psychological standpoint; 
3. The interplay between res and signa; and 
4. The distinction between object language and metalanguage. 
 
 
Section 1. Sign conceptions in Augustine 
Let us summarize, in the form of a schematic outline, the various senses of 
signum and verbum which we have discovered in Augustine’s selected philo-
sophical works. The following table provides the synopsis of the definitions 











Before turning to the analysis of the concept of the sign, we need to first make 
some general considerations. It is hard to make a judgment as to what is the 
Augustinian work that contains the fullest exposition of sign theory. Each work 
has its own value and contributes to the making of Augustine’s theory. It is 
probable that the De dialectica had a greater potential, although its significance 
has been downsized due to the problem of the authorship – the authenticity of 
the treatise was in fact questioned for several years – as well due to its 
incompleteness. The lengthiest treatment of signs is definitely the De magistro, 
whereas the most systematic view is given in the De doctrina christiana. 
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However, the De dialectica provides one of the earliest definitions of the 
word (verbum) as a sign of “any sort of things” (uniuscuiusque). The impor-
tance of this tenet becomes evident in what follows:  
 
a) The word is, without hesitation, ranked among the class of signs; 
b) Because it is conceived as a sign of any type of thing, the word has a 
higher semiotic capacity which sets language apart from any other sign 
system.  
 
Augustine, thus, underscores the semiotic character of the word. To put it 
differently, he describes words as signs, therefore using the concept of signum 
both linguistically and non-linguistically. This distinction is consistent and 
recurs throughout Augustine’s literary production. It was first traced to the De 
dialectica, and it is also found in the De magistro, in the De doctrina christiana 
-as well as in several other works. 
At this juncture, we should make a point about the originality of such a 
tenet – namely, that words are signs. There has been a general tendency, within 
semiotic scholarship (Eco 1984; 1986; Deely 2009; Manetti 1987; Todorov 
1977) as well as in other fields (Markus 1957), to look at Augustine’s analysis 
of signs as particularly original because his theory merged two strands of 
thought about the concept of the sign – the sign as inference and as equi-
valence – in a novel synthesis. Markus (1957) pointed out that Augustine’s 
originality lies in his application of the theory of signs to language. Following 
in the footsteps of Todorov, Eco (1986: 33) commented in a similar way on the 
originality of Augustine, whose signature is the “unification of the theories and 
predominance of linguistics”. Commenting on this point, Eco wrote that “in the 
De Magistro, Augustine will definitely bring together the theory of signs and 
the theory of language. Fifteen centuries before Saussure, he will be the one to 
recognize the genus of signs, of which linguistic signs are a species, such as 
insignias, gestures, ostensive signs” (Eco 1984: 33).  
Thus, the most common and acknowledged view is that for the first time in 
the history of Western thought, with Augustine, words are thought of as signs. 
As noted, this idea is reflected in the definitions of verbum outlined above. 
Although we endorse the main theoretical tenet – words are indeed signs –  
perhaps the originality of Augustine’s thought in this respect should be 
reappraised.  
To start with, the welding of the theory of signs with the theory of language 
already occurred in the De dialectica, rather than in the De magistro, as Eco 
suggested. Moreover, it is not absolutely certain whether Augustine was the 
very first one who spoke of words as signs – thus merging together theory of 
signs and theory of language. Indeed, some commentators – whose conclusions 
seem to be often overlooked – have voiced criticisms towards Augustine’s 
paternity of this principle. The originality of Augustine in this matter is still an 
open question and should be qualified – in light of the studies that envisaged a 
different reading. Jackson pointed out that this widespread view is questionable 
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because the Stoics actually used a theory of signs as a linguistic theory. He 
makes reference to Seneca, Diogenes and Sextus Empiricus to corroborate his 
hypothesis. Commenting on this point, Jackson (1969: 49) says: “It might be 
more correct to say that Augustine is original among Latin authors in calling 
words ‘signs’”. We cannot but share the same concern. 
The second important point to make: Augustine’s definition of the word as a 
sign of any sort of thing ties in with the question of the place of language 
among other systems of signs. As compared to other kinds of signs, words have 
a privileged status in regards to their semiotic modeling capacity. The 
distinctive feature that is characteristic of the linguistic semiotic system is in 
fact a high semiotic capacity. In very simple terms, language is the most 
powerful semiotic system. Its higher semiotic capacity lies in the fact that words 
can be the signs of anything (themselves included). Words can be signs of 
themselves, signs of other signs and signs of things that are not signs. Words are 
quantitatively and qualitatively superior to other types of signs. Not only are 
linguistic signs larger in number in comparison to other signs (visual, auditory, 
olfactory and tactile) used by men, but they are also qualitatively superior be-
cause they can be used to signify anything – other semiotic systems included –  
whereas the contrary cannot be said to be true. As it is apparent, this issue – 
which will become central to many semiotic theories of the XIX century from 
Émile Benveniste to Louis Hjelmslev – ties in with the distinction between 
object language and metalanguage, to which we will turn in a separate section. 
This feature is in fact the basis for the understanding of how language can fulfill 
a metalinguistic function. 
Going now into the specifics of Augustine’s definitions as outlined above, it 
can be stated that his conception of signum is generally triadic, although this is 
not the rule. Indeed, there can be found dyadic as well as tetradic models of the 
sign involved in his works – the former can be found in the De magistro and the 
latter in the De dialectica – which renders his conceptions non-homogeneous. 
We do not, however, intend this to mean that his view is not coherent or 
consistent. 
The triadic character of Augustine’s model of the sign can be gleaned from 
one of the definitions of signum outlined in the De doctrina christiana: “Signs 
are things used to signify something” (… signa, res … quae ad signifi-
candum aliquid adhibentur). There are three relata that are joined together in 
this definition (Markus 1957; Jackson 1969) and form one illustration of sign 
relation in Augustine: 
 
1. Res (thing as sign); 
2. Aliquid (something, what is signified); 
3. Adhibentur (the use of things by an interpreter). 
 
Although Augustine did not identify it by this name, the abovementioned 
definition presupposes an organism or an interpreter that uses (adhibentur) 
things (res) as signs in order to signify something (aliquid). In such a 
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conception, the distinction between the interpretant of the sign and the object of 
the sign (in the Peircean terminology) is blurred. 
Moreover, Augustine’s definitions outlined in Table 1 involve the element of 
intentionality. This characteristic is prominent and consistent. Augustine distin-
guished between signa naturalia and signa data on the basis of the criterion of 
the will – signa naturalia are unintentioned signs whereas signa data are given 
willingly. However, despite the fact that he envisaged in the general theory of 
signs nonintentional conceptions of the sign as well, Augustine’s focus re-
maining upon the analysis of intentional sign situations. 
It is always difficult to interpolate the notions Augustine employed in his 
works with the nomenclatures used for the analysis of sign relations in con-
temporary semiotics. The terminologies used in semiotics cannot be entirely 
superimposed onto the ancient conceptions of the sign in all its variations, 
because they do not always overlap. A similar approach can be seen in the table 
below, which takes the three relata that come together in a sign relation as (1) 
the sign; (2) the interpretant; (3) the object, following the contemporary domi-
nant trend in semiotics: 
 
 




Such an approach is limited because it forces Augustine’s terminology into 
conceptual categories that were foreign to his system. The equivalence between 
the terms is always relative and the heuristic relevance remains meagre. Indeed, 
Augustine’s concepts in fact do not fit easily into this scheme.  
A more fruitful approach in order to map Augustine’s terms related to signs 
is to conceive a schema in which five building blocks hold together: 
 
(1) The thingness of the sign; 
(2) The perceptible aspect of the sign; 
(3) The cognitive aspect of the sign; 
(4) The relational aspect of the sign (the sign as signifying). The relation 
between what is signified and the sign is not fixed and should be 
qualified according to the type of sign; 
(5) The inter-subjective aspect of the sign.  
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Because the sign is always a thing, a sign must have an aspect that is per-
ceptible. In other words, a sign is a material body (1). The second aspect relates 
the perception of signs – that is to say, the sign in its perceivable aspect to the 
sensorium of the interpreter who perceives it. In other words, this dimension has 
to do with the sign and the act of sensation (2). This aspect already factors in a 
sign-receiver. The third element involved is something conceptual or psycho-
logical. In most definitions of the sign, there is very often something to which 
the sign relates to or something that is signified through the sign and is grasped 
with an act of cognition (3). The fourth element concerns the relation between 
what is signified and the sign. This relation is not fixed and ought to be quali-
fied according to the type of sign it is (4). The last factor to take into account is 
the mind of the sign-receiver, which is the other end of the sign process. 
 
 




Section 2. The analysis of the sign from  
the psychological standpoint 
Augustine shows a lively interest in the psychological dimension of the process 
of signification. The De magistro takes a closer look into the use of signs, with 
special attention being given to verbal signs as well as the psychology of 
understanding the sign. On several occasions, Augustine refers to what is going 
on in the mind of the one who perceives a sign, which we can be referred to as 
the sign-receiver. From this standpoint, especially in the De magistro, 
Augustine designs a handful of principles that are worthy of attention: 
 
1. There is a “law of reason itself imparted to our mind”; 
2. The knowledge of things is more valuable than the signs; 
3. The knowledge of things precedes the knowledge of signs. 
 
To start with, for Augustine, there is a law of the mind – “a law of reason” 
according to which, when signs are perceived or, in the case of words, when 
signs are heard, the sign-receiver attends to the things signified by the sign. 
Considering that signs have a material body and a cognitive dimension, this law 
says that the mind of the sign-receiver is projected toward that which is 
signified through an act of cognition. We could say that the communication 
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through words is regulated by this habit of signifying. Augustine is consistent 
with this logic which he reiterates in the De trinitate, “No sign can be said to be 
known perfectly unless it be known of what it is a sign”.1 This highlights to us 
why Augustine did indeed distinguish between the sign, the thing, the cognition 
of the sign, and the cognition of the thing. The latter is essential for under-
standing the sign as a sign. In other words, if this knowledge is absent, there is not 
even recognition of the sign by an interpreter. This is why the knowledge of 
things is of greater value than the knowledge of their signs. For whatever is used 
to signify, whether it is words, gestures, or events, will not have significance for 
one who does not have knowledge of the things signified. In the case of words, 
when one hears them articulated but does not know what is signified, the sounds 
he hears are not signs in his consciousness but merely senseless noise. If he 
knows what is signified, then he does not learn from the sounds he hears. His 
attention is simply directed to what he already knows. This logic implies an 
important general principle, namely, the very institution of any kind of sign 
whatsoever presupposes knowledge of what is to be signified. Interestingly, 
Robert Ayers suggested that Peirce held a similar view of Augustine because “for 
both there must be knowledge of the things signs stand for if there is to be 
knowledge of the meanings of the signs”.2 Therefore, there is a necessary relation 
between the sign and the knowledge of what is signified by the sign. Such a 
relation is essential for any semantic process to actually take place. One funda-
mental point that can be gleaned from an analysis of the sign from the psycho-
logical standpoint is that the knowledge of things is a condition for any theory of 
signs. 
 
Section 3. The interplay between signum and res 
Among the general thematic threads found in Augustine, it is imperative to 
include the division between res and signum, which is the trait d’union between 
the works we have been dealing with. Despite Augustine’s approach to the 
doublet res/signum and the definitions he provides for each of the terms varying 
according to the aim and focus of his works, res and signum constitute the 
building blocks for his general theory. Such a doublet is consistent throughout 
his literary career and it was in fact found in the majority of the works treated in 
the present enquiry. 
The division between res and signum must by no means be taken as 
absolute. The emphasis can be placed either on res taken in themselves – thus as 
things that exist – or on res as signifying something else. For our own conve-
nience, we call the first point of view res qua res, and the second res qua 
                                                                          
1  Trin. 10,1,2. 
2  Ayers (1976: 7–8) refers to the following passage from Peirce to show the similarity 
between Augustine and the American pragmatist: «The Sign can only represent the Object 
and tell about it. It cannot furnish acquaintance with or recognition of that Object; for that is 
what is meant in this volume by the Object of a Sign; namely, that with which it presupposes 
an acquaintance in order to convey some further information concerning it». 
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signum. There is an implicit yet important argument that could be inferred from 
Augustine’s treatment of the res/signum distinction. Augustine’s view of things 
and signs envisages the possibility of shifting from one realm (the existence of 
things) to the other (the signifying of things). The boundary that separates res 
and signum is revealing because such a division is not fixed and immutable, but 
relative and susceptible of shifting from one division to the other. Augustine is 
extremely cognizant that the distinction between res and signum is relative 
rather than absolute, mobile rather than rigid, although he does not explicitly 
say so. Our thesis is that res can alter its own status shifting from the realm of 
things to the realm of signs, depending on whether the emphasis is placed on the 
existence or on the signification of things. 
There are two conclusive remarks that can be drawn from the analysis of the 
res/signum division in Augustine from a semiotic viewpoint. The first conclu-
sion relates both to the ontological and epistemic status of res and signum, 
where ontological means having to do with existence and epistemic means 
having to with knowledge. From an ontological point of view, things and signs 
share a common ground because both partake in the network of things. We saw 
that: signs, to a certain extent, are things, too. Yet our thesis is that there is an 
epistemological gulf between res and signum because the sign derives its nature 
essentially from the relation that holds to another thing for a subject, whereas 
things do not show such a quality. Such an epistemic discrepancy cannot be 
dismissed and must be always kept in mind. More could be added. Such an 
epistemic gulf can be thought of as a continuum, or a gradation, rather than a 
sharp and absolute separation. From the point of view of res, this means that 
anything can potentially function as a sign, thus shifting from the level of mere 
existence to the realm of signifying. Such a view is extremely modern and 
anticipates a pillar of the semiotics of the twentieth century.3 From the perspec-
tive of signs, this epistemic status is pivotal because the essence of signs lies in 
the relation that signs entail with other things through the mechanism of signi-
fying. 
 There is a second point to make. Augustine’s logic of things and signs leads 
to the assessment of the nature of the signum as derivative and secondary in 
respect to res. Signs acquire their nature because they stand for something else. 
Yet signs do not corrupt their status of being things among other things, 
although of a rather peculiar nature. Furthermore, in respect to res, signum is 
derivative. Res is a primitive and intransitive concept, whereas signum is secon-
dary and transitive in respect to res. We can represent the idea of the shifting 
from the level of res to the level of signum with the following scheme. The 
scheme should be read from top to bottom. 
 
 
                                                                          




Figure 19. The res/signum continuum 
 
 
Section 4. Object language and metalanguage 
The distinction Augustine made between res and signum is the basis of a further 
distinction, namely, what in contemporary terminology is referred to as the 
difference between object language and metalanguage. To start with, signum in 
Augustine has a very peculiar status because the sign can be thought of as a sign 
and thing – things qua signs, in fact, do not cease to be things. It is sufficient to 
say that in order to understand Augustine’s approach to signs, these two stances 
must be viewed as complementaries rather than contraries. The doublet signum/ 
res is rather, envisaged in terms of a relative, functional and (as it were) mobile 
relation. Such a division is not an absolute one. 
The idea Augustine put forth is that a sign can rightly be the res of another 
sign. For instance, one can use words not only to talk about things but also to 
dispute about words. Indeed, Augustine pointed out that signs can refer to 
things – thus, there exist signs of things – and yet there are signs whose purpose 
is to signify other signs – signs of signs. The latter case of signifying occurs 
when words are conceived as signs of other words. From this perspective, there 
is the existence of two strata of signification that can be singled out: a word 
(which is a sign) can become the object (res) of another sign. In other words, a 
metalanguage can be envisaged that has a language itself as its own object. 
In this study, we have sought to fathom the features of Augustine’s theory of 
the sign in all its variations. The task was not an easy one because Augustine’s 
writings admit of different interpretations. Our attempt here was simply like 
putting a toe in a vast ocean of information, knowledge and wisdom. We would 
answer to this with Augustine’s own words: “what is sought with difficulty is 
discovered with more pleasure. Those who do not find what they seek directly 
stated labor in hunger; those who do not seek because they have what they wish 
at once frequently become indolent in disdain”.4 
                                                                          
4 Doctr. chr. 6,8 (trans. Robertson, On Christian Doctrine, 54). 
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More than fifteen hundred years ago, Aurelius Augustinus (354–430 AD), also 
known as St. Augustine or Augustine of Hippo, gave birth to a new paradigm of 
thought: the first Christian philosophy. He lived in the midst of quite a unique 
time in history, at the intersection of two cultural epochs, of which he was an 
outstanding synthesizer. It is said, and rightly so, that the boundaries of a 
culture are often the most salient and turbulent points with reference to the 
generation of novel meanings. So was the case for Augustine, who dwelled at 
the fringe of two cultures – classical antiquity and the Middle Ages –that were 
intersecting and commingling one with another, as two streams run into a 
mightier river.  
Augustine’s influence in the theological and philosophical debate remains 
undisputed. Not only was he a prominent figure in the history of theology and 
philosophy, but Augustine was also generally referred to as a forerunner of 
semiotics, the discipline whose business is the study of signs –in all their varie-
ties and their actions. Indeed, Augustine’s definition of signum – “Signum  
est res praeter speciem quam ingerit sensibus, aliud aliquid ex se faciens in 
cogitationem venire” –was and still is a landmark both for ancient sign theories 
as well as for the history of semiotics. 
The present dissertation provides an account of the theories of the sign and 
signification in Augustine of Hippo. Its purpose is to approach Augustine’s 
thought from the point of view of the problem of meaning with a view to its 
evaluation and implications for the domain of semiotics.  
The study uses Augustine’s own accounts to investigate and interpret the 
philosophical problem of the sign, so its methodology is textually-oriented and 
interpretative. The focus lies, for the most part, on the first decade of Augus-
tine’s literary production. The De dialectica, an early treatise written in 387, is 
taken as the terminus ad quo of the study, and the De doctrina christiana, 
Augustine’s masterpiece started after 395 and completed in 420, is the terminus 
ad quem. The reason behind the determination of such a delimitation is because 
those selected texts show an explicit engagement with poignant discussion on 
the nature and structure of the sign, the variety of signs and how signs can be 
used to signify. Although Augustine’s intention never was to establish a theory 
of meaning as an independent field of study, he largely employed a theory of 
signs. Despite the fact that this doctrine served a larger purpose, which was 
theological and exegetical, Augustine’s approach to signs is intrinsically 
meaningful.   
In its entirety, the present study comprises four chapters coupled with an 
introduction and conclusion. Although it does not follow a strict chronological 
design, the structure of the dissertation still takes into account the temporal 
stages of development of Augustine’s thought. Thus, the interest is primarily in 
the exposition of the theories of signs as they were formulated first in the De 
dialectica (387), the De magistro (389), and the De doctrina christiana (396–
223 
420), which are covered by Chapters 1–3. Chapter 4 takes up the issue of false 
signification (falsa significatio) and the doctrine of the lie (mendacium) as 
expounded in the De mendacio (395) and Contra mendacium (420). 
Our enquiry begins with an examination of Augustine’s treatment of signs in 
the De dialectica, an early treatise whose authorship was a disputed issue for 
several years. Nowadays, this treatise is generally considered as a genuine work 
of Augustine. Despite its incompleteness, we argue that the rudiments of 
Augustine’s sign theory can already be traced or discerned in such a work. 
Indeed, here, one can glimpse the first definitions of signum (“sign”), verbum 
(“word”) and res (“thing”) and a clear discussion of words as signs. In this text, 
signum is defined as “something which is itself sensed and which indicates to 
the mind something beyond the sign itself”, and verbum as “a sign of any sort of 
things”. The De dialectica is a technical treatise with a pronounced Stoic 
influence. It presents revealing insights in reference with semantics and prag-
matics. After a brief introduction of the genesis of the treatise, an analysis of the 
structure of the work is presented, coupled with a discussion of all the relevant 
sections. A special emphasis is given to Chapter 5 of the book (“On signi-
fication”). Upon analyses of the most significant passages of this section, the 
semiotic terminology Augustine employed is catalogued and discussed, the 
structure of the sign explained, and the meaning of his fourfold semiotic 
distinctionsignum, dictio, dicile and res)expounded. Outlined in the first 
chapter are five main features of Augustine’s work in regard to his theory of 
signs: (1) the relational nature of the sign; (2) the twofold nature of the sign; (3) 
the social nature of the sign; (4) the intentional nature of the sign; (5) the 
intersubjective nature of the sign. The conclusion is drawn that Augustine’s 
approach to meaning, with reference to this early treatise, is tetradic: it places 
emphasis on the semantic and pragmatic aspect of communication, and under-
scores the fundamental distinction between object-language and meta-language. 
Many of the themes treated in the De dialectica are taken up, amplified, and 
deepened in the De magistro, which is the subject of Chapter 2. Although the 
De magistro is the lengthiest account on signs Augustine ever wrote, its signifi-
cance has been often downplayed for the theological outlook of the work as 
well as because on the surface the work is non-linear and largely inaccessible. 
The De magistro is a dialogue between Augustine and his sixteen-years-old son, 
Adeodatus. Father and son are not only the formal interlocutors of the dialogue, 
but they also symbolize the roles of the teacher and the learner. One of the 
central themes of the dialogue is teaching, intended in a broad sense as making 
known or communicating knowledge, and the problem of the conditions of the 
acquisition and communicability of knowledge. The dialogue raises thought-
provoking questions to which Augustine never replies directly, and it induces 
both Adeodatus and the reader not to expect immediate answers but, rather, to 
formulate arguments meditated on at length: can a man teach another? What is 
the place of signs and the signifying process in respect to teaching, learning, and 
communication in general? Do signs contribute to the acquisition of knowledge 
or, instead, can the sign-mediation be altogether bypassed? The dialogue 
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revolves around two main theses diametrically contraposed: (1) nothing is 
taught if not by means of signs; (2) nothing is taught by means of signs. 
Augustine’s discourse is cumulative and continues with sudden changes in 
directions, which lead him to dismiss the initial argument. Indeed, often, 
throughout the dialogue, a thesis previously substantiated is diametrically 
reversed, so that what seemed consolidated is questioned anew, in a sort of 
reductio ab absurdum. Because the structure of the dialogue is circular and its 
form dialogical, the work has given rise to many interpretations often 
contrasting one to the other. For this reason, Chapter 2, before the analysis of 
the text, first discusses the contemporary debate on the structure of the De 
magistro and shows its significance and implications in regard to the inter-
pretation of the dialogue as a whole. It is argued that the backbone of the 
structure of the work is a threefold distinction Augustine sets forth twice 
throughout the text: (1) signs shown by means of signs, (2) things shown by 
doing things themselves, and (3) things shown by means of signs. Such a 
threefold distinction should be reckoned as a substantial part of the dialogue and 
can be thought of as an engine, as it were, around which the dialogue revolves. 
Not only is Augustine’s De magistro a dialogue about signs, language, and 
the acquisition of knowledge, but it also articulates a ruthless critique both to 
words as signs as well as to language as a system of signification. Ultimately, 
the commonsensical idea that signs (and words in particular) have the capacity 
of bringing forth someone’s ideas to another subject or that signs are able to 
teach something to someone is radically challenged, and ultimately, the office 
of signs is reappraised, limiting the power of words to a set of very specific and 
narrow functions. What is intrinsically important is that in the De magistro, 
Augustine illustrates the relations of signs to themselves, to other signs, and to 
things that are not signs. In other words, the analysis takes into account intra-
systemic, inter-systemic, and extra-systemic sign relations. Further important 
clues for reflections are the theory of showing, or “ostension”, and the functions 
of speech, to which is devoted particular attention. By placing emphasis on the 
language analysis set forth for the most part of the work, it is argued that the De 
magistro has intrinsic significance for the study of meaning and the symbolism 
of language.  
In Chapter 3, Augustine’s theory of signs in the De doctrina christiana is 
presented. The treatise is explored in reference to the theory of signs and 
contemporary semiotics. Specific attention is given not only to the second Book 
of the treatise, which is devoted to the doctrina signorum (“doctrine of signs”), 
but also to Book I where Augustine discusses the doctrina rerum (“doctrine of 
things”). Throughout the chapter it is maintained that the concepts of res 
(“things”) and signa (“signs”) are interconnected and, for this reason, the two 
themes should be treated in tandem. After an introduction in which is discussed 
the debate around the De doctrina christiana, the special province of the en-
quiry is qualified. Chapter 3 deals with with one corner of the issue –namely, to 
study, sub specie semiotica, Augustine’s De doctrina christiana. More speci-
fically, the chapter examines four main questions: (1) to discuss Augustine’s 
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definition of signum against the background of the concept of res; 2) to explore 
the debate around the long-lasting division between signa naturalia and signa 
data; 3) to examine the place of intentionality in Augustine’s theory of signs; 4) 
to explore the various divisions of signs.  
In Chapter 4, the issue of communication mala fide is taken up, analysed, 
and discussed with reference to Augustine’s works. The chapter approaches the 
subject of false signs and how signs can be used for the purposes of misleading, 
by engaging with two works of Augustine that devoted a whole systematic 
analysis of the problem of the lie: the De mendacio (395) and the Contra 
mendacium (420). First, the nature of the lie is explored, and the definitions 
formulated by Augustine are outlined and analysed. Then, two features of the lie 
are singled out –the false signification and the intention to deceive. The pivotal 
question of whether in Augustine the intention to deceive is thought of as an 
essential criterion for the definition of what is a lie is debated and critically 
appraised. It is contended that, despite Augustine’s definition of the lie as a 
false signification uttered for the purpose of deceiving is generally accepted as 
the true Augustinian definition, this formulation is not as clear-cut as one may 
think it to be. Upon closer scrutiny, it is argued that there are two interpretations 
of Augustine’s stance (the mainstream interpretation and a second less known 
yet credible reading of his thought). It is argued that the second interpretation 
has better credentials to be closer to Augustine’s conception about the nature of 
the lie. Moreover, Augustine’s eightfold gradations of lies is spelled out and 
discussed. The remainder of the chapter goes beyond Augustine. Augustine’s 
definition of the lie is paralleled to its congeners (mistakes, jokes, fakes, simu-
lation) and branched out towards a novel synthesis. Ultimately, the chapter 
argues that a semiotics of the lie is of utmost importance. 
The conclusive remarks attend to an assessment of the significance of 
Augustine’s thought within the broader disciplinary field of semiotics. The 
material analysed is brought into focus, and the relations are pointed out in 
order to provide a synthesis of the Augustinian approach to the subject of signs. 
In comparison to previous studies on Augustine’s theory of the sign conducted 
within semiotics (which generally placed emphasis on the theory of signs in the 
De doctrina christiana), the present enquiry presents a novel contribution in 
respect to the following points: (1) the present study is wider in scope inasmuch 
as it does take into account numerous additional Augustinian sources, such as 
the De dialectica and the De magistro, and unravels the complex semiotic 
theories found in these works; (2) it expands the subject of signs by including 
an analysis of the communication mala fide (which includes lying, misdirecting 
and other forms of deception); (3) it places the Augustinian theory of the sign 
always in context; (4) it emphasises the interconnectedness of the concepts of 
res (things) and signa (signs), which are treated in reference to one another; (5) 
it challenges and reappraises the classical Augustinian definition of the lie and 
argues that the heart of Augustine’s definition is the notion of falsa significatio, 
namely, the mismatch between what one holds within his/her “heart” and 
expresses outwardly by means of signs; (6) it provides an original outlook of 
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types of falsehoods. Moreover, the study sketches the general features of 
Augustine’s theory of signs in twenty main points and discusses the general 
import of Augustine semiotics by placing emphasis on four main issues: (a) the 
conceptions of signum and verbum; (b) the analysis of signs from the 
psychological standpoint; (c) the interplay between res and signa; and (d) the 






































SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN 
Augustinus ja märkide ning signifikatsiooni  
uurimine 
Rohkem kui tuhat viissada aastat tagasi pani Aurelius Augustinus (354–430 
AD), keda tuntakse ka kui Püha Augustinust ja Augustinust Hippost, aluse 
uuele mõtteparadigmale: esimesele kristlikule filosoofiale. Ta elas ja tegutses 
ainulaadsel ajastul, mis oli lõikumispunktiks kahele erinevale kultuuriperioodi-
le, mida Augustinus oskas suurepärasel moel omavahel siduda ja sünteesida. On 
õigusega väidetud, et sageli on just kultuuride piirialad uudsete tähenduste loo-
mise tulipunktideks. Nii oli see ka Augustinuse puhul, kes elas klassikalise 
antiikkultuuri ja keskaegse kultuuri piirimail – mis ristusid ja segunesid oma-
vahel nagu kaks suuremasse jõkke suubuvat oja. 
Augustinust, kelle mõju teoloogia ja filosoofia ajaloos on vaieldamatu, pee-
takse reeglina lisaks ka semiootika – teadusharu, mille huviobjektiks on kõik-
võimalikud märgid ja nende toimimine – eelkäijaks. Ja tõepoolest on Augusti-
nuse määratlus mõiste signum kohta – “Signum est res praeter speciem quam 
ingerit sensibus, aliud aliquid ex se faciens in cogitationem venire” –  teedraja-
va tähtsusega nii antiikajastu märgiteooriate kui ka semiootika ajaloo seisu-
kohast vaadatuna.  
Käesolev doktoritöö annab ülevaate Augustinuse mõttepärandis esinevatest 
märgi- ja tähendusteooriatest. Uurimuse eesmärgiks on vaadelda Augustinuse 
arusaamasid tähenduse probleemi seisukohast, anda neile hinnang ning kajas-
tada nende mõju semiootikale. 
Uurimistöö tugineb märkide problemaatika avamisel ja tõlgendamisel 
Augustinuse enda vastavasisulistele kirjeldustele ning on seega meetodilt teksti-
keskne ja tõlgendav. Tähelepanu fookuses on valdavalt Augustinuse loome-
tegevuse esimesel aastakümnel valminud teosed. Uurimuse ajaliseks algpunk-
tiks on Augustinuse “De dialectica”, mis valmis aastal 387 ning lõpp-punktiks 
on tema peateos, aastatel 396–420 valminud “De doctrina christiana”. Tekstide 
valikul on lähtutud asjaolust, et just nimetatud teostes on võimalik leida kõige 
selgekujulisemaid arutelusid märgi, märgistruktuuri, märgitüüpide ning märkide 
kasutamise kohta tähistamisprotsessis. Augustinuse sihiks ei olnud rajada tä-
hendusteooriat iseseisva uurimisvaldkonnana, kuid see ei takistanud teda oma 
teostes sageli märgiteooriat kasutamast. Kuigi tema õpetus märkidest teenis 
laiemat, teoloogilist ja eksegeetilist otstarvet, on see ometi olemuslikult tähen-
duslik ka iseeneses. 
Doktoritöö koosneb neljast peatükist, millele eelneb sissejuhatus ja järgneb 
kokkuvõte. Ehkki uurimuse ülesehitus ei ole rangelt kronoloogiline, on selle 
koostamisel siiski arvestatud Augustinuse seisukohtade kujunemise ja muutu-
misega ajas. Uurimuse peamiseks sihiks on tuua lugeja ette Augustinuse märgi-
teooriad sellistena, nagu need esinevad tema teostes “De dialectica” (387),“De 
magistro” (389) ja “De doctrina christiana” (396–420), mis moodustavad ühtlasi 
doktoritöö kolme esimese peatüki sisu. Neljandas peatükis käsitletakse vale 
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signifikatsiooni (falsa significatio) teemat ja õpetust valest (mendacium), mis 
leiavad kajastamist Augustinuse kirjutistes “De mendacio” (395) ja “Contra 
mendacium” (420). 
Esimene peatükk keskendub Augustinuse arusaamale märkidest nii, nagu see 
on esitatud tema varases teoses “De dialectica”, mille autorsuse üle on pikka 
aega vaieldud, kuid mida peetakse tänapäeval üldjuhul siiski Augustinuse algu-
päraseks kirjutiseks. Kuigi tegu pole tervikliku teosega, väidan, et selles võib 
ometi näha või aimata Augustinuse märgiteooriale iseloomulikke jooni. Siit 
leiab tema esimesed määratlused mõistetele signum (“märk”), verbum (“sõna”) 
ja res (“asi”) ning ühtlasi ka selgesõnalise arutelu sõnade kui märkide kohta. 
Signum on siin defineeritud kui “midagi, mis on ise tajutav ja mis osutab mõis-
tuse jaoks millelegi, mis asub väljapool märki ennast” ning verbum kui “märk 
igat sorti asjade kohta”. Tugevate stoitsistlike mõjutustega ja tehnilist laadi “De 
dialectica” sisaldab kõnekaid seisukohti semantika ja pragmaatika kohta. Dok-
toritöö annab esmalt ülevaate selle teose tekkeloost, liikudes seejärel selle üles-
ehituse ja olulisemate osade analüüsi juurde. Erilist tähelepanu on sealjuures 
pööratud selle 5. peatükile (“Tähendusest”) ja omakorda selle kõige kaaluka-
mate lõikude analüüsile, mille tulemuseks on Augustinuse kasutatud semiooti-
lise terminoloogia kataloog ja selle kohta käiv arutelu nagu ka seletus sellele, 
mida tähendab Augustinuse jaoks märgi struktuur ja kuidas mõista tema nelja-
tist semiootilist jaotust: signum, dictio, dicile ja res. Lisaks piiritletakse siin ka 
Augustinuse kirjatöödes esinevale märgiteooriale omased viis tunnusjoont, 
milleks on: (1) märgi relatsiooniline iseloom; (2) märgi kahetine iseloom; (3) 
märgi sotsiaalne iseloom; (4) märgi intentsionaalne iseloom; (5) märgi inter-
subjektiivne iseloom. Kõige selle põhjal järeldub, et Augustinuse varase kirja-
töö valguses võib tema arusaama tähendusest pidada neljatiseks, ning et see 
rõhutab suhtlemise semantilist ja pragmaatilist aspekti ja toonitab põhimõttelist 
erinevust objekt-keele ja metakeele vahel. 
Paljud “De dialecticas” käsitletud teemad leiavad kajastamist, täiendamist ja 
edasiarendamist Augustinuse teoses “De magistro”, mida vaatleb lähemalt 
käesoleva uurimuse teine peatükk. Vaatamata tõsiasjale, et nimetatud teos on 
mahukaim Augustinuse kirjutatud käsitlus märkide kohta, on selle tähtsust teose 
teoloogilise hoiaku, mitte-lineaarsuse ja raskesti ligipääsetavuse tõttu sageli 
alahinnatud. “De magistro” kujutab endast vormilt dialoogi Augustinuse ja tema 
kuueteistkümneaastase poja Adeodatuse vahel. Isa ja poeg ei ole siin mitte liht-
salt vestluspartnerid, vaid nad kehastavad lisaks ka õpetaja ja õpilase rolli. Dia-
loogi üheks keskseks teemaks on õpetamine laias tähenduses kui teadmise va-
hendamine või teada andmine, ning teadmiste omandamise ja vahendatavuse 
tingimuste problemaatika. Dialoog on üles ehitatud Adeodatuse mõtlema ärgi-
tavatele küsimustele, millele Augustinus ei vasta kunagi otse, ärgitades nõnda 
nii poega kui ka lugejat mitte otsima koheseid vastuseid, vaid sõnastama põhja-
likult kaalutletud argumente: kas üks inimene saab üldse teist õpetada? Milline 
roll on õpetamise, õppimise ja suhtlemise juures üldiselt märkidel ja signifitsee-
rimise protsessil? Kas märgid aitavad teadmise omandamisele kaasa või on 
võimalik märke kui teadmise vahendajaid hoopis vältida? Dialoog keerleb kahe 
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peamise teesi ümber, mis on teineteisele risti vastukäivad: (1) Märkide abita ei 
saa midagi õpetada; (2) Märkide abil ei saa midagi õpetada. Augustinuse 
arutluskäik on kumulatiivne ja kulgeb kiirete suunamuutustega, mis panevad ta 
mõnd oma varasemat argumenti hiljem kõrvale heitma. Kogu dialoogi vältel 
tuleb üsna sageli ette, et mõni eelpool tõendatud argument lükatakse hiljem täie-
likult ümber nii, et see, mis näis juba paika panduna tuleb uuesti üle küsida – 
nõnda, et tulemuseks on teatud mõttes reductio ab absurdum. Kuna dialoogi 
struktuur on tsirkulaarne ja selle vorm dialoogiline, on see andnud alust luge-
matule hulgale erinevatele ja sageli vastakatele tõlgendustele. Seetõttu annab ka 
käesoleva doktoritöö teine peatükk enne “De magistro” analüüsi juurde asumist 
ülevaate nüüdisaegsest diskussioonist teose struktuuri üle ning toob välja selle 
tähenduse ja mõju dialoogi kui sellise mõistmisele tervikuna. Uurimuse autor 
leiab, et kõnealuse kirjutise struktuuri selgroo moodustab kolmetine jaotus, 
mida Augustinus tekstis kahel korral kirjeldab: (1) märgid, mida näidatakse 
märkide abil, (2) asjad, mida näidatakse asjade tegemise läbi, ja (3) asjad, mida 
näidatakse märkide abil.  
“De magistro” ei ole mitte üksnes dialoog märkide, keele ja teadmiste oman-
damise kohta, vaid see on ühtlasi ka armutu kriitika sõnade kui märkide ja keele 
kui signifikatsiooni süsteemi kohta. Veelgi enam, Augustinus seab siin küsi-
märgi alla kogu üldtunnustatud idee sellest, et märkidel (ja eriti sõnadel) on 
võime vahendada ühe subjekti mõtteid teisele või et märgid suudavad kellelegi 
midagi õpetada – selle kriitika tulemusena toimub märgi ülesande ümber-
hindamine ja sõna mõju piiramine nii, et sellele omistatakse vaid väga spetsii-
filised ja kitsad funktsioonid. Siinkohal on äärmiselt oluline silmas pidada, et 
Augustinus näitlikustab „De magistros“ nii märkide suhet isendasse, teistesse 
märkidesse kui ka asjadesse, mis ei ole märgid. Tänapäevase semiootika termi-
noloogiat kasutades võiks öelda, et ta võttis arvesse süsteemisiseseid ja -väliseid 
märgisuhteid. Olulisi vihjeid Augustinuse arusaamade mõistmiseks pakuvad 
lisaks tema osutuse või „ostensiooni“ teooria ja kõne funktsiooni kirjeldused, 
millele on ka uurimistöö kõnealuses peatükis erilist tähelepanu pööratud. Kogu 
raamatus pea läbivalt esineva keeleanalüüsi alusel võib väita, et “De magistrol” 
on tähenduse ja keele sümbolismi uurimisel oluline väärtus.  
Kolmas peatükk keskendub Augustinuse neljaköitelises teoses “De doctrina 
christiana” kajastuvale märgiteooriale, mida vaadeldakse nüüdisaegse semioo-
tika ja märgiteooria valguses. Erilist tähelepanu on seejuures pööratud nii selle 
II raamatule, mis on pühendatud õpetusele märkidest (doctrina signorum) kui 
ka I raamatule, milles Augustinus käsitleb õpetust asjadest (doctrina rerum). 
Peatüki kui terviku lähte-eelduseks on, et Augustinuse arusaam “asjadest” (res) 
ja “märkidest” (signa) on omavahel seotud, mistõttu neid vaadeldakse koos. 
Pärast sissejuhatavat ülevaadet “De doctrina christiana” kohta käivast diskus-
sioonist võetakse kõnealuses peatükis vaatluse alla nimetatud teost puudutav 
kitsam teemavaldkond. Siin seatakse eesmärgiks uurida “De doctrina christia-
nat” sub specie semiotica ehk täpsemalt öelduna: (1) käsitleda Augustinuse aru-
saama mõistest signum tema arusaama valguses res kohta; 2) uurida lähemalt 
signa naturalia ja signa data vahelise pikaajalise eristuse kohta käivat diskus-
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siooni; 3) uurida intentsionaalsuse rolli Augustinuse märgiteoorias; 4) uurida 
märkide erinevaid jaotusi.  
Neljanda peatüki keskmes seisab pahatahtlik suhtlemine mala fidei, mida 
kirjeldatakse ja analüüsitakse Augustinuse teoste taustal. Vaatluse alla tuleb 
valede märkide teema ja see, kuidas märke võib kasutada eksitamise eesmärgil. 
Seejuures toetutakse Augustinuse teostele “De mendacio” (395) ja “Contra 
mendacium” (420), milles on vale probleemile pühendatud terve süstemaatiline 
analüüs. Esmalt uuritakse lähemalt vale olemust ja kirjeldatakse ning analüü-
sitakse Augustinuse antud definitsioone sellele. Seejärel keskendutakse vale 
kahele spetsiifilisele omadusele – valele signifikatsioonile ja kavatsusele petta. 
Arutelu käigus püütakse anda kriitiline hinnang keskse tähtsusega küsimusele, 
kas Augustinuse puhul tuleks kavatsust petta pidada vale definitsiooni olemus-
likuks kriteeriumiks. Analüüsi käigus jõutakse tõdemuseni, et vaatamata sellele, 
et Augustinuse määratlust – mille kohaselt vale on ebaõige signifikatsioon, 
mida on esitatud petmise eesmärgil –, peetakse üldiselt Augustinuse autentseks 
definitsiooniks, ei ole see sõnastus sugugi nii selgepiiriline, nagu võiks arvata. 
Lähemal vaatlusel selgub, et Augustinuse seisukohta on võimalik tõlgendada 
kahel eri moel, millest üks on levinud arusaam ja teine vähem tuntud ent ometi 
sama usutav seletus. Käesolev uurimus annab alust väita, et neist kahest tõlgen-
dusest teine seisab Augustinuse arusaamale valest lähemal. Lisaks käsitletakse 
kõnealuses peatükis Augustinuse kaheksaastmelist jaotust valedest kõnelemisel. 
Sealt edasi minnakse Augustinusest kaugemale, kõrvutades tema vale definit-
siooni vale analoogide (vead, naljad, teesklus, simuleerimine) kohta käivate 
määratlustega, jõudes sel moel uudse sünteesini. Kõnealune peatükk tõstab 
selgelt esile vale kohta käiva semiootika ülimat olulisust.  
Doktoritöö kokkuvõtvas osas antakse läbiviidud analüüsi ja uurimuse najal 
hinnang Augustinuse ideede olulisusele semiootika distsipliini jaoks laiemalt, 
tuues sealjuures selgelt esile nende ideede vahelised seosed, mille alusel on 
võimalik sünteesida Augustinuse arusaama märkidest. Käesolev uurimistöö 
erineb varasematest Augustinuse märgiteooria kohta käivatest semiootilistest 
uurimustest (mis keskenduvad eelkõige teoses “De doctrina christiana” kajastu-
vale märgiteooriale) ja esitab uudse lähenemise selle läbi, et: (1) on laiahaar-
delisem, tuginedes lisaks nimetatud teosele  ka suurele hulgale teistele Augus-
tinuse teostele, näiteks “De dialectica” ja “De magistro”, ning avades neisse 
kätketud keerulisi semiootilisi teooriaid; (2)  avardab märkide teemat, kaasates 
uurimusse analüüsi mala fide kommunikatsiooni kohta (mis hõlmab valetamist, 
eksitamist ja teisi petmise vorme); (3) asetab Augustinuse märgiteooria läbivalt 
konteksti; (4)  rõhutab seost asjade (res) ja märkide (signa) käsituse vahel, mida 
kasutatakse teineteise taustal; (5)  esitab väljakutse klassikalisele arusaamale 
Augustinuse definitsioonist vale kohta ja hindab selle ümber, väites, et  Augus-
tinuse määratluse tuumaks on arusaam falsa significatio’st ehk ebakõla selle 
vahel, mida inimene oma “südames” tunneb ja mida ta märkide abil väliselt 
väljendab; (6) pakub algupärase  lähenemise valede jaotusele. Uurimuse tule-
musena joonistuvad välja Augustinuse märgiteooria kakskümmend peamist 
tunnusjoont ning selgub Augustinuse semiootika olulisus neljas peamises 
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aspektis, milleks on: (a) arusaam signum’ist ja verbum’ist; (b) märkide analüüs 
psühholoogilisest vaatepunktist; (c) res ja signa vastastikune mõju; ja (d) 
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